Nguyen Thi Tuong and Another v. Director of Immigration
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HCAL 1538/2026 [2026] HKCFI 5821 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1538 of 2026 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
THE APPLICATION 1.The applicants are mother (“the mother”) and daughter born on 16 January 2015 (“the daughter”). The mother is acting for herself and as the next friend of the daughter. The mother’s facts in support of her claim form the basis of their joint application. The husband was also a party in the previous claim. The mother told the Director that the husband is now hiding. He is not a party in this application. 2.This is the applicants’ joint application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 25 August 2025 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing their subsequent claim of HCAL 847 of 2019 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 3.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicants to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against them since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicants may take out further proceedings to assert their non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 4.The applicants appeared before the Court on 7 October 2026 and the mother admitted that she relied upon the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application. The procedural history 5.The applicants are nationals of Vietnam. They applied to the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) for non-refoulement protection on the basis that, if refouled, the mother will be harmed or killed by her creditor because she was unable to repay her debt, and the daughter will also be harmed. 6.The Director rejected their claim for the reason that their claim was not substantiated. 7.They appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims (“the Board”). Having considered the evidence, the Board dismissed their appeal. 8.They appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed their appeal on 31 July 2024. 9.They issued a Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. Their application was refused by the Court of Appeal on 25 September 2024. 10.They applied to the Court of Final Appeal for leave to appeal and their application was dismissed on 29 April 2026. 11.By letter received by the Director on 14 May 2026, the applicants applied for subsequent claim under section ZO of the Ordinance. 12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused their application. The subsequent claim application 13.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, they have to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 14.The mother has submitted additional information to the immigration officer to support her application. Having considered the additional materials and the relevant country of origin information relevant to the application, the immigration officer came to the conclusion that the mother is relying the same reasons in her previous claim in support of this subsequent claim. 15.The immigration officer therefore found that the applicants failed to satisfy the conditions under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and dismissed their application for subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 16.The applicants filed Form 86 on 3 September 2026 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 17.The mother has attached a statement of grounds to Form 86, in which she said that the Director’s Decision is wrong and unreasonable without considering their right to life; that the Director did not consider state acquiescence; that the Director had placed too much reliance on the country-of-origin information without considering her personal background and experience; that the Director was unfair for requiring her to answer questions that she was not in a position to offer any response; that the Director had failed to consider her evidence and arguments, without considering corruption and incompetence of the administration of the government. Discussion 18.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 19.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the mother admitted that she relied on the same reasons in her previous claim in support of this subsequent claim. In view of her admission before the Court, her reasons under paragraph 17, which are bare assertions, have become insignificant. In fact, the application for subsequent was without a hearing. 20.For the reasons given by the immigration officer, the immigration officer took the view that the applicants failed to satisfy the conditions in support of their application for subsequent claim. 21.The applicants have not raised any valid ground to challenge the Director’s Decision. 22.I find that there is no realistic prospect of success in the applicant’s subsequent claim. I dismiss their joint application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 23.The Director’s findings show that the applicants are attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 24.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 25.In my view, the fact that the applicants are entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as their intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 26.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicants to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The mother admitted that she relied on the same fear of her creditor in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application. 27.The mother has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the mother said she had nothing to say. 28.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicants would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 29.The applicants’ application is dismissed. 30.RPO in terms of paragraph 28 be made against the applicants. 31.I shall treat non-compliance with Order 80, rule 2 of the RHC in these proceedings as a mere irregularity without rendering the daughter’s application a nullity. Dated the 21st day of October 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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