Liu Kwok Fai Alvan and Another v. Wolf Rene Karl and Another
Read the full judgment text of DCCJ 3204/2013 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 16 March 2015.
1. This is the plaintiffs’ action against the defendants for defamation.
Cites 3 cases
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DCCJ 3204/2013 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO 3204 OF 2013 --------------------
-------------------- 1.This is the plaintiffs’ action against the defendants for defamation. THE ISSUES 2.The issues of this case are as follows:-
3.The facts of the case are largely undisputed between the parties. The only salient facts in dispute relate to the issue of whether the statement makes reference to the plaintiffs and are as follows:-
4.In respect of the minor factual discrepancies not related to the issues, I do not propose to deal with such discrepancies specifically; suffice to say I had regard to the evidence of the parties when considering their overall credibility and reliability. BACKGROUND 5.The 1st plaintiff (“Mr Liu”) is a solicitor and a partner of his firm, Messrs Alvan Liu & Co, and the 2nd plaintiff (“Mrs Liu”) is the wife of the 1st plaintiff. 6.The 1st and 2nd defendants (Mr and Mrs Wolf, respectively) run their own business and are the plaintiffs’ neighbours. 7.The 2 families live in the Chalet situated in Clearwater Bay. The Chalet consists of 4 detached houses; the plaintiffs live in House D and the defendants live in House B. The affairs of the Chalet are jointly managed by all the owners. Curiously, though the reasons are irrelevant to the present proceedings, the owners have never formed a body of incorporated owners and have not hired a manager to deal with the management of the Chalet. At all material times, the plaintiffs took over the Chalet’s common fund and initiated various discussions relating to the repair works and maintenance of the Chalet. 8.Regrettably, the relationship between the parties has been acrimonious since 2005. The defendants’ illegal structures caused the plaintiffs to issue a writ in the High Court in 2007. Part of the complaint against the defendants was against the chimney erected on their roof. The High Court action carried on for 4 years until it was partially resolved when the plaintiffs discontinued their claim against the defendants. There is still an outstanding counterclaim by the defendants which has yet to be resolved. 9.In less than 2 years after the plaintiffs discontinued the High Court action, the plaintiffs issued a memo to all owners of the Chalet dated 22 September 2012. Although the plaintiffs did not specifically name in the letter to whom they referred to as being “immature”, Mr Liu admitted in his evidence that they were referring to the defendants and believed the rest of the owners would know they was referring to the same. The relationship between the parties had deteriorated to such an extent that the plaintiffs had no qualms about describing the defendants’ behaviour as “immature” in open correspondence to all owners. 10.In or about December 2012, a Joint Circulation Letter was sent by Houses A, C, and D to the defendants complaining of, inter alia, the resurrection of chimney construction works on the defendants’ roof. 11.This letter prompted the defendants to issue the Letter on 9 January 2013. The plaintiffs claim the second last paragraph (“the Subject Paragraph”) in the Letter to be defamatory. The Letter is set out in full as follows:-
12.The plaintiffs claim the Letter, in particular the Subject Paragraph, is defamatory because the defendants accused the plaintiffs, either jointly or individually, to have committed criminal damage or vandalism on the defendants’ red car. 13.In defence, the defendants deny the Subject Paragraph referred to the plaintiffs and raise the defence of qualified privilege. During closing submissions, Defence Counsel confirmed the defendants no longer rely on the defence of justification. WHETHER THE SUBJECT PARAGRAPH OF THE LETTER MAKES REFERENCE TO THE PLAINTIFFS The law 14.Where an alleged defamatory statement is made without reference to the name of any specific person, the maker of the statement could still liable if the words may be reasonably understood to refer to the person being defamed: see paragraph 7.2 Gatley on Libel and Slander. 15.It is sufficient that the words are such that those acquainted with the plaintiffs could identify them: see paragraph 7.3 Gatley on Libel and Slander. 16.In the case of Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116 at page 121 Viscount Simon LC said:-
17.At page 119 of the same judgment, Viscount Simon LC also stated:-
18.Lord Reid in Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1239 at page 1245 stated the following:-
19.In the end, Lord Reid stated the test at page 1246 as follows:-
20.It is crucial that all facts and matters relied on to prove the innuendo are pleaded: see paragraph 18/12/17 Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2015. The pleadings 21.The plaintiffs pleaded 3 material facts in support of their claim that reference was made to them. The facts are as follows:-
