彌敦道安寶樓業主立案法團 v. 寶力置業有限公司 and Others

LDBM 51/2023

[2026] HKLdT 58

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

BUILDING MANAGEMENT APPLICATION NO.51 OF 2023

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BETWEEN

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DECISION

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1.The Applicant seeks the following orders after having discontinued the action on 15 September 2025:

1)  The 1^st , 2^nd and 3^rd Respondents do pay the Applicant’s costs of this action (including all costs reserved) in respect of items 1 – 12 of the 《加建物及改動列表》(as annexed to the Amended Notice of Application filed on 25 February 2025) (“the List”), to be taxed on the District Court Scale if not agreed, with certificate for counsel; and

2)  The 1^st , 2^nd and 3^rd Respondents do pay the Applicant’s costs of this application (including the hearing of 22 July 2026 and all costs reserved), with certificate for counsel.

BACKGROUND

2.The Applicant is the Incorporated Owners of Amber House at Nos 777 - 781 Nathan Road, Kowloon, Hong Kong (“Amber House”). The 1^st Respondent is the owner of Shop B1 (“Shop B1”), 1/F (including the Flat Roof), and 2/F of Amber House (collectively referred to as “the Premises”). The 2^nd Respondent is the tenant in respect of 1/F (including the Flat Roof) of Amber House (“the 1/F Premises), and the 3^rd Respondent is the tenant in respect of the 2/F of Amber House (“the 2/F Premises”).

3.I set out the salient undisputed events as follows:

Date	Event
28 September 1984	The Applicant was incorporated.
11 February 2010	The 1st Respondent became the owner of the Premises.
2016	The 3rd Respondent became the tenant of the 2/F Premises
2019	The 2nd Respondent became the tenant of the 1/F Premises
Since October 2022	The Applicant took various steps asking the Respondents to demolish the structures on the external wall of the Premises.
6 March 2023	The Applicant issued a final letter before action the Respondents.
18 May 2023	The Applicant filed its Notice of Application (Form 29) against the Respondents. In Table 5.1 (as annexed to the Notice of Application), 11 items were described as being the structures referred to in the Notice of Application.
January 2024 – May 2025	The Applicant and 1st Respondent engaged in negotiations and mediation.
8 April 2024	HHJ Wong gave leave to the parties to adduce expert evidence.
25 June 2024	By the parties’ expert reports, the experts confirm 6 structures of those listed in Table 5.1 as annexed to the Notice of Application. have been removed and/or demolished.
Around end of 2024 to early 2025	The 2nd Respondent vacated the 1/F Premises and the 3rd Respondent vacated the 2/F Premises.
25 February 2025	The Applicant amended the Notice of Application (“the Amended Notice of Application”). The List specified 14 structures required to be demolished or removed (of which 11 of the items in the List were those as described in Table 5.1 of the Notice of Application).
Around 25 February to 28 April 2025	The Applicant discovered 4 more structures listed in the List have been removed and/or demolished.
19 June 2025	All remaining structures listed in the Amended Notice of Application were removed and/or demolished.
July 2025	Renovations on the external walls of Amber House commenced.
15 September 2025	Parties appeared before HHJ Lam for a call-over hearing. At the hearing, the Applicant indicated it was minded to take out an application to re-amend the Amended Notice of Application. After discussions, the Applicant discontinued the present action with the following orders made: -  Costs relating to Items 1 – 12 of the List be reserved. -  There be no order as to costs between the Applicant and the 1st Respondent in respect of Items 13 – 14 of the List.
2 February 2026	HHJ Lam fixed the argument on costs relating to Items 1 – 12 of the List to be heard on 26 August 2026, with 3 hours reserved.

4.The Applicant submitted this Tribunal should depart from the usual rule of making a costs order against the party whom discontinued the action (that is, the Applicant) for the following reasons:

1)  The Respondents would not have demolished and/or removed the structures on the List but for the institution of the present proceedings.

2)  The Applicant is to be considered substantially successful in that it has obtained most of the relief set out in the Amended Notice of Application.

3)  If the matter proceeded to trial, the Applicant would have likely been the successful party.

4)  The Applicant is duty bound to enforce against breaches of the Deed of Mutual Covenant (“DMC”).

5.The 2^nd and 3^rd Respondents have not participated in the proceedings since 15 September 2025 and have not filed any submissions or evidence in respect of the Applicant’s application for costs.

