HKSAR v. Keita Ali

CACC 419/2015

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 419 OF 2015

(ON APPEAL FROM HCCC NO. 327 OF 2015)

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BETWEEN

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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

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1.On 18 November 2015, the applicant was convicted of a single count of attempted rape, contrary to sections 118(1) and 159G of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap 200, following a trial in the High Court before Tong J and a jury. On the same day, the applicant was sentenced to 6 years’ imprisonment.

2.On 14 December 2015, the applicant filed a Notice of application for leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence.

The prosecution case

3.The events in question took place on 9 January 2015.  The applicant was then aged 26 and the complainant (PW1) was a 63-year-old woman, who lived on social welfare assistance and collected unwanted carton boxes on a daily basis at the rear lane of a supermarket (“the Supermarket”) between Mok Cheong Street and Sung Wong Toi Road in Kowloon City.

4.In the evening of the day in question, the complainant was as usual collecting boxes at the above location, when she saw a black man (who turned out to be the applicant) burning some bubble bags in the rear lane.  Suspecting that he was going to urinate there, the complainant asked him (in Cantonese) to do so elsewhere.  The applicant said something in reply which she did not understand. She then picked up her bag and was about to leave.  At that juncture, the applicant stood in front of her and grabbed her neck, as a result of which she fell face-up into some carton paper.  She shouted for help and tried to resist but the applicant pressed her throat.  He then forcibly assaulted her[1], following which he raised her leg onto his shoulder, removed all of her lower garments and attempted to rape her.

5.According to the complainant’s testimony, she felt the applicant’s penis touch her private parts as it swept past the opening of her vagina three times.  She said the applicant was thrusting his penis at her vaginal opening trying to penetrate her.  When he was unsuccessful, he slapped her private parts three or four times with his right hand.[2]

6.The complainant was understandably very frightened and, on seeing PW2, an employee of the Supermarket whom she knew, standing at the rear door of the Supermarket, she shouted to him that the applicant had raped her and asked him to make a report to the police.  PW2 described the complainant as sounding miserable at that time.[3]  The applicant rushed over to the door of the Supermarket but PW2 managed to close the door.  The applicant then picked up a broom and advanced on the complainant intending to hit her. However, she shouted at him and he desisted.  Thereafter three ambulance men arrived in the rear lane to help.  PW2 had managed to make a report to the police.  When they arrived, the applicant was duly arrested.

7.It was not disputed that the complainant had suffered injuries to her face and neck[4]; and had tenderness and swelling over her perineum.[5] It was the evidence of Dr Foo Ka-chung (PW7) that such injuries would be consistent with the complainant’s account of a sexual attack.[6]

8.The prosecution case against the applicant thus relied heavily on what the complainant said had happened.  Footage from a closed circuit television (CCTV) camera installed at the scene was also admitted at trial: despite its poor quality, it appeared to capture the applicant arguing with the complainant, and punching and kicking something, at the material time.[7]  It was an admitted fact that the seized CCTV footage was subsequently enhanced to improve its quality, the enhanced version being produced as Exh P6.

The defence case

9.In his video-recorded interview, which was admitted at trial, the applicant essentially said that he had been drinking beer[8] in the lane when he discovered that his hand bag had gone missing.  Seeing the complainant there and suspecting that she had taken away his bag, he had a row with her and assaulted her.  The applicant denied any attempt to rape the complainant.

10.The applicant elected not to give evidence and called no witnesses.  Other than what was asserted in his video-recorded interview, the applicant’s defence was advanced by way of cross-examination and submission.

11.During cross-examination, it was put to the complainant that she had moved or touched the applicant’s bag, that she was punched and kicked by the applicant; and that there was no attempted rape at all.  She disagreed with each of these suggestions.

12.The defence also took issue with PW2’s different descriptions of the state of the complainant’s clothing as between his witness statement and his testimony.

13.As to the cause of the complainant’s injuries, PW7 agreed in cross-examination that these could also have been caused by punches and kicks.[9]

14.The defence’s closing submissions also emphasised inter alia the following points:

(a)   The CCTV footage was more reliable than the complainant’s testimony as regards the true account of events, in particular that the applicant punched and kicked the complainant (with which suggestion she had disagreed);

(b)   The complainant’s evidence was not supported by other independent evidence; and

(c)  The applicant was not motivated by sexual gratification to commit the offence in question.