22.No further facts are pleaded to support the plaintiffs’ claim of reference. However, the plaintiffs seek to rely on a purported conversation between Mr Wolf and Mrs Liu where Mr Wolf accused Mrs Liu of damaging his car. Mr Wolf denies that such a conversation took place. Furthermore, Defence Counsel argues that such conversation is inadmissible. 23.I am of the view that the proper approach for this court to adopt is to first determine whether Mr Wolf made oral accusations against the plaintiffs by way of conversation with Mr Fung and Mrs Liu. If I am satisfied such conversations did take place, I shall consider whether these conversations can constitute part of the extraneous facts to consider when determining whether the Subject Paragraph refers to the plaintiffs. However if I find the conversations did not occur or that no weight can be placed on the conversations, the Subject Paragraph should be read in the context of the undisputed evidence to determine if reference is made to the plaintiffs. Purported conversation between Mr Fung and Mr Wolf 24.It is the plaintiffs’ pleaded case that on a date prior to 9 January 2013, Mr Wolf showed Mr Fung dents and scratches on his red car and told Mr Fung the plaintiffs damaged his car. This is adamantly denied by Mr Wolf. Defence Counsel submitted that even if the conversation between Mr Wolf and Mr Fung did occur, the evidence produced by the plaintiffs to prove this conversation is unreliable and cannot be given weight. 25.Having considered the evidence of Mr Liu and Mr Wolf on this matter, I find that even if there had been a conversation between Mr Wolf and Mr Fung on the damage of Mr Wolf’s red car, I am unable to place any weight on the conversation. 26.Firstly, even on the plaintiffs’ evidence, the plaintiffs are unable to prove on a balance of probabilities Mr Fung had the said conversation with Mr Wolf. The plaintiffs rely on the transcript of the phone recording made on 27 May 2013 to prove and support their claim that Mr Wolf did accuse the plaintiffs in front of Mr Fung. However the phone recording was made more than 4 months after the purported conversation. Mr Fung himself indicated to Mr Liu over the phone, the conversation with Mr Wolf took place a long time ago. When Mr Liu asked Mr Fung whether it was Mr or Mrs Wolf whom Mr Fung had the conversation with, Mr Fung said he did not remember but believed it was Mr Wolf. It is apparent from the transcript that Mr Fung is unable to recall with certainty whether he had the conversation with Mr Wolf or Mrs Wolf. 27.Secondly, assuming Mr Fung and Mr Wolf had a conversation relating to the damage to Mr Wolf’s red car, it is questionable whether Mr Fung is capable of understanding the conversation. It is not disputed that Mr Wolf uses English to communicate with Mr Fung. Mr and Mrs Wolf explain that Mr Fung’s English is limited and they rarely communicate with him directly. They usually speak to Mr Fung through his children. This is not rebutted by the plaintiffs. Mr Liu concedes he does not know Mr Fung’s standard of English as he rarely spoke to Mr Fung in English. Hence even if a conversation beyond niceties did take place between Mr Wolf and Mr Fung, I find it questionable whether Mr Fung would completely understand all that was said to him. 28.Thirdly, there is no evidence as to what exact words were exchanged in this purported conversation. Mr Liu admits that when Mr Fung recounted the conversation, Mr Fung used Chinese. As stated above, there is no dispute that if any conversation was exchanged between Mr Fung and Mr Wolf it would have been in English and/or by way of body gestures. The exact words used by Mr Wolf are unknown and the context of such words being spoken is also unknown. In such circumstances, it is unclear on what basis Mr Fung concluded Mr Wolf made accusations against the plaintiffs, if any. 29.By reason of the matters set out above, I find the evidence relating to the purported conversation to be inherently unreliable. Hence even if the conversation did take place, I decline to place any weight on the purported conversation. The conversation between Mr Wolf and Mrs Liu 30.Defence Counsel submitted the purported conversation between Mr Wolf and Mrs Liu is inadmissible to establish reference to the plaintiffs as this fact was not pleaded in the Re-Amended Statement of Claim. 31.Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted the evidence is admissible in so far as it is forms the background of the case. 32.I agree the conversation, if it had occurred, is admissible as part of the background of the case concerned. 33.However I do not find the conversation, if it had occurred, to be admissible to establish reference to the plaintiffs by reason of not being pleaded in the Re-Amended Statement of Claim. It is trite law that all material facts should be pleaded. More importantly, where material facts are being relied on to establish reference to a person in a defamation case, such facts must be properly pleaded. The failure to plead such facts disentitles the claimant to rely on the same: see Hong Kong Civil Procedure paragraph 18/12/11 and paragraph 23.26 Gatley on Libel and Slander. 34.As for the factual dispute as to whether such a conversation took place, I prefer the evidence of Mr Wolf. Mrs Liu sets out the conversation as follows in her witness statement at paragraph 3(b):-
