Lam Ka Wai Rebecca and Another v. Lam Jenny and Another

HCA 43/2024

[2026] HKCFI 5869

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 43 OF 2024

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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Introduction and Background

1.I have before me an appeal by the Defendants (collectively, “Ds”) against the Order of Master Cruden (“the Master”) dated 21 April 2026 (“the Master’s Order”) ordering inter alia that leave be granted to parties to call Mr Anthony Ranauro of Alvarez & Marsal (“A&M”) in the place of Mr Jon Nicklin as the single joint expert (“SJE”) to address the Expert Issue as defined in the Order of Master MK Liu dated 11 December 2024, namely, the market value of the Plaintiffs’ (collectively, “Ps”) respective shares in Rainbow Rich Industrial Limited (“Rainbow Rich”) at the time when two sale and purchase agreements were respectively executed by: (i) the 1^st Plaintiff, the 2^nd Defendant and Lam Calina Ka Ling; and (ii) the 2^nd Plaintiff, the 1^st Defendant and Lam Philip Kai Tak, on or about 11 June 2019 (the valuation date). 

2.In this action, Ps have alleged inter alia that Ds misrepresented the value of Rainbow Rich’s assets leading Ps to sell their shares at less than a fair price.

3.Mr Nicklin was appointed by Master MK Liu after a contested hearing on 11 December 2024, at which Ps and Ds agreed to the appointment of a SJE in principle but disagreed on the candidate (Mr Nicklin was Ps’ proposed candidate). 

4.After Mr Nicklin produced his expert report on 18 April 2025 (“the 1^st Report”), he informed the parties by email of 24 December 2025 of his resignation as role as expert and that he was no longer able to continue to act as the court-appointed expert.  He clarified, by email of 29 December 2025, the reason for resignation as court-appointed expert was because he ceased to be employed by A&M for personal reasons, is no longer working as a forensic accountant or quantum expert and would be working full-time in property-related business in the EU from late January 2026.

5.The 1^st Report stated inter alia that the valuation was subject to several limitations in terms of financial documents and explanations provided to him, in particular, information he had requested but was not provided in relation to Rainbow Rich’s subsidiaries (“GTES”, “Jintian” and “Jinzhang”) which were discussed in section 8 of the 1^st Report. 

6.On 7 November 2025, pursuant to the order of Master Maurice Lam dated 7 August 2025, Ps filed the 3^rd Supplemental List of Documents (“3^rd SLOD”) which disclosed further documents (items 74-77).  As indicated by Mr Keith Chan, counsel for Ps, in the Skeleton Submissions for Ps, Ps seek leave for Mr Ranauro to file a supplemental report to: (1) adopt the 1^st Report to the extent appropriate; and (2) take into account item 76 (audited financial statements of Jintian for the financial years of 2017, 2018 and 2019) and item 77 (unsigned consolidated financial statements of GTE for the years ended 31 December 2021 and 31 December 2022) of the 3^rd SLOD (but not items 74 to 75).

7.However, Mr Patrick Siu together with Mr Adrian Lee, counsel for Ds, submitted that: (1) the further documents disclosed in the 3^rd SLOD do not justify any supplemental report; and (2) even if a supplemental report is to be ordered, it should be limited to the impact of the documents disclosed in the 3^rd SLOD (as determined by this court) on the 1^st Report[1] and it would be improper to appoint Mr Ranauro.  Although in the Skeleton Submissions for Ds (see §88.1), it had been submitted that Mr Jonathan Chan of PWC should be appointed, at the hearing of this appeal, Mr Siu orally clarified that given the lack of information about the proposed fees of the parties’ respective proposed experts, directions should be given inter alia for parties to jointly write to the Court to identify their agreed SJE and failing agreement, parties should nominate 2 experts (with their curriculum vitae (“CV”) and fees to be charged) for selection by the Court.

Applicable Principles and Discussion

8.It is trite that an appeal from a master to a judge in chambers is dealt with by way of an actual rehearing of the application which led to the order under appeal, and the judge treats the matter as though it came before him or her for the first time: see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026, Vol.1, §58/1/2. 

9.However, Mr Chan submitted that, by reference to the cases of The Yin Nin Savings Mortgage Loan & Land Investment Company Limited & Anor v Occupier(s) of Premises & Ors [2026] HKCFI 2224 at §12 per Cheng J, Peking University Resources (Holdings) Company Limited v Peking University Resources Group Co Ltd & Ors [2025] HKCFI 2642 at §6 per DHCJ Alan Kwong and the authorities cited therein, a judge will not lightly intervene in a master’s case management decision unless there are good reasons to do so.  

