Ko Siu Luen, Louisa and Others v. Appeal Tribunal (Buildings)
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 67/2010 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 11 November 2011.
1. The Applicants are the registered owners of various residential apartments in Wing On Towers (“Wing On Towers”), Nos. 7 & 9 Boyce Road, Jardine’s Lookout, Hong Kong.
Cited by 9 cases · Cites 3 cases
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HCAL 67/2010 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 67 OF 2010 ____________ BETWEEN
____________ Before: Hon Au J in Court Date of Hearing: 17 August 2011 Date of Judgment: 11 November 2011 _______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ A. Introduction 1.The Applicants are the registered owners of various residential apartments in Wing On Towers (“Wing On Towers”), Nos. 7 & 9 Boyce Road, Jardine’s Lookout, Hong Kong. 2.In June 2006, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Applicants were respectively served with demolition and re-instatement orders issued by the Building Authority (“the BA”), requiring them to demolish various unauthorized building structures found on their respective apartments. 3.The Applicants each appealed to the Appeal Tribunal (Buildings) (“the Tribunal”) against these demolition orders. By the determination (“the Determination”) dated 8 April 2010, the Tribunal dismissed all their appeals and confirmed the demolition orders. 4.This is the hearing of the Applicants’ judicial review application against the Determination of the Tribunal. 5.The Applicants seek to quash the Determination and for an order of mandamus to require a differently constituted Tribunal to re-consider the Determination in accordance with the law and to allow the appeals. 6.The Tribunal is joined as the Respondent in this application, but it takes a neutral stance and has not any taken active steps in the proceedings. The BA is joined as the Interested Party and is the main opponent to the application. B. Background B1. Unauthorised building works and the Buildings Ordinance 7.Subject to some exemptions, under s. 14 of the Buildings Ordinance (Cap 123) (“BO”), anyone who wants to commence or carry out any building works must first obtain the BA’s approval in writing of the documents submitted to him in accordance with the buildings regulations. 8.Building works on buildings in Hong Kong which have been carried out without obtaining such prior approval (and thus in contravention of s. 14 of the BO) are regarded as unauthorised building works (“UBWs”). Under s. 24 of the BO, the BA may issue a demolition order to require the removal of UBWs. 9.Relevant for the present purposes, s. 24 of the BO provides as follows:
10.Thus, under s. 24 of the BO, the BA may issue orders (generally “s.24 demolition orders”) to, inter alia¸ require the owners of the premises where UBWs are found to demolish the same. A s. 24 demolition order shall specify the time within which the demolition, alteration or work shall be commenced and by when it shall be completed. 11.Under s. 44 of the BO, any person aggrieved by the BA’s decision, inter alia, to serve a s. 24 demolition order on him may appeal to the Tribunal. 12.Under s. 50 of the BO, the Tribunal on hearing such an appeal may receive and consider oral, documentary or other evidence[1]. In determining an appeal, the Tribunal may confirm, vary or reverse the decision that is appealed against, or substitute therefor such other decision or make such other order as it thinks fit[2]. B2. The enforcement on the removals of UWBs 13.Since 1999, the Buildings Department (“BD”) has in every year carried out a large-scale operation for the removal of UBWs on buildings in Hong Kong. The operation is generally known as a “Blitz UBW Clearance Operation”. However, given the very large number of UBWs existing in Hong Kong, the BD has to prioritise its operations. 14.In April 2001, the BD revised its policy (“the 2001 Enforcement Policy”) to intensify and re-prioritise its enforcement action against UBWs. Under this policy, the BD would take immediate enforcement action against all new UBWs and UBWs which pose an obvious hazards to life or property. Priority would be given to the removal of the following types of works:
15.In the press announcement concerning the 2001 Enforcement Policy, the BD stated that in its Blitz operations, it would “adopt this approach for major clearances, particularly those items on the external walls of buildings 20 to 40 years old and some on podiums and rooftops or in yards and lanes”. B3. The s. 24 demolition orders against the Applicants 16.In 2004, Wing On Towers was one of the target buildings designated by the BD for the Blitz UBW Clearance Operation 2004 (“the 2004 Blitz Operation”) in pursuance of the 2001 Enforcement Policy. 17.On 3 September 2004, advisory letters were issued separately by the BD and its consultant LC Surveyors Ltd to inform the owners or occupiers of Wing On Towers that their buildings were so identified as targeted buildings for clearance of UBW. The owners or occupiers were advised to remove the UWBs voluntarily. 18.Subsequent to the advisory letters, L C Surveyors had carried out inspections to identify all the UBWs on Wing On Towers. Pursuant to such identifications, on 9 June 2006, the BD served various s. 24 demolition orders on those owners or occupiers, ordering the removal of UBWs and reinstatement of the affected parts of the building in accordance with the plans approved by the BA. 19.The three Applicants were amongst those owners who had been served with s. 24 demolition orders in relation to various UBWs built on their respective apartments of Wing On Towers. Specifically relevant for the present purposes:
20.It is the Applicants’ case that these UBWs fall into broadly two categories:
B4. The appeals to the Tribunal 21.In June 2006, the Applicants filed Notices of Appeal to the Tribunal pursuant to s. 47 of the BO and s. 3 of the Building (Appeal) Regulation respectively in relation to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Orders (collectively, “the Orders”). I would refer them respectively as the 1st Appeal, the 2nd Appeal, the 3rd Appeal and the 4th Appeal, and collectively “the Appeals”. 22.The Applicants had filed evidence for the Appeals. The Tribunal also directed that the Appeals were to be heard together in a full hearing. 23.In light of the grounds of appeal raised by the Applicants, the issues in the Appeals as identified by the Tribunal are as follows:
24.The full hearing of the Appeals was held between 21 and 25 September 2009. Live evidence, including expert evidence, was called. The evidence related to matters, amongst others, such as whether the UBWs were exempted works under the BO or whether they were actionable UBWs, and the respective personal circumstances of the Applicants. 25.On 8 April 2010, by the Determination, the Tribunal dismissed the Appeals. 26.Although dismissing the Appeal, the Tribunal in fact found that the subject UWBs did not fall within the scope of the 2004 Blitz Operation. It was therefore incorrect for the BD to regard them to be actionable under the said operation. However, the Tribunal further concluded that those UBWs were not exempted works and were thus unauthorized structures under the BO. They were therefore in any event liable to be removed. The BA was thus still correct to exercise its discretion to issue the Orders. The Tribunal also refused to exercise its discretion on appeal in favour of the Applicants, as (the Tribunal reasoned) the BA’s original exercise of discretion under s. 24 of the BO to issue the Orders was not Wednesbury unreasonable. 27.On 7 July 2010, the Applicants applied for leave to apply for judicial review against the Determination. After hearing, Lam J granted leave to the Applicants on certain grounds as set out in the original Form 86 and on an additional ground advanced at the hearing. 28.Pursuant to the said leave, the Applicants filed the Amended Form 86 on 20 September 2010 setting out those grounds. C. The grounds of judicial review C1. The BA had fettered its discretion in applying the 2001 Enforcement Policy 29.This ground is set out at sections D3.1 and D3.2 of the Amended Form 86[3]. In gist, the Applicants’ arguments run as follows:
30.I see no merits in this ground. 31.This is an application for judicial review against the Tribunal’s decision (i.e., the Determination), and (as mentioned above) the Tribunal decided in favour of the Applicants’ arguments in the Appeals that the subject UBWs did not fall within the scope of the 2004 Blitz Operation (which was carried out to pursue the 2001 Enforcement Policy)[6]. In other words, the Tribunal’s decision to uphold the Orders is not based on the application of the 2001 Enforcement Policy, but on the ground that the UBWs are in any event liable to removed as unauthorised building structures under the BO[7]. 32.In the premises, the 2001 Enforcement Policy is irrelevant to upholding of the Orders in the Determination, of which the Applicants now seek to review. 33.In any event, I do not agree that the 2001 Enforcement Policy is rigid by itself nor the BA in the present case had applied the policy rigidly as submitted. In this regard, I agree with the reasoning of the Tribunal set out at paragraphs 32 to 38 of the Determination in rejecting these arguments. For convenience, I would repeat them as follows:
34.I would therefore reject this ground of judicial review. C2. Wednesbury unreasonableness 35.At the first part of paragraph 40 of the Determination, the Tribunal concluded that the BA was justified in the exercise of its discretion under 24 of the BO in issuing the Orders because at that time, “there did not seem to have any evidence to show why the orders should not be made”. The Tribunal was referring to the fact that between the time when the Applicants received the advisory letters and the time when the Orders were issued, the Applicants had not made any representations or submissions to the BA as to why demolition orders should not be issued regarding the subject UBWs. 36.The Applicants now challenge this conclusion to be Wednesbury unreasonable. This ground is set out in the Amended Form 86 as follows:
37.In his skeleton, Mr Ismail for the Applicants further submits that this conclusion (i.e., the BA was justified in its discretion to issue the Orders) is also inconsistent (and thus Wednesbury unreasonable) with the Tribunal’s own conclusion that the subject UBWs did not fall within the scope of the 2004 Blitz Operation. 38.I do not agree with the Applicants’ submissions. My reasons are as follows. 39.First, the Applicants’ contentions, if correct, would amount to imposing a positive duty on the BA to find out the so-called “relevant information” relating to each of the owners or occupies of properties where UBWs have been identified. I do not read s. 24 of the BO to be imposing such an onerous duty on the BA. The BA is to enforce the provisions of the BO, and it must be noted that, once an UBW is identified, the owner or occupier is prima facie in breach of the BO. Moreover, as to what information or circumstances that may exist that may justify the non-issue of a s. 24 demolition order must be something which is only best known to the owners or occupiers. It cannot be right that the burden is somehow reversed on the BA to, as suggested by the Applicants, acquaint itself with the relevant information so as to decide whether or not to issue the s. 24 demolition orders. 40.In this regard, I would also refer to what the Tribunal has said on this at paragraphs 37 and 38 of the Determination as quoted above, and the Tribunal’s above conclusion at paragraph 40 must be read in that context as well. Once so read, I do not find the Tribunal’s said conclusion to be unreasonable as submitted by the Applicants. 41.Secondly, as mentioned above, although the Tribunal found that the subject UBWs were not actionable under the 2004 Blitz Operation, the Tribunal also found that these UWBs were in any event still unauthorized building structures and should be removed. It therefore decided to uphold the Orders. 42.In particular, in coming to that conclusion, the Tribunal relied on the authority of Sky Wide Development Ltd v the Building Authority[8]. In that case, the BA in pursuance of the 2001 Enforcement Policy served certain s. 24 demolitions on the applicants. The applicants sought leave to judicial review the BA’s said exercise of discretion under s. 24 of the BO. One of the proposed grounds of judicial review was that the subject UBWs in that case did not fall within the enforcement policy. Lam J refused leave. In relation to this ground, the learned judge was of the view that, even if the UBWs did not fall within the enforcement policy, so long as they were unauthorised building structures, the BA was entitled to exercise the discretion to issue the s. 24 demolitions and there was nothing to make that exercise reviewable in the public law sense. He explained at paragraphs 10 and 18 of the Reasons for Decision as follows:
43.In adopting Sky Wise, the Tribunal was clearly correct in law in its conclusion that the BA was still right to exercise its discretion with the evidence before the BA even though the subject UBWs (as found by the Tribunal) did not fall within the 2004 Blitz Operation. In any event, it cannot be said that this conclusion is one that no reasonable tribunal in the position of the Tribunal would have come to. 44.I would also reject this ground of judicial review. C3. The tribunal failed to exercise its own independent discretion 45.As I mentioned above, the Applicants adduced fresh evidence[9] at the Appeals to invite the Tribunal to (a) rule that the subject UBWs were exempted works under the BO, or (b) in any event exercise its own discretion afresh on appeal under s. 50(2) of the BO to reverse the BA’s decision to issue the Orders. 46.The Tribunal rejected that the UBWs were exempted works. This part of the decision no longer features in this judicial review. 47.Insofar as the exercise of its own discretion on appeal is concerned, the Tribunal refused to exercise it in favour of the Applicants. It explained why at paragraphs 39 and 40 of the Determination as follows:
48.The Applicants submit that the said reasoning shows that the Tribunal, in the purported exercise of its own discretion, had only considered that the BA’s original exercise of discretion (with the evidence then before the BA) was not Wednesbury unreasonable and had entirely failed to give any considerations to the ample new evidence adduced before it, which was not before the BA. The material parts of this new evidence were summarised at paragraph 54 of the Amended Form 86 as follows:
49.In the premises, the Tribunal (the Applicants further submit) had failed to exercise its own discretion independently or had fettered its own discretion. The Determination should thus be quashed. 50.I think the Applicants are right in these submissions. I will explain why as follows. 51.S. 50 of the BO reads as follows:
52.Under s. 50(1) of the BO, the Tribunal in hearing an appeal is free to receive and hear new evidence. The appeal is thus intended (as rightly submitted by Mr Ismail) to be a de novo hearing[10]. 53.Properly reading s. 50(2) of the BO in such a context, the Tribunal is given by the statute a wide and unfettered discretion on appeal to decide on merits as to whether (for the present purpose) the s. 24 demolition orders should be served on the Applicants relating to the subject UBWs. The Tribunal should exercise the said discretion afresh and independently on merits, in light of all the evidence (including new evidence) and submissions made before it in the Appeals. 