6.The 1^st Respondent vehemently objects to the Applicant’s application for costs for the following reasons:

1)  The Applicant cannot be regarded as being substantially successful by the mere reason the structures have now been demolished and/or removed. By the offers of settlement made to the 1^st Respondent , the Applicant has demonstrated their aim was not to remove or demolish the structures but to extract payment from the use of the external wall of the Premises.

2)  The demolition and/or removal of structures by the 1^st Respondent was done in good faith without making any admissions or concessions on the Applicant’s claims.

3)  The 1^st Respondent would have been the successful party if the matter proceeded to trial because the Deed of Mutual Covenant of Amber House (“the DMC”) and the various assignments show the 1^st Respondent has the exclusive use, occupation and enjoyment of the external wall of the Premises.

7.I shall not repeat each and every submission made by the parties’ respective counsel. Suffice to say, I have considered their submissions in reaching my decision and shall only deal with the salient submissions as relevant to the issues.

8.I now proceed to set out the legal principles governing the present costs application.

THE LAW

9.The Tribunal’s power to award costs is set out in section 12 of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance, which states, inter alia:

“(1) The costs of and incidental to all proceedings in the Tribunal are in the discretion of the Tribunal, and the Tribunal has full power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid.

10.In so far as the considerations to be had when considering the issue of costs after discontinuance, I find the legal principles to be succinctly summarized by HHJ S. Lo in the case of Bright China Investment Limited & others v Yip Siu Kwong Timmy & others [2018] HKLdT 46 as follows:

“Legal Principles on Costs

8. Rule 27 of the Lands Tribunal Rules (“LTR”) confers wide discretion on the Lands Tribunal in determining the question of costs upon discontinuance:

“Discontinuance and withdrawal

(1) A party may, without leave of the Tribunal, discontinue the proceedings or withdraw any part thereof by serving a notice to that effect on the other party.

(2)  A party upon whom a notice mentioned in subrule (1) is served may, within 14 days of that service, apply to the Tribunal for an order for costs and, subject to the Landlord and Tenant (Consolidation) Ordinance (Cap. 7), the Tribunal may make such order as it thinks fit.”

. . .

20.  In my view, the correct approach on the question on costs after discontinuance by the applicant in the Lands Tribunal when the matter becomes academic is as follows:

i.  The Lands Tribunal has very wide discretion as to the question of costs under rule 27 LTR including the discretion to apply any rule or rules of Order 62 RHC, if appropriate, pursuant to section 10 of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance;

ii.  The Tribunal has to determine if the matter has become totally or just partly academic. In other words, the fact that there is/are still live issue(s) to be resolved will greatly affect the discretion to be exercised;

iii.  The general rule that a respondent is entitled to costs when the proceedings are discontinued, is not an invariable rule, which may be departed from a case where the discontinuance is due to good reason(s), rather than to any acknowledgment by the applicant of likely defeat;

iv.  The burden is on the applicant to show good reason(s) for displacing the general rule governing costs upon discontinuance;

v.  It is not justified to have a full-blown hearing to hear oral evidence in order to determine the sole question of costs, which is contrary to the objectives of Order 1A, rule 1 RHC, unless in the exceptional circumstances;

vi.  The overriding objective is to do justice between the parties without incurring unnecessary court time and consequential additional costs. The Tribunal may look at all other relevant factors including the merits of the parties in order to achieve this overriding objective;

vii.  When the Tribunal is to consider the merits of the parties, the appropriate merit threshold is whether the party has an arguable case against the other unless the applicant is seeking costs against the respondent, the threshold is that the applicant has to show a strong case that is bound to win;

viii.  At the end, the Tribunal shall make an appropriate costs order which may be no order as to costs or a party shall pay costs or a portion of costs to the other side. 

11.With the above principles in mind, I now proceed to consider the Applicant’s application for costs.  

WHETHER COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS INEVITABLE AND WHETHER THE APPLICANT IS SUBSTANTIALLY SUCCESSFUL

12.The Applicant argued it should recover costs because the Applicant is duty bound to enforce the DMC and therefore must commence the present proceedings in discharge of its duties. Furthermore, because the Respondents have now removed Items 1 – 12 of the List, the Applicant is considered substantially successful in the present action.

13.There cannot be any dispute that the Applicant, being the IO of Amber House, is duty bound to enforce the DMC if there is any breach of the same.

