Smart Gain Investment Ltd v. Town Planning Board
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 12/2006 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 28 February 2006.
1. On 2 February 2005 the Town Planning Board decided not to propose any amendment to the draft Clear Water Bay Peninsular North Outline Zoning Plan (the draft OZP). Smart Gain seeks leave to apply for judicial review against that decision.
Cites 3 cases
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HCAL 12/2006 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO.12 OF 2006 _____________ BETWEEN
____________ Before: Hon Reyes J in Court Date of Hearing: 22 February 2006 Date of Decision: 28 February 2006 _______________ D E C I S I O N _______________ I. INTRODUCTION 1.On 2 February 2005 the Town Planning Board decided not to propose any amendment to the draft Clear Water Bay Peninsular North Outline Zoning Plan (the draft OZP). Smart Gain seeks leave to apply for judicial review against that decision. 2.Smart Gain owns 4 sites (the sites) within the area covered by the draft OZP. The sites fall within the Conservation Area (CA) zone in the draft OZP. 3.On 10 May 2005 Smart Gain objected to the CA zoning of the sites. At a preliminary meeting on 22 July 2005, the Board rejected Smart Gain’s objection. 4.On 2 November 2005 the Board’s Objection Hearing Committee (OHC) heard representations from Smart Gain in support of its objection. Smart Gain suggested that Site 1 be zoned as “Residential (Group C) 3” (R(C)3); Site 2 as “Village Type Development” (V); Site 3 as “Residential (Group C) 6” (R(C)6); and Site 4 as “Recreation” (R). 5.Smart Gain’s representatives having made their submissions and left, the OHC discussed and rejected Smart Gain’s objection. The OHC did not think that the CA zoning of the sites required amendment. Smart Gain was informed of this by letter from the Board dated 9 December 2005. 6.Smart Gain submits that the OHC’s decision of 2 November 2005 was flawed in the following respects:
II. BACKGROUND 7.Site 1 (0.90 ha) is located between Pik Shui San Tsuen Village, the Staff Quarters of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST) and Clearwater Bay Road. It has been largely cleared and is currently used for open storage (including the storage of containers) and vehicle parking. 8.Site 2 (0.25 ha) comprises private land and an intervening portion of Government land. The private land originally formed part of Tai Po Tsai Village (TPT Village). The resumption of some of TPT Village land for the construction of roads and HKUST resulted in Site 2’s private land becoming separated from TPT Village. Site 2 is now covered in part by vegetation which has grown up over the previously cultivated village land. 9.Site 3 (0.27 ha) lies north of University Road and southeast of HKUST” Staff Quarters. It has been partially cleared, with vegetation around its perimeter and grassy areas in its centre. It is leased to villagers for agricultural use. 10.Site 4 (3.25 ha) is located near Pak Shui Wun beach. It has no vehicular access and can only be reached by footpaths or from the sea by boat. The site comprises 2 areas. 11.The first portion is a low valley which consists of flat agricultural land with a stream flowing through. This area contains the Pak Shui Wun Archaeological Site (the Archaeological Site). 12.The second portion is slightly raised and set back into the hill slopes. 13.All 4 sites together constitute a small proportion (less than 1%) of the land zoned CA under the draft OZP. At the end of this Judgment, I append a location plan of the 4 sites extracted from the Objection Statement dated September 2005 which Smart Gain presented to the Board. The location plan also summarises the re-zoning which Smart Gain proposed for each of the 4 Sites. 14.At the oral hearing before me, Mr McCoy SC said that he did not dispute that there were features suitable for conservation in Site 4. Mr McCoy, however, argued that there was little (if anything) worth conserving in Sites 1, 2 and 3. III. DISCUSSION A. Objection 1: Was there procedural unfairness? 15.Mr McCoy submits that there was procedural unfairness because Smart Gain did not have an opportunity to respond to comments made by the OHC’s Secretary in relation to permissible uses of agricultural land zoned as CA. 16.The draft OZP states that a CA zoning is:
17.The Government Lease currently restricts the sites to use as agricultural land. According to the Schedule of Uses appended to the draft OZP, a CA zoning means that the sites remain available for “Agricultural Use (other than Plant Nursery)”. 18.The draft OZP includes Notes (which are expressly stated to “form part of the Plan”). Note (9)(b) states:
19.Prior to the 2 November 2005 meeting, the Planning Department prepared and circulated an OHC Paper No.242 to OHC members. A copy of the OHC Paper was also provided to Smart Gain in advance of the meeting. At §4.1(c) the OHC Paper stated:
20.Before the OHC on 2 November 2005, Smart Gain argued that there were no significant conservation features on the 4 sites. Smart Gain suggested that a CA zoning was “effectively a confiscation of ownership rights without compensation” which was appropriate only when there was some exceptional aspect that needed to be conserved. 21.Smart Gain complained that a CA zoning would prohibit use of the sites for a “plant nursery”. That would deprive Smart Gain of the possibility of introducing modern productive farming methods (such as a plant nursery) to the sites. Accordingly, a CA zoning would adversely affect Smart Gain’s rights under the Government Lease. 22.After Smart Gain’s representatives left, the following discussion is recorded in the minutes of the OHC meeting as having taken place:
23.The Secretary is not a member of the OHC. 24.Mr McCoy complains that the Secretary’s comments “would inevitably have given the members of the OHC the false impression that the position stated in [OHC Paper No.242 §4.1(c)] was correct, namely that [Smart Gain’s] rights under the lease would not be adversely affected by the CA zoning”. The alleged impression would be false (Mr McCoy submits) for the reasons argued by Smart Gain prior to the OHC meeting’s private deliberations. 25.Smart Gain (Mr McCoy says) was unfortunately not informed of the Secretary’s comments before the Board’s decision to reject its objections. Smart Gain thus had no opportunity to rebut the false impression which the Secretary’s observation would have prompted. 26.This (Mr McCoy argues) was procedurally unfair to Smart Gain. Had Smart Gain had a chance to respond to the Secretary, it would have pointed out the following:
27.Further representations from Smart Gain might (Mr McCoy contends) have compelled the OHC to arrive at some other conclusion. 28.In my judgment, there has plainly been no procedural irregularity of the nature alleged. 29.Comparing the excerpt from the OHC minutes quoted above with Note (9)(b) to the draft OZP, one sees that the Secretary was merely repeating what Note (9)(b) says, no more, no less. Coming into the meeting, Smart Gain must be presumed to have been aware of Note (9)(b) to the draft OZP which it was challenging. Accordingly, Smart Gain had every opportunity to make such representations as it deemed appropriate in light of Note (9)(b). 30.I do not see then how it can suddenly have rendered the entire process unfair that, following Smart Gain’s departure, the Secretary drew the OHC’s attention to something (namely, Note (9)(b)) which had always formed part of the draft OZP. I cannot see how the Secretary’s act can conceivably have created a false impression in any one’s mind. 31.There is no substance to this intended ground of judicial review. B. Objection 2: Was there an abdication of decision-making responsibility? 32.Mr McCoy submits that the OHC failed to exercise its decision-making responsibility. This is because, in rejecting Smart Gain’s objections, the OHC adopted, practically word-for-word, the suggested reasons advanced by the Planning Department in OHC Paper No.242. 33.After a lengthy and detailed assessment of Smart Gain’s objections in relation to the 4 sites, OHC Paper No.242 concluded as follows (in §6.2):
34.Save for insignificant changes, the reasons for the Board’s decision stated in its 9 December 2005 letter to Smart Gain tracks the wording proposed by the Planning Department in the OHC Paper. 35.Mr McCoy suggests that this is contrary to the principles stated by the Court of Appeal in The Law Society v. A Solicitor [2006] 1 HKLRD 49. There Rogers VP said (at §§24-26):
36.Smart Gain (Mr McCoy contends) is entitled to have the Board’s reasons in its own words. Anything less would be an abdication of its decision-making responsibility to the Planning Department. 37.In my view, this submission lacks merit. We are miles away from the situation in the case cited by Mr McCoy. 38.In Law Society a Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal exercising a judicial function delegated the task of writing its decision to a clerk. In those circumstances, as the Court of Appeal points out, there may well be a failure by the tribunal to exercise its decision-making powers. A solicitor before the tribunal is entitled to know why he is (say) being adjudged guilty, in the words of the tribunal, not in the words of a clerk to whom the tribunal delegates the task of coming up with appropriate words. 39.The vice in The Law Society was the employment of a third person (a clerk), who was not party to the proceedings, to come up with the wording for reasons, after the parties’ closing submissions had been heard. That was unfair because the third person (who was not a member of the tribunal and thus not tasked with the duty of deciding) was effectively acting as an advocate of behalf of one or other party. The clerk was suggesting to the decision-makers how the putative winning party’s arguments might best be phrased. 40.As the passage from Bernstein cited by the Court of Appeal notes, the vice is all the more worrisome where it is not just a neutral third person who is asked to draft a judgment. 41.A tribunal frequently has its own counsel to assist in the conduct of proceedings. Such counsel will typically act as “prosecutor” before the tribunal. Where, despite this role, counsel is asked to draft the tribunal’s judgment, a defendant may reasonably claim to be aggrieved by not having the chance to respond to what (in effect) become further submissions (in the form of a proposed text) by the prosecutor to the tribunal. 42.In contrast, here a Board in the exercise of an administrative function has to determine whether to accept or reject certain objections to a draft OZP. 43.The Board hears for and against the objections from Smart Gain and the Planning Department respectively. As part of its submissions, the Planning Department (much as counsel before a Court do in written skeletons) invites the Board to adopt a particular form of words, if the Board is minded to reject the objections. 44.The Board is free to adopt the wording in whole or in part as it pleases. Smart Gain (which was aware of the proposed wording in advance of the OHC meeting) is free to make submissions on the wording as part of its own presentation. 45.If, having heard Smart Gain and the Planning Department and deliberated on the matter, the OHC decides that the wording proposed by the Planning Department adequately encapsulates the Board’s reasons, what (one asks rhetorically) is wrong about the Board adopting the suggested words? 46.Judges themselves sometimes incorporate into their judgments wording suggested by counsel in submission. Judges typically attribute such borrowed words to counsel of a given party. They do this not out of indolence or an unwillingness to decide, but because in their judgment the words accurately articulate what they want to say. 47.There can be nothing wrong or unfair in such practice to a litigant. The latter would have had every opportunity during argument before the Court to comment on any wording advanced by opposing counsel. 48.I therefore do not think that Objection 2 is an arguable ground for judicial review. C. Objection 3: Whether irrelevant consideration taken into account 49.Mr McCoy contends that the Board was wrong to take into account the possibility that Smart Gain’s proposals would ‘set an undesirable precedent for similar requests for other rezoning proposals”. The Board (Mr McCoy says) should not have been concerned with the possible effect of its decision in relation to other objections. 50.Mr McCoy notes that, of the 7 objections to the draft OZP, only Smart Gain’s related to the particular CA zone where the sites are located. The other areas under objection had different characteristics (Mr McCoy observes) from those of the sites. In any event, Mr McCoy suggests that a precedent for the development of the area had already been set by the nearby development of the HKUST Staff Quarters and private housing at Pik Shui San Tsuen. 51.I do not think that this is an arguable ground. 52.In OHC Paper No.242 the Planning Department submitted as follows (in §4.3):
53.Given the assessment in §4.3, the OHC Paper recommended the rejection of Smart Gain’s objections along the line set out in §6.2(d) (quoted above). In adopting OHC Paper §6.2(d) and writing to Smart Gain in terms identical to that paragraph, the Board was clearly endorsing and accepting the Planning Department’s reasoning. 54.In that context, I cannot see how the Board can be accused of taking account of an irrelevant consideration. 55.The Board felt that, if it acceded to Smart Gain’s rezoning proposals, other private owners might later put forward similar applications. In such case, much as Smart Gain uses the existence of the HKUST Staff Quarters and Pik Shui private housing as an argument in its favour, the other private owners would say that they are entitled to be treated in like fashion to Smart Gain. 56.It would then be harder for the Board to turn down similar requests from private owners. On the other hand, the Board could not agree to all applications without (in the Board’s view) causing “adverse impacts on the natural landscape, environmental, traffic and infrastructural provisions in the area”. 57.Somewhere the Board would have to draw a line. I can see nothing irrational or unreasonable in the Board drawing the line (with an eye to precedent) so as to exclude Smart Gain’s re-zoning proposals. The Board must be entitled to take into account the possibility that Smart Gain’s re-zoning proposals would lead to similar proposals which could undermine the future integrity of the CA areas in the draft OZP. 58.Thus, I do not think that Objection 3 is arguable as a ground of review. D. Objection 4: Whether legitimate expectation ignored 59.Mr McCoy submits that Smart Gain had a legitimate expectation that the sites would not be zoned CA. 60.This expectation is said to arise as a result of correspondence and communications between the Planning Department and Tai Po Tsai Development Ltd. (TPTDL), Smart Gain’s associated company. Smart Gain in particular relies on a letter dated 23 February 2001. It is said that this expectation was further strengthened by representations made by the Planning Department on 1 March 2001. 61.TPTDL and Smart Gain belong the same Group. TPTDL owns a significant number of lots near Hiram’s Highway, Pak Shui Wun Sai King and HKUST. Smart Gain acquired the sites from TPTDL in August 2001. 62.In November 1999 TPTDL wrote to the Director of Planning as follows:
63.In the course of 2000 TPTDL followed up by proposing a comprehensive residential, hotel and recreation development at Pak Shui Wun to the Planning Department. 64.By letter dated 18 May 2000 the Planning Department commented on TPTDL’s proposal as follows:
65.The Planning Department’s letter appended a summary of comments on TPTDL’s proposal by various Government Departments. Among those comments were the following:
66.On 5 February 2001 TPTDL wrote to the Planning Department to express concern about a reported remark by a Chief Town Planner. TPTDL sought clarification. It stated:-
67.On 23 February 2001 the Director of Planning responded in the following terms:
68.According to Smart Gain’s Notice of Application for Judicial Review (Notice) (at §6):
69.The Group then decided to transfer the 4 sites to Smart Gain in August 2001 “in order to facilitate the submission of development proposals relating solely to these sites” (Notice §7). 70.Contrary to Mr McCoy’s submission, I cannot discern from the events and statements which I have just summarised (including the meeting of Mr Lo Chai Wan with the Planning Department), any representation by the Government that “at least limited development of the [4] Sites would be permitted”. 71.Note that TPTDL’s proposal in 2000 was different from the re-zoning being advocated by Smart Gain. At best in early 2001, while pouring cold water on TPTDL’s proposal, the Government was saying that it retained an open mind on development in the SENT region. Certainly, Government made no clear, unambiguous representation that the sites (as later put forward by Smart Gain) would not be zoned CA. 72.Mr Lo Chai Wan made an affirmation in support of Smart Gain’s application. Prior to becoming a consultant for Smart Gain, Mr Lo was Deputy Director in the Planning Department between 1991 and 1998. He deposes as follows:
73.I am unable to attach any weight to Mr Lo’s assertions which I have just quoted. Whether or not a person has a legitimate expectation is a conclusion of law. Mr Lo’s personal views on the issue, however interesting, are irrelevant. Similarly, the determination of whether something is or is not reasonable is for the Court. It is not for Mr Lo to make “findings” on the matter. 74.I do not find any relevant representation. Smart Gain’s claim based on legitimate expectation cannot be sustained. In my judgment, Objection 4 is unarguable. E. Objection 5: Whether decision wrong in law 75.Mr McCoy submits that the CA zoning amounted to a deprivation of Smart Gain’s property rights without compensation. Here Mr McCoy echoes the arguments which Smart Gain advanced before the Board and which have already been summarised in my discussion of Objection 1. Mr McCoy says that, if he is right, the CA zoning was contrary to Basic Law (BL) arts.6 and 105. 76.BL art. 6 provides that the Hong Kong Government ‘shall protect the right of private ownership of property in accordance with law”. 77.BL art.105 states:
78.Mr McCoy’s Skeleton expressly acknowledged that:-
79.In the course of oral hearing, Mr McCoy initially seemed to resile from this position. He seemed at first to be going so far as to suggest that, insofar as a CA zoning meant that a person could only use his agricultural land for plant nursery with Government permission, a CA zoning would amount to de facto expropriation without compensation. 80.In such situation, there would (Mr McCoy seemed to contend) be an automatic contravention of art.105. Instead, the correct way to proceed (Mr McCoy submitted) was for the Board to recommend to the Chief Executive in Council (pursuant to Town Planning Ordinance (Cap.131) s.4(2)) that the relevant agricultural land be resumed upon payment of compensation. 81.However, asked how that extreme position squared with authorities such as Grape Bay Limited v. Attorney General of Bermuda [2000] 1 WLR 574 (PC) (especially at 583 per Lord Hoffmann) and Fine Tower Associates Ltd. v. Town Planning Board HCAL No. 5 of 2004, 25 April 2005 (especially at §§51-53 per Hartmann J), Mr McCoy accepted that the law was more nuanced. 82.Mr McCoy reformulated his submission to the effect that a CA zoning would only amount to a wrong deprivation of property right, contrary to art.105, if there were no reasonable basis for imposing such a zoning on a plot of land. In other words, Objection 5 is in effect another way of expressing Objection 6 (which I shall consider below). There would be de facto expropriation if the CA zoning of Smart Gain’s land was perverse or irrational. 83.In my judgment, this reformulation represents a more realistic appreciation of the ambit of art.105 as far as the present case is concerned. 84.In Fine Tower, Hartmann J citing Lord Hoffmann in Grape Bay, pointed out (at §53):
85.The real question then for the purposes of deciding whether to grant leave for judicial review is whether it is arguable that in deciding to retain a CA zoning for the sites the Board acted perversely or irrationally. This is the evaluation which I must undertake in relation to Objection 6. 86.But, before turning to Objection 6, I would make 2 observations. 87.First, in my discussion of Objection 1, I quoted Mr McCoy’s submission that in reality it will be difficult to obtain permission to run plant nurseries on any of the sites. This is because, on the assumption (which Smart Gain disputes) that there is something worth conserving in respect of the sites, it will be practically impossible (Mr McCoy suggests) for Smart Gain to persuade the Government to give the necessary permission for (say) the “workshop and greenhouse structures necessary to permit modern productive farming”. 88.I find the submission puzzling. At present, the Government leases for the sites restrict their use to agricultural purposes. The leases do not permit the building of structures on the sites. In those circumstances, even without a CA zoning, I doubt that Smart Gain is entitled under its leases to build ‘structures” without Government permission. 89.Even if I am wrong in that, it seems to me that Mr McCoy’s reasoning is problematic. 90.He assumes (contrary to his case) that there is something worth conserving, so that permission to build structures will not be forthcoming. However, if there is something worth conserving, then it follows that the CA zoning is justifiable and cannot be treated as irrational. On the basis of Fine Tower, the Board would be entitled to impose a CA zoning and there would be no unlawful deprivation. 91.On the other hand, if one assumes that (consistently with Smart Gain’s case) there is nothing worth conserving, Mr McCoy’s supposed difficulties in obtaining permission for ‘structures” hardly seems compelling. Presumably, the less that there is worth conserving on a given site, the more likely it is that the Government will give the requisite permission for plant nursery upon application by Smart Gain. 92.Second, given Mr McCoy’s acceptance that there were features worth conserving in Site 4, it must follow from his reformulated submission that a CA zoning for Site 4 is justified. A CA zoning for Site 4 must be reasonable. To that extent at least, Smart Gain must fail on both Objections 5 and 6. F. Objection 6: Whether decision perverse F.1 Smart Gain’s complaints 93.In relation to Site 1, Smart Gain’s Notice says that the decision was unreasonable because:
94.In relation to Site 2, the Notice complains of the decision on the following grounds:
95.In relation to Site 3, the Notice complains of the following:
96.The Notice alleges that the CA zoning for Site 4 was irrational. Given Mr McCoy’s concession at the oral hearing before me, any contentions to the contrary in the Notice must fall way. Nonetheless, I shall deal with them briefly for completeness. 97.The Notice says the following in relation to Site 4:
98.In my judgment, none of the grounds raised in the Notice can give rise to a case of irrationality. F.2 Site 1 99.In respect of Site 1, the Planning Department submitted as follows in OHC Paper No.242 (at §4.1(d)):
99. It is plain from the minutes of the OHC’s deliberations following Smart Gain’s representations, that the OHC substantially accepted the Planning Department’s view. Thus, it was necessary (the OHC thought) to maintain a “buffer” between what had been developed in the past (such as HKUST Staff Quarter) and what was sought to be preserved for posterity. The minutes record this conclusion as follows (at §25):
100.As far as I can see, there is nothing to reproach in this succinct summary of the Board’s thought process. 101.The Board adopted the grounds for rejecting Smart Gain’s objections suggested by the Planning Department. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of those grounds simply refer to “the objection sites” as comprising “wooded slopes and river valley, which formed a very significant and attractive landscape”. Mr McCoy criticises this for being too general, especially since Site 1 has been partly cleared. Mr McCoy says that the sites should have been treated separately. 102.But Mr McCoy reads grounds (a) and (b) too narrowly. 103.Fairly read in the context of Minutes §25, grounds (a) and (b) do no more than encapsulate the Planning Department’s submission. Sites 1, 2, 3 and 4 form part of a larger natural landscape. With the exception of Site 4, there may or may not be extraordinary or distinct features worth preserving in Sites 1, 2 and 3 considered individually. But at the very least those 3 sites can serve as a buffer to protect the more sensitive parts of the CA area from existing development. 104.I do not see how such reasoning by the Board can be characterised as Wednesbury unreasonable, such that no rational Board could ever come to the same conclusion. 105.In particular, in relation to Site 1, the OHC accepted that there was less to conserve on the site itself. But it might still function as a buffer. In any event, as discussed in relation to Objection 3, the Board was entitled to consider that allowing development to encroach on Site 1 would not only diminish the existing buffer but also set an undesirable precedent. 106.The Notice further misrepresents the DAFC’s views. He is recorded (in TPB Paper No.7356 attached to OHC Paper No.242) as having held the following opinion (at §6.1.2):
107.In that light, I do not think that it can be argued that the DAFC’s views somehow rendered the OHC’s decision on Site 1 irrational. F.3 Site 2 108.As for Site 2, the Board was not duty-bound to zone the area as V simply on the basis of the TPT Village representations. The latter could only be one of the factors which the Board had to take into account. 109.The Planning Department noted the following in OHC Paper No.242 (at §4.12(f)):
110.It is plain from the OHC minutes that the Board gave careful consideration to the villagers” submissions on the need for small housing. In the end, however, the Board agreed with the Planning Department’s assessment as to the supply of land suitable for small houses for villagers. The minutes record (at §§23-24):
111.Accordingly, it seems to me that the Board was entitled to think that the need to maintain Site 2 as a buffer zone (and not for the supply of land for small houses) was a critical factor. 112.I am not persuaded by the argument that, if Site 2 were zoned V, then it would be available for village housing. 113.It must have been reasonable for the Board to consider the proximity (or lack of it) between Site 2 and the present TPT Village in deciding whether it was appropriate to zone Site as V. The closer Site 2 is to the village the more compelling might be the argument for classifying it as V. How close it would have to be to merit a V zoning, would be a matter for the discretion and judgment of Board members. 114.But it is beside the point to say that the Board could not take proximity (or lack of it) into account because, if classified as V land, Site 2 would be available for small houses. The same could be said of a piece of land anywhere in the New Territories. If zoned as V, then any such land could be used for small houses. No intrinsic feature is identified by this argument as compelling a V zoning for Site 2. By itself, the argument provides no basis for concluding that the Board was wrong to reject a re-zoning of Site 2. 115.I therefore do not think that it is arguable that the Board erred in relation to Site 2. F.4 Site 3 116.As for Site 3, for the reasons discussed, the Board must have been entitled to regard the area as part of a buffer zone, especially in respect of HKUST Staff Quarter. 117.Further, whether or not a structure (yet to be built) would be visible or invisible from the surrounding environment, is a matter of subjective impression. I see nothing in the evidence that leads me to conclude that no rational board could come to the conclusion reached here in relation to Site 3. 118.On traffic, access to Site 3 is from University Road. That then feeds into Clear Water Bay Road. 119.Smart Gain knew from OHC Paper No.242 that there were queries over the traffic situation going in and out of Site 3. If it did not understand the reason for the queries, it could have asked at any time during or before its presentation to the OHC meeting. 120.In any case, OHC Paper No.242 and the annexed TPB Paper No.7356 both specify why there was concern over traffic. The OHC Paper deals with potential traffic at §4.3 (quoted above). The TPB paper states (at §6.1.1):
121.I therefore do not think that it can be suggested that the Board’s decision in relation to Site 3 was perverse. F.5 Site 5 122.As for Site 4, the Planning Department in OHC Paper No.242 stated (at §4.1(h)):
123.The OHC Paper (at §4.4) summarises the AMO’s views thus:
124.It will be seen that, far from supporting Smart Gain’s case for a re-zoning of Site 4, the AMO preferred a CA zoning. 125.In light of the comments in the OHC Paper, it is hardly surprising that Mr McCoy was constrained to accept that a CA zoning for Site 4 was justifiable. I cannot see how the Board’s decision on Site 4 can be impeached. F.6 Miscellaneous ground 126.The Notice ends by alleging that the CA zoning was wrong because it did not follow the practice used for Country Park zoning. 127.Smart Gain suggests that when areas are zoned for Country Parks, private lands within the area are usually excluded from such classification. Since both the CA and Country Park zoning prohibit development, the practice used in the latter should have been (Smart Gain argues) used in relation to the sites here. Not to do so was unreasonable and wrong in law. 128.I do not think that the argument is tenable. 129.I have not been directed to any statute or regulation requiring the carving out of private land from a CA zone. To the contrary, on close analysis, none of the grounds advanced by Smart Gain suggest that any laws (not even the Basic Law) have been contravened. 130.Further, as mentioned above, the Board was entitled to regard the integrity of the proposed CA area and evaluate whether the Sites should (despite being private land) be classified CA by way of a buffer against encroaching development. There cannot have been anything objectionable in such approach. F.7 Conclusion on Objection 6 131.Objection 6 is bound to fail as a ground of judicial review. IV. CONCLUSION 132.The proposed judicial review is untenable. It fails to meet the threshold of “argument” which must be established at the leave stage. Leave is refused.
Mr. Gerard McCoy, SC leading Mr. Collin Wright, instructed by Messrs Johnson, Stokes & Master, for the Applicant
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Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCAL 12/2006
