Vu Hong Nhung v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

Case No.HCAL 2443/2024[2026] HKCFI 5323
Court
High Court CFI
Date22 Sep 2026
Judge—
Case Document
100%

HCAL 2443/2024

[2026] HKCFI 5323

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 2443 of 2024

BETWEEN

  Vu Hong Nhung Applicant
  and  
  Torture Claims Appeal Board / Putative
  Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office Respondent
  and  
  Director of Immigration Putative
    Intersted Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following;

    consideration of the documents only;            or
   consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Andrew Li:

1.  The Applicant’s Form 86 be amended to name only the Torture Claims Appeal Board as the putative respondent and the Director of Immigration as the putative interested party; and

2.  The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

INTRODUCTION

1.By a Form 86 filed on 12 December 2024 (“the Form 86”), the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision by the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 14 November 2024 (“the Board’s Decision”), which affirmed a decision by the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 15 March 2024 in refusing the applicant’s non‑refoulement protection claim. She named the Board and the Director as the proposed respondents but neither of them was listed as interested parties.

2.I amended the Form 86 on my own motion to name only the Board as the putative respondent and the Director as the putative interested party.

3.The applicant requested for a hearing and she attended the same.

BACKGROUND

4.The applicant is a national of Vietnam. She seeks non-refoulement protection on the basis that if she is refouled, she would be harmed by her creditors. Her personal background, the relevant facts and relevant procedural history have been sufficiently set out in the Board’s Decision, which can be accessed through a hyperlink[1]. I shall not repeat the same herein.

DISCUSSION

5.In a judicial review, this court does not provide a further avenue of appeal. Though in non-refoulement case an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the Board is required given the seriousness of the issue at hand, this court should not usurp the role of the Board, which together with the Director are the primary decision-makers. This court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board (Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, [14(1)]). There must be a reasonably arguable claim with a realistic prospect of success before leave for judicial review will be granted (Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung & Anor (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676).

6.In the Form 86 and his affirmation filed in support of the application, the applicant has specified the following grounds: -

(1)  The decisions of the Director and the Board were not reasonable or fair in the Wednesbury sense [1];

(2)  The Director has “failed to appreciate or give the proper importance or weightage to the presence of state Acquiescence” in her decision [2];

(3)  The Board acted “unreasonable and was procedurally unfair by placing too much reliance on the Country of Origin Information (“COI”)” but failed to take into account of the applicant’s personal background and experience. The Director “had listed relevant COIs which support the aversions that the police in [the applicant’s] country would not be able to protect. The Director failed to consider or give enough weightage to that evidence and ruled otherwise. [3];

(4)  The Board “was procedurally improper and/or unfair” when assessing whether to accept or not to accept explanations provided by the applicant and unreasonably required the applicant to respond to questions that she was not in a position to offer any response [4];

(5)  The Director has failed to take into account of the arguments raised by the applicant or has failed to give enough weight to such argument before reaching her decision [5]; and

(6)  The Board has made a ruling to dismiss the applicant’s appeal/petition based on findings which the adjudicator ought to allow the appeal/petition, “thus the Decisions (sic) was irrational” [6].

7.At the hearing, the applicant did not ask the court to take into any other additional grounds other than those stated in her application. She wished to be allowed to stay in Hong Kong as she still could not repay her debts.

8.Insofar as the above purported grounds of review were made against the Director (including Ground [1], [2], [3] and [5] above), it has been held that the Director’s decision is not susceptible to judicial review once an appeal to the Board had been pursued: See Re Raschpal Singh [2020] HKCA 978, per Lam VP (as he then was) at §§40-41. Thus, there is no need for me to consider them. I only need to consider the Board’s Decision.

9.Looking at the Board’s Decision, the Board bore in mind the correct legal principles in respect of each of the four applicable grounds under the USM [6-19].

10.It took into consideration the applicant’s case and evidence, including the evidence she gave at the hearing [20-44].

11.After thoroughly analysing and assessing the above [45-50], the Board came to the findings and conclusions that none of the grounds was made out [65-84].

12.Having looked at the Board’s Decision carefully, I do not find there was anything unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense.

13.As the allegation of failing to appreciate or failed to give sufficient or proper weight to the presence of the state’s “acquiescence” was made against the Director only, it cannot be made a subject of judicial review as the Director’s decision is not susceptible to judicial review as explained above. Even if it is allegation made against the Board, it will not stand.

14.Further, I do not find the Board has placed too much reliance on the COI and failed to take into account of the applicant’s personal background and experience. To the contrary, I find the Board has taken into account fully of the applicant’s personal background and experience and has meticulously set out and analysed the evidence produced by the applicant, including the oral evidence she gave at the hearing.

15.Lastly, I do not find the Board has adopted any improper or unfair procedures when assessing the explanations provided by the applicant. Nor did it in my view unreasonably requested the applicant to respond to any questions that she was not in a position to offer any response to.

16.Despite rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I could not find any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. In my view, the applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision based on public law grounds is not reasonably arguable and has no realistic chance of success.

CONCLUSION

17.For the above reasons, I am not satisfied that this court should intervene by way of judicial review. I therefore dismiss the application.

Dated the 22nd day of September 2026

  (Cheung Ho Yat, Annson)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notes for the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:

       
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
  Sent to the Applicant on 22/9/2026

Vu Hong Nhung

Applicant’s ref. no.:
Nil.
  Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 22/9/2026

Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 23337

Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 338/24 (formerly RBCZ 5000330/24)

Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2)



Form CALL-1

Summaries and metadata are generated from the judgment. Report an error

Related Cases
Ranked by citation overlap · cases that cite each other appear first

Arslan Sharif v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

HCAL 590/2023 · High Court CFI
05 Oct 2026
3 shared citations

Susilowati v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

HCAL 2297/2023 · High Court CFI
24 Sep 2026
3 shared citations

Asghar Bilal Ali v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

HCAL 544/2023 · High Court CFI
22 Sep 2026
3 shared citations

Adisak Kearsing Alias Krueasing Adisak v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

HCAL 612/2023 · High Court CFI
18 Sep 2026
3 shared citations