35.However in her evidence in court, she gave different versions as to what happened. Initially Mrs Liu said that after she parked her car, Mr Wolf suddenly shouted at her and said, “Ada, can you stop to damage my car.” Mrs Liu stood there for 2 to 3 seconds to think about what Mr Wolf said. She then responded by saying, “What are you talking about?” Mr Wolf pointed to his red car and said, “You damaged my car.” Mrs Liu then said, “How could I? Never!” 36.In the second time she recounted the conversation, she said after she stopped her car, Mr Wolf suddenly said to her in an aggressive voice, “Ada, can you stop to damage my car?” Mrs Liu stopped about 2 seconds to think about what Mr Wolf said and then she responded, “What?” Mr Wolf then pointed to his car and said, “You damaged my car.” Mrs Liu replied, “Never! How can I damage your car?” 37.Mrs Liu gave a total of 3 different versions of the conversation. 38.It is apparent that her memory of the conversation is not entirely reliable as to the exact words she used on the occasion. According to Mrs Liu, this conversation happened more than 2 years ago. It is not known whether she made a contemporaneous record of the words spoken by the parties and it was not written down in her witness statement despite her claim that she did remember the conversation clearly at the time she gave her witness statement. The variations in the versions put forward in her evidence in court show she is unable to recall the precise words she used in the conversation. 39.In respect of the version given in the witness statement as compared to the versions given in court, the version given in the witness statement does not mention the important fact that Mr Wolf accused Mrs Liu a second time by having said the words, “You damaged my car.” The witness statement is clear in that after Mrs Liu denied the first accusation made against her, there was no further conversation between the parties. This is clearly contradictory to the version given by Mrs Liu in court. When cross-examined about the difference in her witness statement and her evidence in court, Mrs Liu claimed that she did remember the details of the conversation when she gave the witness statement but she was only focused on putting the main points down in her witness statement. I do not accept this explanation. 40.The whole purpose of paragraph 3(b) of her witness statement was to show Mr Wolf had outright accused her of damaging his car. Any accusation made by Mr Wolf against Mrs Liu must have been a “main point” to be mentioned in the witness statement. If Mrs Liu did remember Mr Wolf made a second allegation against her in the same conversation, there would be no good reason for Mrs Liu to omit this important fact. In absence of a satisfactory explanation to explain the different versions of the purported conversation, I find Mrs Liu’s evidence regarding the conversation and the contents thereof to be incredible and unreliable. Even if I were able to find a conversation did occur between Mr Wolf and Mrs Liu, I am unable to find on a balance of probabilities the content of the conversation is exactly as recounted by Mrs Liu. Reference to the plaintiffs 41.By reason of not placing weight on the alleged conversation between Mr Wolf and Mr Fung, and not accepting the alleged conversation between Mr Wolf and Mrs Liu, I shall now consider whether the Subject Paragraph refers to the plaintiffs, as read in the context of the undisputed facts. 42.On reading the Letter, I am of the view that an ordinary sensible reader would understand the Subject Paragraph to refer to the owners of the Chalet, which will inevitably include reference to the plaintiffs. 43.The first 2 sentences of the Subject Paragraph imply the person who vandalized their cars was someone who had access to the Chalet premises. By implication, the persons who have access to the Chalet will be the residents of the Chalet including the domestic helpers, the guests or visitors invited by the residents, and others who may have gained authorized or unauthorized access to the Chalet. 44.The fact that the plaintiffs’ cars are parked directly adjacent to the defendants’ car is not of any significance. The scratches shown on the pictures of the defendants’ red car (as attached to the Letter) are deliberate and not the type where one causes by accident by opening a car door. This is admitted by Mr Liu. The Subject Paragraph refers to all owners and there was nothing else written in the paragraph to single out the plaintiffs as being the more likely suspect. Hence the mere fact the plaintiffs’ cars are parked next to the defendants’ red car does not make the plaintiffs more likely to be the perpetrators of the vandalism. 