Case Document

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HCAL 646/2024

[2026] HKCFI 5563

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 646 OF 2024

BETWEEN

	Alam Md Monsur	Applicant
	and
	Torture Claims Appeal Board	Putative
		Respondent
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative
		Interested Party

Application for leave to apply for judicial review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)

Following:

consideration of the documents only; or

consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:

1. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the applicant:

The Leave Application

1.By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 24 April 2024, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 12 April 2024 (“the Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-

https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2024/HCAL000646_2024_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf

2.The Board found that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to non-refoulement protection on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board refused his appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 25 October 2023 and confirmed the same, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

The applicant’s case

3.It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.

4.In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Bangladesh, he would be killed by members of the Awami League (“AL”) for political reasons as they wanted him to leave Jamaat-e-Islami (“Jamaat”). The applicant claimed to be a secretary of the Jamaat at union level in their union called Pachgachia.

Oral hearings

5.The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application. However, the applicant was absent at the hearing on 3 September 2026.

6.Upon enquiring with the Director, this court found that the applicant had moved to another address. This court therefore arranged another hearing on its own motion to hear the applicant.

7.At the rescheduled hearing on 24 September 2026, the applicant was present.

8.When this court asked the applicant to elaborate on the grounds of his intended judicial review that were contained in his supporting affirmation dated 24 April 2024, the applicant confirmed that he would rely on the grounds and said that he had political problem in his country, his life would be in danger, he was tortured and his family could not live in the family house but far away.

Grounds for judicial review

9.The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).

10.The applicant did not advance any grounds for the intended judicial review in Form 86.

11.In his supporting affirmation dated 24 April 2024, under the heading “GROUNDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW”, the applicant advanced 6 grounds for judicial review. The grounds are summarised as follows:-

(1)  The adjudicator did not consider his claim;

(2)  The adjudicator did not accept his documents as the documents were in his mother language;

(3)  The officer refused to give him time to translate the documents because he had no time;

(4)  The translator did not help him at all and became angry if the applicant did not understand;

(5)  The interpreter asked him not to take long time for interview as he had another job; and

(6)  He asked the court to help him and save his life.

12.As aforesaid, the applicant confirmed at the oral hearing that he would rely on the above-mentioned grounds. He added that he had political problem in his country, his life would be in danger, he was tortured and his family could not live in the family house but far away.

Discussion

13.First of all, the applicant’s danger in his country had been duly assessed but rejected by the Board. If he intends to challenge the Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for judicial review.

14.All the matters that were stated as “GROUNDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW” in his supporting affirmation (except ground (6) which is not a ground at all) were asserted without any specificity. Many applicants in similar applications used them like a template without any regard to their own cases. The applicant is no exception.

15.He did not state: (1) how the adjudicator did not consider his claim (apart from saying the adjudicator did not take time or did not think about his life); (2) which part(s) of his claim was not considered; (3) what documents he intended to submit were rejected as they were not translated; (4) how the interpreter or translator’s attitude had prejudiced him; and (5) what he wanted to tell the Board was not presented because of the attitude of the interpreter or translator.

16.The Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general assertions without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA 578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further, as held by the Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244, “general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to the facts of his case”.

17.Thus, the general assertions that were contained in the applicant’s affirmation cannot help him at all.

18.In fact, with regards to the two documents submitted by the applicant during the adjournment of the Board’s hearings, the Board had specifically mentioned them in paragraphs 13 to 14 of the Board’s Decision. Contrary to the applicant’s assertion that the documents he intended to submit were rejected as they were not translated, the Board in fact questioned the applicant as to why the Discharge Certificate allegedly issued by the New Upasham General Hospital Ltd was written in English (see paragraph 14(c) of the Board’s Decision).

19.Moreover, the said document was rejected not because it was not translated. The Board had given its reasons in paragraph 19(b) of the Board’s Decision for the finding that the said document could not be used to support his claim that he was assaulted on 25 December 2020.

20.Thus, it is simply groundless for the applicant to allege that the Board did not accept his documents as the documents were in his mother language and there was no time to do the translation.

21.The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

22.Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the intended judicial review.

23.In assessing the applicant’s appeal/petition, the Board held two oral hearings on 31 January 2024 and 18 March 2024 respectively and the applicant was present. Thus, the applicant was given the opportunity to present his case to the Board in person.

24.As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had given a detailed analysis of the applicant’s claims and its reasoning in rejecting the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection. The Board had laid out its analysis of the applicant’s claim and its assessment of the credibility of the applicant’s claim in details in paragraphs 15 to 20 of the Board’s Decision.

25.In gist, the Board found parts of the applicant’s account in support of his claim hard to believe. Some of his evidence was vague, shifting, exaggerated, inherently inconsistent and/or defy logic.

26.As aforesaid, the Board found that the Discharge Certificate allegedly issued by the New Upasham General Hospital Ltd could not be used to support his claim that he was assaulted on 25 December 2020. As to the Certificate the applicant claimed to be issued by Jamaat, the Board noted that the said document stated that the applicant was secretary of the Panchgachia Union of Jamaat from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2018. The Board found the fact that the applicant was attacked years after he was in office meant that the document could not be used to prove that the attack he encountered related to his role in Jamaat. Thus, the Board found the applicant’s claim that he was attacked by six AL people on 25 December 2020 because they wanted him to leave Jamaat was not proved. The applicant’s claim that he then spent a week in hospital was also not proved.

27.Further, the Board found that the applicant had failed to prove the incidents in June 2023 and August 2023 took place. The Board also considered the applicant’s claim that he continued to receive threats from the AL people after he had fled Bangladesh to be at best hearsay and not supported by any documentary evidence.

28.With regards to its analysis of the applicant’s case on all the applicable grounds under the USM, the Board found that the extent of the applicant’s injuries as a result of the alleged assault in 2020 was not as severe as he had described. After due consideration of the available country of origin information (“COI”), the Board considered that the applicant would receive adequate state protection and that would further reduce or even negate the risk of him being killed or subjected to ill-treatment by the AL members.

29.The Board had also given its reasons in paragraph 30(j) of the Board’s Decision for the finding that it would not be unduly harsh for the applicant to relocate to Dhaka on his return to Bangladesh, if he feared to stay in his home village.

30.Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant had not substantiated a case for non-refoulement protection on any of the applicable grounds under the USM.

31.The assessment of evidence, COI and risk of harm was primarily within the realm of the Board in dealing with the applicant’s appeal/petition. The Board was entitled to come to its own conclusion. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board reached its conclusion.

32.Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof. The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its decision.

33.As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave must be refused.

Conclusion

34.For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.

Dated the 30^th day of September 2026

( Gladys LEE )
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence

Notes for the applicant: If leave has been granted, the applicant or his solicitors must:
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A); b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).		Sent/Handed to the applicant/the applicant’s solicitors on:30/09/2026 Applicant’s ref. no: Nil		Sent/Handed to the putative respondent / the putative respondent’s solicitors / such putative interested parties as may be directed by the Court / the putative interested parties’ solicitors on: 30/09/2026 Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office Putative respondent’s ref. no.: USM 22418 Director of Immigration Putative interested party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 1036/23 (formerly RBCZ 5000969/23) Department of Justice, Senior Assistant Law Officer (Civil Law) (Civil Litigation Unit 2)