Re Sim Tze Jye

Case No.HCB 5997/2024[2026] HKCFI 5268
Court
HCB
Date08 Oct 2026
Judge—
Case Document
100%

HCB 5997/2024 and HCB 5998/2024
(Heard together)

[2026] HKCFI 5268

HCB 5997/2024

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO. 5997 OF 2024

____________

RE: SIM TZE JYE (沈士傑) Debtor
EX-PARTE: DRAGON SILVER HOLDINGS LIMITED 1st Petitioning
    Creditor
  TAK FUNG INTERNATIONAL (HK) LIMITED 2nd Petitioning
    Creditor

____________

AND

HCB 5998/2024

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO. 5998 OF 2024

____________

RE: SIM TZE SHIONG (沈士雄) Debtor
EX-PARTE: DRAGON SILVER HOLDINGS LIMITED 1st Petitioning
    Creditor
  TAK FUNG INTERNATIONAL (HK) LIMITED 2nd Petitioning
    Creditor

____________

(Heard together)

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Kent Yee in Court
Date of Hearing: 15 July 2026
Date of Judgment: 8 October 2026

________________

J U D G M E N T

________________

Introduction

1.Dragon Silver Holdings Limited (“P1”) and Tak Fung International (HK) Limited (“P2”) jointly presented a petition dated 28 August 2024 against Sim Tsz Jye (“D1”) under HCB 5997/2024 and another petition of the same date against Sim Tze Shiong (“D2”) under HCB 5998/2024 (both as amended on 7 May 2025).

2.Each of P1 and P2 (collectively “Ps”) issued their respective statutory demands both dated 18 June 2024 (“D1’s SD”) and served the same personally on D1 on 19 June 2024 whereby D1 was demanded to pay P1 a debt in the amount of US$10,603,857.41 (“P1 Sum”) and to pay P2 another debt in the amount of US$9,442,815.62 (“P2 Sum”).

3.On the other hand, each of Ps issued their respectively statutory demands both dated 3 July 2024 (“D2’s SD”) and served the same personally on D2 on 4 July 2024 whereby D2 was demanded to pay P1 P1 Sum and to pay P2 P2 Sum.

4.The two Amended Petitions are based on the failure of D1 and D2 (collectively “Ds”) to comply with the D1’s SD and D2’s SD (collectively “the SDs”).

5.Both Ds oppose the Amended Petitions. Neither of them denies their non-compliance with the SDs. As stated in their respective Notices by Debtor of Intention to Oppose Petition both dated 29 August 2025, their common position is that the Amended Petitions are defective and there is bona fide dispute about the alleged debts. They further allege that the amounts demanded in the SDs represent unliquidated damages.

6.The substantive hearing of the Amended Petitions has been fixed to be heard together before this court. Mr Hui appeared for Ps and Mr Lau appeared for Ds.

7.Ps took out a summons dated 4 March 2026 for their application for retrospective leave to file and serve on Ds two additional affirmations of the same date. Having heard the parties, this court allowed the application on the main ground that the evidence contained therein is not controversial and Mr Lau accepted that there was no prejudice caused to Ds and no evidence in reply was necessary.

Ps’ case against Ds

8.Ps’ case against Ds is mainly based on four guarantees. In his written submissions, Mr Hui gives an account of how the four guarantees came into being. His account is summarised as follows.

9.D1 and D2 are brothers. Both of them were at all material times directors and shareholders of Perfect Hexagon Limited (“Perfect Hexagon”), a company incorporated in Hong Kong. Perfect Hexagon has been wound up already.

10.Ps traded in gold with Perfect Hexagon since late 2023. Through the introduction of D2, P2 traded in gold with Persada Syabas (Singapore) Pte. Ltd (“Persada”) using cryptocurrency, namely, USDT. Persada is a company incorporated in Singapore, which was allegedly controlled by D2.

11.The trade of gold in the form of gold bars among the parties was conducted on a daily basis based on the daily gold price issued by the London Bullion Market Association. Perfect Hexagon and/or Persada would issue a final invoice confirming the final gold price upon Ps’ locking in a gold price for each trade and the daily gold price matched the lock-in price. Since Ps made payment prior to the issuance of the final invoice, the discrepancy between the amount paid and the amount stated in the final invoice would be carried forward to the next transaction.

12.In early December 2023, Perfect Hexagon and Persada started defaulting in their delivery of gold bars to Ps in accordance with the invoices despite their payments. The amount of undelivered gold bars accumulated.