14.It is undisputed the DMC did not assign any shares to the external walls. The DMC read together with the First Assignment does not state that the external walls have been assigned to the first or second owner. The DMC merely granted a right to use the external walls. In such circumstances, I am of the view the Applicant cannot be faulted for believing it had the duty to request the 1^st Respondent and its occupiers to demolish and/or remove the structures on the external wall of the Premises. Whether the Applicant is correct in its belief is another question. Nevertheless, once the Applicant believed the Respondents were in breach of the DMC, the Respondents’ repeated failure to remove or demolish the said structures would inevitably lead to the present proceedings.

15.As for whether the Applicant has obtained most of the relief pleaded in the Amended Notice of Application, the 1^st Respondent does not deny that most of the structures (that is, Items 1 – 12 of the List) have been removed and/or demolished since the commencement of these proceedings. However, the 1^st Respondent submitted the following:

1)  During negotiations between the parties from 2024 to 2025, the Applicant’s initial request to the 1^st Respondent was for payment of fees for the use of the external wall, not for the removal or demolition of the structures. The 1^st Respondent sets out the chronology of the Applicant’s various offers as follows:

a)  23 January 2024: The Applicant proposed the 1^st Respondent to pay $5,000 per month as rent for the use of the external wall.

b)  18 October 2024: The Applicant requested the 1^st Respondent to undertake to never use the external wall of the Premises and not to let its occupiers do the same.

c)  8 May 2025: The Applicant invited the 1^st Respondent to consent to the Applicant’s application to re-amend the Amended Notice of Application by adding an injunctive relief. The Applicant intended to seek an injunction prohibiting 1^st Respondent from erecting or installing any structures on the external wall.

d)  26 June 2025: The Applicant asked the 1^st Respondent to agree the external wall of the 1/F Premises and 2/F Premises is a common area and to undertake not to occupy the external wall of the 1/F Premises and 2/F Premises.

e)  27 August 2025: The Applicant asked the 1^st Respondent to provide a written undertaking not to use the external walls without prior approval.

f)  13 November 2025: Despite having discontinued the proceedings, the Applicant asked the 1^st Respondent to fully settle the renovation expenses of the external walls, failing which the 1^st Respondent “will be deemed to have given up any dispute [sic] the ownership of the external walls”.

2)  The Applicant did not consider asking for an injunction prohibiting the Respondent from using the external walls until 8 May 2025.  

3)  At the time of discontinuance, the Applicant was aware that Items 1 – 12 of the List have all been removed from the external walls. Hence, the Applicant discontinued the proceedings because it was unable to achieve the real purpose of the proceedings, that is, to obtain a usage fee for the usage of the external walls.

4)  Furthermore, the Applicant is unable to prove it would be able to obtain a reinstatement order and/or damages for reinstatement against the 1^st Respondent since all reinstatements done by June 2025 were not done by the 1^st Respondent

16.Having considered the 1^st Respondent’s submissions, the without prejudice letters and the relevant draft consent summons, I do not accept the Applicant’s true aim of the proceedings is to extract a usage fee from the 1^st Respondent for the usage of the external walls.

17.It is clear the relief sought in the original Notice of Application was a mandatory injunction against the Respondents mandating them to remove, inter alia, the structures at Items 1 – 12 of the List.  It is not disputed that at the time of the filing of the Notice of Application, the Respondents did not heed to the Applicant’s requests to demolish and/or remove the same. It was not until almost 2 years later did the Respondents remove / demolish all the structures. However, even after the removal, the 1^st Respondent still refused to reassure the Applicant it would not use the external walls in the future. Therefore, I do not find it peculiar the Applicant considered applying for a prohibitory injunction at the call-over hearing before HHJ Lam.

18.As for the Applicant’s offer of settlement relating to usage fees of the external walls, I do not find anything sinister in such offers. The offers were made in an attempt to avoid litigation. Offers of settlement inevitably involve compromising and offering potentially viable solutions in an attempt to resolve differences in position. I do not see how without prejudice offers of settlement can be seen as an indication of ulterior motives. I do not accept the 1^st Respondent’s submission on any purported “true motive” behind the present proceedings.

19.In so far as the 1^st Respondent alleges the Applicant is unable to prove it would be able to obtain a reinstatement order and/or a damages order against it, it is clear the majority of the Applicant’s pleaded relief is to have the structures demolished and/or removed. Hence the Applicant had achieved its main aim of having the Respondents remove the structures listed in the List.