Summing-up

15.In his summing-up, the judge identified the issues and gave detailed directions to the jury on the relevant law relating to those issues.  In particular, the judge directed the jury on the offence of attempted rape, saying that the prosecution had to prove three things, namely (1) that the applicant intended to have sexual intercourse with the complainant; (2) that he knew that she did not consent to it, or was reckless as to whether she consented; and (3) that he did something that was more than mere preparation for committing the rape.[10] The judge then summarised the evidence and the respective speeches of counsel.

16.Among his general directions on the law, the judge directed the jury on the contents of the applicant’s video-recorded interview as follows:

“Now, the defendant’s video interview with the police appeared to contain both incriminating parts and explanations. He admitted that he was there at the lane and had a row with PW1, but he said there was never any sexual attack on PW1 by himself. You must consider the whole of the statement in deciding where the truth lies. You may feel that the incriminating parts are likely to be true for why else would he have made them? You may also feel that there is less weight to be attached to his explanations for they were not made on oath, has [sic] not been repeated on oath, and have not been tested by cross-examination.

However, in this regard, members of the jury, you may think that the interview was a rather long one and the officer had raised many queries and asked the defendant a lot of questions. I do not know whether you may think that the defendant had in a way been cross-examined by the officer, although it was not done on oath. And yet, the defendant had maintained that he had not attempted to rape PW1. You should consider his answers fully and fairly, and decide where the truth lies.”[11] (Emphasis added)

17.In connection with PW2’s allegedly inconsistent evidence, the judge gave the following directions:

“Members of the jury, the defence has pointed out, especially in the cross-examination of PW2, that he had previously made a statement which conflicted with his evidence in court. The two main points raised, I am sure you recall very clearly, being whether PW2 saw PW1 wearing trousers and whether he said he had the impression that the defendant was looking for his bag.

Members of the jury, you may take into account the fact that PW2 did make such a statement or statements when you consider whether he is believable as a witness. However, the witness statement itself is not evidence of the truth of its contents except for those parts of it which the witness has told you are true.

In examining these suggested inconsistencies, you will wish to decide, first, whether there is in fact and in true context an inconsistency. And if you decide that there is one, you will wish to decide whether it is material and relevant, or on the other hand, insignificant or irrelevant. If there is an inconsistency, it may lead you to conclude that the witness is generally not to be relied upon. Alternatively, that a part only of his evidence is inaccurate, or you may accept the reason the witness has provided for the inconsistency, and still consider him to be reliable as a witness.”[12]

18.Regarding the defence’s contention that the complainant’s evidence was unsupported by other independent evidence, the judge directed the jury as follows:

“Now, one point I want to say here is that [defence counsel] was right in that PW1’s account of the event was not supported by any independent evidence. So you have only her words about what had happened. You should consider her evidence very carefully and to decide whether you could rely on her evidence in the absence of some supporting evidence, but that is a matter for you.”[13]

19.Concerning the absence of motivation on the part of the applicant to commit the offence, the judge said:

“Members of the jury, you heard many times from [defence counsel] saying that the evidence showed only an assault, and such an assault was not sexually motivated. Members of the jury, you may wish to note that motivation is not an element of this offence of attempted rape. The important element is rather an intention on the part of the defendant to have sexual intercourse with the woman, PW1.”[14]

The judge then continued to illustrate, with examples, the differences between intention and motive.

20.Having pointed out the defence case that the applicant had committed an assault but not an attempted rape, the judge further warned the jury that the applicant was on trial for attempted rape not assault, and that they should not convict him of the former simply because they were satisfied as to the latter but there was no alternative charge catering for any assault.  The judge said:

“[Defence counsel] has spent some time in addressing you on the issue of alternative charges, indecent assault or otherwise. But, members of the jury, there is no alternative charge or charges for you to consider. The prosecution has put before you one charge and that is attempted rape. Hence, if you reject PW1’s evidence on this crucial part, you will have to acquit the defendant and there is no need for you to consider further, such as, what about the punches and kicks on PW1 by the defendant? You do not need to consider that. The prosecution case has all along been that this is a case of attempted rape, so, if that is not proved there should not be any problem, simply acquit the defendant.

