Anmol Kumar Sawlani v. Yeshma Gobindram Sawlani
Read the full judgment text of HCA 2231/2011 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 29 August 2013.
1. On 9 May 2013 I ruled on the plaintiff’s application to discontinue the action (and the costs of the action) as well as an application by the plaintiff to obtain costs out of the estate. The issue of costs of the application was left over for the parties to place further materials and submissions before me.
Cited by 14 cases
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HCA 2231/2011 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 2231 OF 2011 ________________
________________________ R U L I N G O N C O S T S ________________________ 1.On 9 May 2013 I ruled on the plaintiff’s application to discontinue the action (and the costs of the action) as well as an application by the plaintiff to obtain costs out of the estate. The issue of costs of the application was left over for the parties to place further materials and submissions before me. 2.The plaintiff filed submissions dated 15May 2013 (subsequently amended on 16May 2013); the defendant filed submissions dated 23May 2013; the plaintiff filed reply submissions dated 27May 2013. 3.This is my ruling on costs. 4.The defendant’s argument is that he had made an offer to pay the plaintiff’s costs on a party and party basis (which “matched” the order that I eventually made) and therefore the costs incurred by the plaintiff’s attempt to seek costs on a higher standard of taxation (and to obtain his own costs out of the estate) were necessitated by the plaintiff’s refusal to accept the defendant’s offer. 5.The lynchpin of the plaintiff’s argument is that even though at one time (12 September 2012) the defendant had indicated (by way of a draft consent order) a willingness to settle the matter by way of the plaintiff discontinuing the action and the defendant paying the plaintiff’s costs on a party and party basis (which “matched” my order made at the end of the day), this offer had been withdrawn so that there was no effective (or unconditional) offer which the defendant could rely upon to seek costs against the plaintiff. 6.The parties’ respective submissions went through a series of correspondence between the parties concerning their attempts to resolve the matter. Each tried to put their own “spin” on the correspondence. But at the end of the day the point is very simple. 7.The “withdrawal” relied on by the plaintiff stems from the fact that at one stage during the negotiations, the plaintiff wanted not only (i) an order that the defendant pays the plaintiff’s costs of the action but also (ii) an order that the plaintiff’s solicitors and client’s own costs be paid out of the estate (see plaintiff’s fax dated 24 October 2012). The defendant was not amenable to that suggestion and indicated that position in a letter dated 30th October 2012. The plaintiff submitted that the result of this (and subsequent correspondence referred to at page 2 of the plaintiff’s costs submissions) was that the defendant had “withdrawn” the offer or had resiled from the earlier agreement to pay costs on a party and party basis, and therefore when he issued the summons there was no effective or “unconditional” offer from the defendant which could be taken into account in my exercise of discretion as to costs. 8.I reject the plaintiff’s interpretation of the correspondence. I do not read the defendant as in any way resiling from or withdrawing his offer. Rather, it was the plaintiff who sought to add conditions on the defendant’s proffered consent order (for a provision which I ultimately rejected). 9.Put simply the position was this:
10.The long and short of the matter is therefore that the defendant had made an offer which the plaintiff had failed to “beat” at the hearing. In the exercise of my discretion I am entitled to, and I do, take this into account and place weight on it to order costs of this application be borne by the plaintiff on a party and party basis. 11.But let it be assumed that I was wrong and that the defendant had, by the correspondence relied on by the plaintiff, indeed withdrawn his earlier offer:- my discretion as to costs would still be exercised in the same manner. The fact remains that an offer has been made at one stage and has not been accepted. On the facts of this case the defendant was not obliged to keep that offer open and thereby exposing himself to a continuing liability for the plaintiff’s costs (albeit still subject to taxation). If the defendant had to keep the offer open down to the very last minute in order to protect his costs position, that would not provide any incentive for the plaintiff to provide any reasonable response. If such a continuing offer is made, the plaintiff could be encouraged to make unreasonable counter-proposals, comforted by the knowledge that even if it was rejected, he could still resort to the defendant’s original offer which was always open for acceptance. That cannot be right. 12.For the above reasons and in the exercise of my discretion I order that the costs of the application be borne by the plaintiff to be taxed on a party and party basis.
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