13.Eventually, Ps reached an agreement with Perfect Hexagon and Persada (“the Buyback Agreement”) whereby the latter would buy back the gold bars duly paid for by Ps and yet delivered based on the gold price on 15 December 2023.

14.Against this background, each of Ds executed one guarantee to each of Ps on 18 December 2023. In addition, each of Ds executed one written confirmation to each of Ps.

15.The figures in both written confirmations were calculated arithmetically based on the amount of the gold bars which Perfect Hexagon and Persada failed to deliver despite payments on the gold price on 15 December 2023.

16.The details of the four guarantees are as follows.

17.D1 executed:

(1)  a deed of guarantee and indemnity in favor of P1 (“D1’s Guarantee for P1”) annexed with a written confirmation which provides that Perfect Hexagon owed P1 USD10,603,857.41 being the buyback price of the gold bars Perfect Hexagon failed to deliver and owed to P1 (“D1’s Written Confirmation for P1”); and

(2)  a deed of guarantee and indemnity in favor of P2 (“D1’s Guarantee for P2”) annexed with a written confirmation which provides that Persada owed P2 USD9,442,815.62 being the buyback price of the gold bars Persada failed to deliver and owed to P2 (“D1’s Written Confirmation for P2”),

(collectively “D1’s Guarantee Documents”).

18.D2 executed:               

(1)  a deed of guarantee and indemnity in favor of P1 (“D2’s Guarantee for P1”) annexed with a written confirmation which provides that Perfect Hexagon owed P1 P1 Sum being the buyback price of the gold bars Perfect Hexagon failed to deliver and owed to P1 (“D2’s Written Confirmation for P1”); and

(2)  a deed of guarantee and indemnity in favor of P2 (“D2’s Guarantee for P2”) annexed with a written confirmation which provides that Persada owed P2 P2 Sum being the buyback price of the gold bars Persada failed to deliver and owed to P2 (“D2’s Written Confirmation for P2”),

(collectively “D2’s Guarantee Documents”).

19.D1’s Written Confirmation for P1 and D2’s Written Confirmation for P1 (collectively “Ds’ Written Confirmations for P1”) have the same content and they provide that:

“(一)  香港龍銀控股有限公司在2023年11月30日到2023年12月15日期間向美環有限公司購買實物黃金產品;

(二)  經美環有限公司核算及確認,截至2023年12月15日,美環有限公司從香港龍銀控股有限公司收到美元10,603,857.41以購買實物黃金產品,但美環有限公司卻未能提供任何實物黃金產品予以香港龍銀控股有限公司;

(三)  因此,美環有限公司再確認自2023年12月15日已拖欠香港龍銀控股有限公司美元10,603,857.419(「該欠款」);

本人在此以書面形式記錄美環有限公司就上述黃金交易事宜已確定美環有限公司的權利和責任:

1.  美環有限公司在2023年12月18日或以前須完全歸還其拖欠香港龍銀控股有限公司的美元10,603,857.41。”

20.Further, D1’s Written Confirmation for P2 and D2’s Written Confirmation for P2 (collectively “Ds’ Written Confirmations for P2”) have largely the same content and they provide that:

“一.  [P2] 在2023年8月到2023年12月8日期間向 [Perfect Hexagon and Persada] 購買實物黃金條(成色99.99%)產品;

二.  經 [Perfect Hexagon and Persada]核算及確認,截至2023年12月8日,[Perfect Hexagon and Persada] 從 [P2] 收到美元9,442,815.62以購買實物黃金條(成色99.99%)產品,但 [Perfect Hexagon and Persada] 卻未能提供任何實物黃金條(成色99.99%)產品予以 [P2];

三.  因此,[Perfect Hexagon and Persada] 再確認自2023年12月8日已拖欠[P2] 美元9,442,815.62(「該欠款」)。

本人在此以書面形式記錄 [Perfect Hexagon and Persada] 就上述實物黃金條(成色99.99%)產品交易事宜已確定 [Perfect Hexagon and Persada] 的權利和責任:

[Perfect Hexagon and Persada] 在2023年12月15日或以前須完全歸還其拖欠 [P2] 的美元9,442,815.62。”

21.On the other hand, D1’s Guarantee for P1, D1’s Guarantee for P2, D2’s Guarantee for P1, and D2’s Guarantee for P2 (collectively “Ds’ Guarantees”) have the same content except for the parties involved and each of them provides inter alia that:

“1.1  鍳於貴司按照本契約之附表一中所附上的《書面確認書》的內容,在貴司以絕對酌情權認為合適的前提下向美環有限公司(Perfect Hexagon Limited)(「美環有限公司」)提供或持續提供欠款通融或延長還款期限,本人作為本契約的擔保人謹此不可撤銷及無條件地:

(a)  向貴司保證美環有限公司及時並妥為履行其向貴司到期的、欠付的、或由美環有限公司承擔的任何性質的義務,不論是現存的或將來的、實有的或或有的(以及不論是單獨的或與任何其他人共同的,以及不論是作為主要義務人的或擔保人的或任何其他身份的),包括但不限於不時支付任何性質的任何款項、債務或責任的任何義務;

(b)  向貴司承諾及保證促使美環有限公司適當及適時地履行及遵守其於《書面確認書》項下的所有義務;

(c)  向貴司承諾如美環有限公司未能支付其拖欠貴司的到期款項,本人將應要求立即向貴司支付所有屆時美環有限公司應付的款項(不論該等款項乃本金、利息、或其他性質的欠款),猶如本人代替美環有限公司成為主要債務人,而不只是擔保人; 及

(d)  作為主要義務人,作為一項本人在本契約第1.1(a)條至1.1(c)條項下所承擔的義務和責任之外的分割及獨立的義務和責任,向貴司承諾按全額彌償之基準及應要求,賠償貴司,並使貴司免受損於源於或與下列情況有關的所有損失、責任、損害、費用、支出、成本、開銷、墊支及/或任何性質的付款,即(i)因任何原因而無法在本契約第1.1(a)條至1.1(c)條項下成為可收回的任何款項,或者(ii)Persada Syabas (Singapore) Pte. Ltd 及/或Perfect Hexagon Limited 任何未能履行或清償其關於《書面確認書》及/或本契約之任何義務或責任。

1.2  本契約中所包含的保證乃一項持續性保證並將保持十足效力及作用,直至於本契約項下對貴司之所有保證責任已被完全解除,而且本契約之保證適用於美環有限公司欠貴司的最終總餘額。本契約中所包含之保證是添加的,並不應妨害其他現時或將來由本人為保證美環有限公司妥為履行其在《書面確認書》下的責任而向貴司所提供之保證、彌償或抵押品或被該等保證、彌償或抵押品所妨害。”

22.On or about 10 January 2024, P1 received a post-dated cheque drawn by Perfect Hexagon in its favour for the amount of HK$82,900,000.00 and P2 received another cheque drawn by Perfect Hexagon in its favour for the amount of HK$73,800,000.00 (collectively “the Cheques”).

23.The total amount of the Cheques represents the total indebtedness of Perfect Hexagon and Persada to Ps.

24.In the premises, Ps say that the debts in the D1’s SD and D2’s SD are P1 Sum and P2 Sum, which Ds have confirmed to be outstanding in Ds’ Written Confirmations for P1 and Ds’ Written Confirmations for P2 (collectively “the Written Confirmations”) and they are liable to pay the same under Ds’ Guarantees.

Ds’ case

25.Mr Lau essentially takes two points. First, he argues that there are bona fide disputes to the debts. He submits that P1 Sum and P2 Sum were calculated on the erroneous basis that there was no delivery of gold bars on 6 and 7 December 2023 and that the Buyback Agreement existed. In any event, Mr Lau submits that Ps fail to provide sufficient particulars of the Buyback Agreement.

26.Second, Mr Lau submits that on a proper construction of the terms of Ds’ Guarantees, all the obligations undertaken by Ds are in the nature of payment of unliquidated damages and hence neither of SDs is for a liquidated sum.

Applicable legal principles

27.Both Mr Hui and Mr Lau have helpfully referred to a number of relevant authorities explaining the well-established legal principles relating to bankruptcy petitions. The following would be sufficient for present purposes.

28.Rule 68 of the Bankruptcy Rules, Cap. 6A provides that the debtor shall file a notice “specifying the grounds on which he intends to show cause”. The Court may not allow a debtor to raise an objection for which notice has not been given: Re Choy Chi Fung Orpheus [2024] HKCFI 956 per DHCJ Le Pichon at §26, referring to Re Maydwell ex p WFM Motors Pty Limited (a creditor) [1999] 3 HKLRD 325 at 345E-I and Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2024, Vol 2, at §I1/62.

29.In opposing a petition, the debtor has to show a bona fide dispute on substantial grounds by sufficiently precise evidence which is believable, and must establish that he has a defence of substance, not just a fair probability of one: Re Leader, John Roger also known as Roger Leader [2022] HKCFI 11 at §8, per Ng J.

