Mo Ying v. Brillex Development Ltd and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCA 111/2011 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 5 May 2014 before Deputy High Court Judge Eugene Fung SC.
Common intention constructive trust – bona fide purchaser – estoppel – waiver – acquiescence – laches – beneficial interest – matrimonial home – property dispute – costs – whether wife established beneficial interest under common intention constructive trust – no express common intention found – no inferred common intention from conduct – no detriment – purchaser had constructive notice – defences not made out – wife's claims dismissed – costs order nisi against plaintiff
Legal issues: Common Intention Constructive Trust Issue · Bona Fide Purchaser Issue · Estoppel, Waiver, Acquiescence and Laches Issue
Outcome: Wife's claims dismissed. Costs order nisi against Plaintiff.
Cited by 52 cases · Cites 13 cases
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HCA 111/2011 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 111 OF 2011 ________________
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________________________ A. INTRODUCTION 1.These proceedings arise out of a dispute concerning the ownership of a residential flat at Flat G, 6th Floor, State Theatre Building, Nos 277‑291 King’s Road, Nos 4, 4A‑D, 6, 6A‑D Java Road, Nos 2‑16 Tin Chong Street, Hong Kong (“the Property”). The Property was the former matrimonial home of the plaintiff, Madam Mo Ying (“the Wife”) and the 2nd defendant, Mr Chan Wai Tim (“the Husband”), and was at all material times registered in the Husband’s name. 2.More than two years before the Wife commenced divorce proceedings against the Husband, the Husband sold the Property to the 1st defendant, Brillex Development Limited (“the Purchaser”). In this action, she claims against both the Husband and the Purchaser that she has some beneficial interest in the Property on the basis of a common intention constructive trust. B. THE RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND 3.The facts set out in this section were largely not disputed by the parties. B1. Husband and Wife’s marriage in 1987 4.The Husband and Wife were married in Hangzhou in Mainland China on 29 October 1987. At the time of their marriage, the Husband was residing in Hong Kong and the Wife was residing in the Mainland. B2. Husband’s purchase of the Property in 1988 5.By a sale and purchase agreement dated 31 May 1988, the Husband agreed to purchase the Property for HK$500,000. 6.On 20 June 1988, the Property was assigned to the Husband. 7.The Husband purchased the Property with the assistance of a loan from Hang Seng Finance Limited (“Hang Seng”). On 20 June 1988, a mortgage over the Property was executed by the Husband in favour of Hang Seng to secure the loan (“the Hang Seng Mortgage”). 8.The Hang Seng Mortgage was discharged on 28 December 1993. B3. Wife’s arrival in Hong Kong in 1988 9.In December 1988, the Wife came to reside in Hong Kong from the Mainland. B4. Birth of children in 1990 and 1995 10.The Wife and Husband have two children. On 8 January 1990, the Wife gave birth to a daughter. On 12 November 1995, the Wife gave birth to a son. B5. Husband’s sale of Property to the Purchaser in 2008 and renting of Property from 2008 to 2010 11.By a provisional sale and purchase agreement dated 18 July 2008 (“the Provisional SPA”), the Husband agreed to sell the Property to the Purchaser for HK$1,750,000. The completion date was stated on the Provisional SPA to be 29 October 2008. 12.On 31 July 2008, the Husband and the Purchaser executed the formal sale and purchase agreement in respect of the Property (“the Formal SPA”). 13.By a tenancy agreement dated 9 October 2008 (“the Tenancy Agreement”), the Purchaser leased the Property to the Husband for one year from 29 October 2008 to 28 October 2009 for HK$9,500 per month. 14.On 29 October 2008, the Husband and the Purchaser executed an assignment to assign the Property to the latter (“the Assignment”). 15.After the expiry of the Tenancy Agreement on 28 October 2009, the Purchaser continued to lease the Property to the Husband on a monthly tenancy basis on the same terms as those in the Tenancy Agreement. 16.The Husband continued to pay rent of HK$9,500 to the Purchaser until July 2010. B6. Purchaser’s commencement of possession proceedings in 2010 17.From late July 2010, the Husband defaulted in the payment of rent for the Property to the Purchaser. 18.On 13 September 2010, the Purchaser commenced proceedings in the Lands Tribunal (LDPD 2264/2010) against the Husband to recover vacant possession of the Property (“the Possession Proceedings”). 19.On 5 October 2010, Deputy HH Judge Kot ordered, amongst other things, that vacant possession of the Property be delivered to the Purchaser (“the Possession Order”). 20.On 11 October 2010, the Wife applied to join in the Possession Proceedings as a co‑respondent. B7. Wife’s commencement of proceedings in 2011 21.On 20 January 2011, the Wife commenced the present proceedings against the Purchaser and the Husband. 22.On 30 January 2011, the Wife commenced divorce proceedings (FCMC 1264/2011) against the Husband (“the Divorce Proceedings”). B8. Status of Possession Proceedings and Divorce Proceedings 23.On 25 January 2011, Deputy HH Judge Kot allowed the Wife to be joined as a co‑respondent and ordered that the Possession Order be stayed upon the condition that the Wife should pay HK$9,500 per month from 1 February 2011 as interim payment to be stake‑held by the Purchaser’s solicitors. 24.On 30 August 2011, the Purchaser successfully applied to be joined as an intervener in the Divorce Proceedings. 25.On 25 November 2011, Deputy HH Judge Kot ordered that the interim payment order against the Wife be stayed. 26.I was told by Ms Audrey Eu SC (leading Mr Alan Kwong), counsel for the Purchaser, that both the Possession Proceedings and the Divorce Proceedings are effectively stayed pending the determination of these proceedings. C. THE PLAINTIFF’S CASE 27.The Wife’s pleaded case can be summarised as follows:
D. THE DEFENDANTS’ CASE D1. The Purchaser’s case 28.The Purchaser’s case against the Wife can be summarised as follows:
29.The Purchaser has issued a Contribution Notice against the Husband. In the event that the Purchaser is found to be liable to the Wife, the Purchaser would claim against the Husband to be indemnified against the Wife’s claim and the costs of this action and, a number of other reliefs including (1) damages for breach of the covenants in the Assignment or the Formal SPA, (2) rescission of the Assignment, the Formal SPA and the Provisional SPA, and (3) restitution or refund of HK$1,750,000. D2. The Husband’s case 30.Throughout these proceedings, the Husband was not legally represented. He conducted the trial as a litigant in person. His case is primarily that the Property belonged to him absolutely and there was no common intention between the Wife and him to share the Property beneficially. E. THE ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION 31.There are the following three principal issues in this trial for my determination:
F. THE COMMON INTENTION CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST ISSUE F1. The Wife’s case on Common Intention Constructive Trust 32.In her Statement of Claim, the Wife claimed that it was the common intention of her and the Husband that she would have a beneficial interest in the Property. The following matters were pleaded as support of the alleged common intention:
F2. The relevant legal principles 33.Where a property is vested only in one person’s name (A), the other party (B), in order to establish a beneficial interest, may be able to establish a constructive trust by showing that it would be inequitable or unconscionable for A to claim the entirety of the beneficial ownership. This requires two matters to be proved:
See Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch 638 at 654D‑E (Sir Nicolas Browne‑Wilkinson VC); Luo Xing Juan Angela v Estate of Hui Shui See Willy (2009) 12 HKCFAR 1 at §38 (Ribeiro PJ). This type of constructive trust is generally known as a “common intention constructive trust”. 34.The onus is upon the person seeking to show that the beneficial ownership is different from the legal ownership. Therefore, in sole ownership cases, it is upon the non-owner to show that he/she has any interest at all. See Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432 at §§56 and 68 (Baroness Hale); Jones v Kernott [2012] 1 AC 776 at §17 (Lord Walker & Baroness Hale). F2a. Common intention to share the property beneficially 35.The party alleging the common intention constructive trust must first prove that there was, at any time prior to acquisition or exceptionally at some later date, an agreement, arrangement or understanding reached between the parties that the property is to be shared beneficially: see Lloyds Bank Plc v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107 at 132E‑F (Lord Bridge). 36.The question of whether there was a common intention that each party should have a beneficial interest in the property has been described as the primary or threshold question: see Oxley v Hiscock [2005] Fam 211 at §§47 and 68 (Chadwick LJ); Chan Chui Mee v Mak Chi Choi [2009] 1 HKLRD 343 at §24 (Johnson Lam J). 37.The common intention, or the agreement, arrangement or understanding, between the parties may be based on express discussions between them or inferred from their conduct: see Lloyds Bank Plc v Rosset at 132E‑133B (Lord Bridge) and Oxley v Hiscock at §§36 and 40 (Chadwick LJ). 38.Express common intention:
39.Inferred common intention:
40.In Lloyds Bank v Rosset, Lord Bridge at 132D‑E referred to the distinction between:
F2b. Detriment 41.Once a finding of express discussions is made, the party asserting a claim to a beneficial interest must show that he or she has acted to his or her detriment or significantly altered his or her position in reliance on the agreement, arrangement or understanding in order to give to a constructive trust: see Lloyds Bank v Rosset at 133G (Lord Bridge). 42.There must be some connection between the plaintiff’s conduct and his/her belief that he/she has an interest in the property. To constitute conduct amounting to an acting upon the common intention, it must be conduct on which the plaintiff could not reasonably have been expected to embark unless he/she was to have an interest in the property: see Grant v Edwards at 648G‑H (Nourse LJ). F2c. Quantifying the shares 43.The last question is to find out the extent of the parties’ respective beneficial interests in the property: see Oxley v Hiscock at §69 (Chadwick LJ); Chan Chui Mee at §25 (Johnson Lam J). 44.Where the defined shares have been agreed by the parties, the court will give effect to that agreement. 45.The court cannot impute an intention that is contrary to the evidence: Stack v Dowden at §61 (Baroness Hale). 46.When the evidence does not support an inference as to the shares they intended to take, the court can impute an intention to them. The parties are taken to have intended whatever share was fair having regard to the whole course of dealing between them. See Jones v Kernott at §§31 and 51 (Lord Walker & Baroness Hale) and §64 (Lord Collins). F3. Express Common Intention 47.As I read the Wife’s Statement of Claim, there is no contention that the Husband and Wife had any actual discussions about the sharing of the Property at any time. 48.Moreover, in her cross‑examination by Ms Eu, the Wife accepted that she and the Husband never talked about how much interest she would have in the Property. 49.Nonetheless, in the Wife’s written closing submissions, Mr William Wong SC (leading Mr Justin Lam) contended the Wife’s primary case on common intention constructive trust was based on an express common intention. His contentions are summarised as follows:
50.The discussion between the Husband and Wife was described in the Wife’s written closing submissions as the “most important piece of evidence”. Mr Wong submitted that the Wife was led by the Husband to believe that she had an interest in the Property. He relied heavily on Grant v Edwards and Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338 and submitted that the existence of the Wife’s interest in the Property was established by these two authorities. 51.The Wife’s evidence was that soon after she arrived in Hong Kong, she and the Husband discussed about adding her name as a co-owner of the Property. However, the Husband refused to do so and said to the Wife “it’s troublesome, have to pay” (“好麻煩，要加錢”). In the course of writing this judgment, I listened to the court’s recording of this part of the proceedings and am satisfied that these were the actual words used by the Wife when she told Ms Eu what the Husband said in that discussion. The Wife also told the court in her oral testimony that she did not have anything else to say to the Husband after he uttered those words. The Wife confirmed that that was the only conversation she had with the Husband about the addition of her name to the title of the Property. The Husband accepted the Wife’s account in his cross‑examination. 52.Although the Husband agreed that there was such a conversation between him and the Wife, the Husband said in his oral testimony that the conversation was very brief and only comprised a few exchanges between them. 53.In her witness statement (in the same paragraph where she described the conversation with the Husband about the addition of name as a co-owner of the Property), she said irrespective of whether she was a registered owner, she believed that she would have some “beneficial interest” in the Property by reason of her being the wife of the Husband. In her cross-examination, the Wife explained the use of the words “beneficial interest” in her witness statement and said that those words were used by her lawyers. She said that what she meant was that she believed that she was to have a share in the Property by reason of her marriage. There was no evidence from the Wife that she was led by the words uttered by the Husband in the conversation shortly after December 1988 into thinking that she had an interest in the Property. 54.Mr Wong submitted that Eves v Eves and Grant v Edwards are authorities for the legal proposition that where there was a discussion about the beneficial interest of the property and the legal owner gave an impression to the partner that the latter would have some interest in the property, this would give rise to an express common intention for the purpose of a common intention constructive trust. 55.In Eves v Eves, the parties lived together and intended to marry each other when they were free to do so. A house was purchased in the man’s name. He told the woman that it was to be their house, but that it would have to be in his name alone as she was under the age of 21. This was an excuse to avoid a conveyance into joint names. She made no financial contribution, but did a great deal of work in the house and garden. After they parted, she successfully claimed a share of the beneficial interest in the house. 