45.In respect of Mr Liu’s assertion that the defendants have labelled the High Court Action as an attack and therefore this must mean the Subject Paragraph refers to the plaintiffs, I do not accept this assertion. There is no evidence produced before this court to show the defendants have labelled the High Court Action as an attack on them. I fail to see how the High Court Action in itself is indicative of reference or of any assistance in considering whether the Subject Paragraph refers to the plaintiffs. 46.Had the Subject Paragraph ended without the last sentence, I would have found there to be no reference to the plaintiffs. 47.Unfortunately, the Subject Paragraph ends with the following sentence: “It would be good to know the expiry date of the attack on us, our house and our cars so that we can all begin anew.” 48.On a reading of this last sentence, I find the phrase “the attacks on us, our house” is more reasonably understood to refer to the complaints made by the 3 owners against the defendants as set out in the Joint Circulation Letter. Upon reading the Letter, it is clear that the defendants were unhappy with the joint demand of the other 3 owners that the defendants report on their construction works. This was the main complaint in the Letter, in which half of the Letter was dedicated to. 49.It is evident from the plaintiffs’ evidence that there are 2 factions in the Chalet; the defendants on one side and the owners of Houses A, C and D on the other. 50.In the documentary evidence produced before the court, there are 4 documents which are co-signed by more than one owner; these are the joint letters and memos of Houses A, C and D issued to the defendants making complaint about their construction works. These co-signed documents are dated 22 January 2007, December 2012 (the Joint Circulation Letter), 16 January 2013, and 31 January 2013. There are no other letters produced before the court where the other owners have co-signed a letter with the defendants. 51.In the tape recorded conversation of 27 May 2013, Mr Fung said that the defendants were not of their party. When the plaintiffs called for a meeting to be held on 9 January 2013, Mr Liu admittedly chose a date after consulting with the owners of Houses A and C on their availability but deliberately chose not to consult the defendants on their availability. When the owners received the Letter, Houses A and C they dismissed the defendants’ allegations as being “crazy”. 52.It is in the context of an apparent faction in the Chalet that the Letter was sent from the defendants on one side to the other 3 owners of the Chalet on the other side. 53.I am of the view that an ordinary and sensible reader, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, will understand the phrase “the attacks on us, our house” as referring to the Joint Circulation Letter and the complaints made collectively by the owners of Houses A, C and D against the defendants. 54.As for the reference to attacks “on our cars”, this must be read and understood in the context of the last sentence. An ordinary and sensible reader will not sever the reference to the attack on the cars from the attacks on the house and the defendants. The last sentence of the Subject Paragraph is an assertion by the defendants that they had suffered attacks on their house, themselves, and their cars. Since the comment on attacks on the defendants and their house refer to the owners of Houses A, C and D, it is by ordinary reading and logical inference that the reference to attack on the defendants’ cars in the same sentence must also refer to the said owners. Moreover the defendants question when these attacks will expire so that “we can begin anew.” This is clearly a request by the defendants that these attacks do stop so that all the owners of the Chalet can live in peace. I am of the view that reading the last sentence as a whole, an ordinary and sensible reader will understand the last sentence to mean the attacks on the defendants, the house, and the cars to be perpetrated by one or all of the owners of Houses A, C and D of the Chalet. 55.In the case of Knupffer, Viscount Simon LC stated at page 119:-
56.The current case is precisely the scenario as described by Viscount Simon LC in the passage cited above. The Chalet consists of 4 households only. It is clear that even if the Subject Paragraph does not specifically or solely refer to the plaintiffs, the reference to the owners of the Chalet, as a whole, is capable of reference to the plaintiff. 57.I therefore find the Subject Paragraph does make reference to the plaintiffs by virtue of making reference to the owners of Houses A, C and D of the Chalet. WHETHER THE WORDS ARE DEFAMATORY 58.Defence Counsel submitted the words are not defamatory and that the meaning of the words used, in particular the word “vandalism”, would not be construed as meaning criminal damage by a hypothetical reasonable reader. 59.The law is clear that in interpreting whether the words have a defamatory meaning, the court must determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used: See Hung Yuen Chan Robert v Hong Kong Standard Newspapers Ltd and others [1996] 4 HKC 519 at 526G. In doing so, the court shall have regard to the context in which the words were used and to read the publication as a whole, taking into account any implications that a reasonable reader would draw from the words: see paragraphs 3.18 and 3.30 Gatley on Libel and Slander. 60.The test set out in Capital and Counties Bank v Henty 5 CPD 539 as approved by Greer LJ in the case of Cassidy v Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1929] 2 KB 331 is as follows:-