WHETHER THE APPLICANT WOULD HAVE LIKELY SUCCEEDED AT TRIAL

20.The 1^st Respondent submitted it would have likely succeeded in defending the present proceedings because the 1^st Respondent has the exclusive use occupation and enjoyment of the external wall of the Premises.

21.Having considered the evidence filed by the parties, the DMC, and the assignments, I am of the view the 1^st Respondent would, taking its case at its highest, only be partially successful in asserting exclusive use and occupation over the external wall of the Premises.

22.The First Assignment between Yee Tak Investment Company Limited (as vendor) (“Yee Tak”) and Yau Kit Lai Josephine (as purchaser), in respect of the sale of Flat A of Amber House, does not stipulate the assignment of the external walls or any part thereof. The only mention of the external walls is where Yee Tak reserves a right to use the same. The reservation as set out in the First Assignment is as follows:

“…excepting and reserving unto the Vendor the right to the exclusive use occupation and enjoyment of the external wall at the rear of the said Building from the first floor level to the roof of the said Building and shall have the right to permit its purchaser or licensees of appointees to install chimneys and/or Air-ventilation pipes for he purposes of running the business of a Restaurant…” (own emphasis added)

23.According to the Block Plan attached to the First Assignment, Amber House faces Nathan Road and a narrow scavenger lane. Although not defined in the First Assignment, it is common sense the front of the building is the side facing Nathan Road and the rear of the Amber House is the side facing the scavenger lane.

24.On a reading of the First Assignment, it is clear Yee Tak did not reserve the exclusive right to use the whole of the external walls of the Premises. Yee Tak merely reserved the right to use the external wall from 1^st Floor to the Roof at the rear of the Building (“the Rear External Wall”). There is no mention of reserving the right to use the external wall of the Premises in so far as it faces Nathan Road (“the Front External Wall”).

25.I note the First Schedule of the DMC states the Vendor has the exclusive use and occupation of  “THE WHOLE BUILDING (including all flats, floors, parts, flatted roofs, main roofs, and the exterior walls of the said building.”  However, this must be read in conjunction with the First Assignment.

26.The Court of Final Appeal in the recent case of Donora Co Ltd v Incorporated Owners of Tsuen Kam Centre (荃錦中心業主立案法團) (2024) 27 HKCFAR 166 at paragraph 39 of the judgment, set out the proper approach to be adopted as follows:

“Therefore, the crucial question is not whether the DMC has superseded the Earlier Reservation in the First Assignment. Instead, the correct approach is to read the DMC together with the First Assignment in discerning the common intention of the parties with regard to the external walls. Applying the statutory definition in section 2 of the BMO, the question is when these documents are read together whether they manifest a common intention to specify or designate the external walls as being for the exclusive use, occupation or enjoyment of an owner. These documents should be construed together contextually and purposively in a coherent fashion.”

27.Having considered the DMC and the First Assignment, I am of the view the DMC is consistent with the arrangement set out in the First Assignment. Clause 6 of the DMC is telling in that it refers to “the parties or party hereto who are or is entitled to the exclusive use occupation and enjoyment of the whole or part of the external walls.” This clause clearly envisages the situation where the external walls may not be wholly owned or used by one party. This mirrors the arrangement as set out in the First Assignment where it is clear Yee Tak did not intend to reserve the whole of the external walls for its exclusive use. Furthermore, this arrangement is consistent with the fact that the DMC does not allot separate shares to the external walls.

28.It was not until the Sub-Deed of Mutual Covenant (“the Sub-DMC”) executed by Denz Limited and Union Bank of Hong Kong Ltd (“Union Bank”) on 4 October 1995, was Union Bank given the right to use the Front External Wall of Shop B and B1. The use of the Front External Wall was limited to the shop front area on the Ground Floor as marked X to Y and Y to Z, respectively, on the plan attached to the Sub-DMC. There is no mention of any right to use the Front External Wall above the Ground Floor. Hence, I am of the view the Sub-DMC only permits the 1^st Respondent to use the Ground Floor Front External Wall of Shop B1 as corresponding to the area marked Y to Z on the said plan.

29.However, the 1^st Respondent’s use of the Front External Wall of Shop B1 is not without restrictions. Clause 7 (a) of the Sub-DMC does not permit any structural alterations to Amber House and does not permit the installation or fixture which would affect the supply of electricity or gas to other parts of Amber House. The same clause further restricts the use so that the 1^st Respondent cannot cut or damage any of the main walls or beams or floors of the said Building.

