翟格 訴 林國雄及另一人

HCA 1413/2009

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2009年第1413號

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主審法官：高等法院原訟法庭法官鍾安德內庭聆訊

審訊日期：2009年12月15日

最後提交書面陳詞日期：2009年12月24日

判決書日期：2010年1月7日

判決書

1.原告人不服聆案官在2009年11月2日撤銷本訴訟的命令，向原訟法庭法官提出本上訴。

2.原告人在2009年6月16日針對兩被告人提出本訴訟。他前曾在2006年針對本訴訟的第二被告人（“Pacrim”）提出訴訟（HCA 1250/2006），該訴訟其後被上訴法庭撤銷（CACV 366/2007）。

3.原告人在提出本上訴後，在他的上訴陳詞大綱中表示，撤回針對Pacrim的申索。故此，本上訴祗涉及，原告人針對第一被告人（“D1”）的申索。

4.本訴訟所涉的背景及事件，與HCA 1250/2006的訴訟中所涉的背景及事件相同。即使依原告人所言，兩者之間不同的地方祗為:-

(a)  D1並非HCA 1250/2006中的與訟任何一方；

(b)  本訴訟的訴因，是有欺詐成分的失實陳述，而HCA 1250/2006中的訴因，是違反合約。

5.D1則認為，本訴訟屬“既判案件”法律原則涵蓋範圍，原告人濫用法律程序，故本訴訟應被撤銷。聆案官同意D1的論據。

6.D1在聆案官席前，及在本上訴中，引用下述案例:-

(1)  Yat Tung Investment Co. Ltd. v. Dao Hang Bank Ltd. and Another [1975] AC 581；

(2)  Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2001] 2 WLR 72；

(3)  Tang Kin Wah v. Cheng Choy Kam Chee Connie and Others, HCPI 771/2000（2001年1月15日）。

7.英國樞密院在Yat Tung一案的判案書中（第590頁）說:-

“… But there is a wider sense in which the [res judicata] doctrine may be appealed to, so that it becomes an abuse of process to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and therefore should have been litigated in earlier proceedings.  The locus classicus of that aspect of res judicata is the judgment of Wigram V.C. in Henderson v. Henderson(1843) 3 Hare 100, 115, where the judge says:

“… where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case.  The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.”

The shutting out of a “subject of litigation” – a power which no court should exercise but after a scrupulous examination of all the circumstances – is limited to cases where reasonable diligence would have caused a matter to be earlier raised; moreover, although negligence, inadvertence or even accident will not suffice to excuse, nevertheless “special circumstances” are reserved in case justice should be found to require the non-application of the rule.  For example, if it had been suggested that when the counterclaim in no. 969 came to be answered Mr. Lai was unaware, and could not reasonably have been expected to be aware, of the circumstances attending the sale to Choi Kee, it may be that the present plea against him would not have been maintainable.  But no such averment has been made.”（上文獲強調處，由本席後加）。

8.英國上議院在Johnson一案中的判案書所述的法律原則，與上述引述的相同: 參看其中第90及117至119頁。原訟法庭在Tang Kin Wah一案中的判案書所述的法律原則亦相同，本席不再在此重覆。

9.原告人在本上訴時承認，他在HCA 1250/2006的訴訟開展時，已知悉本訴訟中他所倚仗的事項，尤其是:-

(a)  D1被指曾作出的失實陳述；

(b)  D1的身份。

10.原告人解釋，他未在HCA 1250/2006的訴訟中，以有欺詐成份的失實陳述作為訴因之一，是因他:-

(1)  並不具所需法律知識；

(2)  誤以為，單憑藉違反合約作為訴因，經已足夠。

11.但前第10段所述的理由，都並非“既判案件”法律原則中，認可的充分理據，或“特別情況”。

12.鑑於前第9段所述的事項，均為原告人在HCA 1250/2006的訴訟中，可提出（故應提出）的事項，而原告人沒有提出其他足以被視為“特別情況”的事項，本席同意D1指，本訴訟屬濫用法律程序。

13.故此，本席駁回本上訴。

14.此外，在與訟雙方同意下，本席亦批予許可，撤回原告人針對Pacrim的申索（見前第3段）。Pacrim不擬就訟費提出申請，故本席不就原告人與Pacrim間的訟費，作出訟費命令。

15.與訟雙方就本上訴所涉的訟費，呈交各自的書面陳述。

16.經審閱相關陳述後，本席判定，本上訴所涉訟費，應由原告人付予D1。本席亦評定，訟費數額為 $14,000（即從訟費清單中的 $22,000，共扣減 $8,000）。