Santiago Jessica Viray and Another v. Torture Claims Appeal Board
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HCAL 1034/2023 [2026] HKCFI 5744 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1034 OF 2023 BETWEEN
Application for leave to apply for judicial review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
Observations for the applicants: The Leave Application 1.By way of Form 86 dated 26 June 2023 and filed on 27 June 2023, the applicants applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 30 May 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”). 2.The Board found that the applicants had failed to show that they were entitled to non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism. Hence, the Board affirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 20 January 2020, which rejected the applicants’ non-refoulement claims. Amendments 3.In Form 86, Agaba Lucky Haruna Kine, who is the 1st applicant’s son and a minor, is named the 2nd applicant. As the 2nd applicant is represented by the 1st applicant as his next friend, his name is amended to “Agaba Lucky Haruna Kine (a minor) by Santiago Jessica Viray, his next friend” on this court’s own motion. 4.The applicant named “Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office” as the putative respondents in Form 86, when only the Board should be so named. 5.The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the Board and should not be named as a putative respondent at all. 6.This court therefore makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”. The applicants’ case 7.In sum, the applicants claimed for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong because if refouled to the Philippines, the applicants feared that: (1) they would be ill-treated or even killed by the 1st applicant’s husband due to family dispute; (2) the 1st applicant would be ill-treated or even killed by her maternal uncle for accusing her to steal a mobile phone and she had filed a complaint against him for his false accusation; and (3) the 2nd applicant would be discriminated by the 1st applicant’s family members for difference in religious belief as his father was a Muslim whereas the 1st applicant’s family members were Catholic. Withdrawal of the Leave Application 8.Before the Leave Application was dealt with, the Director informed this court on 29 September 2026 that the 1st and 2nd applicants had written a letter dated 18 September 2026 to withdraw the Leave Application. In the said letter, the 1st applicant on behalf of herself and the 2nd applicant stated that they withdrew their cases as they wanted to return to their home country as soon as possible, their issues in their home country had been resolved and they could return home. 9.There is no evidence to show that the 1st and 2nd applicants made the withdrawal application other than out of their own volition. With this withdrawal application, it is clear that they no longer wish to proceed with the Leave Application or any oral hearing of the Leave Application even though they had previously requested one. 10.However, the Court of Appeal had held in Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471 that:-
11.Thus, it is not right to leave the action at large. The 1st and 2nd applicants’ application to withdraw the Leave Application is therefore refused and this court will proceed to deal with the Leave Application. Legal representation of the 2nd applicant 12.The 2nd applicant is a minor born in Hong Kong out of wedlock on 24 August 2018 and is represented by the 1st applicant in the Leave Application. 13.There is no indication that the 1st applicant had applied for legal aid for the 2nd applicant and the 2nd applicant is not legally represented in the Leave Application. 14.However, as the 2nd applicant was legally represented before the Director, and both the 1st and 2nd applicants had applied to withdraw the Leave Application, this court considered that the lack of legal representation for the 2nd applicant in the Leave Application was a mere irregularity and it would not prejudice the 2nd applicant. Hence, this court waived the irregularity and proceeded to deal with the Leave Application. Discussion 15.It is not necessary for this court to discuss the merits of the intended judicial review any more, as the applicants had confirmed that their issues in their home country had been resolved. In other words, it was safe for them to return to their country. Thus, the basis of their non-refoulement claim no longer exists. 16.It is clear that the applicants no longer need non-refoulement protection and the intended judicial review serves no practical purpose. 17.It is well established that the court may exercise discretion not to grant a remedy on judicial review if it would serve no practical purpose, where it may have become otiose or pointless to grant a remedy because the relevant detriment to the applicant has been removed (see AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam, CACV 63 of 2015). 18.Even assuming that there were errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision and the case were remitted to the Board for reconsideration, there would simply be no more basis for the applicants to claim non-refoulement protection as it was no longer unsafe for them to return to their own country. The Board should assess the risk of the applicant at the time of the proceedings, taking account of information that has come to light to ensure that it is able to make a “full and up-to-date assessment” of the current situation (see Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security and Another (2012) 15 HKCFAR 743). 19.It is therefore otiose and pointless to grant leave to the applicants to proceed with the intended judicial review even if there were merits in it. Thus, the Leave Application ought to be dismissed. Conclusion 20.For reasons aforesaid, the 1st and 2nd applicants’ application to withdraw the application for leave to apply for judicial review is refused, and the Leave Application in respect of both the 1st and 2nd applicants is dismissed. Dated the 14th day of October 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
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