56.In Grant v Edwards, the defendant told the plaintiff with whom he was cohabiting that her name was not to go on to the title because, if the property were acquired jointly, it would operate to her prejudice in the matrimonial proceedings between her and her husband. The English Court of Appeal concluded that there was a common intention between the parties that the plaintiff was to have some sort of proprietary interest in the house. 57.It is true that the man in both Eves v Eves and Grant v Edwards gave an excuse for not having the house conveyed into joint names, and that the English Court of Appeal in both cases concluded that a common intention existed between the parties for the woman to have some beneficial interest in the house. However, it cannot be right to say that whenever a man makes an excuse for not wanting to convey a property into joint names, the court must necessarily find that there was a common intention between the parties that the property is to be shared beneficially. The fact that a man makes an excuse does not necessarily mean that he accepts that the woman should have a share in the property. Each case must turn on its own facts. This was made abundantly clear in Stack v Dowden at 459B and Jones v Kernott at 794F. 58.One can understand why the excuse made by the man in Eves v Eves and Grant v Edwards led the English Court of Appeal to conclude that there was a common intention to share the house:
59.In my view, the reasoning in Eves v Eves and Grant v Edwards is not applicable to the facts of the present case:
60.Further, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a pre‑acquisition common intention and a post‑acquisition common intention:
61.Having carefully reviewed the evidence, I find that there was a short conversation between the Husband and Wife shortly after December 1988. In this conversation, the Wife asked the Husband to add her name as a co‑owner of the Property. The Husband refused and said to the Wife “it’s troublesome, have to pay” (“好麻煩，要加錢”). The Wife did not have any substantive response and the conversation ended shortly thereafter. I find that the Husband at the time did not want to make the Wife a co‑owner of the Property, and that the Wife knew that this was the case. And that was the reason why the Wife never raised the subject with the Husband again. I do not think the words used by the Husband in fact led the Wife to believe that she was to have some interest in the Property. These findings are made not on the basis of my assessment of the credibility of the Husband and Wife, but on the basis of the Wife’s own evidence, namely that the reason why she believed at the time she had an interest in the Property was due to the fact that she was married to the Husband. Even on her evidence, the Wife never said that she was led by the Husband’s response in this short conversation into thinking that she had or would have an interest in the Property. Insofar as the Wife thought at the time that she had an interest in the Property, I find that her (erroneous) belief was not caused by what the Husband said to her during the short conversation shortly after December 1988. 62.Other than this short conversation between the Husband and Wife shortly after December 1988, I find that there was no actual discussion at any time between the Wife and Husband about whether the Wife would have any beneficial interest in the Property. 63.For the above reasons, there was no express common intention between the Husband and Wife concerning the sharing of the Property at any time. F4. Inferred Common Intention 64.Apart from express common intention, the Wife also alleged that the court should infer from the conduct of the Husband and Wife a common intention that both were to have a beneficial interest in the Property. Mr Wong submitted that he relied on 5 matters to give rise to such inference that both the Husband and Wife would have a beneficial interest in the Property:
65.As far as the second matter is concerned, the Wife alleged that through the existence of “pooled family resources”, she contributed to (1) the purchase price of the Property, (2) the payment of mortgage instalments in relation to the Property, and (3) the household expenses. F4a. Marriage between the Husband and Wife 66.Mr Wong submitted that the court should infer from the existence of the marriage between the Husband and Wife that each of them intended to have a beneficial interest in their matrimonial home. I am unable to accept this submission. 67.The fact that two persons get married and live in a family home (either by themselves or with other family members) does not throw light on their intention in relation to the beneficial ownership of the home. As Lord Bridge said in Lloyds Bank v Rosset at 130D:
68.Therefore, I cannot infer from the marriage between the Husband and Wife and the fact that they used to live together with the children at the Property that the two of them intended to each have a beneficial interest in the Property. F4b. The Wife’s alleged contribution to purchase price of the Property 69.The Wife contended that the Property was purchased with the assistance of the Loan (from the Third Sister):
70.Following from my conclusion that the Wife has not established that any part of the Loan was subsequently applied towards the payment of purchase price of the Property in 1988, I find that the initial deposit of HK$10,000 and the further deposit of HK$40,000 for the purchase of the Property were paid by the Husband using his own money. I also find that the Wife did not in any way contribute to the payment of purchase price when the Property was purchased by the Husband in 1988. F4c. The Wife’s alleged contribution to payment of mortgage instalments 71.It was submitted on behalf of the Wife that “Mortgage payments were … made by the pooled family resources, including rent from the [Property]”. It appears to be the Wife’s contention that the Husband and Wife consciously pooled the family resources together and the mortgage instalments were settled by the Husband using the pooled family resources. If this were true, it might provide a basis for the Wife to contend that she indirectly contributed to the payment of mortgage instalments in relation to the Property. 72.The Wife’s evidence was that the Husband and Wife pooled their income and resources to acquire the Property, to repay the mortgage in respect of the Property, to repay the Loan and for the benefit of the Household. 73.In her evidence, the Wife accepted that all the mortgage instalment payments were made by the Husband. The Wife also gave evidence to say that the rental income of about HK$5,000 per month was used, with the consent of both herself and the Husband, to settle the mortgage instalments as well as some of the household expenses. 74.In her cross-examination, the Wife accepted:
75.There was no dispute that it was the Husband who arranged for all the mortgage instalments to be paid. The Husband gave evidence to this effect at the trial. 76.However, the Husband denied that the mortgage instalments were paid from the rental income. He said he had sufficient money to settle them from his salary. Moreover, he said that all the expenses relating to the Property including management fees, all utility expenses, rates, as well as renovation expenses. The Husband disagreed with the Wife’s contention that there was any pooling of income between him and the Wife, and that there was any discussion between them relating to the application of the rental income. 77.In seeking to resolve the factual differences between the Husband and Wife in this case, I bear in mind the general principles which judges apply as to fact finding and the assessment of credibility. Some of these principles were recently summarised in Hui Cheung Fai v Daiwa Development Ltd (unreported, HCA 1734/2009, 8 April 2014) §§77-80:
78.In the context of the present case, I also bear in mind what Baroness Hale said at §69 of Stack v Dowden where she said the “parties’ individual characters and personalities may also be a factor in deciding where their true intentions lay”. On this point, I have seen how the Wife and Husband gave their evidence from the witness box. Although one’s true character and personality may never be accurately assessed from the witness box, it is fair to say that one aspect of the Husband’s character and personality surfaced fairly clearly during his oral testimony. When the Husband was asked in cross-examination why he did not consult the Wife before signing the Provisional SPA, the Husband said that he just decided to sell the Property and that was his way of doing things. Having seen the Husband giving evidence in the witness box, it appears to me that the Husband is a man of strong character and is not the sort of person who would discuss family matters with the Wife. Indeed, Ms Eu in her closing submissions described the Husband as someone with “a big ego” and “in every respect a male chauvinist”. Bearing in mind that one should not too readily draw conclusions about a witness’ reliability from the assessment of his character, I should emphasise that my assessment of the Husband’s character and personality in this respect is only relevant to my assessment of the inherently likelihood of the Wife’s case concerning the existence of the alleged pooled family resources. 79.Neither the Husband nor the Wife produced any contemporaneous documents to support their respective evidence. 80.On the existing evidence, I find it was inherently unlikely for the Husband and Wife at the material times to have any arrangement or understanding between them that they should pool their resources together to settle the mortgage instalments. First, there was no joint bank account between the Husband and Wife and they kept their income separate at the material times. I am not satisfied that the Wife has proved on a balance of probabilities that the money used by the Husband to pay the mortgage instalments was not his alone but came from some “pooled resources”. Second, in view of the Husband’s strong personality, I find it difficult to imagine that this couple would have had any discussion about how to pool their resources together to settle any payment. Third, I am not satisfied on the evidence that the Husband needed the Wife’s income to settle the mortgage instalments. If the Husband could afford paying the mortgage (as he claimed he could and I do not have sufficient basis to disbelieve him on this point), I find it inherently improbable that he would agree with the arrangement now contended for by the Wife. I find that it is more probable than not that the money for the payment of mortgage instalments came entirely from the Husband’s own resources and not from the alleged pooled resources of the family. I am unable to find that there were any pooled resources in this family. I also find that the Wife did not in any way contribute to the payment of mortgage instalments in respect of the Property. F4d. The Wife’s alleged contribution to household expenses 81.As mentioned above, the Wife alleged that she and the Husband pooled their income together and spent it on the household expenses. By household expenses, I refer to the everyday expenses of the family (eg expenses for grocery), but excluding those relating to the Property (eg utility expenses). 82.A common intention may be inferred where there is an agreement between the parties that the payment by one of them of the household expenses permits the other to pay the mortgage instalments: see Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886 at 903B‑C (Lord Pearson). 83.However, following from my finding that the Husband and Wife did not have any arrangement or understanding between them that they should pool their resources together to settle the mortgage instalments, I also find that there was no arrangement or understanding between them to pool their resources to pay for the household expenses. 84.Mr Wong submitted that the Wife must have paid some household expenses. I have no reason to doubt this. However, I do not think this is a sufficient basis to infer that the Husband and Wife each intended to have a beneficial interest in the Property. This is because the mere payment of household expenses is not an expenditure that is referable to the acquisition of the property: see Burns v Burns [1984] Ch 317 at 328H‑329C (Fox LJ); Grant v Edwards at 647B. I understand from Mr Wong’s submissions that this proposition was accepted by the Wife. 85.For these reasons, I cannot infer from the Wife’s payment of household expenses (ie expenses not related to the Property) that there was a common intention between the Husband and Wife that the Property was to be shared beneficially. F4e. The Husband’s alleged abandonment of the Property in 2005 86.The Wife’s evidence was that the Husband no longer lived at the Property from 2005 onwards and had from that date abandoned the family. The Husband disagreed with the Wife’s evidence. 87.I do not consider this to be a relevant issue. Even if (which I do not find) the Husband did move out of the Property in 2005, that cannot have any bearing as to whether there was or was not any common intention between the Husband and Wife that each of them should have a beneficial interest in the Property. F4f. The Husband’s removal of hi-fi equipment from the Property in 2008 88.In the Husband’s cross-examination, he said that he went back to the Property in 2008 to take away his hi-fi equipment. Mr Wong submitted that this was consistent with the Wife having some interest in the Property. I disagree with this submission. I cannot see how the removal of certain chattels from the Property by the Husband can give rise to an inference that there was a common intention that the Wife would have some beneficial interest in the Property. F4g. The Third Sister’s occupation at the Property 89.The Wife’s evidence was that the Third Sister occupied a room at the Property with her family from around August 1988 to around February 1990. The Husband did not seriously dispute this. Mr Wong submitted that the fact that the Third Sister was allowed to live at the Property suggested that the Wife had an interest in the Property. I also cannot accept this submission. On the Wife’s own case, the Third Sister was staying at the Property as a tenant (even though the rent she would have had to pay was set off against the Loan). I fail to see how the Third Sister’s occupation at the Property can give rise to an inference of common intention that the Wife should have some beneficial interest in the Property. F5. Detriment 90.As mentioned in the above section on the legal principles, in order to establish a common intention constructive trust, a plaintiff must prove that he or she has acted to his/her detriment in reliance on the informal agreement, arrangement or understanding that he/she would acquire a beneficial interest in the property. In case I am wrong in my conclusion on the existence of common intention, I proceed to briefly discuss the element of detriment and make the necessary findings. 