Case Document

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HCAL 1384/2026

[2026] HKCFI 5631

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1384 OF 2026

BETWEEN

	Samiullah alias Malik Muhammed Sami	Applicant
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative Respondent

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

consideration of the documents only; or

consideration of the documents and the Applicant being absent in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:

1.  Extension of time for the application for leave to apply for Judicial Review of the decision of Director of Immigration dated 3 July 2025 be refused;

2.  The application for leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed; and

3.  A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the Applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 3 July 2025 refusing to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection after his previous claim had been rejected by both the Director and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) on all the applicable grounds.

2.The Applicant is a 50-year-old national of Pakistan who entered Hong Kong illegally on 5 January 2016 and was arrested by police on the same day. After he was referred to the Immigration Department for investigation, he raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if he returned to Pakistan he would be harmed or killed by certain local supporters of the political party Pakistan Muslim League (N) (“PML(N)”) as he supported their rival Pakistan Peoples Party (“PPP”).

Previous Non-Refoulement Claim

3.By a Notice of Decision dated 6 January 2017, the Director rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

4.In his decision, the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from those local PML(N) supporters upon his return to Pakistan as low due to the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that there is no reliable evidence of any real intention of them to seriously harm or kill him or any political reason to do so given that he was just an ordinary PPP supporter without holding any official post in the party, that in any event in the absence of any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Pakistan with a large population of 199 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 796,000 square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other part of the country away from his home district in large cities where it would be difficult if not impossible for anyone to locate him.

5.The Applicant’s appeal against the Director’s decision was then dismissed by the Board on 27 April 2018 after hearing him in evidence and submissions and upon finding no merits in his claim or appeal, and that it also confirmed the Director’s decision.

6.The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision was then refused by this Court on 17 May 2019 upon finding none of the proposed grounds for his intended challenge reasonably arguable, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in his process before the Board or in its decision, and that there was no prospect of success in his intended application (HCAL 1265/2018 [2019] HKCFI 1181).

7.The Applicant’s subsequent appeal against the Court’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 11 August 2020 (CAMP 294/2019 [2020] HKCA 596).

8.The Applicant’s Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decisions was also dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 21 January 2021 ([2021] HKCA 45), and then by the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal on 15 December 2021 under Rule 7 of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Rules, Cap 484A.

Request To Make Subsequent Claim

9.Meanwhile on 26 April 2022 the Applicant was convicted of the offence of illegally remaining in Hong Kong and was sentenced to prison for 15 months, and upon his discharge from prison he then absconded from his recognizance and disappeared, and was arrested by police more than one year later on 23 August 2023 and was scheduled to appear in court for the offence of making false representation to an immigration officer, but on 2 May 2024 he failed to attend court and again disappeared until 19 March 2025 when he was arrested and was then placed under detention by the Immigration Department.

10.Shortly thereafter on 3 May 2025 the Applicant in writing to the Immigration Department requested to make a subsequent claim on the basis that if refouled to Pakistan he still fears of being harmed or killed by those local PML(N) supporters as well as a new claim of fear of harm from his brother over their land dispute in his home village which they had prior to his departure of Pakistan in 2016 and which has not yet been resolved between them that he also fears of being harmed or killed by his brother upon his return to Pakistan.

11.There are however constraints on a claimant who has previously made a non-refoulement claim to make a subsequent claim, as stipulated by Section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance as follows:

“(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who has previously made a torture claim must not subsequently make another torture claim.

(2) A person may make a subsequent claim if the person provides sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that –

(a) there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn; and

(b) the change, when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of the previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

(3) In deciding whether or not a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), an immigration officer may take into account any finding of credibility or fact made by an immigration officer or the Appeal Board in relation to a torture claim previously made by the person.

(4) If an immigration officer decides that a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision.

(5) If an immigration officer decides that a person may not make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision, and the notice must also include the reasons for the decision.”