Members of the jury, what you must not do is to convict the defendant on the attempted rape when all the defendant did was just kicks and punches on PW1; and do not think that because there is no alternative, therefore because of the punches and kicks you must convict the defendant on attempted rape. That would be the wrong approach.”[15]

Verdict

21.The jury returned a verdict of guilty by a majority of 5:1.

Mitigation

22.In mitigation, it was submitted on the applicant’s behalf that:

(a)   He was educated up to Form 5 level;

(b)   His family migrated to Hong Kong in 2005 but then his parents moved to the United States, leaving him behind;

(c)  His locally-born wife had left him; and

(d)   He had made no attempt to flee from the scene (albeit that there was ample opportunity to do so).

23.Counsel for the applicant in the court below submitted that, whilst the sentence for offences of this kind could range from 3 or 4 years’ imprisonment at one end of the scale to 7 or 8 years’ imprisonment at the other, the applicant’s case was very different from other rape or attempted rape cases because it was not a “classic sexual desire motivated rape”.[16] It was said to be a very unusual case, yet neither of the psychiatric reports placed before the judge suggested that the applicant was suffering from any mental disorder.[17]

Reasons for sentence

24.In passing sentence, the judge considered the harm and injury that had been inflicted upon the complainant, and the fact that she had evidently suffered both physically and psychologically as a result.

25.The judge said he shared counsel’s view that there was something “odd” about the applicant, yet neither psychiatrist had found anything mentally wrong with him.  Having considered the applicant’s circumstances, the judge adopted a starting point of 6 years.  Noting that there was no particular mitigating factor in his favour, he imposed a sentence of 6 years’ imprisonment accordingly.

Grounds of appeal against conviction and sentence

26.In his Form XI, the applicant has not identified any specific ground of appeal, merely stating that he had been attacked by an inmate and hence hospitalised, and that during hospitalisation he was unable to write because of his health condition.

Respondent’s submissions (on conviction)

27.Ms Janice Cheuk PP, for the respondent, submits that the judge gave the jury proper and sufficient directions in respect of all relevant legal matters.[18]  Although defence counsel did raise, at the conclusion of the summing-up, the question of whether the judge had correctly directed the jury on the law of recent complaint, she submits that the judge was correct not to give any re-direction on the issue, since the direction was in conformity with the specimen directions in jury trials applied in Hong Kong.

Respondent’s submissions (on sentence)

28.Ms Cheuk argues that whilst the customary starting point for a rape or attempted rape offence would be 5 years’ imprisonment, this might be enhanced where any one or more of the aggravating features identified in the case of R v Billam[1986] 1 WLR 349, at 351F-G[19],were present.  Citing the decisions in Secretary for Justice v Leung Yuet Hung[2014] 3 HKLRD 304, at 315 para 30, and Secretary for Justice v Lau Yun Leung[1999] 3 HKLRD 289, at 299C-D, she further submits that an offence of attempted rape could, by virtue of certain aggravating features, be even more serious than the completed offence.

29.Ms Cheuk pointed to certain aggravating features which she contends were present in this case, in particular (i) the age of the complainant and the impact of the offence on her; (ii) the use of violence on a much older woman; and (iii) the sexual degradation of the complainant by way of the slapping of her private parts.  She submits that the sentence of 6 years’ imprisonment was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

30.As for the applicant’s complaints in his Form XI Notice, they were only relevant to his prison life and should be investigated elsewhere.

Discussion

31.On any reading of the papers in this matter, one might agree that it was an “odd” case, a word the judge himself used to describe the applicant’s behaviour.  Nevertheless, this was a set of facts which were classically for the jury to decide.  The judge gave an accurate set of directions on the law applicable to the offence and a perfectly adequate recitation of the evidence relevant to the issue the jury had to decide.  Indeed, unusually perhaps for a short trial, he gave a comprehensive and helpful summary of each counsel’s speeches to the jury.  Such weaknesses and inconsistencies as there were in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses were also adequately put before the jury with appropriate legal directions as to how they should approach such evidence.  And the jury were specifically warned that they should consider the testimony of PW1 very carefully before relying upon her evidence in the absence of supporting evidence.  Indeed, it seems to me that the summing-up was well balanced and fair as far as it went.  I note, for example, the comment made (in his direction at para 16 supra in italics) that despite what might seem to be a lengthy cross-examination of the applicant in interview, he maintained his position that he had not attempted to rape the complainant, which was plainly a comment in favour of the defence.

