Fong Ming及另四人 訴 Ma Shu Tau

LDBM000285A/2000

LDBM 285/2000

香港特別行政區土地審裁處

建築物管理申請編號LDBM 2000年第285宗

主審法官：周兆熊法官

宣判日期：2000年12月15日

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判 決 書

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1. 2000年10月24日，對答辯人於2000年9月19日提出的傳票申請，本席頒令將答辯人的名字從本案中剔除，並頒佈後列臨時訟費的命令：所有申請人須支付答辯人應訊本案及本傳票的訟費，但不須支付Ma Shu Tau 誓章的費用。如與訟雙方未能議定訟費的款額，則該款額由法庭按《區域法院民事訴訟（訟費）規則》為基準而予以評定。如與訟雙方不在14天內向本庭提出有關此臨時訟費命令的申請，則此臨時訟費的命令變為永久的命令。

2. 2000年11月6日，基於後述的理由，答辯人向本席提出下列的要求：

(1) The District Court Civil Procedure (Costs) rules has been repealed and substituted by Order 62 of the District Court Rules.

(2) Further, it is unequivocal from the judgment that this action is bound to fail. These proceedings are completely misconceived and should have never been brought against the Respondent at all. The Respondent therefore invites the Presiding Officer to review/re-hear the Respondent's application for costs for an Order that "all costs of and incidental to this action and the application be to the Respondent on full indemnity basis to be taxed if not agreed."

2000年12月7日，本席聆聽雙方有關臨時命令的陳辭。

《區域法院民事訴訟（訟費）規則》對本案是否仍有效力？

3. 申請人的申請是於2000年8月28日提出的，而《區域法院民事訴訟（訟費）規則》是在2000年9月1日被廢除，故此本席仍有權命令本案的訟費以該規則為基準而予以評定。

答辯人是否有提交誓章的必要？

4. 答辯人要求剔除申請人的申請是按土地審裁處規則第11條，和/或高等法院規則第15號命令第6條規則和/或土地審裁處固有的司法權而提出的。為支持提出誓章的理由，答辯人律師（梁律師）引述White Book（1999年版，第1冊）於第229頁所載的有關部份："If the facts are in dispute, the application should be supported, as a rule, by affidavit, which shall be served on all parties to the action (Tildesley v. Harper (1876) 3Ch.D.277; Re Colbeck (1888) 36W.R.259)。"

5. 第6條規則與本案有關的部份後列如下：

“(2) 除本條規則的條文另有規定外，法庭可在任何訟案或事宜的法律程序的任何階段，施加其認為公正的條款而主動或應申請

(a) 命令任何不恰當或不必要地成為一方的人，或因任何理由而停止成為恰當或必要的人，停止成為一方；

(b) 命令任何以下的人加入成為一方，即

(i) …………

(ii) …………

(3) 任何人要求根據第（2）款作出命令將其加入成為一方的申請，除非是經法庭許可，否則必須由一份誓章支持，該份誓章須示明該人在有關訟案或事宜中的有爭議的事宜上的利害關係或該人與有關訟案或事宜的任何一方之間須予裁定的問題或爭論點（視屬何情況而定）。”

6. 第6條規則祗規定，除非是經法庭許可，當任何人申請要求將某人加入成為訟案的一方時，他必須以一份誓章支持他的申請；但第6條規則並無規定當申請是將某人停止成為一方時，該申請須由一份誓章支持。

7. Tildesley v. Harper 一案的內容，後列如下：

"An alteration in the parties to an action will not be made upon an ex parte application.

MACLEAN, for the Plaintiff in this action, moved, under Order XVI., rule 2, for an order to strike out the Plaintiff (who was a trustee) as Plaintiff, to substitute three infant cestuis que trust as Plaintiffs instead of him, and to make the Plaintiff a Defendant.

The action was one to set aside certain mortgages, and for other relief, and the motion was made ex parte.

HALL,V.C.:

The three infant cestuis que trust may be joined as Plaintiffs by a next friend, and then, if there should turn out to be any misjoinder, I can, at the bearing, order the Plaintiff trustee to be treated as a Defendant. I cannot, however, alter the parties to an action upon an ex parte application, but you may give the Defendants notice that an order had been made in these terms, and require them to state whether they object to the order or require notice; stating to them at the same time that the Court considered they ought to have been served. Then if they do not object, the order will be drawn up as having been made upon motion, while, if they require to be served with notice, the Court, on the further application, will deal with the costs, which otherwise will be costs in the cause."

Re Colbeck 一案的內容是如下列：

"An application to add a defendant to an action must not be made ex parte.

Motion.

An order had been made on an ex parte application by the plaintiff, giving him leave to add a defendant; but the registrar refused to draw up the order, on the ground that it ought not to have been made ex parte. He relied on Tildesley v. Harper, 3 Ch. D. 277, 25 W. R. Dig. 201.

Tanner, for the plaintiff, now asked the court to direct that the order should be drawn up. He contended that Tildesley v. Harper, which was under ord. 16, r. 2, of the old Rules of Court of 1875, did not apply to an application under B.S.C., 1883,, ord. 16, r. 11: Ann. Pr., pp. 214, 226.