30.Section 6(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance, Cap.6  requires that a creditor’s petition must be based on a debt for a liquidated sum payable to the petitioning creditor.

31.Mr Lau places reliance on Southwest Securities (HK) Brokerage Limited v Nieumarkt Investments Ltd and Anor. [2021] 5 HKCA 740 where Cheung JA said the following:

“5.7 In McGuinness v. Norwich and Peterborough Building Society [2012] 2 BCLC 233, Patten LJ identified four classes of liability that may be imposed on a guarantor.

‘[7] It is common ground that a guarantee of a loan may impose one or more of the following types of liability on the guarantor. These are:

(1) a “see to it” obligation: i.e. an undertaking by the guarantor that the principal debtor will perform his own contract with the creditor;

(2) a conditional payment obligation: i.e. a promise by the guarantor to pay the instalments of principal and interest which fall due if the principal debtor fails to make those payments;

(3) an indemnity; and

(4) a concurrent liability with the debtor for what is due under the contract of loan.’

5.8 Patten LJ held at [8] that the obligations in classes (2) and (4) create a liability in debt. On the other hand the obligations in classes (1) and (3) are enforceable by way of action for unliquidated damages. He explained in respect of classes (1) and (3),

‘a guarantee of the ‘see to it’ type has also been held by the House of Lords to create a liability in damages. The obligation undertaken by the guarantor is not one to pay the debt but consists of a promise that the debt will be paid by the principal debtor: see Moschi v Lep Air Services Ltd [1972] 2 All ER 393, [1973] AC 331. It is well established that an indemnity is enforceable by way of action for unliquidated damages: see Firma C-Trade SA v Newcastle Protection and Indemnity Association [1990] 2 All ER 705 at 715‑717, [1991] 2 AC 1 at 33‑36. The liability arises from the failure of the indemnifier to prevent the person indemnified from suffering the type of loss specified in the contract.’ ”

32.It is worthy of note that Cheung JA (as he then was) in Bright Islands Corp v Chao [2002] 2 HKLRD 97 said this at §81:

“A debt is a definite sum of the performance of a specified obligation by the other party or upon the occurrence of some specified event or condition; damages may be claimed from a party who has broken his contractual obligation in some way other than failure to pay such a debt.

The term liquidated damages is applied where the damages have been agreed and fixed by the parties (in respect of which the law has developed criteria for their validity), or fixed by statute as in the case of damages against parties to a dishonoured bill of exchange. Unliquidated damages is the term applied where the damages are at large and are to be assessed by a jury or by a judge sitting as a jury; the rules as to remoteness of damage are the main criteria for such damages.

See Chitty on Contracts (28th ed.) Vol. 1, paras 27-008 and 27-009. Paragraph 6/2/4 of Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2002, Vol. 1, further states that:

A liquidated demand is in the nature of a debt, ie a specific sum of money due and payable under or by virtue of a contract. Its amount must either be already ascertained or capable of being ascertained as a mere matter of arithmetic. If the ascertainment of a sum of money, even though it be specified or named as a definite figure, requires investigation beyond mere calculation, then the sum is not a ‘debt or liquidated demand’, but constitutes ‘damages’.

Discussion

Bona fide disputes to the Debts?

33.Mr Lau has done his utmost to persuade this court that the admitted indebtedness in the Written Confirmations (“Admitted Indebtedness”) is erroneous. He tries to show that there were gold bars delivered to Ps on 6 and 7 December 2023. Thus, the alleged debts (P1 Sum and P2 Sum) have been grossly inflated.

34.Mr Lau further argues that the Buyback Agreement did not exist.

35.On the other hand, Ds, for the first time, allege that they were coerced and threatened to sign the Guarantee Documents. Such allegations were not made in their Notices of Intention to Oppose Petition.  

36.In all fairness to Mr Lau, he makes little submission on this serious allegation, which I find no merit in any event as will be explained below.

37.The primary objection of Mr Hui is that Ds must be debarred from disputing the Admitted Indebtedness by reason of estoppel by deed and/or estoppel by convention.

38.Alternatively, Mr Hui submits that the text messages -exchanged between D2 and Ps confirm Ds’ acceptance of the Admitted Indebtedness. He further points to the Cheques which inexplicably covered the Admitted Indebtedness and submits that the belated dispute raised by Ds is not bona fide.