32.At the end of the day, the jury accepted the fundamentals of PW1’s evidence and rejected the defence being advanced.  This they were entitled to do, provided they received correct directions on the law and evidence from the judge.

33.I have examined the point raised by defence counsel at the conclusion of the summing-up about the direction on recent complaint.  However, the judge’s direction[20] is entirely in conformity with the standard specimen direction on the subject published by the Hong Kong Judicial Institute and I can see no valid cause for complaint.

34.I have also examined whether the judge’s direction that the jury should consider PW1’s testimony very carefully before relying on it in the absence of supporting evidence was sufficient in all the circumstances.  I do not consider that this would afford a reasonably arguable ground of appeal: the judge’s warning was enough.  Indeed, it seems to me that there was some supporting evidence for her account, namely the injury to the area of PW1’s perineum.

35.However, there is one matter which does concern me.  The judge obviously made the decision, and gave a robust direction as a result, that the jury should not concern themselves with alternative verdicts but only consider whether the count of attempted rape had been made out or not.  He warned them that even if they were of the view that the applicant had punched and kicked the complainant rather than attempted to rape her, they should not convict him of attempted rape simply because there was no alternative verdict open to them (see the full direction at para 20 supra). This direction was evidently given because defence counsel had urged the jury that this was not a case of attempted rape but, on the applicant’s case, one of assault.

36.I would accept that just because an offence alleged in an indictment includes by necessary implication other lesser offences, the judge is not required to leave every conceivable alternative to the jury. Much will depend on the circumstances and the live issues at trial.  Thus, on a charge of robbery, it would not be necessary to direct the jury on the possible alternatives to such an offence, such as theft, handling stolen goods or common assault where, for example, the issue at trial was identity, or the defence was that the whole allegation was an invention by the ostensible victim. Similarly, it would not be necessary to direct a jury as to the alternative of simple possession on an indictment for trafficking in 1 kilogramme of heroin, or where the defendant was alleging that the accomplice witness was deliberately framing him up.

37.Much will depend on the facts of the case and the nature of the defence being run.  If, for example, on a count of robbery, the defence was that there was a theft but no assault, or an assault but no theft, it would obviously be necessary to give the jury directions on the respective alternatives available to them, even though the prosecution case was that it was a clear case of robbery and nothing else.  Similarly, in a trial for trafficking in dangerous drugs, where the defendant was a self-confessed drug addict and the quantity of heroin was possibly consistent with self-consumption, it might well be necessary for the judge to consider giving the jury a direction on an alternative verdict of simple possession.

38.On a charge of rape, the other statutory offences of which a defendant may be convicted are set out in Schedule 1 to the Crimes Ordinance.[21] None of them would have arisen on the facts of this case on a count of rape (or attempted rape).  However, section 51(2) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap 221 also provides that:

“If on a trial of any information, charge or indictment for any offence other than treason it is proved that the accused is not guilty of that offence but the allegations in the information, charge or indictment amount to or include, whether expressly or by implication, an allegation of another offence falling within the jurisdiction of the court of trial, he may be found guilty of that other offence or of an offence of which he could be found guilty on an information, charge or indictment specifically charging that other offence.”

Section 51(3) applies the same to attempts.

39.Furthermore, indecent assault and common assault are constituent elements of the offence of rape: see R v Hodgson and others [1973] 57 Cr App R 502, where the Court held, at 509:

“It is plain, of course, that a charge of rape of necessity involves two of the same constituent elements that are also involved in the charge of indecent assault – an assault and indecency. Every charge of rape, therefore, as it were, contains within itself the essential ingredients of indecent assault.”

