China Metal Recycling (Holdings) Ltd (in Liquidation) and Another v. Chun Chi Wai and Others
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HCA 1412/2013 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 1412 OF 2013 _____________________
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_____________________ JUDGMENT _____________________ INTRODUCTION 1.There are two applications before the court:
2.The Amendment Order is about the following two Mareva injunctions previously made and then amended by other judges:
3.As far as the present applications are concerned, the effects of the Amendment Order are twofold:
There are provisions in common in Tong Order and Geiser Order extending/elaborating on the scope of the assets under restraint and in respect of which R1‑R3 are required to make disclosure. Apart from the extended Mareva injunctions obtained in Hong Kong, Ps have also obtained an English ancillary order[10] against R1‑R3 in substantially the same scope as the Hong Kong orders which remains in place to date. 4.Rs are the daughters of Mr Chun Chi‑wai (D1). D1 is the former chairman and CEO of P1. He has jumped bail, resulting in forfeiture of his bail money. Mrs Chun, his wife and Rs’ mother, I am told, has been charged by the police in relation to the massive fraud allegedly committed by her and her husband. However, the criminal case is still at an early stage and no trial dates have been fixed. Rs are all university students now studying full time in London. 5.The Property, which is subjected to the freezing orders, is a luxurious apartment situated in Central London registered in the sole name of R1 which was purchased in cash (GBP 1.8 million) in late February 2014 without any mortgage. As aforesaid, there are also substantial amounts of cash held respectively in Rs’ respective bank accounts in UK and in Hong Kong.[11] So far as it is relevant to the present applications, the current position is that:
THE ISSUES 6.It is not in dispute that Rs, being full time students either in their young adulthood or late teen, do not have financial resources of their own. The factual dispute between the parties is about the source of the purchase price of the Property and the substantial amounts of cash in the Rs’ bank accounts. Rs’ case is that their assets were provided by Mrs Chun and their paternal grandmother (Madam Qin) which had nothing to do with Mr Chun. On the other hand, it is Ps’ case that both Mrs Chun and Madam Qin are in fact nominees of Mr Chun and that any money which they might have provided to Rs was in fact property from or related to Mr Chun and therefore should also be subject to the various injunctions which have already been imposed. 7.Apart from the factual disputes, R1‑R3 also raised two legal issues. Firstly, they argue that the restraint and duty of disclosure imposed on them by the Amendment Order are wilder in scope than what is supported by the relevant case authorities. In respect of the freezing order against them, they ask that the following be struck out:
8.Secondly, for the same reason, R1‑R3 also ask that the following part of the consequential Disclosure Orders be either discharged or struck out:
9.Thirdly, R1‑R3 argue that the remainder of Tong Order and Geiser Order against them are defective in that they require Rs to ascertain for themselves whether the assets they held in fact belong to D1 or D13. The task, it is submitted, is “impossible” for Rs. It is further submitted that two Orders fall foul of being unclear by making reference only to the “assets of [D1/D13]” without identifying those assets with precision so that “everyone should know exactly what acts are prohibited by the injunction”. THE RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES 10.Rs are not parties to the main action. The extended Mareva injunctions against them were sought on Chabra basis, following the decision in TSB Bank International v Chabra.[13] 11.The relevant legal principles are well‑established. The threshold for the exercise of Chabra jurisdiction is where there is “good reason to suppose” that the assets of the third party are, in truth, the assets of the injuncted defendant. In such cases, the Chabra jurisdiction will be exercised where it is “just and convenient” to do so. The court is not obliged to discharge the injunction on the mere say‑so of the third party: SCF Finance Co Ltd v Masri.[14] However, this jurisdiction is exceptional and should be exercised with caution, taking care that it should not operate oppressively to innocent third parties who have not acted to frustrate the administration of justice. The ultimate test is always whether there is good reason to suppose that the assets would be amendable to execution of a judgment obtained against the defendant in the main action: see XY, LLC v Jesse Zhu & Anor[15] citing with approval Paul Cardile v LED Building Proprietary Ltd.[16] 12.