10.On the other hand, Mr Siu submitted that the matter was not that clear-cut.  All the cased cited by DHCJ Alan Kwong, he submitted, could be traced back to the decision of Bharwaney J in Ng Wing Man v Everbest Port Services Limited (unrep) HCPI 780/2012, 21 March 2013, where the learned judge, by reference to the principles reiterated by Kwan JA (as she then was) in relation to appeals to the Court of Appeal from case management decisions in Wong Kar Gee Mimi v Severn Villa Ltd [2012] 1 HKLRD 887 at 897, said that “a cogent argument could be advanced that, just as a judge in chambers should not allow an appeal against the costs order made by a master unless it was unreasonable or erred in law, likewise, a judge in chambers ought not to allow appeal against a case management decision of the master”.  However, as Mr Siu pointed out, the learned judge, at §4, said he did not need to decide the point and further on, at §8, said that he would deal with the appeal as a hearing de novo, notwithstanding that he was dealing with an appeal from a case management decision of the master.  That said, he further stated “I give notice that I will not lightly interfere with the case management decision of a master in a case in the Personal Injuries List, and that I will only do so for good reason”.  Mr Siu submitted that requiring good reason to interfere with the case management decision of a master was said in the context of personal injuries cases. 

11.However, I would note that the case of Tin Kun Sin as executor of the estate of Tin Ka Kung, deceased v Tin Chun Nei Jenny [2023] HKCFI 2975 was not a personal injuries case yet DHCJ Herbert Au-Yeung (as he then was) adopted the same principle at §13, requiring good reasons to intervene in a master’s case management decision.  Neither was the case of Peking University Resources (Holdings) Company Limited a personal injuries case.  Furthermore, I agree with Mr Chan that the rationale for requiring good reason for interfering with case management decisions is that the courts and parties should not be bogged down by a proliferation of satellite litigation and appeals on case management matters, which is contrary to the underlying objectives of the civil justice reform, and I see no reason why this rationale should only apply to personal injuries cases.

12.As for the applicable principles governing a change of experts, these were summarized by Bharwaney J in Law Chung Fai v Lam Ming Kuen (unrep) HCPI 96/2008, 13 September 2010, and was adopted by Lok J in Cheung Ting Kau, Vincent v Koo Siu Ying & Anor [2021] HKCFI 1540 at §5, as follows:

(1)  The court’s discretion, whether or not to allow a party to change his expert, is exercised within the ambit of the court’s management powers.  These powers must be exercised in the light of the underlying objectives of the recent civil justice reform, including the need to ensure the cost effectiveness of the proceedings; to ensure that the case is dealt with expeditiously; to ensure reasonable proportionality having regard to the amount of money involved, the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, and the financial position of each party; to ensure procedural economy in the conduct of the proceedings; and to ensure fairness between the parties;

(2)  In the exercise of its powers of case management, the court recognises that the primary aim is to secure the just resolution of the dispute in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties;

(3)  Expert shopping is undesirable and, whenever possible, the court will use its powers to prevent it.  It can lead to potential unfairness between those who can afford to shop around for the opinions of more than one expert and those who cannot.  Expert shopping is not conducive to cost effectiveness of the proceedings and the expeditious disposal of a case;

(4)  The disclosure of the original expert’s report, and the waiver of the privilege that would normally be attached to it, would usually be imposed as a condition for granting permission to call a substitute expert.  However, the disclosure of the original expert’s report per se does not guarantee that the court would permit a substitute expert to be called;

(5)  To curtail expert shopping, the court may refuse to grant leave if the only reason for calling a substitute expert is that his opinion is more favourable to the party calling him than the opinion of the original expert;

(6)  However, if the court is satisfied that the just resolution of a dispute requires leave to be granted for a substitute expert to be called, it should not refuse leave simply because the opinion of the substitute expert is more favourable than that of the original expert;

(7)  In every case, the court should examine the grounds put forward by the substitute expert and make a preliminary assessment of the cogency of those grounds as compared with those set out in the report of the original expert and the report of the expert engaged by the other side.  If the court is satisfied that there are relevant matters canvassed by the substitute expert which may be important to the just resolution of the dispute which was omitted from the reports of the original expert, or which was outside the expertise of the original expert, a prima facie case would be made up for the admission of the substitute expert report in the interests of the just resolution of the dispute;

