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HCMA493/2007
香港特別行政區
高等法院原訟法庭
刑事上訴司法管轄權
判罪上訴
案件編號：裁判法院上訴案件2007年第493號
(原東區裁判法院案件2006年第4940號)
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主審法官 ： 高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官潘敏琦
聆訊日期 ： 2007年8月23日
裁決日期 ： 2007年8月23日
判案書
1.本案上訴人在聆訊後被裁定一項「猥褻侵犯」罪罪名成立，違反香港法例第 200 章《刑事罪行條例》第 122(1) 條，被判處入獄21 日。他現不服定罪，提出上訴。
2.上訴人是一名保安主任，第一控方證人(“證人”)是一名女接待員。根據證人的口供，當時上訴人坐在其身旁，突然拍了她的右大腿一下，又把手放在她的左肩，手指像彈鋼琴那般，輕輕地敲著她的左肩約一分鐘，及用手指掃她的肩胛約一分鐘。後來，上訴人捉著她的左手，不斷地捏弄，又稱讚她的皮膚很滑，更把手放在她的右大腿中間近內側的位置，手指不停地在她的腿上輕輕打轉了約半分鐘，並由上述的位置撫摸到她的大腿外側的底部，又由那裡撫摸到大腿上面，並繼續慢慢地向上摸，和伸進證人的裙內。上訴人是在證人大力推開他的手才停止及把手縮回。證人在翌日報警；警員其後拘捕上訴人。警誡下，上訴人說「淨係摸宋詩慧隻手及膊頭」。
3.上訴人並不爭議他曾如證人所述般觸摸她。他指當時他們交談氣氛投契，他對證人有好感及追求之意，自然地有身體接觸，期間證人不但沒有拒絕，還對他作出鼓勵的嫣然一笑。他不覺得證人對他有所不滿。但當他感到證人推他的手時，他已即時停止其所有作為。
上訴理由
4.上訴理由現重組歸納如下：
| (1) |
裁判官在考慮上訴人所聲稱具真誠信念相信證人是同意該些身體接觸時，以信念是否合理來決定上訴人是否真實持有他聲稱的信念，犯了法律上的錯誤； |
| (2) |
裁判官未有充分考慮到證人當時的表現是否會引致上訴人持有上述信念，認為證人是同意這些身體接觸的； |
| (3) |
定罪不安全及不穩妥。 |
答辯人回應
5.答辯人大律師指，裁判官在考慮上訴人是否真的如他所述持真誠信念證人是同意被他侵犯時，絕對可以考慮上訴人的稱聲在事實和環境基礎下是否合理，裁判官可以在衡量證供後，基於上訴人的聲稱於理不合、或有違內在或然性，而拒納他持有真誠信念的聲稱。
6.另答辯人指裁判官在裁斷陳述書第 8 頁(上訴綜卷第 18 頁)已詳細考慮到證人當時的表現，包括嘗試推開上訴人的手後，上訴人仍繼續摸入她的裙內，導致證人需要大力推開上訴人的手他才停止。裁判官正確裁斷上訴人肯定知道證人是不同意其作為、或存在不同意其作為的危險性。
7.答辯人續指本案證人的證供，根本不存在會引致上訴人錯誤認為證人是同意這些身體接觸的情況。
判決
8.本席首先處理上訴理由 (1)。裁判官在裁斷陳述書第 16 段說：
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辯方大律師正確地指出：法庭在考慮被告人的案時，應以被告人的主觀來看，即是被告人是否真實地相信宋同意他的作為，而不是他的信念是否在客觀下合理。然而，依本席的看法，事實審裁團可從被告人的信念是否合理，來推斷被告人是否真實地持有他聲稱的信念。越合理的信念當然會越容易令事實審裁團信納被告人的話，而反之亦然。」 |
9.上訴人大律師援引DPP v. Morgan [1975] 2 AER 347一案，指出如果上訴人有真誠信念相信證人是同意他的作為的，則不論該信念是如何不合理，那控方仍不能證實上訴人有意圖在證人不同意他的作為時侵犯她。
10.Morgan一案涉及強姦罪，該案之法律原則廣泛沿用在涉猥褻侵犯罪及以自衛作辯護理由的案件。
11.英國上訴法庭在R. v. Kimber, 77 Cr. App. R. 225一案中分析了Morgan案頒下之法律原則如下：
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The offence of indecent assault is now statutory … The prosecution had to prove that the appellant made an indecent assault on Betty … the prosecution had to prove that the appellant intended to commit it. This could not be done without first proving that the appellant intended to assault Betty… |
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… In this case the appellant by his own admissions did intentionally lay his hands on Betty. That would not, however, have been enough to prove the charge. There had to be evidence that the appellant had intended to do what he did unlawfully. When there is a charge of indecent assault on a woman, the unlawfulness can be proved,… by evidence that the defendant intended to cause bodily harm. In most cases, however, the prosecution tries to prove that the complainant did not consent to what was done. The burden of proving lack of consent rests upon the prosecution … The consequence is the prosecution has to prove that the defendant intended to lay hands on his victim without her consent. If he did not intend to do this, he is entitled to be found not guilty; and if he did not so intend because he believes she was consenting, the prosecution will have failed to prove the charge. It is the defendant’s belief, not the grounds on which it was based, which goes to negative the intent.” |
12.Lord Lane CJ在R. v. Williams (Gladstone) (1984) 78 Cr. App. R. 276一案處理「自衛」的辯護理由時，就著被告人聲稱所持的真誠信念有如下的說法：
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The reasonableness or unreasonableness of the defendant’s belief is material to the question of whether the belief was held by the defendant at all. If the belief was in fact held, its unreasonableness, so far as guilt or innocence is concerned, is neither here nor there. … In other words the jury should be directed first of all that the prosecution have the burden or duty of proving the unlawfulness of the defendant’s actions; secondly, if the defendant may have been labouring under a mistake as to the facts, he must be judged according to his mistaken view of the facts; thirdly, that is so whether the mistake was, on an objective view, a reasonable mistake or not.” |
13.上述的觀點，在Archbold Hong Kong 2007, 16-9, 16-10綜合如下：
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16-9 |
… DPP v. Morgan [1976] AC 182, is commonly thought of as being a turning point in the development of the law, and is frequently cited as authority for the proposition that a defence based on mistake of fact may succeed though it is not based on reasonable grounds, so long as it was honestly held. Morgan was indeed a landmark case, but it is an oversimplification of the decision to describe its effect as being the removal of the requirement of reasonableness… |
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16-10 |
The decision in Morgan has since been applied to the offence of indecent assault in R. v. Kimber 77 Cr. App. R. 225, CA, and to an allegation of assault occasioning actual bodily harm in R. v. Williams (G) 78 Cr. App. R. 276, CA … One of the elements of the latter offence is that the accused was acting unlawfully … and a successful prosecution depends upon proof of an awareness of the circumstances rendering the attack unlawful. It follows that if the defendant believes in facts which would have rendered his use of force lawful, the prosecution have failed to prove the case. … The reasonableness or unreasonableness of the belief was material only to the question of whether the belief was in fact held by him.” |
14.故此，Morgan一案並不是說法庭或陪審團完全不須考慮被告人所持的信念是否合理，裁判官正確指出「事實審裁團可從被告人的信念是否合理，來推斷被告人是否真實地持有他聲稱的信念。越合理的信念當然會越容易令事實審裁團信納被告人的話，而反之亦然。」裁判官對Morgan一案的理解完全正確。
15.本席現處理上訴理由(2)。上訴人大律師力陳，裁判官未有充分考慮證人與上訴人已認識了好一段時間、工作或午膳常有接觸，亦會傾談私事這些背景，亦未有充分考慮證人當時的表現，會否令上訴人認為證人是同意這些身體接觸。
16.根據裁斷陳述書第 13(c) 段，聆訊時代表上訴人的大律師已如此向裁判官指出：
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在約30分鐘的時間，被告人以試探式的方法，按部就班地接觸宋的身體。宋不但沒有在口頭或行動上阻止被告人，還與被告人傾談。宋又扮鎮定；她的做法可能使被告人有一個錯誤的印象，令他相信在追求的過程中，他有一個基礎去進一步接觸宋的身體。被告人又有留意宋的神態，所以他並無罔顧宋的意願。而當宋推開他的手時，他亦立刻停止觸摸她。」 |
17.然而，裁判官認為證據顯示，上訴人和證人只屬普通同事，但沒有證據顯示他在觸摸證人之前有任何基礎令他相信證人願意與他有親密的接觸。而裁判官亦認為證人只是強裝鎮定，裁判官認為上訴人聲稱追求證人，以「按部就班、試探式」的觸摸來表示追求的說法只是一派胡言。他信納證人所指：
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......當被告人的手開始進入她的裙內時，她曾嘗試推開被告人的手。但他繼續向上摸，並且進入了她的裙裡面。宋要再大力地推被告人的手，他才停止。本席肯定那是事實。本席亦在無合理疑點下信納，當宋第一次阻止被告人時，他肯定知道：宋不同意他的作為，或存著宋不同意他的作為的危險性。但他不合理地強行繼續摸上宋的大腿。」 |
18.明顯地裁判官認為上述證供顯示，上訴人無視證人曾嘗試推開他的手，而肆無忌彈進一步把手向上移至證人裙內，這點實與上訴人聲稱之信念不能兼容。裁判官正確裁定上訴人之言殊不合理，拒納上訴人是真實地持有他聲稱的信念之說。
19.上訴理據不足，駁回，維持原判。
控方 ： 由律政司高級政府律師何詠光代表香港特別行政區。
辯方 ： 由陳崔律師事務所轉聘大律師是香媛代表被告人。
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