KAT,J. - The present rule does not say that it can be done without notice to the other side. [His lordship read ord. 16, r. 11, and continued:-] The plaintiff must give notice of his intention to add a party before the order can be made."

8. 這二宗案件，均無提及有關的申請，須以誓章支持。

9. 答辯人從來沒有提交反對通知書，故此在他作出剔除申請的傳票時，本案就祗有申請通知書內所提述的事實，故此當時的案情並無所謂爭議的事實。

10. 《土地審裁處規則》第11條有以下的規定：

“在法律程序的任何階段，審裁處可應某一方的申請或在無人提出申請的情況下，將任何人的名字或名稱加入或替代任何一方，或自任何一方的名單中剔除。”

11. 第11條並無規定剔除一方名字的申請須以誓章支持。

12. 答辯人亦在下列書面陳辭中申述提交誓章的理由：

"2.3 The Respondent was made the respondent in this case as the Chairman of the Incorporated Owners of Grand Court.

2.4 In the Applicants' application herein under Form 28 apart from applying for dissolution of the management committee of the Incorporated Owners of Grand Court ("the Management Committee") and appointment of an administrator pursuant to Section 31 of the Building Management Ordinance Cap.344("BMO"); they are also applying for an order that a meeting of the owners to appoint a Management Committee be convened by the Applicants or by such owner as the Tribunal may direct. If the Tribunal finds in favour of the Applicant it may order the Respondent, as Chairman of the Management Committee to convene the said meeting.

2.5 The fact of whether the Respondent is the Chairman or not is in dispute.

2.6 In the letter from Messrs. Katherine Y.W. Or & Co. ("KO") to Messrs. Johnny K.K. Leung & Co. ("JL") dated 7.9.2000 (exhibited in Exhibit "MST-3" of the Respondent's Affirmation) KO expressly stated that the letters were addressed to the Respondent in the capacity of the Chairman. In the last paragraph of the said letter KO demanded the Respondent to convene a meeting to dissolved the Management Committee.

2.7 JL by letters to KO dated 14.9.2000 and 19.9.2000 (exhibited in Exhibit "MST-1" of the Respondent's Affirmation) provided evidence that the Respondent was not the Chairman.

2.8 KO by their letter to JL dated 15.9.2000 (exhibited in Exhibit "MST-3" of the Respondent's Affirmation) insisted to proceed against the Respondent as the Chairman.

2.9 Cheng Yin Chong, one of the Applicants filed his affirmation on 10.10.2000 exhibiting various documents to establish that the Respondent is the Chairman.

2.10 Therefore, it is necessary and proper for the attainment of justice and for defending the rights of the Respondent of file the Respondent's Affirmation."

13. 答辯人的誓章是於26.9.2000向法庭存檔，而Cheng Yin Chong的誓 章是於10.10.2000才呈交的。答辯人無可能會受到這份誓章的影響而作出他的誓章。

14. 答辯人在誓章中否認他是Grand Court業主立案法團（“法團”）的主席，但Cheng Yin Chong（申請人之一）在誓章中羅列數宗事實証明答辯人是Grand Court法團的主席。對兩份誓章分歧的地方，梁律師認為本席不需要進行審訊，本席祗要按誓章內容便可作出事實的裁決。在聆訊時，與訟雙方祗是按誓章分別作出陳辭。梁律師並無向本席提出審訊的要求。

15. 在誓章內申請人列舉下列的事實以証明答辯人是法團的主席：

"(a) The Respondent has been collecting the management fee from the owners of Grand Court since 1987 in the name of the Incorporated Owners of Grand Court;

(b) The Respondent has in possession of the official stamp of the Management Committee of Grand Court and used the official stamp to issue the management fee receipts ......

(c) The Respondent has exerted the authority to make sole decision or issues concerning the management of the Grand Court. The Respondent has unilaterally appointed King Rise E & M Engineering Company to maintain the elevator despite the owners' objection;

(d) The Respondent has through Mr. Yeung Bor issued a notice to all the owners of Grand Court, inter alias, that :-

(i) the management fees would be increased to HK$500.00 per month; and

(ii) the Respondent would be grateful if any owner who would like to manage Grand Court should contact the Respondent."

16. 對上述的指稱事實，答辯人並無作出反應。除非他承認該些指稱的事情為事實，否則本席不可能祗是通過與訟雙方的陳辭便可對雙方在事實上分岐的地方作出裁定。

17. 答辯人已知雙方對答辯人是否法團主席一事會有所爭議，但是他又不預算就雙方各自表述的事實要求審訊，以便本席作出事實的裁定。這使到答辯人的誓章對解決本傳票的爭議完全起不到任何作用，既然如此，根本上他便無需提交答辯人的誓章。

18. 在Vaisey v. Toddlers Footwear (1954) Ltd. [1957] RPC 90一案，Lloyd - Jacob J在判詞中說：

"It is the fact that the court possesses power, so as to do justice between the parties, to direct apportionment of the general costs incurred in an action. That is plainly a valuable sanction if, in the result, the court thinks it right to hold that any party has introduced irrelevant material or has unduly expended time upon matters which are not really relevant to the issue."