91.In the light of my findings made about regarding the absence of any alleged pooled family resources, it seems to me that the Wife can only rely on two matters to support her case on detriment: (1) that she paid for some of the household expenses (ie expenses not related to the Property) prior to 1997; and (2) that she resigned from work in around September 1997. 92.In my view, neither of these matters (whether taken singly or together) can constitute reliance on the part of the Wife to establish a common intention constructive trust. As mentioned above, the sort of conduct sufficient to constitute detriment for the purpose of establishing a common intention constructive trust must be conduct on which the plaintiff could not reasonably have been expected to embark unless he/she was to have an interest in the property: see Grant v Edwards at 648G‑H (Nourse LJ). The two matters relied upon by the Wife cannot be described as such conduct. Indeed, as the Wife herself said so in her cross-examination, the reason why she gave up her job in 1997 was to look after the children and to help them with their studies, and she did not want to regret for not having done so. 93.Accordingly, even if the Wife has established a common intention to share the Property beneficially (which she has not), I would not have been able to find that the Wife acted to her detriment in reliance on any agreement, arrangement or understanding that she would take a beneficial interest in the Property. F6. Quantification of Interests 94.In the light of my conclusion that there was never any common intention between the Husband and Wife that each of them should have a beneficial interest in the Property, the question (“what is the extent of the parties’ respective beneficial interests in the property?”) does not arise. F7. Conclusion 95.It is perhaps worth repeating one part of the Wife’s evidence to illustrate her frame of mind in bringing this claim. As mentioned above, the Wife said that the reason why she believed that she has an interest in the Property was because she was the lawful wife of the Husband. In other words, her belief was not grounded on the existence of some informal agreement, arrangement or understanding between herself and the Husband that she would have an interest in the Property. In these proceedings, this Court is determining the property rights of the parties. Whether or not the Wife should obtain any assets upon her divorce is not a question before this Court. 96.Accordingly, I conclude that: (1) there was no common intention at any time, whether express or inferred, between the Husband and Wife that each should have a beneficial share in the Property; and (2) the Wife did not act to her detriment in the belief that by so acting she was acquiring a beneficial interest in the Property. In these circumstances, it would neither be inequitable nor unconscionable for the Husband (who was the sole registered owner) to claim the entirety of the beneficial ownership of the Property. 97.The Wife’s claim that the Property was held on a common intention constructive trust therefore fails. G. THE BONA FIDE PURCHASER ISSUE G1. The Purchaser’s case 98.The Purchaser contended that it was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and should take free of the Wife’s interest even if she has any beneficial interest in the Property. 99.In the light of my conclusion on the Common Intention Constructive Trust Issue, I do not strictly need to go into the Bona Fide Purchaser Issue. However, in case I am wrong on my views expressed above, I will proceed to discuss this issue and make the necessary findings of fact. Everything I say on the Bona Fide Purchaser Issue in this judgment is therefore on the assumption that the Wife has a beneficial interest in the Property under a common intention constructive trust. G2. The Wife’s case 100.The Wife alleged that the Purchaser was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. Mr Wong submitted that the Purchaser had (1) actual, (2) imputed and (3) constructive, notice of the Wife’s beneficial interest in the Property. 101.The Wife also took a point in her pleadings and evidence that the Property was sold by the Husband to the Purchaser at an undervalue. This point was featured in Mr Wong’s opening submissions and was explored by Mr Wong in his cross-examination of the Purchaser’s witness. At the end of his oral closing submissions, Mr Wong confirmed that the court would not need to be troubled by the Wife’s undervalue point. Accordingly, in this judgment, I have treated the Wife’s undervalue complaint as no longer being an issue between the parties. G3. Different kinds of notice 102.The Wife relied on three classes of notice against the Purchaser and it is important to bear in mind what each class of notice means. 103.I adopt the definition of the three classes of notice used in Snell’s Equity (32nd edn, 2010) §4-027:
G4. The Wife’s case on Actual Notice 104.The Wife alleged that the Purchaser had actual notice of the Purchaser’s interest in the Property. 105.In her closing submissions, Mr Eu objected to the Wife’s allegation of actual notice on the basis that it was not pleaded by the Wife. Ms Eu took me to the relevant parts of the Wife’s pleadings to demonstrate that there was never any pleaded case that the Purchaser had actual notice of the Wife’s interest in the Property. In response, Mr Wong submitted that the case of actual notice was pleaded and took me to a paragraph in the Wife’s Reply to the Purchaser’s Defence where the Wife pleaded “[the Purchaser] had notice of the [Wife’s] occupation of the [Property] and her refusal to sell the [Property] through its agent Mr Chu and/or Yue Kee Estate Agent”. In my view, reading this paragraph as a whole, it is clear that it was not a plea of actual notice, but a plea of imputed notice. The Wife in that paragraph relied on the notice of the Purchaser’s agent to support her case of notice; there was no plea that the Purchaser’s agent actually told the Purchaser what the agent knew. I consider Ms Eu’s objection on pleading to be well‑founded. 106.Be that as it may, I do not think the point would have assisted the Wife even if the case of actual notice had been pleaded. This is because I do not consider that the Wife has proved that the Purchaser actually knew about the Wife’s interest in the Property. Ms Sy Lai Li (“Ms Sy”) gave evidence for the Purchaser and her evidence was that the Purchaser never knew, or was told by anyone, whether the Wife had any interest in the Property. I accept her evidence in this regard. 107.If (contrary to my conclusion on the Constructive Trust Issue) the Wife has a beneficial interest in the Property, I would have concluded that the Purchaser did not at the material times have actual notice of the Wife’s interest in the Property. G5. The Wife’s case on Imputed Notice 108.The Wife’s case on imputed notice was that the Purchaser’s estate agent, Mr Chu, had notice of the Wife’s interest in the Property and such notice ought to be imputed to the Purchaser. G5a. The relevant principles on imputed notice 109.The general principles on imputed notice are summarised in Snell’s Equity (32nd edn, 2010) §4-036:
110.Ms Eu submitted that an estate agent in Hong Kong in law is not a true agent of the principal, but only a middle man. She relied on what Godfrey J said in Cheng Kwok-fai v Mok Yiu-wah [1990] 2 HKLR 440 at 445F:
111.This passage was relied upon by Chung J in Tai Sang Kung Ltd v Paraking Ltd [2001] 4 HKC 61 at 77D‑E to conclude that the estate agent on the facts of the case only acted as an “introducer” of the relevant property. 112.In Yili Concepts (HKG) Ltd v Lee Wai Chuen (unreported, HCA 12911/97, 29 September 2000), DHCJ Kwan (as she then was) at pages 21 and 22 referred to Cheng Kwok Fai and said:
