Case Document

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HCAL 1500/2026

[2026] HKCFI 6000

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1500 OF 2026

BETWEEN

	Pirzada Fizza	1^st Applicant
	Pirzada Muhammad Hasnain	2^nd Applicant
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative Respondent

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

consideration of the documents only; or

consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the 1^st and 2^nd Applicants (“the Applicants”) in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:

1.  Extension of time for the application for leave to apply for Judicial Review of the decision of Director of Immigration dated 25 June 2025 be refused;

2.  The application for leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed; and

3.  A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the Applicants.

Observations for the Applicants:

Introduction

1.This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 25 June 2025 refusing to allow the Applicants who are siblings from Pakistan to make a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection after their previous claims raised jointly with their parents had been rejected by both the Director and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) on all the applicable grounds.

2.Their father in 2007 departed Pakistan and subsequently entered Hong Kong illegally, and upon his arrest by the police he then raised a non-refoulement claim for protection from threats from some Sunni Muslims in his home village over their religious disputes, and after being released on recognizance pending the determination of his claim, he then arranged for his wife and 2 children to leave Pakistan to come to Hong Kong to join in his claim.

3.Accordingly the 1^st Applicant, a daughter born in 2001, and the 2^nd Applicant, a son born in 2005, were brought by their mother from Pakistan to Hong Kong on 13 March 2012, and when they were refused entry by the Immigration Department, they then raised their non-refoulement claims based on the father’s claim, and which were jointly assessed and determined by the Director as one family unit on the factual basis of the father’s claim and with legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”).

Previous Non-Refoulement Claim

4.By a Notice of Determination dated 26 October 2012 and a Notice of Decision dated 28 July 2017, the Director rejected their claims on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of their absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

5.In his decision, the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the claims of the father and his family and assessed the level of risk of harm from his enemies upon their return to Pakistan as low due to the absence of or low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that there is no reliable evidence of any real intention of his enemies to seriously harm or kill him or his family over their religious disputes, that in any event in the absence of any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to all of them if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Pakistan with a large population of 200 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 796,000 square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the father as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move with his family to other part of the country away from his home district in large cities such as Karachi where it would be difficult if not impossible for his enemies to locate them.

6.Their appeal against the Director’s decision was then dismissed by the Board on 10 May 2019 after hearing both parents in evidence and submissions and upon finding no credibility in their claim or any merits in their appeal, and that it also confirmed the Director’s decision.

7.Their joint application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision was also refused by this Court on 23 May 2023 after the father had for himself withdrawn from the application upon confirming that his problems in his home country had already been resolved that it was safe for him to return to Pakistan, and upon finding none of the proposed grounds for intended challenge of the mother and the Applicants were reasonably arguable, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in their process before the Board or in its decision, nor was there any potential child-specific non-refoulement basis in the claims of the 2^nd Applicant who was then still a few months short of the age of 18 in accordance of the guideline set down by the Court of Appeal in Fabio Arlyn Timogan [2020] HKCA 971, and that there was no prospect of success in their intended application (HCAL 1858/2019 [2023] HKCFI 1395).

8.The mother and the Applicants were subsequent some 14 months late with their intended appeal against the Court’s decision, and upon finding no good reason or justification for their serious delay or any prospect of success in their intended appeal, this Court on 24 September 2024 refused to extend time for their appeal, and thereafter they take not take any further steps with their intended appeal.

Request To Make Subsequent Claim

9.Some 5 months later on 26 February 2025 the Applicants who have since both reached the age 18 in writing to the Immigration Department requested to make a subsequent claim on the basis that they still fear of being harmed or killed by their father’s enemies if refouled to Pakistan.

10.There are however constraints on a claimant who has previously made a non-refoulement claim to make a subsequent claim, as stipulated by Section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance as follows:

“(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who has previously made a torture claim must not subsequently make another torture claim.

(2) A person may make a subsequent claim if the person provides sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that –

(a) there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn; and

(b) the change, when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of the previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

(3) In deciding whether or not a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), an immigration officer may take into account any finding of credibility or fact made by an immigration officer or the Appeal Board in relation to a torture claim previously made by the person.

(4) If an immigration officer decides that a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision.

(5) If an immigration officer decides that a person may not make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision, and the notice must also include the reasons for the decision.”

