HKSAR v. Don Amarasinghalage Don Chandra Janaka
Read the full judgment text of CACC 283/2015 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 20 June 2016.
1. The applicant seeks leave to appeal against his conviction on14 August 2015, after trial by Deputy High Court Judge Campbell-Moffat SC and a jury, of a count of unlawfully trafficking in a dangerous drug, namely 25.91 grammes of methamphetamine hydrochloride (‘Ice’) (Count 2) and a count of possession of dangerous drugs, namely, 1 gramme of ketamine and 0.03 gramme of a powder containing cocaine (Count 3), contrary to section 4(1)(a) and (3) and section 8(1)(a) and (2) of the Dangerous Drugs
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CACC 283/2015 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 283 OF 2015 (ON APPEAL FROM HCCC NO. 472 OF 2014) ____________
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_____________________ J U D G M E N T _____________________ Hon Lunn VP (giving the Judgment of the Court) : 1.The applicant seeks leave to appeal against his conviction on14 August 2015, after trial by Deputy High Court Judge Campbell-Moffat SC and a jury, of a count of unlawfully trafficking in a dangerous drug, namely 25.91 grammes of methamphetamine hydrochloride (‘Ice’) (Count 2) and a count of possession of dangerous drugs, namely, 1 gramme of ketamine and 0.03 gramme of a powder containing cocaine (Count 3), contrary to section 4(1)(a) and (3) and section 8(1)(a) and (2) of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, Cap. 134 respectively. Also, the applicant seeks leave to appeal against the sentence of 7 years and 9 months’ imprisonment imposed in respect of Count 2. By verdict of the jury, the applicant was acquitted of a count of possession of arms without a licence, namely a stunning device, contrary to section 13(1) and (2) of the Firearms and Ammunition Ordinance, Cap. 238 (Count 1). The prosecution case 2.On 8 May 2014, police officers executed a search warrant on a hut on the rooftop of Hing Wah Building in Hung Hom. After having knocked on the door to the hut announcing that they were police officers, after a delay of about one minute the applicant opened the door and police officers entered the premises. They found the applicant and a female present. A subsequent search of her revealed that she had cannabis hidden in her underpants. 3.A search of the premises revealed the items the subject of the three counts, namely a stun gun, four re-sealable plastic bags containing the dangerous drugs, together with an electronic scale and a number of empty re-sealable plastic bags, openly displayed on a shelf in the room. Having been arrested and cautioned, the applicant remained silent. 4.Mr Kalamulla (PW3) testified that he allowed the applicant, an asylum seeker, to live in the room without the payment of rent. The applicant helped him out with odd jobs and made contributions to the utility bills. That arrangement had come to an end, the applicant was to move out on the day that the police searched the premises. 5.The total value of the Ice was HK$11,103, the ketamine HK$149 and the cocaine HK$29 [1]. The defence case 6.The applicant gave evidence, testifying that he was an asylum seeker. Having arrived in Hong Kong he met a Pakistani man and his sister, who had a young child. They abused drugs. As a result, the applicant took care of the child. Initially, the child lived with the applicant in premises in Lantau, paid for by the International Social Service. Then, he moved into the rooftop hut in 2013. However, he stayed there only occasionally. Rather, he used it to store his belongings. 7.Then, the Pakistani man was arrested, after which his sister had given him a blue bag with their belongings, which the applicant had stored in the rooftop hut. However, subsequently the sister was also arrested. As a result, he took the child to live with its natural father. When the Pakistani man was released, he and his girlfriend stayed with the applicant in Mr Kalamulla’s absence. However, on Mr Kalamulla’s return, they were asked to leave. 8.Two days before his arrest, the applicant had moved some of the items from the blue bag to a red suitcase, during which exercise he found the electronic scale, plastic bags and the cannabis. He took the cannabis for his own use. 9.On 8 May 2014, the applicant had called the Pakistani man, asking him to pick up his belongings, which had been left in the corridor of the premises. At 11 p.m. that night, they met up and consumed Ice for the whole night, after which they went back to the premises together. In the applicant’s room, the Pakistani man told the applicant he wanted to leave a brown plastic bag with him, which he would pick up later together with his other belongings. The applicant then put the bag on the table. They spoke to Mr Kalamulla for a while, and the Pakistani man left. The police arrived a few hours later. Before the police entered the room, the applicant had given the cannabis to his girlfriend. 