113.In my view, I consider what Godfrey J was saying in the above-quoted passage in Cheng Kwok Fai was to explain that an estate agent in Hong Kong is not an agent in the strict legal sense. An agent in the strict legal sense is a person who acts on behalf of the principal so as to affect the principal’s legal relations with a third party. In a case of true agency, where the agent is effectively the alter ego of the principal, so that the agent’s acts are treated as the principal’s acts, it is not surprising that the agent’s knowledge is similarly attributed to the principal. However, an estate agent in Hong Kong cannot affect his principal’s legal relations with a third party, and is therefore not an agent in the strict legal sense. This was explained by Lord Millett NPJ in ING Baring Securities (HK) Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2007) 10 HKCFAR 417 at §§137-138:
I believe this was why Godfrey J in Cheng Kwok Fai described a Hong Kong estate agent as a “broker”. 114.Accordingly, given that the Wife relied on the notice of an estate agent in the present case, it seems to me that she cannot simply rely on the general principle that “any actual or constructive notice which an agent has … is normally imputed to his principal”. The Wife must rely on something more to impute the notice of Mr Chu or Yue Kee to the Purchaser. Mr Wong appeared to recognise this and submitted that the question to ask was whether Yue Kee had actual or ostensible authority to receive information on behalf of the Purchase in relation to the transaction. 115.The question posed by Mr Wong appeared to be taken from what Hoffmann LJ said in El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc [1994] 2 All ER 685 at 703c-e:
116.Mr Wong then submitted that the question he posed must be answered in relation to the specific facts of the case. 117.In cases where an agent’s function is to receive communications on behalf of his principal, one can readily understand why the knowledge of the agent would be imputed to the principal. However, I have some doubt as to whether such a principle applies to an estate agent in Hong Kong. In a typical case, an estate agent’s function is to perform a service by introducing a counter-party to his principal so as to enable his principal to conclude a particular transaction with that counter-party; his function is not to receive communications on behalf of his principal. No cases have been cited to suggest that an estate agent in Hong Kong has the general authority to receive communications for his principal. Accordingly, I am unable to accept Mr Wong’s submission that notice of an estate agent in Hong Kong is imputed to his principal. G5b. Findings of fact 118.In any event, I proceed to make the relevant findings of fact in the event that I am wrong in my conclusion above that notice of an estate agent is not imputed to his principal. 119.The Wife’s evidence was that after she learned of the Husband’s sale of the Property, she went to Yue Kee and told Mr Chu that she did not approve of the sale and would not move out of the Property. The Wife said that she expressly told Mr Chu to pass on the message to the Purchaser. The Wife also said that during that visit, Mr Chu’s daughter, Ms Chu Lai Sheung (“Ms Chu”), told the Wife that this had nothing to do with them and asked the Wife to discuss with the Husband. 120.Before the trial, Mr Chu prepared a witness statement for the Purchaser (on 3 April 2012). In the Purchaser’s written opening submissions, Ms Eu informed the court and the Wife that Mr Chu was unfit to attend the trial to give evidence. A letter from Mr Chu’s doctor (dated 28 February 2014) was produced to certify that Mr Chu was suffering from senile dementia and that he was not able to present himself in court. On the first day of the trial, Ms Eu asked the court for leave to allow Ms Chu to file a witness statement for the Purchaser. Mr Wong did not object to the application. I accordingly gave leave to the Purchaser to file Ms Chu’s witness statement. Ms Chu attended the trial and gave evidence on behalf of the Purchaser. 121.Ms Chu’s evidence was that: (1) the Wife did pay a visit to Yue Kee on one occasion and asked Mr Chu whether the Property had been sold; (2) Mr Chu told the Wife that the Husband had already sold the Property for HK$1,750,000 and that the Provisional SPA had already been signed; and (3) the Wife left Yue Kee without protest or making any objection to the sale. In her cross-examination, Ms Chu said that she told the Wife on that occasion to ask the Husband about the sale. 122.Mr Wong submitted that Ms Chu’s evidence should not be believed because it was inherently improbable for the Wife to visit Yue Kee and not object to the sale of the Property. I do not find it inherently improbable for the Wife not to have made any objections during her visit to Yue Kee. I do not see why a person would necessarily make objections to an estate agent about the sale of a property when the person knew that the provisional sale and purchase agreement has already been signed. 123.Mr Wong further attacked Ms Chu’s credibility by suggesting that there was no reason for her to tell the Wife to ask the Husband about the sale unless Ms Chu knew that there was already a dispute between the Husband and Wife over the sale of the Property. I do not think this is necessarily correct. As submitted by Ms Eu, as Ms Chu did not understand why the Wife would approach an estate agent to ask whether the Husband had sold the Property, it was only natural for Ms Chu to tell the Wife to talk to the Husband about the sale. 124.Moreover, I bear in mind that Ms Chu is a completely independent witness and I can see no good reason for her to lie in her evidence. 125.On the other hand, there are unsatisfactory aspects of the Wife’s evidence regarding her visit to Yue Kee:
126.For these reasons, as far as the Wife’s visit to Yue Kee is concerned, I prefer Ms Chu’s evidence to that of the Wife. I find that on a day between 18 July 2008 (the date when the Provisional SPA was signed) and 29 October 2008 (date of completion of the sale and purchase of the Property), the Wife visited Yue Kee and spoke to Mr Chu. On that occasion, the Wife asked Mr Chu whether the Property had been sold. Mr Chu told the Wife that the Husband had already sold the Property for HK$1,750,000 and that the Provisional SPA had already been signed. Having heard Mr Chu’s response, the Wife left Yue Kee without protest or making any objection to the sale. 127.It follows that I am unable to find that Mr Chu was told by the Wife that she would not move out of the Property or that she objected to the sale of the Property by the Husband. G5c. Conclusion on imputed notice 128.If (contrary to my conclusion on the Constructive Trust Issue) the Wife has a beneficial interest in the Property, I would have concluded that the Purchaser did not at the material times have imputed notice of the Wife’s interest in the Property. G6. The Wife’s Case on Constructive Notice G6a. The relevant principles 129.According to Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property (7th edn, 2008) §8-018, a purchaser has constructive notice of a fact if he:
The learned editors also say that a purchaser’s ordinary duties fall into two main categories: inspection of the land, and investigation of the vendor’s title. 130.As far as an inspection of the land is concerned, if the land is occupied by a person jointly with the vendor, this occupation will be constructive notice of that person’s rights such as any rights stemming from a contribution to the purchase price: Wong Chim-ying v Cheng Kam-wing [1991] 2 HKLR 253 at 273C-G (Clough JA). G6b. The Purchaser’s position 131.There was no dispute that the Purchaser did not inspect the Property at any time prior to the completion of the purchase. Ms Sy’s evidence was:
132.Ms Eu accepted that Wong Chim Ying remains good law. She submitted that there is no direct authority suggesting how the legal principle should apply in situations where the purchaser and vendor enter into a post-completion rental arrangement. She further submitted that in a rental case, the tenant has to pay rent every month and there would be a repeated and renewed acknowledgement and representation every month that the landlord is the owner and entitled to possession. I am unable to accept these submissions:
G7. Conclusion 133.Accordingly, if (contrary to my conclusion on the Constructive Trust Issue) the Wife has a beneficial interest in the Property, I would have concluded that the Purchaser had constructive notice of the Wife’s interest and would not be a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. H. THE ESTOPPEL, WAIVER, ACQUIESCENCE AND LACHES ISSUE 134.The Purchaser raised a number of distinct defences to defeat the Wife’s claim. The Purchaser contended that by reason of the Wife’s conduct, she is now barred from claiming her beneficial interest in the Property. As pointed out by Ms Eu, these defences are only applicable if (1) the Wife succeeds in her claim to establish that she has some beneficial interest in the Property, and (2) the Purchaser is not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. 135.In view of my conclusion above on the Common Intention Constructive Trust Issue, these defences strictly do not arise. On the assumption that I am wrong on that issue, I now proceed to discuss the various defences and make the necessary findings. Again, everything I say on this issue is on the assumption that the Wife has a beneficial interest in the Property under a common intention constructive trust. Both Mr Wong and Ms Eu referred me to numerous authorities on this issue. However, since what I say will necessarily be obiter, I hope I will be forgiven for referring to only some of the authorities. H1. The Relevant Evidence and Findings of Fact 136.There are two areas in which I need to make findings of fact for the purpose of making a determination on the application of the defences relied upon by the Purchaser: (1) the Wife’s knowledge of the sale of the Property by the Husband, and (2) the Wife’s knowledge of the lease of the Property entered into by the Husband. H1a. Wife’s knowledge of sale of the Property 137.The Wife’s own evidence was that she knew about the sale of the Property by the Husband on 1 October 2008. The Husband, on the other hand, said in evidence that he told the Wife about the sale of the Property within a few days of his signing of the Provisional SPA on 18 July 2008. It is fair to record that the Husband did say in cross-examination that he was not sure about the exact timing. 138.The exact date on which the Wife learned about the sale of the Property is not important. It is sufficient for me to find that the Wife knew about the sale of the Property on 1 October 2008 at the latest. H1b. Wife’s knowledge of lease of the Property 139.The Wife’s evidence was that she did not know about any lease arrangement in relation to the Property until she received an eviction notice in September 2010. 140.I am unable to accept the Wife’s evidence that she only found out that she was occupying a leased property for the first time in September 2010:
141.Accordingly, I find that it is more likely than not the Wife knew in October 2008 or shortly thereafter that there was some lease arrangement in respect of the Property. H2. Estoppel 142.The Purchaser contended that if the Wife had a beneficial interest in the Property, she had a duty to speak out in the circumstances of this case and having failed to speak out, she is now estopped from asserting her interest. 143.Ms Eu appeared to rely on both the doctrine of estoppel by representation and the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. 144.The essential elements of estoppel by representation are (1) a representation or conduct amounting to a representation intended to induce a course of conduct on the part of the person to whom the representation is made, (2) an act or omission resulting from the representation, whether actual or by conduct, by the person to whom the representation is made, and (3) detriment to such person as a consequence of the act or omission. See Greenwood v Martins Bank Ltd [1933] AC 51 at 57 (Lord Tomlin). 145.The essential elements of proprietary estoppel have been described as follows:
See Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [1982] QB 133 at 144 (Oliver J); Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776 at §29 (Lord Walker); Chan Gordon v Lee Wai Hing [2011] 2 HKLRD 506 at §28 (DHCJ Au‑Yeung). 146.I should say at once that I find it somewhat odd for the Purchaser to rely on the doctrine of proprietary estoppel to seek to defeat the Wife’s claim. It is clear from the description of the elements of this doctrine that it is used as a cause of action (and not as a defence) to enforce or grant rights to those who have been induced or invest in or improve property owned by others either as a consequence of their own mistake or by direct encouragement or informal agreement. I am therefore not convinced that proprietary estoppel can be used as a defence against the Wife in this case. In any event, the three broad elements of proprietary estoppel appear to coincide closely with the elements of estoppel by representation, and it is not clear what additional benefit one can derive from the reliance on proprietary estoppel as a defence if the doctrine of estoppel by representation is applicable. For these reasons, I will confine my discussion on the Purchaser’s defence of estoppel by representation in the remaining part of this section. 147.Ms Eu submitted that a representation can be made by way of silence or inaction. She relied on the proposition that the duty necessary to found an estoppel by silence or acquiescence arises where a reasonable man would expect the person against whom the estoppel is raised, acting honestly and responsibly, to bring the true facts to the attention of the other party known by him to be under a mistake as to their respective rights and obligations: see Spencer Bower: The Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation (4th edn, 2004) p 48 citing Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v Twitchings [1977] AC 890 at 903F (Lord Wilberforce). Ms Eu also submitted that the duty to speak can arise in situations where there was no contractual or pre‑existing relationship between the parties: see Fung Kai Sun v Chan Fui Hing [1951] AC 489 at 501‑503 (Lord Reid). 148.On the facts of the present case, I do not think the authorities cited by Ms Eu assist the Purchaser. It cannot be disputed that the Purchaser had a duty to make inquiry, including a duty to inspect the Property (see Section G above). In view of this, I do not think a duty to speak could be imposed on the Wife to inform the Purchaser of her interest in the Property. Given that the Purchaser had failed to inspect the Property in the first place (and had therefore acquired constructive notice of the Wife’s interest in the Property), the Purchaser could not “reasonably assume” (using the words of Lord Wilberforce in Moorgate v Twitchings) that the Wife would not claim an interest in the Property. 