Ho Mui v. Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCA 2584/1973 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment.
1. This is an application on the part of the 1st Defendant for an order that the Plaintiff serve on the 1st Defendant certain further and better particulars of the Statement of Claim.
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HCA002584/1973 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG ----------------- ORIGINAL JURISDICTION -----------------
Coram: Mr. Registrar Barnes in Chambers. Mr. R. Tang of Counsel (D.L.A.) for Plaintiff. Mr. R. Mills-Owens of Counsel, (Deacons) for 1st Defendant. Mr. Taylor of Johnson Stokes & Master for 2nd Defendant. Date of Judgment: 14th November, 1974. ----------------- JUDGMENT ----------------- DECISION: 1. This is an application on the part of the 1st Defendant for an order that the Plaintiff serve on the 1st Defendant certain further and better particulars of the Statement of Claim. 2. The Plaintiff's claim is for damages under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance. In paragraph 4 of her Statement of Claim she has pleaded:-
3. The 1st Defendant in its Defence has denied that allegation and pleaded that the deceased was not employed by the 1st Defendant but was a sub-contractor of the 2nd Defendant which itself was a sub-contractor of the 1st Defendant. 4. The 1st Defendant seeks the following further particulars of the Plaintiff's allegation in paragraph 4 of her Statement of Claim:-
5. The Plaintiff's response to this request was as follows:-
6. In my view there is no merit in the Plaintiff's first objection to supplying the requested particulars but her objection, framed in the alternative, is valid. 7. In her Reply to the Defence of the 1st Defendant the Plaintiff has pleaded that the 1st Defendant, in proceedings brought under the Workmen's Compensation Ordinance, has already admitted liability in respect of the personal injuries and death suffered by the deceased arising out of and in the course of his employment by the 1st Defendant and that as it was the same accident and the same injuries which give rise to the claim in this action, the 1st Defendant is estopped from denying that the deceased was at all material times employed by the 1st Defendant. 8. In the present form of the pleadings it appears that, as between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant, it has been judicially determined in a final manner that a contract of service existed between the deceased and the 1st Defendant at all times material to this action. In my view, therefore, the 1st Defendant is estopped from denying that a contract of service existed at the time of the accident which gives rise to these proceedings. Accordingly, I agree with the plaintiff's contention that the 1st Defendant is not entitled to the further particulars requested. 9. The 1st Defendant has also requested further and better particulars of the Plaintiff's Particulars of Negligence set out in paragraph 8 of the Statement of Claim. Those particulars, the 1st Defendant's request and the Plaintiff's reply thereto may be tabulated as follows (omitting of course what is not relevant on this Aplication):-
10. Mr. Mills-Owens' argument was that, the Plaintiff having alleged that the 1st Defendant failed to provide a safe system of work, the obligation fell upon her to particularise what system was employed, how it was unsafe and what system should have been provided which would have been safe. 11. In support of his argument he relied upon Colfax v. Coggins & Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd. [1945] A.C. 197, per Viscount Simon, L.C., at p.203; General Cleaning Contractors Ltd. v. Christmas [1953] A.C. 180 per Lord Tucker at pp.195 and 197; and Gilfillan v. National Coal Board 1972 S.L.T. 39, 44. 12. Mr. Tang, in reply, contended that ...(illegible) obligation was on the employer to prove that the system in use was safe and that the Plaintiff was under no obligation to provide further particulars. He referred to Dixon v. Cementation Co. Ltd. [1960] I W.L.R. 746; and Ceneral Cleaning Contractors Ltd. v. Christmas (supra) per Lord Oaksey at pp. 190-1. 13. Some of the dicta to which I was referred by Counsel seemed to me, at the time, to be in conflict. But, having had time to refer to them more closely, it now seems to me that each was an individual observation on the question whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, the particulars supplied were sufficient to outline the case to be made against the Defendant. 14. The overriding principle seems to be that "particulars will be ordered whenever the master is satisfied that without them the applicant cannot tell what is going to be proved against him at the trial" (Odgers on Pleading and Practice, 18th ...(illegible) p.158). And the "what" is that which is sufficient to indicate to the defendant the nature of the evidence he will be required to adduce to meet the plaintiff's allegation. (The Supreme Court Practice, 1973 at p.276, citing Elkington v. London Association, etc. 27 T.L.R. 329). 15. Applying that principle it seems to me that the Plaintiff has indicated to the 1st Defendant the nature of the evidence it will need to have available at the trial with this exception: the particulars in paragraph (4) of the table set out above (which is Paragraph 8(v) in the Statement of Claim) indicate that the Plaintiff intends to put in issue matters regarding safety supervision not relevant to this action. The 1st Defendant is entitled to have these particulars expressed more precisely so that it will know the nature of the evidence it will need to have available on this issue. 16. I therefore order that the Plaintiff do within 21 days serve on the 1st Defendant the further and better particulars set out in the summons in respect of paragraph 8, sub-paragraph (v) of the Statement of Claim. I further order that if the Plaintiff should default in supplying the said particulars within the said time or within any extension of that time either agreed upon by the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant or allowed by the Court the Plaintiff be precluded from adducing at the trial of this action any evidence relevant to the said particulars. The costs of and incidental to this application to be costs in the cause with a certificate for counsel. 17. DATED the 14th day of November, 1974.
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