39.In China Citic Bank International Limited v Tus-Holdings Co., Ltd. [2025] HKCFI 5264, cited by Mr Hui, DHCJ Le Pichon had this to say about estoppel by deed at §36,   

“An estoppel by deed results from a statement in a deed. If upon the true construction of the deed, the statement is that of both or all the parties to the deed, the estoppel is binding on each party; if otherwise, it is binding only on the party making it. The estoppel therefore binds as an agreement made under seal to admit the relevant statement: see Halsbury’s Laws of England, 5th Ed. (2021), Vol 47 at §304.”

40.The deputy judge went further to explain the following at §39,

“Both the operative provisions and the recitals in the deed are capable of giving rise to estoppels. Statements made in the operative parts of the deed give rise to an estoppel by virtue of the fundamental principle of the common law which precludes a grantor from disputing the validity or effect of his own grant: Phipson on Evidence (20th Ed) at §5-09; Taylors Fashions Limited v Liverpool Trustees Co Limited [1982] QB 133, 159D-E.”

41.In the present case, in all of Ds’ Guarantees, it is expressly stipulated that in consideration of Ps’ exercise of their discretion to allow further time for Perfect Hexagon and Persada to repay their indebtedness and in view of the contents of Ds’ Written Confirmations, Ds irrevocably and unconditionally made the assurances and promises in Ds’ Guarantees.

42.There is no dispute that Ds’ Guarantees are deeds. Ds’ Written Confirmations were clearly referred to in Ds’ Guarantees and the parties placed reliance on them. In my view, there is no reason why Ds are not caught by estoppel by deed. I agree with Mr Hui that Ds should be estopped from disputing the Admitted Indebtedness.

43.On the other hand, regarding the doctrine of estoppel by convention, Mr Hui refers to the following passage in Chitty on Contract (36th Ed) at §7-016:

“Estoppel by convention is notoriously difficult to pin down. It may arise where both 0parties to a transaction:

“… act on assumed state of facts or law, the assumption being either shared by both or made by one and acquiesced in by the other.”

The parties are then precluded from denying the truth of that assumption, if it would be unjust or unconscionable (typically because the party claiming the benefit has been “materially influenced” by the common assumption) to allow them (or one of them) to go back on it.”

44.Ribeiro PJ in Siegfried Adalbert Unruh v Hans-Joerg Seeberger and Anor. (2007) 10 HKCFAR 31 gave an instructive explanation of the doctrine of estoppel by convention.

45.First, at §131, the following passage of the speech of Lord Steyn in The “Indian Endurance” (No 2) [1998] AC 818 (at p.913) was quoted:

“It is settled that an estoppel by convention may arise where parties to a transaction act on an assumed state of facts or law, the assumption being either shared by them both or made by one and acquiesced in by the other. The effect of an estoppel by convention is to preclude a party from denying the assumed facts or law if it would be unjust to allow him to go back on the assumption. It is not enough that each of the two parties acts on an assumption not communicated to the other. But it was rightly accepted by counsel for both parties that a concluded agreement is not a requirement for an estoppel by convention.”

46.Ribeiro PJ then proceeded to set out the elements of estoppel by convention. At §133, Ribeiro PJ stated the parties must enter into some legal relationship on the basis of an assumption that is shared by or common to them both. The distinctive feature of this doctrine is the commonality of the assumption.

47.Ribeiro PJ pointed out that it must be shown that the assumption was communicated between the parties and acted upon. There must be some “mutually manifest conduct of the parties”: §135.

48.Ribeiro PJ explained that there is no necessity for the parties or either of them to believe that the assumed state of affairs is true or to have been mistaken about the matters assumed: §136. The belief in the correctness of the facts or state of affairs assumed is not always necessary. What is important is for them to act in the belief, manifested by words or conduct, that they are both proceeding with the transaction on the basis of the same shared assumption: §137.

49.Further, the content of the shared assumption must be sufficiently certain to enable the court to give effect to it: §138. The word “transaction” is to be understood in the broad sense of the parties engaging in acts or omissions affecting their mutual legal relationship: §142.

50.In the present case, Ds’ Written Confirmations show the shared or common assumption. They were issued by Ds to Ps to evidence their acceptance of the Admitted Indebtedness. Their acceptance was clear and unequivocal. The Admitted Indebtedness was a shared and common assumption. As shown in the references to the Written Confirmations in Ds’ Guarantees, the parties did act on it and they proceeded with the execution of Ds’ Guarantees on the basis of the shared and common assumption shown in the Admitted Indebtedness. The execution of Ds’ Guarantees in favour of Ps must be a transaction.