本席有權將答辯人誓章的訟費從整宗案件的訟費分割出來。

19. 基於上述的原因，本席裁定申請人不須支付予答辯人有關此誓章的費用。

9月27日的訟費

20. 申請人的傳票是於2000年9月19日提出的，而聆聽的日期是9月27日。答辯人是於9月25日為他的誓章宣誓的，而在9月26日，他向法庭存檔該誓章。

21. 9月27日，申請人的律師向本席申請將聆訊日期押後，以便申請人可作出誓章以便回應。本席批准他的申請，並下令該日聆訊的訟費待決。

22. 明顯地答辯人在2日的時間內將誓章送達予申請人，致使他們沒有充份的時間作出誓章以作回應，引致聆訊要延期舉行，故此答辯人須支付申請人9月27日聆訊的訟費。

答辯人是否應該獲得彌償訴訟費？

23. 梁律師在書面陳辭指的第3.12及3.13段指稱申請人濫用法庭程序，故此答辯人應獲得彌償訴訟費：

“3.12 In Paragraph 18/19/22 on Page 353 of the White Book 1999 Vol. 1 - where proceedings which were viable when instituted have by reason of subsequent events become inescapably doomed to failure, they may be dismissed as being an abuse of the process of the Court (Domer v. Gulf Oil Great Britain [1975] 119 S.J. 392).

3.13 In this case after the correspondence, the Respondent's Affirmation, the preliminary view of the learned Presiding Officer on 27.9.2000 and the letter of KO dated 17.10.2000, the continuation of opposing the struck out of the name of the Respondent as a party in this action is an abuse of the process of the Court."

24. 在10月17日的信中，申請人的律師行（“柯玉華律師事務所”）致函答辯人的律師行。該信的內容是如下列：

"We refer to the above matter and are given to understand that our client and yours have intention to reach the following agreements:-

1. our client would concede with Clause 1 of your client's application;

2. there be no order as to costs to your client's application; and

3. there be no further and/or other relief to your client.

Kindly confirm the above in writing before 2:30p.m. today."

（原文無劃線）

25. 通過這封信，申請人的律師行要求答辯人的律師行確認申請人與答辯人是否有達成信內所述的協議。這封信與日期為10月12日信件的性質是不同的。10月12日柯玉華律師事務所致函答辯人的律師行。該信件是“Without Prejudice save as to costs”的信件。它有以下的內容：

"In order to resolve the argument amicably, we are instructed that, on a without prejudice basis, our client is prepared to accept Clause 1 of the Summons file by your client date 19th September 2000 subject to the following conditions :-

1. there be no order as to costs;

2. there be no further and/or other relief to your client; and

3. your client shall surrender all the keys and official stamps of the Incorporated Owners' of Grand Court forthwith."

26. 答辯人在書面陳辭的第3.9段說

"3.9 By letters dated 12.10.2000 (a without prejudice save as to costs letter) and 17.10.2000 (an open letter) respectively from KO to JL, KO conceded to the struck out of the name of the Respondent as a party in this action but asked for no order as to costs."

27. 上述的指稱是錯誤的，申請人並無 "conceded to the struck out of the name of the Respondent as a party in this action"。

28. 答辯人誓章對解決本傳票完全沒有幫助 。至於雙方面以往的書信往來，亦對解決本傳票沒有幫助。該些書信的內容，顯示與訟雙方對答辯人一事有所爭議。未經審訊的程序，本席無法作出事實的裁定。

29. 本席在9月27日所表示的意見並不是命令。申請人無需接納該些意見。他們仍然有權行使他們的權利。

30. 本席並不認為申請人有濫用法庭的司法程序。

31. 在聆訊本傳票的申請時，與訟雙方皆有述及兩方的誓章。在缺乏審訊的情況下，這些誓章變得毫不重要。與訟雙方實在是浪費他們本身和法庭的時間。

32. 基於上述的原因，本席認為答辯人不應獲得彌償性的訟費。

33. 與訟雙方皆有權就訟費的事宜向本席作出陳述，故此12月7日的聆訊，是整宗案件的一部份，而此聆訊並不是覆核的聆訊，故此本席雖然不接納答辯人的申述，申請人仍須支付此日的訟費予答辯人。

34. 本席作出下列訟費的命令以取代臨時訟費的命令：

(1) 所有申請人不須支付答辯人誓章的費用。

(2) 答辯人須支付所有申請人2000年9月27日聆訊的訟費。

(3) 除 (1)、(2) 項兩者有關訟費的規定外，所有申請人須支付答辯人本案及本傳票的訟費（包括2000年12月7日聆訊的訟費）。如與訟雙方未能議定訟費的款額。則該款額由法庭按《區域法院民事訴訟（訟費）規則》為基準而予以評定。

第一至第五申請人：由柯玉華律師事務所代表。

答辯人：由梁家駒律師行代表。