30.Hence even if the 1^st Respondent was entitled to use the Front External Wall of Shop B1, the 1^st Respondent must still prove it did not contravene the Sub-DMC provisions in its use of the same. A determination of whether there has been any structural alteration is clearly a dispute of fact and law.

31.I am of the view that without the benefit of a trial to resolve the issues that require a factual determination, this Tribunal is not in a position to gauge which party is likely to succeed on their respective case in so far as the use of the Front External Wall of Shop B1 is concerned.

32.As for the use of the Front External Wall on the 1^st and 2^nd Floor of Amber House and the use of the canopy areas, subject to the 1^st Respondent’s argument of laches and acquiescence, I fail to see how the 1^st Respondent could maintain the DMC or the various assignments confer the exclusive right to use and occupy the same.

Laches and/or acquiescence

33.The 1^st Respondent submitted its tenants have been using the external wall of the Premises for more than 14 years. Hence the Applicant’s inaction of the years would have constituted acquiescence and/or laches.

34.I shall deal with this point briefly.

35.In the case of Centre Chase Investment Limited v The Incorporated Owners of Castle Peak Road International Industrial Building and anor [2026] HKCFA 26, the Court of Final Appeal opined that in appropriate cases, defence of waiver, estoppel or acquiescence may be available against incorporated owners in matters concerning the enforcement of a DMC. I cite paragraphs 56 and 57 of Mr Justice Lam PJ’s judgment as follows:

“ 56. Hence, the reasoning of Godfrey JA in Hoi Luen Industrial Centre and Chungking Mansions cannot be sustained and should not be followed. In terms of the availability of the defences of acquiescence or waiver as matter of law, there should not be any distinction dependent on whether a claim for enforcement of a deed of mutual covenant is brought by an individual owner or an IO.

57. In the light of this conclusion, it is not necessary to embark on drawing distinctions by reference to the specific type of breach in question. Apart from breaches involving illegality, the doctrines of waiver and acquiescence apply to a claim by an owners’ corporation in the same manner as to a claim advanced by an individual owner. Section 18(1)(c) of the Ordinance does not give rise to a special rule precluding these defences from being relied upon when a claim is brought by an owners’ corporation.”

36.In the case of Mo Ying v Brillex Development Ltd and anor [2014] 3 HKLRD 224, Deputy High Court Judge Eugene Fung SC (as he then was) set out the test for acquiescence and laches as follows:

“156.  The term “acquiescence” is used where a person having a right, and seeing another person about to commit, or in the course of committing an act infringing upon that right, stands by in such a manner as to induce the person committing the act, and who might otherwise have abstained from it, to believe that he assents to its being committed, he cannot afterwards be heard to complain of the act: see De Bussche v Alt (1878) 8 Ch D 286 at 314.

…

159.  Laches essentially consists of a substantial lapse of time coupled with the existence of circumstances which make it inequitable to enforce the claim. Accordingly, delay alone is insufficient to constitute laches. Further, there can be no abandonment of a right without full knowledge of all the relevant circumstances. See Snell’s Equity (32nd edn, 2010) §5-019.

160.  The essence of equitable doctrine of laches was summarised by Lord Selbourne LC in Lindsay Petroleum v Hurd (1874) LR 5 PC 221, 239-240:

“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapses of time and delay are most material.””

37.In the recent case of The Incorporated Owners of Pak Tat Mansion (百達大廈業主立案法團) v Tang Kee Tong Trading as Chili King (鄧屺堂經營麻辣王) [2026] HKCU 3077, HHJ LJ Cruden summarized the principles of acquiescence as follows:

“141. Acquiescence arises if:

(a) There is an assent or lying by to the acts of another person; and

(b) In view of the assent or lying by and consequential acts, it is unjust in all the circumstances to grant the relief in question.

142. The party in the position of the IO, against whom acquiescence is contended should also have knowledge of the other person’s acts:

(a) The degree of knowledge required depends on the circumstances.

(b) It is sufficient that at the relevant time the party concerned knew of the facts or matters that gave rise to his right to equitable relief, even although he may not have fully understood, as a question of law, the rights that he possessed.

(c) It is sufficient that the party has been put on suspicion, that is, that he is aware of sufficient matters to raise in his mind a doubt whether an infringement of his rights has taken place.”