(8)  In every case, however, the court must also have regard to other relevant circumstances, such as the potential disruption to the trial, the prejudice to the other parties, and the explanation offered by the applicant for the change of experts.  All these matters have to be considered and weighed in the light of and against the underlying objectives of the civil justice reform: to ensure cost effectiveness and economy, expedition, proportionality, and fairness between the parties;

(9)  It is not possible to lay down definitive and exhaustive guidelines to cover and cater for every possible situation that may arise and which prompts an application by a party to change his expert;

(10)  Ultimately, the court strives to do justice between the parties and, in cases where the court permits the parties to call expert evidence, the court strives to ensure a level playing field with fair access to proper experts for all parties.

13.Although the facts of Law Chung Fai and Cheung Ting Kau, Vincent concerned the replacement of a party’s own expert rather than a SJE, I see no reason why, as a matter of principle and common sense, similar considerations (with necessary modifications) should not apply to an application to replace a SJE.  I respectfully disagree with Mr Siu that the case of A v B [2025] HKCFI 978 is apposite.  That case concerned a situation where there were already SJE reports and the applicant sought leave to adduce a second opinion from his own expert on certain issues.  I am of the view the principles set out in Law Chung Fai are more apt.  In any event, I would have regard to all the relevant circumstance of this case and strive to do justice to parties bearing in mind the underlying objectives

14.Having considered all the circumstances of the present case and the reasons put forward for applying for a change of SJE, and despite Mr Siu’s abled submissions, I am of the view that Ds have not demonstrated any good reason to overturn the Master’s exercise of case management discretion.  In any event, even exercising the discretion afresh by treating this appeal as a hearing de novo, I would allow the change of SJE to Mr Ranauro and order a further supplemental report as sought by Ps to be filed by Mr Renauro. 

15.The following are my main reasons.

16.Firstly, given that in the 1^st Report, Mr Nicklin recorded that there were key information required for valuation purposes which had not been received (see §3.41) and the information requested but not provided are crucial, has hampered his ability to reach a conclusive opinion as to the market value of Rainbow Rich (see §§8.2.1 and 8.2.2), and in section 8 of the 1^st Report he explained how, bearing in mind the underlying objective of the CJR and that the primary aim is to secure the just resolution of the dispute in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties, a supplemental report should be ordered in view of the further documents becoming available. 

17.I respectfully disagree with Mr Siu’s submissions that Ps’ application is seeking to have a second bite at the cherry on issues which Ps disagree with in the 1^st Report when those further documents requested, not provided but are now available, had not been considered in the 1^st Report.  The allegation of cherry-picking by Ps is also unjustified, at least in respect of seeking reconsideration of the 1^st Report in light of the annual audited financial statements further disclosed, when it was Ds’ solicitors who first wrote to Mr Nicklin by email dated 22 April 2025 informing him that §§5.5.6 to 5.5.9 of the 1^st Report (concerning the valuation of Rainbow Rich’s investment in Jintian) “must be revisited and adjusted accordingly” as Jintian’s financial statements for 2017 to 2019 had been uploaded onto the shared link on 8 April 2025. 

18.Specifically, in respect of item 76, the 1^st Report noted that audited financial statements for Jintian from 2014 to 2022 was key information required for valuation but not received (see §3.4.1).  It was explained that audited financial statements, as well as management accounts and tax returns, which were also requested, are crucial for valuation as they provide a complete financial picture.  Furthermore, audited financial statement provides external validation and can provide cross-checking to ensure consistency and reliability, essential for accurate valuation (see §8.2.2).  In the diagram at §8.2.2, it is stated that the audited financial statement is the most reliable financial information of the company.  Given the clear relevance of the financial statements for Jintian which have not been considered in the 1^st Report and may be important to the just resolution of the dispute, a prima facie case is made for a supplemental report.

19.Whilst Mr Siu submitted that Mr Nicklin had already valued Jintian at HK$68.32M, and the further documents valued the equity at around HK$70.4M, such that it was not proportionate to order a further report to take into account item 76 (but not disputing its relevance), apart from being inconsistent with Ds’ stance in the email of 22 April 2025, in my view the valuation of Jintian should be left to the expert. 

20.Moreover, I could see the grievance of Ps and the unsatisfactory state of affairs if they and the court were to accept the valuation said to be done on incomplete documents which is not fully accurate or reliable even according to Mr Nicklin. 