54.It must be remembered that the Tribunal is not hearing the appeals as if they were a judicial review application. It is hearing on appeal the matters de novo on merits. In the premises, the Tribunal was wrong in law to import the principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness (a public law principle) to restrict and limit its own exercise of the discretion on appeal. In so concluding at paragraph 40 of the Determination, the Tribunal had wrongly fettered its own discretion. Moreover, in (wrongly) applying the test of Wednesbury unreasonableness, it had also failed to or to properly consider the new evidence adduced by the Applicants in the Appeals. 55.I would therefore allow the judicial review on this ground. 56.The matters should be now remitted back to the Tribunal to re-consider exercising its discretion afresh and independently on merits with all the evidence adduced at the Appeals. In order to save time and costs, insofar as practicable, the constitution of the Tribunal for re-hearing the matter in relation to this ground should be the same as the Tribunal originally hearing the Appeals. C4. The Additional Ground 57.This ground is set out in the Amended Form 86 as follows:
58.In substance, the Applicants contend that the Orders themselves are illegal as they are in breach of s. 14 of the BO, since in effect the Orders ask the Applicants to commence and carry out those demolition works (which are defined to be building works under the BO) without first obtaining approval from the BA. 59.This argument was not raised before the Tribunal in the Appeals. So, this is an entirely new point raised for the first time. 60.Judicial review is not an appeal and the function of the Court is not to rehear the case on its merits. In judicial review, the Court would only interfere in the subject decision if it contains errors of law, is unreasonable or irrational in the public law sense, or is a result of procedural errors or unfairness. 61.However, an entirely new argument like this simply could not be relied upon to show that the Tribunal was wrong (in the public law sense) in coming to the Determination as this was not an issue before the Tribunal. Further, to permit this to be raised now would also effectively amount to allowing the Applicants to pursue a second or alternative appeal under the pretence of judicial review, which cannot be right[11]. 62.Therefore, it is not for this Court in a supervisory role to consider in the present case an issue that was never raised and argued before the Tribunal, in particular if the new issue relates to fact sensitive arguments. For example, in one of its submissions made to counter this ground, the BA submits that, even if (which it disagrees) the Orders did engage the requirements under s. 14(1) of the BO, it is clear on the facts of the present case that the BA did approve and consent to the demolition works required under the Orders. This is a fact sensitive argument which should have been dealt with by the Tribunal but not this Court for the first time in judicial review. 63.In the circumstances, I would not allow this new argument to be raised now against the Determination for the purpose of the judicial review. D. Conclusion 64.For the reasons given above, the Applicants succeed in this judicial review, and I would quash the Determination on the basis that the Tribunal failed to exercise its own discretion independently or had wrongly fettered its own discretion on appeal. I further order that the matters be remitted back to the Tribunal for a fresh consideration in relation to its own exercise of discretion in light of the all evidence adduced before it for the purposes of the Appeals. Insofar if it is practicable and possible, the new Tribunal should have the same constitution as the one originally hearing the Appeals in order to save time and costs. 65.I further make an order nisi that costs of this application be to the Applicants. 66.Lastly, I thank counsel for their helpful submissions.
Mr. Anthony ISMAIL, instructed by Messrs Woo, Kwan, Lee & Lo, for the 1st to 3rd Applicants. Mr. Abraham CHAN, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Interested Party. The Respondent, represented by Department of Justice, excused from attendance. [1] See: s. 50(1)(c)(i) of the BO. [2] See: s. 50(2) of the BO. [3] Paragraphs 45-51 thereof. [4] See: Quebostock Ltd v The Building Authority [1986] HKLR 467 (CA), at 476G-I per Silke JA. [5] See: Stringer v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1970] 1 WLR 1281 at 1298D; Wise Union Industries Ltd v Hong Kong Science and Technology Parks Corp [2009] 5 HKLRD 620 at paras 31-33 per A Cheung J; de Smith’s Judicial Review(6th ed), para 9-002. [6]See paras 25-29 of the Determination. [7] See paras 29-31 of the Determination. [8] Unrep., HCAL 116/2008, 24 October 2008. [9] Which included expert evidence as well as factual evidence with live witnesses relating to the personal circumstances of each of the Applicants. [10] See also the decision of the Appeal Tribunal in In the matter of 31 and 31A – G Robinson Road (Appeal Case No. 28 of 1998) (unrep., 22 December 1998) at pp 3 to 4. [11] See: Re Ng Kin Wo Johnny (unrep., HCAL 114 & 115/2010, Lam J, 18 November 2010) at paras 20-23; Asher v Secretary of State for the Environment [1974] Ch 201 (CA) per Lord Denning at 222D-F, per Orr LJ at 224H-225B, per Lawton LJat 228B, D-E. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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