HKSAR v. Chiu Lam Lei
Read the full judgment text of DCCC 450/2009 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 13 November 2009.
1. The defendant has been convicted after trial of arson being reckless as to whether life would be endangered, contrary to the Crimes Ordinance, and the finding of the court was of course was that the defendant started the fire and at the time had the necessary intent.
Cited by 2 cases
|
DCCC450/2009 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CRIMINAL CASE NO. 450 OF 2009 ----------------------
----------------------
------------------------------ Reasons for Sentence ------------------------------ 1.The defendant has been convicted after trial of arson being reckless as to whether life would be endangered, contrary to the Crimes Ordinance, and the finding of the court was of course was that the defendant started the fire and at the time had the necessary intent. 2.Considerable damage was caused by the fire but there was no injury to anybody. 3.The trial entirely turned upon her mental state at the time of the offence and the question was whether she had the intent to commit the offence or whether she was in fact suffering from insanity. 4.At the end of the day I rejected those defences and convicted her, but the medical evidence particularly I heard must condition how I approach sentence of the defendant, and I think the best way in which it could be put is that although the defendant’s illness did not excuse her as a matter of law from these offences, it did show that the intent that she did form was as a result of a delusional state that she was in which was a consequence of her suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time. 5.The medical reports are quite clear about that; the medical evidence that the court heard was quite clear about that. There was no dispute about these facts, and although it did not, in my view, provide a defence, it does very much affect how the court would approach her culpability for these offences at this point in time. 6.What the medical evidence showed in respect of the defendant was that she had been well up to about a year before the incident then she started to suffer from auditory hallucinations, she had delusions of reference and delusions of persecution. She was distressed and developed a suicidal ideation and set her flat on fire by burning her own clothes. 7.She was detained in Kwai Chung Hospital from 2 January 2009 to 3 March and diagnosed as suffering at the time from paranoid schizophrenia. Her treatment has been successful and she has been discharged. 8.The conclusion of the reports that I heard are that this lady, the defendant, had been suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and it was likely that she was under the influence of that mental illness at the material time. 9.This is a serious offence, but of course, the defendant’s culpability arises out of her delusional state. As far as I can see from the medical evidence I now have, she is at least temporarily cured of that state, so this puts her in a very different category from other offenders. 10.It appeared to me that the process of sentencing should engage on prevention of any further relapse of mental illness and what is required for the defendant is supervision to ensure that she complies with the medical requirements of her cure. 11.If there had been a finding of insanity, there are specific ways in which that can be addressed, but without that finding, it appeared to me that the Probation Services were the only people who could supervise the defendant and ensure that she continues her treatment. 12.To that end, I obtained a Probation Officer’s report on the defendant. The contents of that are very helpful to her. The conclusion is the defendant was brought up and raised in Tianjin in China. She married a Hong Kong man and came to Hong Kong, she divorced in 2006, she could support herself until 2008, when her psychiatric illness onset. It says that now having received appropriate and regular psychiatric treatment, her condition is now under control. She lives with her younger sister, who renders her care and support. It says that in view of the accused’s remorseful attitude, her willingness to receive continuous psychiatric treatment and her sister’s strong support, probation supervision for 18 months is recommended, with of course the additional requirement she receive psychiatric treatment. 13.The most recent medical report, which is dated 30 October 2009, from Dr Watt supports that conclusion, and that report sets out the history of the defendant’s illness, which is similar to earlier reports. 14.Paragraph 4 says that
that is the psychiatric centre,
15.Dr Watt’s conclusion is that,
16.So it would appear that the provision of a Probation Order together with the requirement for psychiatric treatment would satisfy any requirement that the defendant continue to receive the treatment which would ensure that her paranoid schizophrenia remains in relapse. 17.That I consider to be the most important business of this court in sentencing this defendant for this offence and that is why, subject to the defendant’s consent, which is required, I will impose a Probation Order for 18 months together with the requirement that psychiatric treatment be received as directed. 18.The defendant needs that to be explained to her and I will do that now. 19.I propose that you should be placed on probation for 18 months. The requirement of the order are that you keep the peace and be of good behaviour, tell your Probation Officer of any change of address or employment, you keep any appointments they make for you to see your Probation Officer. You will be subject to the additional condition that you receive psychiatric treatment as and when directed by your Probation Officer. If you breach any of those conditions or you commit any further offence while this order is in force, you will be brought back to this court and sentenced again for the offence of which you were originally convicted. Do you understand that and do you consent to be placed on probation on those terms? DEFENDANT: Understand and consent.
|
Other judgments that cite this case