21.As for item 77, in the 1^st Report, it was noted that Ps allege that GTE owed Rainbow Rich a sum of HK$39.04M as at 31 May 2019. According to the GTE Audited Financial Statement 2022, which was provided to Mr Nicklin, this sum was said be owed from GTE to GTES prior to the sale of GTES in 2017 and subsequently, assumed by Rainbow Rich.  However, as this did not appear in Rainbow Rich’s Pre-Completion Accounts as a receivable from GTE or other parties, and Ds did not admit Ps’ assertion surrounding this sum, not having sight of any accounting evidence to indicate this receivable existed at the valuation date, it was not included in the valuation.  See §§5.2.3-5.2.5.  Furthermore, it was considered that the lack of management accounts or trial balances for Rainbow Rich’s subsidiaries constituted a particularly significant limitation to the report leading to Mr Nicklin not being able to reach a valuation conclusion as to the alleged HK$39.04M receivable (see §8.5.3).

22.Mr Siu submitted that the GTE Audited Financial Statement 2022 was considered by Mr Nicklin and contained in note 15 being the same information as contained in the GTE consolidated financial statements of 2021 and 2022 (item 77).  However, I agree with Mr Chan that the consolidated financial statements of GTE for the years ended 31 December 2021 and 31 December 2022 are “other accounting evidence” (cf §5.2.5), not seen by Mr Nicklin to show that the receivable was owed by GTE to Rainbow Rich and may lead to a valuation conclusion. 

23.To the extent that they are unsigned and insofar as that may affect their probative value, this should be a matter for the expert and by requiring the expert to have regard to item 77, no doubt the expert would state whether the financial statements being unsigned would affect the opinion in the 1^st Report and explain why.

24.Secondly, I do not consider that any delay by Ps has caused any real prejudice to Ds which cannot be compensated by costs.  Mr Siu complained about the unexplained delay of not having disclosed the further documents in the 3^rd SLOD before the 1^st Report was produced which he submitted necessitated the application to the Master. 

25.After Mr Nicklin’s report was finalized, signed and sent to parties on 18 April 2025, it was Ds’ solicitors who emailed Mr Nicklin informing him that they had uploaded Jintian’s financial statements for 2017 to 2019 on 8 April 2025.  Mr Nicklin replied on 23 April 2025, stating that he was not notified of the upload of the Jintian financial statements which was in any event after the deadline for provision of documents of 6 April 2025.  However, he agreed to address the additional accounting evidence by way of an addendum to the 1^st Report by 9 May 2025.  Yet by email of 9 May 2025, Ps’ solicitors informed that Ps were collating additional documents to be disclosed by way of Ps’ supplemental list of documents, and Mr Nicklin was instructed to extend the deadline for the addendum to 23 May 2025.  Mr Nicklin replied, on 9 May 2025, that he would not issue the addendum but urged parties to seek instructions from the court on a new supplemental expert report with timelines.  At least for the non-provision of the audited financial statements of Jintian, it would not be fair to place the blame solely on Ps when it was Ds that had the financial statements but missed the deadline.

26.As for any complaint about the unexplained delay for the disclosure of the other further documents by Ps and to procure Mr Nicklin to produce the addendum in response to the further disclosed documents, I do not see how Ps could have predicted that Mr Nicklin would resign from A&M, change his career and move to Europe in December 2025 which is the main reason necessitating the application to the Master.  With greatest respect to Mr Siu, I do not agree that the fact from his CV it is apparent that Mr Nicklin was never based in Hong Kong but in Shanghai, that one could or should have anticipated his career change and move to Europe and that he would not have been able to attend trial in Hong Kong.

27.In any event, given the relatively early stage of this action (which has yet to be set down), there is no disruption to any milestone date or disruption to trial which would cause any real prejudice to Ds as a result of any delay on the part of Ps or the application for change of SJE.

28.Thirdly, given that Mr Nicklin has resigned from A&M, has ceased to work as a forensic accountant/quantum expert, has moved to Europe, and trial is not imminent, I see no basis or reason to compel Mr Nicklin to make a supplemental report and to compel his attendance at court or by video-link for cross-examination even though he had been appointed as the SJE.  In the absence of any direct authority drawn to my attention, I do not believe it can be the case that once appointed a SJE, the expert must continue to act and can be compelled to continue to act as a SJE come what may.  

