Re Pramanick Sukumar

CACV 771/2026 , [2026] HKCA 1769

On appeal from [2026] HKCFI 3972

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 771 OF 2026

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 708 OF 2026)

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JUDGMENT

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Hon Chu VP (giving the Judgment of the Court):

Introduction

1.This is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Levy (“the Judge”) given on 23 July 2026[1] refusing to give him leave to judicially review the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 26 March 2026 which refused his request to make a subsequent non-refoulement protection claim.

Background

2.The applicant is a national of India born in 1975. He arrived in Hong Kong on 8 April 2008 and was permitted to remain as a visitor until 22 April 2008. He overstayed and was arrested by the police on 1 April 2009. He later lodged a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by a creditor named Bijay Shaw due to his inability to repay his debt.  

3.By two decisions dated 25 November 2014 and 9 May 2017, the Director rejected the applicant’s claim. The first decision covered the torture risk[2], BOR 3 risk[3] and persecution risk[4] grounds, and the second decision dealt with the BOR 2 risk[5] ground. By two decisions dated 24 May 2017 and 28 May 2020, the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissed the applicant’s respective appeals against the Director’s first and second decisions. The applicant’s application for leave to judicially review the Board’s second decision was refused by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Lewis Law on 8 October 2025 ([2025] HKCFI 4649).  

4.On 24 December 2025, the applicant wrote to the Director requesting to make a subsequent non-refoulement claim. By letters dated 27 January and 27 February 2026, the applicant, with the assistance of the Duty Lawyer Service, provided supplemental information to the Director in support of his request.  

5.In gist, the applicant’s subsequent claim was based on his fear of being harmed by (1) his creditor; (2) the staff of the Central Bureau of Investigation of India (“CBI”); and (3) online scammers. The applicant also provided to the Director a First Information Report filed against him with CIB and screenshots of WhatsApp messages exchanged between a CBI officer and him.

6.By a decision dated 26 March 2026, the Director refused the applicant’s request to make a subsequent claim (“the Director’s 2026 Decision”). In respect of the applicant’s fear of being harmed by his creditor, the Director considered it was largely a reiteration of the previous claim which had already been considered and determined, and, as acknowledged by the applicant, there was no significant change of circumstances. With regard to the applicant’s fear of harm from the CBI staff, an internet search of the telephone number and profile picture of the WhatsApp account shown in the screenshots provided by the applicant did not show that they had any connection with the CBI. The Director also noted that there were reports of digital arrest scams in India that falsely claimed to be from the CBI.  As to the fear of harm from scammers, the Director did not accept that scammers would target the applicant, and further noted that the applicant had delayed some nine months before making this claim and there was no satisfactory explanation for the delay. The Director further had regard to objective COI and was of the view that the Indian government was willing to protect its citizens and there were many internal relocation options within India. 

7.The applicant did not appeal the Director’s 2026 Decision.

8.On 9 April 2026, the applicant filed a Form 86 and an affirmation to seek leave to apply for judicial review against the Director’s 2026 Decision. He did not provide any grounds for seeking relief in his Form 86 or in his supporting affirmation. He lodged a written submission and attached copies of the First Information Report and screenshots of the WhatsApp message records on his phone.

9.The Judge heard the application at an oral hearing held on 19 May 2026. By a Form CALL-1 dated 23 July 2026, the Judge dismissed the application, finding that the intended judicial review had no realistic prospect of success. In gist, the Judge considered the submissions of the applicant vague and devoid of particulars, the documents submitted by the applicant had already been considered by the Director, and there was no legal error, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the consideration and assessment of the applicant’s request to make a subsequent claim.  

Appeal to this Court

10.By a notice of appeal dated 27 July 2026, the applicant appealed the Judge’s decision to this court.  He stated as his grounds of appeal that he disagreed with the Judge’s decision which did not scrutinise his claim properly, and that the court and the Board should not have rejected his claim because the problems in his country were severe and he would be killed by his enemies if he returned to India.

11.The applicant has lodged written submissions on 7 September 2026 which stated that: (1) the Judge failed to apply the principle of irrationality when the Board had failed to evaluate and find whether there was a consistent pattern of gross and mass violation of human right in India, and also failed to assess whether state protection existed in India; (2) the Judge failed to apply the principle of procedural fairness which required the Director and the Board to give reasons for their decisions, when the Board had failed to give the applicant sufficient opportunity to arrange relevant evidence; (3) the Judge did not analyse the applicant’s claim properly despite the severity of his problems and that all the proof for his claim had been submitted; (4) the Judge failed to apply the high standard of fairness when the decision has the effect of finally disposing of the applicant’s claim, which involved the applicant’s fundamental human right of not to be subject to torture; (5) the Board significantly relied on sources of news that were not officially recognized or were simply hearsay; and (6) the applicant would face hardship and death in his home country as his enemies are now controlling the government and they are still looking for him.

12.At the hearing of the appeal, the applicant indicated he had nothing to say.

Discussion

13.The general principles regarding an appeal in a non‑refoulement case have been set out comprehensively by the Court of Appeal in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at §14.  In sum, the role of the court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal.  The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision being challenged.

14.The applicant’s intended judicial review concerns the Director’s 2026 Decision, which rejected the applicant’s request to make a subsequent claim after his non-refoulement claim was refused. Under section 37ZO(2) of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115, the applicant was required to provide sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that (a) there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn; and (b) the change, when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of the previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. Section 37ZO(3) further provided that, in determining the request, an immigration officer may take into account any finding of credibility or fact made in relation to a torture claim previously made by the applicant.

15.In the Director’s 2026 Decision, the Director took into account the assessment of the applicant’s previous claim, namely that the future risk of harm from the creditor was unlikely to materialise, and that state protection and internal relocation alternatives were reasonably available. The Director found that the applicant had acknowledged in his written response that in relation to his fear of harm from the creditor there have been no significant changes in circumstances, and his current request is largely a reiteration or continuation of his previous claim which had already been considered and assessed.

16.Regarding the applicant’s subsequent claims, on the basis of the supplemental information provided by the applicant, the Director found that the claims of fear from the CBI or the scammers were not credible. The applicant failed to explain the discrepancy in the CBI contact information provided by him, and his delay in making the request in relation to the scammers. The Director concluded that the applicant failed to satisfy the requirements of section 37ZO(2), and further took note that, on the basis of the COI, internal relocation was viable and state protection was available, which would reduce or negate any risk of harm that the applicant might face in his home country.

17.We agree with the Judge that the applicant’s grounds for seeking relief as contained in the Form 86 are general and unparticularized assertions, and fail to disclose any basis for the Court to interfere with the Director’s decision. We would further point out that judicial review is a remedy of last resort and generally an applicant should exhaust all appeal procedures or other alternative remedies before resorting to judicial review.  Accordingly, the applicant ought to have appealed the Director’s 2026 Decision to the Board before applying for judicial review. On this ground, the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is liable to be dismissed.

18.In this appeal, the grounds and submissions raised by the applicant are mostly general assertions that bear no relevance to the facts and the Director’s reasons for refusing his request to make a subsequent claim, or are not borne out by the circumstances of the case. They also do not properly engage with the reasons of the Judge in refusing his application.

19.As the applicant’s appeal is devoid of merits, we dismiss the appeal.

The applicant, unrepresented, acted in person

[1] [2026] HKCFI 3972

[2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383.

[3] This refers to risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383).

[4] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non‑refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

[5] This refers to the risk of being arbitrarily deprived of life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383).