61.The ordinary and natural meaning of the Subject Paragraph of the Letter clearly means someone has deliberately damaged the defendants’ cars. Moreover the use of the word “vandalism” in the Subject Paragraph imports an element of ill-will on the person who damaged the car. According to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary on Historical Principals (6th ed.), the word “vandalism” is defined as follows: “Wilful or malicious destruction or damage to works of art or other property.” 62.The deliberate damage to another’s property is capable of amounting to criminal damage. Section 60(1) Crimes Ordinance (Cap 200) provides: “A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to another intending to destroy or damage any such property or being reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an offence.” 63.I therefore find the Subject Paragraph of the Letter to be defamatory. WHETHER QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE IS AVAILABLE TO THE DEFENDANTS 64.The reasoning behind the defence of qualified privilege is succinctly and thoroughly set out in paragraph 14.7 Gatley on Libel and Slander. In summary, the law chooses to protect the freedom of communications where the communication is done in the interest of society or for some common interest. The privilege is lost once the maker of the statement uses the occasion for some purpose other than that for which the law gives protection: see Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135. 65.In the case of Lee Ching v Lau May Ming [2007] 3 HKLRD 623 at 663, the Honourable Mr Justice Jeremy Poon explained as follows:-
66.He went further on to state at pg 665:-
67.In the absence of a body of incorporated owners and/or a manager, the owners in the Chalet are each responsible for ensuring compliance with the Deed of Mutual Covenant. At all material times, the Chalet is managed by the owners together. According to Mr Liu, due to the busy schedules of the owners, they seldom meet to discuss the management of the estate. Instead, the management of the Chalet is conducted through exchange of correspondence or memos. 68.Mr Liu in his witness statement at paragraphs 13 to 14 stated the Joint Circulation Letter was issued in place of a meeting which could not take place due to the busy schedule of the owners. The Joint Circulation Letter clearly invites discussion amongst the owners on the management of the Chalet. Questions relating to the common fund, the defendants’ construction works were posed in the letter. In respect of matters relating to the main gate, the Joint Circulation Letter specifically states, “Owners are invited to express opinions.” Mr Liu in his evidence in court confirmed that some people did not close the door on the main gate after they opened it. 69.Although the Joint Circulation Letter did not specifically invite comments on vandalism occurring inside the Chalet, this does not pre-empt the defendants from raising the matter themselves. The defendants are, after all, one of the owners responsible for the management of the Chalet with the same rights as any other to enforce the provisions in the deed of mutual covenant. In the mode of management adopted by the owners of the Chalet, the defendants are entitled to raise any concerns they have about the Chalet by way of correspondence at any time. In particular, the defendants are entitled to raise management issues relating to the protection of their own property, whether by way of letter, memos, or otherwise. The Letter, being a direct response to the Joint Circulation Letter, is the vehicle chosen by the defendants to respond to and raise management issues of the Chalet. 70.The defendants’ concern of vandalism occurring in the Chalet is a valid one as I note that the plaintiffs in their letters dated 26 March 2013 and 8 April 2013 (pages 89 and 90 of the Trial Bundle respectively) also acknowledge they have experienced damage to their cars when parked in the Chalet. 71.When questioned about the said letters and the damage to their cars as set out in the said letters, the plaintiffs denied the reference to damage of their car meant they believed the damage was caused by vandalism in the Chalet. They explained that the car could have been damaged outside of the Chalet and the damage was undetected until they were inside the Chalet. However I find this explanation to be directly contradictory to what is written in the letters. 