29.The present case is a far cry from the case where the court refused the application for a change of expert based on a general assertion of unavailability with no further explanation why the expert could not continue with their duty and by not applying leave to change the expert before the new report was prepared, presenting the court with a fait accompli: see Wing Ming Garment Factory Limited v The Incorporated Owners of Wing Ming Industrial Centre (unrep) HCCT 60/2006, 15 February 2011, §§21, 33-35.  I respectfully disagree with Mr Siu that the circumstances of Mr Nicklin’s resignation is the same as being “too busy” or the reason for resigning is not a good one when he did not resign on medical/health reasons and still possessed the relevant expertise and qualifications.  Nor was I persuaded that by the mere assertion from the Bar table that to release Mr Nicklin as SJE would lead to a “flood-gate” of similar applications from court appointed SJE to be released and replaced by other experts after having already a “fat brief” for the first report.

30.There is also nothing to the complaint that Mr Nicklin has not made any affirmation to confirm to the court his resignation and the reasons for his resignation.  There is simply no reason supported by evidentiary basis to doubt the truth of what he has stated and my attention was not drawn to any legal requirement for a formal application supported by affirmation be made by the court-appointed expert. 

31.Neither do I accept the submissions that the court can or should arrive at its own decision without the assistance of a supplemental report but by way of submissions.  Ds should not be allowed to revisit the need for SJE to opine on the Expert Issue which has been determined by Master MK Liu after a contested hearing when even parties were agreed for the need for SJE to be appointed and in any event, there has not been any appeal against Master MK Liu’s order.

32.I also accept that whilst there is no application for leave to cross-examine the SJE, given the early stage of this action, parties should not be foreclosed from even the possibility of applying to cross‑examine the SJE.  In any event, even if the chances of requiring the SJE to be cross-examined is remote or speculative, there should be an expert available to stand behind the reports filed with the court and for the expert to attend trial if necessary to assist the court even if in the normal course of events, there is no need for a SJE be cross-examined. See e.g.: The Yin Nin Savings Mortgage Loan & Land Investment Co Ltd, §§9.3 and 20; Tierra Trading Limited & Anor v Land Base Limited (unrep), HCMP 3074/2014, 21 August 2015, §21(14); and Cyberworks Audio Video Technology Limited v Mei Ah (HK) Company Limited (unrep) HCA 677/2006, 12 January 2016, §24c(4).

33.Fourthly, there can be no real concern of expert shopping by Ps when due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties, Mr Nicklin resigned and left Hong Kong.  Mr Ranauro is of the same firm as Mr Nicklin and is supported by the same team in A&M.  By contrast, it is Ds who have suggested in Skeleton Submissions (§88.1) that the expert should be changed to another firm nominated by them when Mr Nicklin was the SJE nominated by Ps.

34.Fifthly, whilst a supplemental report would incur further costs, given that Mr Renauro would be supported by the same A&M team who supported Mr Nicklin, there would be time and costs saving as compared to instructing a new expert of another firm.  Mr Siu was critical that Ps had not place before the Master and this court the costs incurred by the 1^st Report and costs to be incurred to produce a supplemental report but both Mr Nicklin and Mr Ranauro are of the same seniority (Senior Director) in A&M and the hourly rate of HK$4,800 was provided to Master MK Liu (by way of Affirmation of Chan Jamie dated 8 November 2024) so even if there were upward revisions of fees, Mr Ranauro’s fees should be comparable to that of Mr Nicklin’s.  In any event, given the likely quantum of Ps’ claim (of around HK$10M based on the current valuation of HK$18.85M by Mr Nickin), the fees incurred for the 1^st Report and to be incurred in the supplemental report (limited to consideration of two further items) if supported by the same team as Mr Nicklin is unlikely to be disproportionate.

35.Sixthly, I do not accept that there was anything improper for Ps to write to Mr Nicklin to update him on the further disclosure and to seek his confirmation whether it would have impacted his findings in the 1^st Report.  As already mentioned, it was Ds’ solicitors who first approached Mr Nicklin to ask him to revisit various parts of the 1^st Report in light of the audited financial statements of Jintian.  It lies ill in their mouths to complain that the subsequent approach by Mr Nicklin was improper. 