11.Accordingly, the Director required the Applicants to provide further information and evidence in writing in support of their request within 14 days, which they subsequently did via their lawyer from Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”) with further details of their father being attacked by some Shia Muslims after his return to Pakistan supported by some photographs showing a man in some hospital and that their father later fled to Indonesia to save his life, and hence the Applicants also fear of being harmed or killed by those enemies of their father if refouled to Pakistan.

12.By a Notice of Decision dated 25 June 2025, the Director refused to allow the Applicants to make a subsequent claim upon finding that the basis thereof was essentially the same as that of their previous claim, and that they failed to provide sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that there has been any significant change of circumstances since their previous claim was determined, or that those changes when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of their previous claim would give their subsequent claim any realistic prospect of success given the unchallenged findings by both the Director and the Board in their previous claim of the availability of both state protection and reasonable internal relocation to the Applicants upon their return to Pakistan to similarly negate whatever risk that may arise from their intended subsequent claim.

13.On 26 August 2026, the Applicants filed their Form 86 in these proceedings for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s decision, but no proper ground for seeking relief was given in their Form or supporting affirmation of the same date in which they just repeated their claim as before as to the risk of harm faced by their father in Pakistan, and asserted that the Director had erred in confusing their father’s past enemies of the Sunni Muslims with the latest attack of him by the Shia Muslims after his return to Pakistan that has now formed the basis of their intended subsequent claim.

14.The Applicants were however by then already out of time with their application, as Order 53 rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A requires that an application for leave to apply for judicial review be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for the application first arose unless the court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made.

15.As the last day of the 3-month period for them to file their Form 86 fell on 25 October 2025 after discounting the month of August 2025 for court’s vacation, the Applicants was therefore some 10 months late with their application, and in considering whether to extend time, the court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the merits of the intended application; and (iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public administration; AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393.

16.In the Applicants’ case, a delay of 10 months must be considered as very substantial and inordinate, for which they explained in their affirmation and at the hearing of their application that they were without legal representation and had had to take care of their mother due to her various medical issues after their father had left Hong Kong to return to Pakistan that all of which accounted for the delay with their application.

17.The record shows that the Director’s decision was sent on the same day of 25 June 2025 to the Applicants’ then reported address without being returned through undelivered post, and that even accepting their assertion of having to take care of their mother due to her various medical issues as true that it cannot amount to any acceptable justification for their serious delay with their application.

18.As for the merits, if any, of their intended application, their complaint that the Director had confused the Sunni Muslims’ risk of harm in their previous claim from the risk from the Shia Muslims in their intended subsequent claim is not in my view reasonably arguable for their intended challenge as the Director was correct to find insufficient evidence of their claim of attack by Shia Muslims on their father as alleged, let alone the lack of any reliable evidence for the reason or motive for such alleged attack on their father or of any connection or implication of such risk on the Applicants themselves in the absence of any past ill-treatment on either of them prior to their departure of Pakistan more than 10 years ago that I do not find their complaint reasonably arguable for their intended challenge of the Director’s decision.

19.In the premises and having considered the decision of the Director with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the decision or any failure to apply high standards of fairness in the consideration and assessment of the Applicants’ request to make a subsequent claim, and as I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in their intended application for judicial review, and in the absence of any good reason for their serious delay, I refuse to extend time and accordingly dismiss their leave application.

Restricted Proceedings Order

20.Given the facts that the Applicants’ non-refoulement claim has already been finally and conclusively determined in the previous proceedings, ending with the order of this Court dated 23 May 2023 and in the absence of any appeal to the Court of Appeal by the Applicants, but that they are still trying to re-litigate their case by making this subsequent claim based on essentially the same facts and basis as before or some invalid basis, I shall next consider whether it would be appropriate to make a Restricted Proceedings Order (“RPO”) against both of them.

21.Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4 provides as follows:

“Restriction of vexatious legal proceedings

(1) The Court of First Instance may, on the application of the Secretary for Justice or an affected person, make an order that –

(a) no legal proceedings shall without the leave of the Court of First Instance be instituted by the person against whom the order is made; and

(b) any legal proceedings instituted by that person in any court before the making of the order shall not be continued by him without the leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2) The Court of First Instance may not make an order under subsection (1) unless –

(a) it is satisfied that the person against whom the order is to be made has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings, whether in the High Court or in any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against different persons; and

(b) it has heard the person against whom the order is to be made or given him an opportunity of being heard.