40.Thus, it seems to me that the alternative of at least common assault was open to the jury, particularly where that was in fact the defence.  I appreciate Ms Cheuk’s point that PW1 did not accept what was put to her in cross-examination concerning the applicant’s assault upon her, notwithstanding the CCTV footage which seemed to show him kicking something.[22]  However, she also accepts that the applicant’s account in his record of interview was that there was some sort of physical altercation but no attempted rape.  That was a so-called “mixed statement”, on which the judge gave an entirely proper standard specimen direction.[23]

41.The judge’s direction on the question of alternative verdicts (para 20 supra) was clear and robust.  In simple terms, the judge was directing the jury that since there was no alternative count available on the indictment, they must either find the applicant guilty or not guilty of attempted rape; and they must still acquit him of that offence, even if they thought he had punched and kicked the complainant.

42.I consider it reasonably arguable that the jury ought to have been directed on the alternatives open to them on the facts in this case, given the defence being advanced.  As Lord Bingham put it in R v Coutts [2007] 1 Cr App R 6, at para 12:

“In any criminal prosecution for a serious offence there is an important public interest in the outcome (R. v Fairbanks (1986) 83 Cr. App. R. 251, 255-256; [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1202, 1206). The public interest is that, following a fairly conducted trial, defendants should be convicted of offences which they are proved to have committed and should not be convicted of offences which they are not proved to have committed. The interests of justice are not served if a defendant who has committed a lesser offence is either convicted of a greater offence, exposing him to greater punishment than his crime deserves, or acquitted altogether, enabling him to escape the measure of punishment which his crime deserves. The objective must be that defendants are neither over-convicted nor under-convicted, nor acquitted when they have committed a lesser offence of the type charged. The human instrument relied on to achieve this objective in cases of serious crime is of course the jury. But to achieve it in some cases the jury must be alerted to the options open to it. This is not ultimately the responsibility of the prosecutor, important though his role as a minister of justice undoubtedly is. Nor is the responsibility of defence counsel, whose proper professional concern is to serve what he and his client judge to be the best interests of the client. It is the ultimate responsibility of the trial judge (Von Starck v R. [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1270, 1275; Hunter v R. [2003] UKPC 69, [27]).”

It seems clear from the subsequent cases discussed by Lord Bingham in his judgment that he was not confining the above principle to murder/manslaughter cases, where this problem is most commonly encountered in the authorities.

43.Lord Bingham formulated what he conceived to be a workable test, at 75 para 23, as follows:

“The public interest in the administration of justice is, in my opinion, best served if in any trial on indictment the trial judge leaves to the jury, subject to any appropriate caution or warning, but irrespective of the wishes of trial counsel, any obvious alternative offence which there is evidence to support. I would not extend the rule to summary proceedings since, for all their potential importance to individuals, they do not engage the public interest to the same degree. I would also confine the rule to alternative verdicts obviously raised by the evidence: by that I refer to alternatives which should suggest themselves to the mind of any ordinarily knowledgeable and alert criminal judge, excluding alternatives which ingenious counsel may identify through diligent research after the trial. Application of this rule may in some cases benefit the defendant, protecting him against an excessive conviction. In other cases it may benefit the public, by providing for the conviction of a lawbreaker who deserves punishment. A defendant may, quite reasonably from his point of view, choose to roll the dice. But the interests of society should not depend on such a contingency.”

44.Of this test, Lord Mance said in his judgment, at 103 para 100:

“Accordingly, in my view, where, as Lord Bingham has said, an obvious alternative verdict presents itself in respect of some more than trifling offence and can without injustice be left for the jury to consider, the judge should in fairness ensure that this is done, even if the alternative only arises on the defence case in circumstances where as a matter of law there should apart from that alternative be a complete acquittal.”

See also Ho Hoi Shing v HKSAR (2008) 11 HKCFAR 354, at para’s 12 – 16.

45.It is not necessary for me to go further in this application and determine whether the jury should, in the circumstances of this particular case, have been fully “alerted to the options open to it” by the judge and the consequences, if any, of the course which the judge took.  These will be matters for the Court of Appeal to consider.  I am satisfied that this matter affords a reasonably arguable ground of appeal and I grant the applicant leave to appeal against conviction on this point only.

46.In respect of sentence, the judge was right that there is no tariff for the offence of attempted rape.  However, given the circumstances which the jury must have accepted, and the aggravating features to which Ms Cheuk has referred (para 29 supra), some of which are perhaps more significant than others in the present context, I cannot see any arguable grounds of appeal against the sentence of 6 years’ imprisonment.  This, of course, assumes that the conviction for rape is sustained.  If it is not sustained, then the question of any sentence will depend upon the Court’s resolution of the appeal against conviction and any consequent orders it makes.