36.In any event, any views expressed by Mr Chambers by his email of 2 January 2026 on the relevance on the further disclosed documents which “could materially impact the valuation analysis” in the 1^st Report were his open (the emails were copied to Ds’ solicitors and did not amount to Ps seeking A&M’s “private views” as submitted by Mr Siu) and tentative views (he expressly stated that the newly appointed expert will need to “independently review all information, including the new documents… conduct additional enquiries and issue their own valuation opinion”).  I cannot see how the sending of that email and its content would give rise to any basis to believe that Mr Ranauro or the A&M team would be biased or create the impression of impartiality even if Mr Chambers could be regarded as Mr Ranauro’s “boss”.  As Mr Siu accepted, Mr Nicklin (not the A&M team) was the court appointed SJE and was tasked with the Expert Issue.  He alone owed duties to the court as an expert under the Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses which provides that “an expert witness’s paramount duty is to the Court and not to the person from whom the expert has received instructions or by whom he is paid”.  Similarly, if Mr Renauro is appointed SJE, he alone will be the court-appointed expert and would have to reach his own independent view.  Whilst Mr Renauro was proposed or put forward by Mr Chambers, even if it was for A&M’s business benefit or corporate motive, these are not grounds to lead a reasonable person to believe that he would be biased or impartial.  With no undue disrespect, having carefully considered the email correspondence, I simply cannot accept the assertion in Ds’ Skeleton Submission (§§76.1 and 83) that Mr Ranauro “cannot command the confidence of a reasonable person as shown in the correspondence exchanged” or that there is an “apparent willingness to reopen issues already determined [in the 1^st Report] based on the flimsiest excuse”.

37.As I do not believe there is any basis to suggest that Mr Ranauro is biased or would be perceived as biased, leading to any objectively justifiable loss of confidence of Ds in him, I also do not accept that there will be the incurring of additional time and costs by the need to cross-examine Mr Ranauro if he was to replace Mr Nicklin as SJE.  It was a bare assertion from the Bar table that if Mr Ranauro was appointed the SJE, Ds will seek to cross-examine him over 1 to 2 days which would not be conducive to the underlying objectives.  With the trial not having been set down, I further disagree there would be a “derailment” of the trial. 

38.Lastly, only for completeness, I should say that I share Mr Chan’s strong sentiments against giving directions as proposed in Ds’ Skeleton Submissions (§88.2) when notwithstanding directions were given by Master Ho on 2 February 2026 for Ds to file affirmation in opposition, Ds did not do so.  Rather, the proposal for alternative candidate was only indicated by a letter of 15 April 2026 (one day before Ps’ skeleton submissions for the substantive hearing before the Master were due) and there is an apparent back-tracking in the proposed candidate by Mr Siu’s clarifications and seeking of the proposed directions.  The proposed directions would only lead to the incurring of further time and costs as well as use of judicial resources which is not conducive to the underlying objectives.

Disposition and Orders

39.In all, having considered all the relevant circumstances of this case and counsel’s submissions, I would agree with the Master that Mr Ranauro should be appointed as the SJE in place of Mr Nicklin and that he should produce a supplemental report addressing the Expert Issue having regard to 1^st Report and items 76 and 77 of 3^rd SLOD.  As an independent expert, who would stand by his own report, undoubtedly Mr Ranauro should consider the Expert Issue independently and critically in light of the 1^st Report and items 76 and 77 which had subsequently been disclosed.  For the avoidance of doubt, the supplemental report should adopt the 1^st Report to the extent Mr Ranauro is in agreement with it, and to extent he does not agree or adopt any part, explain why.  With this clarification and save that an extension of time for parties to provide joint instructions to and for Mr Ranauro to submit the supplemental report be granted to 4 weeks from the date of handing down of this Decision and 56 days thereafter respectively, I do not see any good reason or need to disturb the Master’s Order.

40.Accordingly, I will dismiss Ds’ appeal. 

41.I see no reason why costs should not follow the event.

42.Whilst Mr Chan submitted that costs should be awarded on an indemnity basis given the appeal was wholly unmeritorious, the conduct of Ds including making serious allegations against Mr Renauro and A&M without proper basis, considering all the circumstances of this case, I do not regard there are special and unusual features in this case which makes indemnity costs appropriate.  I will therefore make a costs order nisi that Ds should pay to Ps forthwith the costs of and occasioned by this appeal, to be summarily assessed on paper, if not agreed.  Any application to vary the costs order nisi shall be made within 14 days from the handing down of this decision otherwise the costs order nisi shall be come absolute and Ps should lodge and serve a Statement of Costs (limited to 3 pages) within 14 days of the handing down of this decision and Ds should lodge and serve a list of objections (limited to 2 pages) thereafter.

Mr Keith Chan, instructed by Messrs. Karas So LLP, for the 1^st and 2^nd Plaintiffs

Mr Patrick Siu and Mr Adrian Lee, instructed by Messrs. Yuen & Partners, for the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants