Sky Wide Development Ltd and Others v. Building Authority
Read the full judgment text of CACV 321/2008 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 2 March 2009 before Tang VP, Wright J.
Administrative law – judicial review – leave to apply for judicial review – Buildings Ordinance, Cap. 123 – unauthorised rooftop structures – Building Orders under section 24(1) – Buildings Department's Enforcement Policy – press release of 21 February 2003 on single staircase buildings – whether the press release was limited to single staircase buildings in which the main staircase was required by Regulation 39(2) of the Building (Planning) Regulations to be continued to the roof – applicants' properties are 4-storey buildings with highest floor about 11.58m above ground level – Sunderland Estate, No. 1 Hereford Road, Kowloon Tong – whether application arguable – whether costs should be awarded against applicants on leave application – first issue: whether applicants had arguable case that BA wrongly applied the press release to their 4-storey single staircase buildings – held: no, the expression 'single staircase building' in the press release is a descriptive term meaning a building with a single staircase, not limited to buildings where the staircase is required to continue to the roof, and the press release is fairly and reasonably applicable to all single staircase buildings regardless of height – second issue: whether costs should follow the event on a leave application where putative respondent attended at court's invitation – held: no error in learned judge's exercise of discretion, multiple factors justified costs order including the fact that full argument and evidence was deployed giving applicants the advantage of an early substantive hearing, applicants sought to delay enforcement of Building Orders made more than two years ago, and some applicants did not even appeal to the Buildings Appeal Tribunal – appeal dismissed with costs taxed if not agreed.
Legal issues: Whether the applicants' challenge to the Building Authority's enforcement action against unauthorised rooftop structures was arguable · Whether costs should be ordered against the applicants following the dismissal of the leave application
Outcome: Appeal dismissed; leave to apply for judicial review refused as the applicants' case was held to be wholly unarguable
Cited by 26 cases · Cites 3 cases
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CACV 321/2008 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 321 OF 2008 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 116 OF 2008) ----------------------
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---------------------- Before: Hon Tang VP and Wright J in Court Date of Hearing: 20 February 2009 Date of Judgment: 2 March 2009 ---------------------- J U D G M E N T ---------------------- Hon Tang VP: Introduction 1.The 1st to 6th, 9th – 18th and 20th applicants (these applicants), are the registered owners of various town houses or flats of Sunderland Estate, No. 1 Hereford Road, Kowloon Tong. 2.Their application for leave to apply for judicial review concerned:
3.Lam J refused leave after hearing at which the putative respondent appeared at the request of the court. On 16 December 2006, Lam J ordered that the applicants pay the costs of the putative respondent. The appeal 4.This is the applicants’ appeal. 5.The subject premises consist of both town houses and apartments. According to the approved building plans, all the town houses and apartment buildings are 4-storey buildings, and that the level of the highest floor, namely the level of the roof, is about 11.58m above ground level. 6.It is common ground that there were unauthorised rooftop structures and that under the Building Ordinance, the BA had the power to order their removal. 7.The BA’s enforcement policy was stated in a document “Buildings Department’s Enforcement Policy against Unauthorized Building Works” published in 2001 (“the Enforcement Policy”):
8.On 21 February 2003, the Buildings Department (“the BD”) in a press release (“the press release”) announced that clearance of illegal rooftop structures on single staircase buildings would be accorded top priority for enforcement action. 9.Although only the first 3 paragraphs of the press release are directly relevant, I re-produce the entire press release below.
10.The press release is not a formal document. It is clear that neither the reference to single staircase buildings nor the description of fire hazard which may arise as a result of illegal rooftop structures was intended to be exact or comprehensive. 11.The applicants’ case is that the enforcement action had been taken by the BA in the mistaken belief that the subject premises were single-staircase buildings within the meaning of the press release. 12.The applicants referred to Regulation 39(2) of the Building (Planning) Regulations (“the B(P)R”) which provides that:
Regulation 41 of the B(P)R also provides that:
13.Paragraph 9 of the Code of Practice for the Provision of Means of Escape in Case of Fire (“the Code”) further explains when single staircase may be permitted in buildings and when the staircase shall be continued to the roof:
14.It is pertinent to note that in terms of means of escape in case of fire, the Code distinguishes between two categories of single staircase buildings. It appears from paragraph 9.2(e) of the Code that it is those buildings in which the level of the highest floor is more than 13m (or 4 storeys) above the ground level that the roof is required to be used for rescue purpose and has to comply with certain requirements. In other cases, the rescue method is by rescue ladder/appliance as stated in paragraph 9.2(b) of the Code. 15.The applicants submitted that since the applicants’ properties did not exceed 4 storeys or 13m in height and they were not required to have a main staircase which was continued to the roof of the building, they were not covered by the press release. 16.But it is self-evident that illegal rooftop structures are fire hazards. They may be a danger not only to the occupants or users of the illegal rooftop structures, the extra risk of fire can also pose dangers to the occupants of the rest of the building. Lack or blockage of a fire escape is not the only form in which a fire hazard can take. 17.I do not agree it is arguable that the press announcement and Regulation 39(2) must be read together such that single-staircase buildings must refer to single-staircase buildings not exceeding 4 storeys in height. Indeed, para. 9.1 of the Code provides that single staircases may be permitted in buildings not exceeding 6 storeys in height, this would include single staircases for buildings under 4 storeys (hence not required to be continued to the roof) as well as buildings over 4 storeys but under 6 storeys and 17m in height. 18.The applicants relied on Building Authority v. Appeal Tribunal (Buildings), unreported, HCAL 3/2005, dated 7 November 2005. There, the court was concerned with Antonia House on Broom Road. Antonia House stood on Nos. 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 Broom Road. It was 4 storeys high, and has 2 entrances, each leading to one staircase. One of the two staircases served Nos. 4 and 6, the other, Nos. 8, 10 and 12. The flats on either staircase did not have direct access to the other staircase. However, because both staircases were continued to the roof, it was possible to gain access from one staircase to the other by crossing over the roof. The BA took enforcement action against illegal staircases on the roof of Nos. 4 and 12 Broom Road on the basis that Nos. 4, 6 and 8, and Nos. 10 and 12 were separate buildings each with one single staircase. The Building Appeal Tribunal allowed the appeal on the basis that they were not single staircase buildings. Chu J allowed the Buildings Authority’s appeal. She said:
19.The applicants pointed to the fact that in deciding whether the buildings had one staircase Chu J had taken into account both the B(P)R and the 1959 Code of Practice. It is legitimate to look at both B(P)R and the Code in order to ascertain whether a building is a single-staircase building. But HCAL 3/2005 is not authority that the expression “a single staircase building” in the press release referred solely to a building in which the main staircase was required to be continued to the roof. 20.Although the press release referred to the roof as a fire refuge, I do not believe it is seriously arguable that the press release was a comprehensive statement of the danger of fire hazard in the case of illegal rooftop structures. The inhabitants of the 4-storey building might not have to use the roof as fire refuge, but it must be a matter of serious concern in the case of a single staircase building, especially one where the main stair case was not required to be continued to the roof, that the occupiers or users of the illegal roof structures should have no ready means of escape. As Chu J said:
21.I see nothing in the press release which even remotely supports the applicants’ submission that a 4-storey building with illegal roof structures should not be accorded priority under the Enforcement Policy. Nor can I possibly agree with the submission that, even if a 3-storey illegal rooftop structures had been built on top of a 3-storey building and there was only one staircase, it would fall outside the Press Enforcement, because the press release only applied to buildings with 4 lawful storeys only. I have set out the press release in full to show that it is not a document designed for nice semantic analysis. 22.The learned judge said in para. 15 of his judgment:
With respect, I agree. 23.It is unnecessary for me to go on to deal with the other arguments advanced by Mr Denis Chang SC on behalf of the applicants. It is unnecessary to decide, for example, whether if the BA was wrong, relief should nevertheless be refused. I am of the clear view that the applicants’ case is wholly unarguable and will stop at that. Costs 24.The learned judge after hearing further submissions awarded costs against the respondent. Mr Chang submitted that the learned judge had proceeded on the basis that the normal rule under Order 62 Rule 3, namely that costs should follow the event, applied to a case where on an ex parte application for leave, the putative respondent was invited by the court to attend. With respect, it is clear to me that that was not the learned judge’s approach. 25.The discretion of the court in relation to costs on such applications is broad. 26.Brooke J (as he then was) said in R v Honourable Society of the Middle Temple ex p Bullock [1996] ELR 349 at 359C:
27.In R (on the application of Mount Cook Land Ltd) v Westminster CC [2004] 2 P & CR 22 405 at 425, Auld LJ said:
28.I agree that it takes unusual circumstances for an award of costs to be made against an applicant for leave and that the court should be sparing in the exercise of such discretion. That has been the courts approach. 29.Hartmann J (as he then was) in Cheung Wai Mei v Michael Pik-Kiu Chan, Esq, Coroner, unreported, HCAL 24/2007, dated 9 March 2007 said:
30.In Lo Siu Lan and another v Hong Kong Housing Authority, unreported, CACV 378/2004, dated 1 March 2005, Ma CJHC said (at para. 3):
31.It is obvious that the learned judge proceeded on the basis that costs should not be ordered against the applicants unless these are good reasons to do so. In para. 26, he stated the reasons:
32.The learned judge having exercised his discretion, I do not believe I am entitled to interfere. I should add, however, that had the discretion been for me to exercise, with respect, I would have exercised it in exactly the same way. 33.I turn to the costs of the appeal. 34.Mr Chang submitted that costs should not follow the event. I am not going to decide whether the correct rule should be that costs should follow the event unless there are good reasons to do otherwise or that there should be no order as to costs unless there are good reasons otherwise. I recognize that in judicial review proceedings, even in respect of inter partes hearings, often it is inappropriate to order the unsuccessful applicant to pay costs. But this is not such a case. This is not a case where the applicants could say that they have made the application in the public interest (except in the limited sense that good administration is in the public interest). Despite the eloquence of counsel, I am firmly of the view that the appeal has no merit. I dismiss the appeal with costs, such costs be taxed if not agreed. Hon Wright J: 35.I agree.
Mr. Denis Chang, SC, Mr. Hectar Pun & Mr. Newman Lam, instructed by Messrs Chan, Lau & Wai, for the 1st – 6th, 9th – 18th & 20th Applicants. Mr. Joseph Fok, SC and Ms. Teresa Wu, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent. |
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