“Good reason to suppose” in this context means a good arguable case that there are assets, apparently vested in the third party, which may be beneficially the property of the defendant and therefore available to satisfy the plaintiff’s claims against him if established at trial. The plaintiff does not need to demonstrate a balance of probabilities. A good arguable case is “one which is more than barely capable of serious argument, but yet not necessarily one which the judge believes to have a better than 50% chance of success”: Ninemia Maritime Corporation v Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft GmbH.[17] 13.As to the scope of assets that can be subject to Chabra jurisdiction, it is not limited to cases where the assets to which the defendant is beneficially entitled can be specifically identified in the hands of the third party; once the court is satisfied that there are such assets in the possession or control of the third party, the court could make an order over the third party’s assets up to the amount of the defendant’s assets of which the third party appears to have possession and control: see Yukong Line Ltd v Rendsburg Investments Corp.[18] BACKGROUND 14.Before dealing with the issues, it is pertinent for me to make reference to the history of the case, which is lengthy and protracted, insofar as it is relevant to the present proceedings. 15.There have already been many court proceedings before various judges. A narrative of it is neatly summarised by DHCJ Judge Yee,[19] which I gratefully adopt as follows:
16.In respect of the shares of Chung Shing Belize (which ultimately controlled the company which had received US$82 million from D13) mentioned at §10 of the judgment of DHCJ Yee above, the daughters (R1‑R3) have given an undertaking to the court not to deal with those shares or to do anything to diminish the value of their shareholding.[21] The daughters’ case, which was based on an affirmation given by their mother, was that the shares were a “secret gift” from their father which they had not even known about.[22] CONSIDERATION ON LEGAL ISSUES As to the scope of restraint 17.Ms Sit, counsel for Ps, argues that Chabra jurisdiction can be exercised in situations where the defendant, even without any legal or equitable right to the assets (in the strict trust law sense), has some right in respect of, or control over, or other rights of access to, the assets. In other words, as long as he has “substantive control” over the assets that would suffice. References are made to Dadourian Group International Inc v Azuri Ltd[23] and Akai Holdings Ltd (in liq) v Ho Wing On Christopher.[24] 18.Ms Sit’s above submission is on its face attractive. However, a closer reading of the relevant parts of Dadourian and Akai shows that they do not in fact support her broad proposition that “substantive control” of itself is sufficient to invoke Chabra jurisdiction, nor was the point appeared to have been argued at any length in the two cases she relies upon. What the two cases have decided is that “substantive control” is an important consideration and that Chabra jurisdiction “can be” exercised where a defendant is shown to have “substantive control” over the assets held by a third party. I note, however, that in Akai, Tang VP (as he then was), giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, said,
By emphasizing twice “for the present purpose” in the above paragraph, it is obvious that Tang VP was not laying down any general principle that “substantive control” would in all circumstances be sufficient. In my humble view, what Tang VP was saying that in the factual context of the case before him, “substantial control” would be sufficient for invoking Chabra jurisdiction against Accolade (a third party), which was the trustee of the Ho Family Trust, when, Mr Ho had represented to the whole world that he was the beneficial owner of the trust and the latter had kept silent about it. 19.That said, I have no difficulties with the proposition that in a suitable factual situation “substantial control” by a defendant of the asset of a third party may well be a factor, or even a strong factor, in favour of the inference that the asset in fact belongs to the defendant. I also have no difficulty that Chabra jurisdiction can also be invoked even in cases where a defendant does not have some sort of proprietary entitlement over the asset of a third party. As said in Paul Cardile v LED Building Proprietary Ltd,[25]
20.On the other hand, there are clear case authorities that “substantial control” is not the test for Chabra. In PJSC Vseukrainskyi Aktsionernyi Bank v Maksimov,[26] which was cited with approval in XY, LLC v Jesse Zhu & Anor, Popplewell J said at §32:
As a matter of stare decisis, I am bound by XY, LLC v Jesse Zhu & Anor which is a judgment of the Court of Appeal directly on point. 21.I now turn to the relevant parts of the injunctions which are challenged by Mr Mok. For the sake of convenience, they are reproduced below, with the parts objected to under this ground underscored.