51.What Ds then thought, and now think, about the correctness of the Admitted Indebtedness is not material in the circumstances.

52.I, thus, come to the conclusion that the doctrine of estoppel by convention is applicable as well. Ds are estopped from denying the Admitted Indebtedness stated in their Written Confirmations.

53.Regarding Ds’ serious allegations of threat and coercion, they are not supported by any cogent and credible evidence with adequate particulars. I am unable to accept such allegations.

54.It is remarkable that D2 actually indicated his acceptance of the Admitted Indebtedness in the WhatsApp messages by an icon showing a gesture of OK on 15 December 2023. There is no explanation given for his affirmative responses after the alleged coercion and threats.

55.Moreover, the delivery of the Cheques to Ps can only be indicative of Ds’ voluntary acceptance of the Admitted Indebtedness. Ds could not have delivered the Cheques to Ps about three weeks after the execution of the Guarantee Documents if they had been coerced and threatened.   

56.There is nothing to suggest that the Guarantee Documents can be vitiated. Ds must be bound by the terms of their Written Confirmations and Ds’ Guarantees.

57.This being the conclusion, I do not think that it is necessary to consider Ds’ challenge to the correctness of the Admitted Indebtedness.

A liquidated demand or a demand for unliquidated damages?

58.I now turn to the other challenge to the SDs raised by Mr Lau concerning the nature of the demands for P1 Sum and P2 Sum in SDs. It is trite that unliquidated damages cannot be a debt forming the basis of a bankruptcy petition.

59.Mr Lau accepts that a conditional payment obligation under a guarantee creates a liability in debt and clause 1.1(c) apparently creates such a conditional payment obligation. However, he submits that clause 1.1(c) has a broader coverage and it covers the payment obligation of all sums owed by Perfect Hexagon and Persada at any point of time and not just P1 Sum and P2 Sum in the Written Confirmations.

60.Mr Lau further highlights Clause 1.2 which provides that the Guarantees covered the final outstanding amount owed by Perfect Hexagon Limited and Persada to Ps. Therefore, he submits that clause 1.1(c) when read in conjunction with clause 1.2 actually has a catch-all operation and is not confined to P1 Sum and P2 Sum.

61.Thus, Mr Lau argues that Ps are actually relying on clauses 1.1(a) and (b), which impose a “see to it” obligation on Ds. Any breach of such an obligation can only give rise to unliquidated damages, on which a bankruptcy petition cannot be based: McGuinness v Norwich and Peterborough Building Society [2012] 2 BCLC 233 at §§7-8 cited by H Au Yeung J in Joyful Delight Limited v Active Access Holdings Limited and Ors. [2022] HKCFI 2623 at §32.

62.I see no merit in this submission.

63.On a proper construction of clause 1.1(c), Ds undertake a conditional payment obligation and they undertake to pay all the indebtedness owed by Perfect Hexagon and Persada and not just the Admitted Indebtedness when Perfect Hexagon and Persada fail to make such payments. This is a distinct and separate obligation undertaken by Ds in addition to their “see to it” obligations in clauses 1.1(a) and (b). Whether the scope of clause 1.1(c) is broader than clauses 1.1(a) and (b) is irrelevant.  

64.Further, I am of the view that this conditional payment obligation is not in any way altered, removed or curtailed by clause 1.2.

65.In the premises, I conclude that Ds’ liabilities arising from Ds’ Guarantee Documents are sound in debt and the petitioning debts are for liquidated sums.

Conclusion and order

66.For the reasons given, Ds are unable to show any bona fide disputes to the debts on substantial grounds. Ds are clearly liable to pay the Admitted Indebtedness pursuant to Ds’ Guarantees.

67.To conclude, Ps are entitled to a bankruptcy order against each of Ds and I grant the usual bankruptcy order against each of Ds accordingly.

68.I further make a costs order nisi that each of Ds should pay costs of Ps and the Official Receiver relating to the Amended Petitions including all costs previously reserved (if any), to be taxed if not agreed.

69.Lastly, I thank Mr Hui and Mr Lau for their helpful assistance.

  (Kent Yee)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Hui Ho Ming, instructed by Messrs C F Lee & Co, for the 1st and 2nd petitioning creditors in HCB 5997/2024 and HCB 5998/2024

Mr Victor Lau, instructed by Messrs. Stephenson Harwood, for the respective debtors in HCB 5997/2024 and HCB 5998/2024

Attendance of the Official Receiver’s Office was excused

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Other Judgments in This Case

Further hearings and rulings under HCB 5997/2024