72.The letter dated 26 March 2013 reads as follows: “The wiper of one of our cars was damaged when it was parked at The Chalet overnight. In a few occasions, the tires of our cars became flat when they were parked at The Chalet overnight.” (own emphasis added) 73.It is clear that this letter means the wipers was damaged and the tires became flat whilst it was parked in the Chalet. There is nothing to support the interpretation or meaning given by the plaintiffs. There is a clear allegation in this letter that the damage to the plaintiffs’ car occurred whilst in the Chalet. 74.Similarly, the letter dated 8 April 2013 reads, “(1) Our Benz (licence plate no MH8497) was parked in the car park of the Chalet the whole day on 7 April 2013 and was not used. All four tyres of the Benz were normal. (2) When we were about to use the Benz this morning (on 8 April 2013), we noticed that the right tyre at the back was flat.” 75.Again, there is nothing in this letter to support the interpretation given by the plaintiffs in court. If the tire sustained damage before 7 April 2013, the tire should have either become totally flat or would have started to become flat on 7 April 2013. It is highly unlikely the tire would have remained “normal” throughout the whole day of 7 April 2013 and then suddenly become flat overnight. On a reading of this letter dated 8 April 2013, it is evident the letter implies the damage to the tire occurred inside the Chalet. 76.Hence I do not accept the plaintiffs’ evidence that there had not been any previous acts of vandalism that occurred in the Chalet. The letters sent by the plaintiffs support the defendants’ concern of cars being damaged in the Chalet. I find the issue of vandalism as raised in the Subject Paragraph is something that the defendants as one of the owners in the Chalet and as co-managers of the estate have a legal and moral duty to raise. Malice 77.Counsel for the plaintiff submitted the defendants had used the occasion for an ulterior motive and submitted the remarks made in the Subject Paragraph were malicious. However, I fail to see how the remarks were made maliciously. 78.To constitute malice, the intention to harm the plaintiffs must be the sole or dominate purpose of the publication: see Lee Ching at page 669 of the judgment. Even if there are mixed motives for publishing a defamatory statement, the plaintiffs must establish the improper motive as being the dominate motive: see paragraph 17.7 Gatley on Libel and Slander. 79.The defendants have attached photographs to prove the damage of the car. It is conceded by Mr Liu in his evidence in court that the damage appears to be caused deliberately and not accidentally. Hence it is evident that the defendants honestly believed there was damage caused to their cars and that such damage was caused whilst the cars were parked in the Chalet. 80.Furthermore, I do not find the plaintiffs’ allegation of the defendants’ improper motive in sending the Letter to be substantiated. I do not accept that the defendants purposely sent the Letter to defame the plaintiffs. As I have set out above, the Letter is a response to the Joint Circulation Letter. For reasons given, I found the Subject Paragraph to refer to the owners of Houses A, C and D of the Chalet. I did not accept the Subject Paragraph referred to the plaintiffs alone. Moreover for reasons set out above, the defendants were entitled to raise concern about the damage to their cars sustained whilst parked in the Chalet. These are matters relevant to the management of the premises. Although the defendants have not worded their problems or concerns tactfully, there is nothing in the Letter to show the dominate purpose was to “tarnish the reputation of the plaintiffs,” as submitted by Counsel for the plaintiffs. 81.For reasons given above, it is clear the Letter is a response to the Joint Circulation Letter in which management issues were discussed. The dominate motive of the letter was to respond to the request for information relating to the defendants’ construction works. I do not find the dominate motive to be an improper one so as to render the defence of qualified privileged to be inapplicable. 82.By reason of the reasons set out above, I find that even if the defamatory remarks made in the Letter refer to the plaintiffs, the contents of the Letter are covered by the defence of qualified privilege. 83.I therefore dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim against the defendants. 84.I make a costs order nisi that the plaintiffs pay the defendants’ costs of this action to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for Counsel. Unless any party applies to vary the costs order within 14 days hereof, the costs order shall become an order absolute.
Mr Paul HM Leung, instructed by Eddie Lee & Company, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs Mr Jeffrey Chau, instructed by Hau, Lau, Li & Yeung, for the 1st and 2nd defendants | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under DCCJ 3204/2013