Alam Daniyal v. Torture Claims Appeal Board
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HCAL 1666/2024 [2026] HKCFI 5488 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1666 OF 2024 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
Observations for the applicant: The Leave Application 1.By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 24 September 2024, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 30 May 2024 (“the Board’s Decision”). 2.The Board found that the applicant failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism. Accordingly, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 6 February 2024 and affirmed the same, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. Amendments 3.In Form 86, the applicant named “TORTURE CLAiM APPEAL BOARD NON REFOULEMENT CLAiM PETiTION OFFiCE WANCHAi” as the putative respondent and “TORTURE CLAiM APPEAL BOARD NON REFOULEMENT CLAiMS PETiTION OFFiCE WANCHAi / IMMIGRATiON DEPARTMENT” as the putative interested party. 4.In fact, only the Board should be the putative respondent and the Director should be the putative interested party. 5.The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the Board, and should not be named as a putative party at all. 6.Thus, on this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent is amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and the name of the putative interested party is amended to “Director of Immigration”. Late application 7.By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the Board’s Decision was made. 8.However, the applicant filed Form 86 on 24 September 2024, which was 3 months and 25 days after the Board’s Decision (made on 30 May 2024). The applicant was hence late for 25 days in making the Leave Application, and this court has to consider whether there is any good reason to extend the time for the applicant to make the Leave Application. 9.As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria for granting an extension of time are:
10.The applicant did not make any application for extension of time and provided no explanation for the delay when he filed the Leave Application. 11.A delay of 25 days is not insubstantial, and there is simply no reason for this court to extend the time for the applicant to make the Leave Application when no explanation was given for the delay at all. Moreover, as the Leave Application ought to be dismissed as discussed below, there is simply no reason for this court to extend the time. 12.Having considered the above criteria, this court is not prepared to grant any extension of time to the applicant to file the Leave Application. The Leave Application can therefore be dismissed on the ground of being made out of time alone. 13.However, for the sake of completeness, this court will still deal with the Leave Application as discussed below. The applicant’s case 14.The applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Pakistan, he would be at risk of being harmed or killed by a village head named Sameer Khan in his home village due to a land dispute. Withdrawal of the Leave Application 15.Before the Leave Application was dealt with, the Director informed this court on 2 September 2026 that the applicant wrote a letter dated 31 August 2026 to withdraw the Leave Application. In the said letter, the applicant stated that he wanted to return to his country as his problems had been solved. 16.The Director further informed this court on 24 September 2026 that the applicant had been removed from Hong Kong during the period from 14 September 2026 to 20 September 2026. 17.There is no evidence to show that the applicant made the withdrawal application other than out of his own volition. With this withdrawal application, it is clear that the applicant no longer wishes to proceed with the Leave Application or any oral hearing of the Leave Application even though he had previously requested one. 18.However, the Court of Appeal had held in Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471 that:-
19.Thus, it is not right to leave the action at large. The applicant’s application to withdraw the Leave Application is therefore refused and this court will proceed to deal with the Leave Application. Discussion 20.It is not necessary for this court to discuss the merits of the intended judicial review any more, as the applicant had confirmed that his problems in his home country had been solved. In other words, it was safe for him to return to his country. Thus, the basis of his non-refoulement claim no longer exists. 21.It is clear that the applicant no longer needs non-refoulement protection and the intended judicial review serves no practical purpose. 22.It is well established that the court may exercise discretion not to grant a remedy on judicial review if it would serve no practical purpose, where it may have become otiose or pointless to grant a remedy because the relevant detriment to the applicant has been removed (see AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam, CACV 63 of 2015). 23.Even assuming that there were errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision and the case were remitted to the Board for reconsideration, there would simply be no more basis for the applicant to claim non-refoulement protection as it was no longer unsafe for him to return to his own country. The Board should assess the risk of the applicant at the time of the proceedings, taking account of information that has come to light to ensure that it is able to make a “full and up-to-date assessment” of the current situation (see Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security and Another (2012) 15 HKCFAR 743). 24.It is therefore otiose and pointless to grant leave to the applicant to proceed with the intended judicial review even if there were merits in it. Thus, the Leave Application ought to be dismissed. Conclusion 25.For reasons aforesaid, the application to withdraw the Leave Application is refused and the Leave Application is dismissed. Dated the 30th day of September 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
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