(3) An order made under subsection (1) –

(a) may be made on such terms and conditions as the Court of First Instance thinks just; and

(b) may provide that it is to cease to have effect at the end of a specified period, but shall otherwise remain in force indefinitely.

…”

22.Relevantly, Section 27A also provides:

“(1) Leave for the institution or continuance of any legal proceedings by a person who is the subject of an order for the time being in force under section 27(1) shall not be given unless the Court of First Instance is satisfied that –

(a) the proceedings are not an abuse of the process of the court in question; and

(b) there are reasonable grounds for the proceedings.

(2) No appeal lies from a decision of the Court of First Instance granting or refusing leave required under this section, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court of First Instance.”

23.In Etik Iswanti v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2021] HKCFI 1589, Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) examined the relevant principles for making an order under Section 27 against a non-refoulement claimant to prevent him or her from commencing vexatious legal proceedings which sought to re-open a non-refoulement claim which had already been finally and conclusively determined in previous proceedings, and held that repeated actions evidencing a calculated attempt by a claimant to delay an inevitable judgment or its execution or a refusal to accept the unfavourable final result of a litigation or seeking to re-open matters already determined in a previous action may be regarded as vexatious legal proceedings which would justify a RPO being made under the section.

24.His Lordship in the subsequent case of Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 (again sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) went on to hold that apart from Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, the Court has an inherent jurisdiction which it can exercise on its own motion to make a RPO to prevent similar abuses of the court’s process by non-refoulement claimants, as the underlying purpose of the court’s jurisdiction to make a RPO is the prevention of abuse of process ([9] – [10]).

25.In the subsequent jointly heard appeals of Siti Khotimah v Director of Immigration, CACV 420/2021 and Reza Sahin v Director of Immigration, CACV 422/2021 ([2022] HKCA 327, 28 February 2022), Poon CJHC in giving judgment of the Court of Appeal also held that where a judge of the Court of First Instance (“CFI judge”) makes a RPO, he may where appropriate properly exercise his power under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to also make a restrictive order against vexatious appeals under which the non-refoulement claimant concerned cannot appeal without first obtaining leave from him or another CFI judge designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court upon observing procedural fairness by putting the non-refoulement claimant concerned on notice and giving him or her the opportunity to address the court before making the restrictive order ([38] - [40]).

26.In the present case, it is clear from the above that the Applicants’ conduct in seeking persistently to re-litigate their non-refoulement claims without viable grounds and then to launch their legal challenge to the Court after their futile request to make a subsequent claim has been refused amounts to an abuse of process, and that unless a RPO is made against them, to which they were unable to answer or raise any valid objection at the hearing, I am convinced that the Applicants or either of them will likely continue to do so and/or to make vexatious appeals, thereby wasting further precious time and resources of the Judiciary.

27.Accordingly, I make the following order:

(1)  The Applicants be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to or touching upon or leading to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicants in the High Court, or any appeal, including this Order, without the leave of a Judge of the Court of First Instance;

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List;

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicants do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of their intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicants from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicants do file a copy of each such response together with their said application for leave;

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the court written representations regarding the same;

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the designated Judge should otherwise direct;

(6)  If the Applicants or either of them should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to this Court or the designated Judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed;

(7)  Notice of each decision by the designated Judge made pursuant to this Order be given in writing to the Applicants and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings;

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the designated Judge, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly;

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicants within any period of 3 months;

(10)  No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave under this Order, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Judge;

(11)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this Order; and

(12)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

Disposition

28.The Applicants’ application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.

29.A RPO in terms of paragraph 27 be made against the Applicants.

Dated the 29^th day of October 2026

(Chung Lai Fan, Christine)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Notes for the Applicant: If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A); b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).		Sent to the Applicants on 29 October 2026 Pirzada Fizza Pirzada Muhammad Hasnain Applicants’ ref. no.: Nil.		Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 29 October 2026 Director of Immigration Putative Respondent’s ref. no.: L/M (33274-33275) in ImmD RA 7/37/C (formerly RBCZ/229/12; RBCZ/2000070/14)(formerly RBCZ/230/12; RBCZ/2000071/14) Department of Justice, Senior Assistant Law Officer (Civil Law) (Civil Litigation Unit 2)