10.The applicant’s case was that the plastic bags, as well as the stun gun, had been taken from the brown plastic bag on the table. The scales and three packets of bags were in the red suitcase in the hallway. Having been taken to the corridor when his room was being searched, the applicant did not know how the items ended up on his shelf. He had never seen a stun gun, nor such a large quantity of drugs before. The applicant said he had told the police about the Pakistani man either in the premises or at the police station. He complained that the police had also failed to retrieve any CCTV evidence, which would have revealed that someone else had put the items in the applicant’s room. 11.The applicant’s friend, Mr Kashif, was called in the defence case. He said that he had seen the Pakistani man with the applicant in the early hours of the morning. Two days earlier, he had seen the Pakistani man in Chungking Mansion with something which flashed a light and gave off a sound of an electric shock. The summing up 12.In a lengthy summing up, Deputy Judge Campbell-Moffat, as Campbell-Moffat J was then, suggested to the jury:[2]
Nevertheless, she went on to say “you look at each count individually against the background of all the evidence.” 13.In the context of the jury’s consideration of Count 1, in respect of the stun gun, the judge said:[3]
14.Of the dangerous drugs the subject of Count 2, in respect of which it was alleged that the applicant was trafficking unlawfully, the judge said:[4]
15.Of the 1 gramme of ketamine and the 0.03 grammes of a powder containing cocaine, in respect of which it was alleged by Count 3 that the applicant was in possession, the judge said:[5]
Grounds of appeal against the conviction 16.By ground 1 of the grounds of appeal against conviction Mr McGowan, who was counsel for the applicant at trial, submitted the jury’s verdict of not guilty on Count 1 and their verdicts of guilty on Counts 2 and 3 were perverse and logically inconsistent. 17.By ground 2, it was submitted that, having been informed by the jury that they were split 4:3, the judge erred in not informing the jury that it was permissible to disagree in that ratio and that it was not required that they remain together until they reached an acceptable verdict. 18.Mr McGowan submitted that the prosecution had invited the jury to conclude that the items, the subject of the three counts, were a ‘package’; the issue was whether or not the items were on the shelf when the police officers arrived. It was the prosecution case that the stun gun was used as a protective measure for the purpose of trafficking unlawfully in dangerous drugs. The submissions of the respondent 19.In opposing the application for the grant of leave to appeal against conviction Mr Man, for the respondent, reminded the court that in advancing the ground that the verdicts were inconsistent, the burden was on the applicant to show not only that the verdicts were inconsistent but also that they were such as called for interference by this Court.[6] He suggested that the verdicts were readily explicable. The judge directed the jury that it was an ingredient of the offence in Count 1 that the applicant knew that the object, which bore the inscription ‘Flashlight’ on its barrel, was in fact a stun gun. He suggested that, from its appearance, that was anything but obvious. By contrast, it was the evidence of the applicant that he was an abuser of dangerous drugs, including Ice. 20.Although Mr Man acknowledged that the judge had never directed the jury in terms “However, if after full discussion you cannot reach agreement, you must say so”, nevertheless he submitted that in directing them that they were to inform the court if they were split 4:3 and they would receive further direction, the message contained in the omitted sentence was conveyed to the jury. 21.Mr Man submitted that the real issue was whether “there is a real danger that the jury were put under undue pressure to reach a verdict.” [7] He invited the court to note that in its judgment in Chan Kar Leung v HKSAR [8] the Court of Final Appeal had declined to quash the appellant’s conviction, in circumstances where the judge directed the jury in respect of their verdict that anything less than 7-2 would not be acceptable. The court was satisfied that there was no real danger that the jury had been given the impression “that they had to go on deliberating indefinitely.” A consideration of the submissions 22.The trial before the jury had been a short trial, during which evidence had been adduced over three days and one hour. At the completion of evidence on 12 August 2015, counsel made their closing speeches and the judge began her summing up at about 12:30 p.m. Shortly before 4:00 p.m. the case before the jury was adjourned. The summing up resumed the following morning at 10:30 a.m. and the jury retired to consider their verdicts at 12:08 p.m. on 13 August 2015. 23.At the outset of her summing up on 12 August 2015 sensibly the judge had warned the jury of what might lie ahead the following day, when they retired to consider their verdicts:[9]
24.Shortly before 4:25 p.m. the jury sent the judge a written note:
25.At the conclusion of her summing up, the judge had directed the jury:[10]
26.Of the verdicts themselves, the judge directed the jury:[11]
27.That direction resonates with the Specimen Direction of the Judicial Studies Board on unanimous majority verdicts, as quoted in the judgment of this Court in HKSAR v Chan Ka Man [12], cited with approval in the judgment of Li CJ, with which judgment all the other judges agreed, in the Court of Final Appeal in Tam King Hon v HKSAR.[13] 28.However, the judge went on to direct the jury:
29.The phrase, in the context of a 4:3 split of the jury “and you do not feel you are moving forward” finds no place in the Specimen Direction that it is suggested is given to the jury initially. 30.The direction referred to at paragraph 23 incorporates most, but not all, of the direction that Li CJ suggested was appropriate, albeit that he said:[14]
31.Singularly absent from the suggested direction was the final sentence:
At no stage, did the judge give the jury that direction. 32.In discussions with counsel at 4:25 p.m., in the absence of the jury, the judge having responded affirmatively to Mr McGowan’s suggestion that she enquire of the jury if she could assist them with any further direction, the following interchange ensued:[15]
33.On the return of the jury, the judge directed them to further :[16]
34.Following the retirement of the jury the judge acknowledged affirmatively the suggestion of Mr Whitehouse, counsel for the prosecution, that the jury appeared to have reached a verdict on Count 1 and indicated that she was not minded to take that verdict separately. Then, further discussion ensued with counsel as to the way forward:[17]
35.In response to Mr Whitehouse’s apparent concern at the jury being directed to retire overnight and in face of his observation “it is rather a simple case” the judge said:[18]
36.At 7:33 p.m. the court reconvened, in the absence of the jury, and the judge informed counsel:[19]
37.On their return to court, the judge gave the jury further directions:[20]
38.The judge’s observation to the jury that “it is very difficult” is given context by the exchange that occurred after the jury had retired:[21]
39.In passing, the judge observed:[22]
40.At the hearing of the application there was no dispute that the judge’s direction to the jury that they were to remain in the court building overnight and they were to resume their deliberations the following morning met with a negative response from some of the jurors. As a result, with no opposition from Mr Man, for the respondent, we granted Mr McGowan’s application that we receive fresh evidence by way of an affirmation from his instructing solicitor addressing that issue. 41.Mr Ip Ka Tung, a partner of Ip Kwan & Co, affirmed that he had been present in court at the time that the jury were directed to retire overnight. He confirmed what Mr McGowan had told us from the Bar table, namely that in response to the judge’s direction the forelady of the jury struck her forehead with the palm of her hand in a gesture of apparent despair. Also, he recalled the other jurors evinced dissatisfaction with the direction which they had just received. 42.At the outset of proceedings at 9:30 a.m. on 14 August 2015, in the absence of the jury, the judge informed counsel:[23]
43.Subsequently, the following interchange ensued:[24]
44.Although the judge had adverted to having read judgments of the court addressing the issue with which the judge and counsel were grappling, she did not cite any such case and there was no discussion between the Bench and Bar of any of those judgments. 45.In the result, on their return to court, the judge gave the jury further directions:[25]
46.At 11:12 a.m. the jury returned a verdict of not guilty on Count 1, by a majority of 6:1, a verdict of guilty on Count 2, by a majority of 5:2 and guilty of Count 3, by a unanimous verdict. 47.It is clear from the judgment of Li CJ in Tam King Hon v HKSARthat a considerable degree of discretion is reposed in a trial judge in formulating the language by which the principles identified in that judgment are to be given by way of directions to a jury. Nevertheless, Li CJ noted of the provisions of the Jury Ordinance, Cap. 3:[26]
48.Li CJ went on to cite with approval [27], as being a sound view, a passage in the judgment of this Court delivered by Stock JA, as Stock NPJ was then, in HKSAR v Chan Ka Man in which he said, inter alia:[28]
49.Of that provision, Li CJ went on to say:[29]
50.It follows that a consideration of the circumstances obtaining in a particular case is of considerable importance. Obviously, a long trial involving a multi-handed and/or multi-count indictment may produce circumstances which are quite different from a short trial involving a single defendant on a single count. In the case of the applicant, as noted earlier, the evidence had lasted just over three days. The issues were relatively simple. 51.The jury had been deliberating for over four hours when they informed the court that they were split 4:3 and indicated that they sought additional directions in respect of Counts 2 and 3. It is readily apparent from the judge’s candid remarks to counsel in the absence of the jury that she had resolved by 4:30 p.m. that if, after further deliberations, the jury was not able to deliver verdicts by 7 p.m., the jury was not to be allowed “to throw in the towel today”. Rather, they were to be required to remain together overnight and to resume their deliberations the following day. 52.It may be that that determination is what persuaded the judge that it was not appropriate, even after the jury had retired for over seven hours, to enquire of them if they were of the view that if they were allowed further deliberation it was reasonably possible that they would be able to reach a verdict. Of course, that would have been an opportunity to direct the jury in the terms set out in the final sentence of the suggested direction of Li CJ, namely:
53.However, whatever may have been the merits of pursuing that course in the late afternoon and early evening of 13 August 2015, the adverse reaction of the jury to the judge’s direction that they were to remain together overnight and that they were to resume their deliberations the following morning was clearly a highly significant development in the particular circumstances relevant to a determination of the appropriate directions to be given to this jury. 54.We are satisfied that, if the judge was of the view that, having given the jury the direction that they were to cease their deliberations and resume them the following morning it was too late to make the enquiry of them noted earlier, it was necessary that the jury be told the following morning, before they retired to consider their verdicts that, if they were unable to reach verdicts which the court could receive, they “must say so.” Not to do so in the circumstances which pertained in this particular case was to risk placing them under unacceptable pressure to deliver a verdict that the court could accept. Also, it was an opportunity to inform them of the effect of section 27 of the Jury Ordinance, namely that if they “cannot agree upon a verdict” the court would discharge them. Conclusion 55.In all the circumstances we are satisfied that we must allow the application for leave to appeal against conviction and quash the applicant’s conviction in respect of Count 2, where the verdict of the jury was by a majority of 5:2. By contrast, it is to be remembered that the jury’s verdict in respect of Count 3 was unanimous. In context of the allegation made in Count 3, namely that he was in unlawful possession of a minute amount of cocaine and a small amount of ketamine, it is be remembered that it was the appellant’s evidence that, together with others, he had consumed Ice for the whole of the night of 7/8 May 2014.[30] Also, he testified that on the arrival of the police at the front door of the hut, he had given the cannabis found on his girlfriend for her to hide. The allegation in Count 2 of an unlawful trafficking in more than 25 grammes of Ice was quite different from the allegation of unlawful possession of a small amount of dangerous drugs in Count 3. Retrial 56.Mr Man indicated that, if this court quashed the convictions of the applicant on Counts 2 and 3, nevertheless he would seek a retrial in respect of Count 2 only. Mr McGowan opposed the order of a retrial on that count. In doing so, he invited the court to note that the applicant had been in custody since his arrest on 8 May 2014, so that he had served a substantial part of the sentence of 7 years and 9 months’ imprisonment imposed on the applicant for Count 2. He pointed out that with an anticipated discount of one-third for good behaviour the applicant would have to serve 5 years and 2 months’ imprisonment only. Nevertheless, he acknowledged that the applicant had not served even half of the sentence of imprisonment that it was anticipated that he would have to serve for that offence. 57.In all circumstances, we are satisfied that it is appropriate that we order that the applicant be retried. Accordingly, we order that the applicant be retried on a fresh indictment of which Count 2 of the existing indictment is to be the only count, which indictment is to be filed with the court within 14 days. Furthermore, we order that the matter is to be listed before the Listing Judge for the fixing of trial dates within 28 days hereof.
Mr Jonathan Man, SADPP, of the Department of Justice, for the respondent Mr James McGowan, instructed by Ip, Kwan & Co., assigned by Director of Legal Aid, for the applicant (Conviction only) [1] Appeal Bundle; page 12, Admitted Facts - paragraph 6. [2] Appeal Bundle, page 63 L-M. [3] Appeal Bundle, page 63 B-F. [4] Appeal Bundle, page 64 D-I. [5] Appeal Bundle, page 66 N-P. [6] HKSAR v Chau Shu Ho [2005] 3 HKLRD 786, at paragraph 18. [7] Cheung Chi Keung v HKSAR (2009) 12 HKCFAR 502, at paragraph 16(c). [8] Chan Kar Leung v HKSAR (2006) 9 HKCFAR 827, at paragraph 7. [9] Appeal Bundle, page 16 G-Q. [10] Appeal Bundle, page 67 G-N. [11] Appeal Bundle, page 67 O - 68 D. [12] HKSAR v Chan Ka Man [2005] 1 HKC 162, paragraph 11. [13] Tam King Hon v HKSAR (2006) 9 HKCFAR 206, at paragraph 34. [14] Tam King Hon v HKSAR, at paragraph 29. [15] Appeal Bundle, page 71 A-G. [16] Appeal Bundle, page 71 M - I. [17] Appeal Bundle, page 72 S - 73 M. [18] Appeal Bundle, page 75 F-H. [19] Appeal Bundle, page 75 P-Q [20] Appeal Bundle, page 77 A-N. [21] Appeal Bundle, pages 77 O - 78 G. [22] Appeal Bundle, page 78 J. [23] Appeal Bundle, page 80 C-I. [24] Appeal Bundle, page 81 K-Q. [25] Appeal Bundle, page 83 P-T. [26] Tam King Hon v HKSAR, at paragraph 31. [27] Tam King Hon v HKSAR, at paragraph 34. [28] HKSAR v Chan Ka Man [2005] 1 HKC 162, at paragraph 11. [29] Tam King Hon v HKSAR, at paragraph 34. [30] Appeal Bundle, page 56 S-U. | ||||||||||||||||||
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