12.Accordingly, the Director required the Applicant to provide further information and evidence in writing in support of his request within 14 days, which he subsequently did via his lawyer from Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”) with further details of his alleged land dispute with his brother in his home village prior to his departure of Pakistan in 2016 for Hong Kong to seek non-refoulement protection which he claimed to have forgotten to raise or include in his previous claim when he submitted his Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 29 June 2016 to the Immigration Department or to mention it to the immigration officer during his screening interview with his legal representation for his previous claim.

13.By a Notice of Decision dated 3 July 2025, the Director refused to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim upon finding that the basis of risk of harm from the local PML(N) supporters was the same as that of his previous claim, and that he failed to provide sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that there has been any significant change of circumstances since his previous claim was determined, while his new claim of risk of harm from his brother over their land dispute prior to his departure of Pakistan in 2016 but which he somehow failed to raise or include in his previous claim without any valid or credible reason or explanation that such claim is not considered as credible or reliable or even if true to amount to any significant change of circumstances given that it was already in existence in 2016 when he raised his previous claim, or that such change when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of his previous claim would give his subsequent claim any realistic prospect of success given the unchallenged findings by both the Director and the Board in his previous claim of the availability of state protection and internal relocation alternatives to similarly negate whatever risk that may arise from his intended subsequent claim.

14.On 4 August 2026 the Applicant filed a Form 86 in these proceedings for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s decision, but no ground for seeking relief was given in his Form or supporting affirmation of the same date to which he just attached a copy of the decision but without putting forth any proper ground for his intended challenge, nor did he subsequently attend the scheduled hearing of his application without any explanation.

15.By then the Applicant was also out of time with his application, as Order 53 rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A requires that an application for leave to apply for judicial review be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for the application first arose unless the court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made.

16.As the last day of the 3-month period for him to file his Form 86 fell on 3 November 2025 after discounting the month of August 2025 for court’s vacation, the Applicant was therefore some 9 months late with his application, and in considering whether to extend time, the court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the merits of the intended application; and (iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public administration; AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393.

17.In the Applicant’s case, a delay of 9 months must be considered as extremely substantial and inordinate, for which he did not provide any explanation in his Form or affirmation, nor as noted above did he attend the hearing of his application, and as the shows that the Director’s decision was sent on the same day of 3 July 2025 to the Applicant via his lawyer from DLS without being returned through undelivered post, and given the experience he already had from his previous claim, I am unable to see any good or valid reason for his such serious delay.

18.As for the merits, if any, of his intended application, as noted above that the Applicant has also failed to put forward any proper ground for his intended challenge, and in the absence of any error of law or irrationality or procedural unfairness in his process before the Director or in his decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not find any merits in his intended application either.

19.In the premises and having considered the decision of the Director with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the decision or any failure to apply high standards of fairness in the consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s request to make a subsequent claim, and as I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, and in the absence of any good reason for his serious delay, I refuse to extend time and accordingly dismiss his leave application.

Restricted Proceedings Order

20.Given the facts that the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim has already been finally and conclusively determined in the previous proceedings, ending with the order of the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal dated 15 December 2021, but that the Applicant is still trying to re-litigate his case by making this subsequent claim based on essentially the same facts and basis as before or invalid/incredible basis, I shall next consider whether it would be appropriate to make a Restricted Proceedings Order (“RPO”) against him.

21.Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, Cap. 4 provides as follows:

“Restriction of vexatious legal proceedings

(1) The Court of First Instance may, on the application of the Secretary for Justice or an affected person, make an order that –

(a) no legal proceedings shall without the leave of the Court of First Instance be instituted by the person against whom the order is made; and

(b) any legal proceedings instituted by that person in any court before the making of the order shall not be continued by him without the leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2) The Court of First Instance may not make an order under subsection (1) unless –

(a) it is satisfied that the person against whom the order is to be made has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings, whether in the High Court or in any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against different persons; and

(b) it has heard the person against whom the order is to be made or given him an opportunity of being heard.