38.The Applicant does not seem to dispute the 1^st Respondent has been using the external wall of the Premises for over 14 years. However, the Applicant explained it had issued oral warnings to the 1^st Respondent throughout the years objecting to the structures erected on the external wall of the Premises. This is disputed by the 1^st Respondent.

39.It is trite that mere inaction or delay itself is insufficient to establish the defence of laches or acquiescence. The 1^st Respondent must also establish the Applicant’s knowledge, and whether the Applicant’s enforcement is unjust. Needless to say, I am unable to resolve the said issues (which would inevitably involve factual disputes) at this juncture without the benefit of a trial. I therefore am unable to gauge with certainty which party would be the more likely to succeed had the matter proceeded to full trial.   

THE TIME LAPSE OF 3 MONTHS FROM REMOVAL OF STRUCTURES TO DISCONTINUANCE

40.The 1^st Respondent further submitted the Tribunal should not grant the Applicant’s costs incurred after 19 June 2025, that is, when the Applicant had knowledge that all structures were removed/demolished by the Respondents.

41.The Applicant conceded there is a time lapse of 3 months from the removal of all structures until it discontinued the action. However, the Applicant does not view this lapse to be so inordinate so as to justify any adverse costs order.

42.I note the Applicant has not provided a clear answer on why they did not discontinue earlier. The Applicant merely explained that since the Applicant needed to consider the matter and seek legal advice, it was not a delay as such.

43.I find the explanation offered unsatisfactory. The Applicant clearly succeeded in having the Respondents remove the Items 1 – 12 of the List. Yet at the call-over hearing before HHJ Lam, the Applicant sought leave (or at least indicated they intended to seek leave) to amend the Amended Notice of Application to add a new injunctive relief. I am of the view that if the Applicant’s aim was to proceed with its claim for damages and the intended prohibitory injunction, it would not have chosen to discontinue the proceedings. It would seem that by discontinuing the action without proceeding on the other relief sought in the Amended Notice of Application, the Applicant’s main aim was to secure the removal of Items 1 – 12 of the List. Once those items were removed, there was no further reason for the Applicant to continue with the present proceedings. In such circumstances and for reasons already set out above, I fail to see how the Applicant can justify its claim for costs after 19 June 2025.

SUMMARY

44.For reasons set out above, I am of the view this Tribunal is not in a position to gauge with certainty which party would be more likely to succeed had the matter gone to trial. Although the Applicant is not bound to win, I am of the view the 1^st Respondent is erroneous in its belief that it had the right of exclusive use and occupation of the canopy areas and the Front External Wall of the 1^st and 2^nd Floor Premises. Having considered the evidence before me and the parties’ submissions, I am of the view that there should be no order as costs of the action, up to and inclusive of 19 June 2025. I therefore refuse the Applicant’s application for costs against the Respondents.

45.In respect of the costs of the action incurred after 19 June 2025 for reasons set out above and in accordance with the legal principles as cited, I see no reason to depart from the usual costs order upon discontinuance.

46.As for the costs of the present application for costs, costs should follow the event and the Applicant should pay the 1^st Respondent’s costs.

47.In so far as the 2^nd and 3^rd Respondents are concerned, because they have not participated in the present proceedings since 15 September 2025, I will make no order as to costs as between the Applicant, and the 2^nd and 3^rd Respondents in respect of the Applicant’s present costs application.

48.I therefore make the following orders:

1)  There be no order as to costs of this action (in so far as it relates to Items 1 – 12 of the List) incurred up to and including 19 June 2025.

2)  Costs of this action (in so far as it relates to Items 1 – 12 of the List) incurred on or after 20 June 2025 be to the 1^st - 3^rd Respondents to be taxed if not agreed, on the District Court Scale, with certificate for counsel.

3)  There be no order as to costs between the Applicant, 2^nd Respondent and 3^rd Respondent in respect of the Applicant’s application for costs.

4)  The 1^st Respondent’s costs of the Applicant’s application for costs be paid by the Applicant, to be taxed if not agreed, on the District Court Scale, with certificate for counsel.

Mr Wong, Iverson C.M., instructed by Messrs C.W. Chan & Co., for the Applicant

Mr Felix H.F. Tsang, instructed by Messrs Gallant, for the 1^st Respondent

The 2^nd Respondent acting in person, absent

The 3^rd Respondent acting in person, absent