47.On that basis, I refuse leave to appeal against sentence.

The granting of a Legal Aid Certificate

48.Since I am granting the applicant leave to appeal against conviction on the single ground I have addressed, I shall grant the applicant a legal aid certificate confined to his appeal against conviction only, pursuant to Rule 12(3) of the Legal Aid in Criminal Cases Rules, Cap 221.

Consequent Orders

49.Finally, in order that the ground may be properly argued before the Court, I shall further order that a transcript of the following parts of the trial be prepared, incorporated in the appeal bundle and served on the parties:

(i) The evidence of PW1;

(ii) The evidence of PW2;

(iii) Any discussions between the judge and counsel prior to closing addresses relevant to the summing-up;

(iv) The closing addresses of both prosecuting and defence counsel;

(v) The transcription and certified translation of the applicant’s record of interview (Exh’s P9A and P9B), and any other answers to caution produced at trial.

I would also suggest that the CCTV footage which was played to the jury (Exh P6) should be made available and accessible to the Court, should they wish to examine it for themselves in open court during the hearing of the appeal.

Ms Janice Cheuk PP, of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent

The Applicant appeared in person

[1] In assaulting PW1, the applicant used his fingers to force open her eyelid; tried to clench her nose; pushed a plastic bag into her mouth; and used a bag to cover her head (Appeal Bundle p 11I-M).

[2] It may be noted that PW1 only felt, but did not see, these events happen because her eyes were closed at the time (Appeal Bundle pp 11P-Q and 12B). Under cross-examination, PW1 explained that she closed her eyes because she was afraid that the applicant would scratch her eyes out (Appeal Bundle p 13G).

[3] Appeal Bundle p 14L.

[4] See Admitted Facts, para 7 (Appeal Bundle pVI) – 8 photographs of the complainant were taken on 10 January 2015 and were produced as Exhibit P2.

[5] Admitted Facts, para. 5: Appeal Bundle p VI.

[6] Appeal Bundle p 18O.

[7] The CCTV footage apparently depicted (at 20:52:26) an attack by the applicant on the complainant.  Both of them were then out of sight for 9 minutes and 24 seconds.  At 21:01:50, the applicant was seen standing up.

[8] The fact that the applicant had consumed alcohol was supported by the evidence of PW5 (PC 13203) who detected the smell of alcohol from the applicant at the scene (see the summing-up: Appeal Bundle p 17Q).

[9] See the summing-up: Appeal Bundle p 18P.

[10] Appeal Bundle, pp 7S-8G.

[11] Appeal Bundle p 21J-T.

[12] Appeal Bundle pp 20J-21A.

[13] Appeal Bundle p 26I-K.

[14] Appeal Bundle p 27C-F.

[15] Appeal Bundle p 28D-M.

[16] Appeal Bundle pp 38Q-39A.

[17] The two psychiatric reports are at Appeal Bundle pp 43-46.

[18] Those matters included the functions of the judge and jury, the burden and standard of proof, inferential evidence, right to remain silent, the essential elements of “attempted rape”, expert evidence, recent complaint, the need for care when assessing PW1’s unsupported evidence, the inconsistency on PW2’s testimony and his previous statements, mixed statements, the irrelevant consideration of alterative charges, the difference between “motivation” and “intention”, and other concluding directions.

[19] Lord Lane CJ (giving the judgment of the Court) stated “[t]he crime should in any event be treated as aggravated by any of the following factors: (1) violence is used over and above the force necessary to commit the rape; (2) a weapon is used to frighten or wound the victim; (3) the rape is repeated; (4) the rape has been carefully planned; (5) the defendant has previous convictions for rape or other serious offences of a violent or sexual kind; (6) the victim is subjected to further sexual indignities or perversions; (7) the victim is either very old or very young; (8) the effect upon the victim, whether physical or mental, is of special seriousness.” (Emphasis added)

[20] Appeal Bundle, pp 19R-20I.

[21] See section 149(1) of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap 200.

[22] Appeal Bundle pp 13K-14D.

[23] Appeal Bundle p 21J-T.