149.Ms Eu also relied on the case of Midland Bank Ltd v Farmpride Hatcheries Ltd (1981) 260 EG 493 to found a case of estoppel. In that case, a company mortgaged its property to a bank and it was held that a contractual licensee who was in occupation of a house under a licence from the company, of which he and his wife were in complete control, to be estopped from relying on the constructive notice doctrine against the bank. This was because he had “set up a smoke-screen designed to hide even the possible existence of some interest in himself which could not derogate from the interest of the company ostensibly conferred by the mortgage” (Shaw LJ at 497). In the present case, I do not find that the Wife deliberately withheld information about her interest in the Property. I do not think this case assists the Purchaser. 150.As the Purchaser has failed to establish the first element for an estoppel by representation (namely the existence of a representation), I do not propose to go on to discuss the remaining elements. I conclude that the Purchaser’s defence of estoppel has not been made out. H3. Waiver 151.Further, Ms Eu submitted that the Wife’s inaction and/or conduct constituted a pure waiver or a waiver by election. 152.Pure waiver can be summed up as “the unilateral divesture of certain rights” or “the abandonment of a right in such a way that the other party is entitled to plead the abandonment by way of confession and avoidance if the right is thereafter asserted”: see S Wilken QC & K Ghaly, The Law of Waiver, Variation, and Estoppel (3rd edn, 2012) §4.28. 153.The principles of waiver by election were summarised by Yuen JA in Large Land Investments v Cheung Siu Kwai [2003] 1 HKLRD 313 at §15:
154.It is not entirely clear from the Purchaser’s case as to what was alleged to have been waived by the Wife. Insofar as the Purchaser contended that the subject matter of the waiver was the Wife’s interest in the Property, it seems clear to me that there could not have been any such waiver because the Wife has not satisfied the relevant formality requirements to dispose of her beneficial interest in land. Insofar as the Purchaser contended that the subject matter of the waiver was the Wife’s right to pursue her claim as a beneficial owner of the Property, I do not consider that the facts of the case support this contention. There was nothing to suggest that the Wife actually knew of the identity of the Purchaser before she received the eviction notice in September 2010. Ms Eu suggested that the Wife could have found out the identity of the Purchaser from the estate agents, or could have approached various government departments or other people for assistance. That may be true, but I do not think the law requires someone like the Wife to have made enquiries about the identity of the Purchaser in the circumstances of the present case. No authorities have been cited to me to suggest that the Wife should have been fixed with constructive knowledge of the identity of the Purchaser. As the identity of the Purchaser was a pertinent fact which gave rise to the existence of her right of claim, the Wife cannot be said to have waived her right to pursue a claim against the Purchaser. H4. Acquiescence 155.Moreover, Ms Eu submitted that the Wife’s inaction and/or conduct amounted to acquiescence. 156.The term “acquiescence” is used where a person having a right, and seeing another person about to commit, or in the course of committing an act infringing upon that right, stands by in such a manner as to induce the person committing the act, and who might otherwise have abstained from it, to believe that he assents to its being committed, he cannot afterwards be heard to complain of the act: see De Bussche v Alt (1878) 8 Ch D 286 at 314. 157.On the facts of this case, I do not think it can be said that the Wife’s inaction had induced the Purchaser into acquiring the Property. H5. Laches 158.Finally, Ms Eu submitted that the Wife’s inaction and/or conduct amounted to laches. 159.Laches essentially consists of a substantial lapse of time coupled with the existence of circumstances which make it inequitable to enforce the claim. Accordingly, delay alone is insufficient to constitute laches. Further, there can be no abandonment of a right without full knowledge of all the relevant circumstances. See Snell’s Equity (32nd edn, 2010) §5-019. 160.The essence of equitable doctrine of laches was summarised by Lord Selbourne LC in Lindsay Petroleum v Hurd (1874) LR 5 PC 221, 239-240:
161.Mr Wong submitted the doctrine of laches has no application where the Statute of Limitations applies. Specifically, he submitted that laches has no application in the present case because of the application of section 20(2) of the Limitation Ordinance (Cap 347) which expressly allows the Wife to pursue her claim for the beneficial interest in the Property within six years from the date on which the right of action accrued. 162.In reply, Ms Eu submitted that section 20(2) of the Limitation Ordinance has no application in the Wife’s claim against the Purchaser. She submitted that the “action by a beneficiary to recover trust property” referred to in section 20(2) is only intended to cover a claim by a beneficiary against the trustee for recovery of trust property, and has no application in the present case where the Wife is claiming against a third party non‑trustee. 163.Given that section 20(1)(b) already provides for a claim by a beneficiary to recover trust property from the trustee, it would be odd for section 20(2) to repeat the same claim but to provide for a different limitation period. It seems to me that on a proper construction of section 20 of the Limitation Ordinance, the words “action by a beneficiary to recover trust property” should be construed to mean an action against non-trustees. I note that the learned editors of Lewin on Trusts (18th edn, 2006) §44‑19 also take the same view. 164.Accordingly, it seems to me that Mr Wong’s point that the defence of laches cannot apply to the Wife’s claim against the Purchaser is a valid one. 165.In any event, even if I am wrong on the construction of section 20(2), laches would not have assisted the Purchaser because I do not think that (1) there had been a substantial lapse of time; and (2) the circumstances of the case do not appear to me to be inequitable for the Wife to enforce her claim against the Purchaser. H6. Conclusion 166.Accordingly, if (contrary to my conclusion on the Constructive Trust Issue) the Wife has a beneficial interest in the Property, the Purchaser’s defences in estoppel, waiver, acquiescence and laches would have failed. I. CONCLUSION 167.For all of the above reasons, I dismiss the Wife’s claims against the Purchaser and the Husband. The issues in the Purchaser’s Contribution Notice against the Husband do not arise. I make an order nisi that the costs of the defendants in this action are to be paid by the plaintiff, to be taxed if not agreed. The costs order nisi shall be made absolute 14 days from the date of this judgment. The Wife’s own costs are to be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations, Cap 91A.
Mr William Wong SC leading Mr Justin Lam, instructed by Fairbairn Catley Low Kong, assigned by Director of Legal Aid, for the plaintiff Ms Audrey Eu SC leading Mr Alan Kwong, instructed by Poon, Yeung & Li, for the 1stdefendant The 2nddefendant appeared in person | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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