(3) An order made under subsection (1) –

(a) may be made on such terms and conditions as the Court of First Instance thinks just; and

(b) may provide that it is to cease to have effect at the end of a specified period, but shall otherwise remain in force indefinitely.

…”

22.Relevantly, Section 27A also provides:

“(1) Leave for the institution or continuance of any legal proceedings by a person who is the subject of an order for the time being in force under section 27(1) shall not be given unless the Court of First Instance is satisfied that –

(a) the proceedings are not an abuse of the process of the court in question; and

(b) there are reasonable grounds for the proceedings.

(2) No appeal lies from a decision of the Court of First Instance granting or refusing leave required under this section, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court of First Instance.”

23.In Etik Iswanti v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2021] HKCFI 1589, Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) examined the relevant principles for making an order under Section 27 against a non-refoulement claimant to prevent him or her from commencing vexatious legal proceedings which sought to re-open a non-refoulement claim which had already been finally and conclusively determined in previous proceedings, and held that repeated actions evidencing a calculated attempt by a claimant to delay an inevitable judgment or its execution or a refusal to accept the unfavourable final result of a litigation or seeking to re-open matters already determined in a previous action may be regarded as vexatious legal proceedings which would justify a RPO being made under the section.

24.His Lordship in the subsequent case of Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 (again sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) went on to hold that apart from Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, the Court has an inherent jurisdiction which it can exercise on its own motion to make a RPO to prevent similar abuses of the court’s process by non-refoulement claimants, as the underlying purpose of the court’s jurisdiction to make a RPO is the prevention of abuse of process ([9] – [10]).

25.In the subsequent jointly heard appeals of Siti Khotimah v Director of Immigration, CACV 420/2021 and Reza Sahin v Director of Immigration, CACV 422/2021 ([2022] HKCA 327, 28 February 2022), Poon CJHC in giving judgment of the Court of Appeal also held that where a judge of the Court of First Instance (“CFI judge”) makes a RPO, he may where appropriate properly exercise his power under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to also make a restrictive order against vexatious appeals under which the non-refoulement claimant concerned cannot appeal without first obtaining leave from him or another CFI judge designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court upon observing procedural fairness by putting the non-refoulement claimant concerned on notice and giving him or her the opportunity to address the court before making the restrictive order ([38] – [40]).

26.In the present case, it is clear from the above that the Applicant’s conduct in seeking persistently to re-litigate his non-refoulement claims without viable grounds and then to launch his legal challenge to the Court after his futile request to make a subsequent claim has been refused amounts to an abuse of process, and that unless a RPO is made against him, and to which he also failed to attend the hearing of his application to raise any objection, I am convinced that the Applicant will likely continue to do so and/or to make vexatious appeals, thereby wasting further precious time and resources of the Judiciary.

27.Accordingly, I make the following order:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to or touching upon or leading to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court, or any appeal, including this Order, without the leave of a Judge of the Court of First Instance;

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List;

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of his intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with his said application for leave;

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the court written representations regarding the same;

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the designated Judge should otherwise direct;

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to this Court or the designated Judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed;

(7)  Notice of each decision by the designated Judge made pursuant to this Order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings;

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the designated Judge, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly;

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months;

(10)  No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave under this Order, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Judge;

(11)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this Order; and

(12)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

Disposition

28.The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.

29.A RPO in terms of paragraph 27 be made against the Applicant.

Dated the 8^th day of October 2026

(Chung Lai Fan, Christine)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Notes for the Applicant: If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A); b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).		Sent to the Applicant on 8 October 2026 Samiullah alias Malik Muhammed Sami Applicant’s ref. no.: Nil.		Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 8 October 2026 Director of Immigration Putative Respondent’s ref. no.: L/M (33942) in ImmD RA 7/37/C (formerly RBCZ/11063/16; RBCZ/137/16) Department of Justice, Senior Assistant Law Officer (Civil Law) (Civil Litigation Unit 2)