22.The parts underscored above can be divided into three broad categories:
23.I fully accept the proposition that the above three categories are capable of being important pointers to the existence of good reasons to suppose that the assets under consideration are amenable to the execution of a judgment obtained against D1/D13. However, applying XY, LLC v Jesse Zhu & Anor, the categories are not in themselves the test for invoking Chabra jurisdiction. In particular, whilst Category (i) is capable of giving rise to the inference that the asset under consideration in fact belongs to D1/D13, in my view a distinction should be drawn between a piece of evidence adduced for proving a certain matter and the matter itself. As regards Categories (ii) and (iii), with respect, they are different ways of saying that the asset under consideration is subject to the “substantial control” of [D1/D13]. Insofar as Clauses 1.5 & 1.6 seek to equate an asset falling within the three categories to an asset of D1/D13, this, with respect, is incorrect in view of PJSC Vseukrainskyi Aktsionernyi Bank v Maksimov and XY, LLC v Jesse Zhu & Anor. 24.Given my view that as a matter of law assets falling within any of the three categories above are not necessarily amenable to execution of a judgment obtained against D1/D13, I do not think that the presence of the words underscored about can be justified on the basis that assets falling within them may turn out to be so amenable. In my view, since the breach of an injunction may lead to penal consequences, it is imperative that its terms should comply strictly with the law. 25.In the circumstances, I accept Mr Mok’s submission that those parts in Clauses 1.5 & 1.6 underlined above have gone beyond what is permitted pursuant to Chabra jurisdiction and should therefore be struck out from the extended Mareva injunctions. As to the injunctions as a whole 26.Mr Mok submits that the remainder of the injunctions are defective in that they fall foul of the principle that an injunction must identify the assets with precision so that “everyone should know exactly what acts are prohibited by the injunction”. It is submitted that it is no good for a freezing order to prohibit a third party from dealing with the assets of the defendant, leaving it to the third party to find out for himself what those assets might be. In the present case, so far as R1‑R3 are aware, the funds in their bank accounts were from their mother and grandmother. Given such state of their knowledge, it would have been impossible for R1‑R3 to identify any of the monies in their respective bank accounts as constituting the assets of D1 or D13. 27.In reply, Ms Sit draws my attention to the following passage from Dadourian,[29] which I respectfully agree:
28.Applying the above passage to the present case, I am unable to accept Mr Mok’s submission that the remainder of the freezing orders against R1‑R3 (ie after deleting the words underscored as discussed above), is defective. My reasons are as follows:
29.Based on the above, given what my view is about the sources of Rs’ assets in the discussion below, I can see no objection to the making of an order which catches the general assets of Rs up to the amount of D1 of which they appear to have possession and control. Rs are only students and they do not require any money for doing business. There is nothing to suggest that the present levels of allowances given to R1 R3 for their tuition fees and living expenses on the one hand and legal fees on the other are insufficient for their purpose. The freezing orders, after removing the parts underscored as discussed about, are not in my view objectionable. As to scope of disclosure order 30.Clause 2.7(a) of Tong Order and Clause 2.3(a) of Geiser Order are similarly phrased. Again, for the sake of convenience, they are reproduced as below with the part objected to under this ground underscored:
31.In considering whether the words underscored above should be struck down or varied, I bear in mind that disclosure of assets is a necessary adjunct of a freezing order to make it effective. I also bear in mind the general principles stated in Pacific King Shipping Holdings Pte Ltd v Huang Ziqiang.[30] Jeremy Poon J (as he then was), giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, noted that the main underlying consideration for ordering disclosure is to prevent abuse by the defendant to frustrate or defeat the very purpose of the Mareva injunction. Absent any evidence of abuse such as non-compliance with the Mareva injunction, the court will normally refuse to order further disclosure in addition to the standard disclosure. His Lordship also quoted with approval a passage from Gee on Commercial Injunction (5th ed) that there are situations where the court would order disclosure against a third party, eg there may be an issue as to whether certain assets belong beneficially to the defendant, and therefore should be subject to a Mareva injunction, or information may be needed to enable the court to formulate injunctions against several defendants in appropriate terms, as in A v C (No 1),[31] or to make a Mareva injunction fully effective (eg by enabling the court to specify particular assets in the order which can then be notified to non-parties holding the defendant’s assets). It may be that information is needed because the defendant cannot be relied upon to obey the court order and it is necessary to take steps to preserve the assets in the hands of non‑parties.[32] 32.I am alive that the power to order disclosure, if too readily resorted to, could easily become an oppressive procedure especially in case of a third parity. Therefore, this court must strike a balance between what Ps would reasonably require as against the need to avoid making an order that was unreasonable, unnecessary or oppressive. 33.Having considered the written and oral submissions from both sides, I am of the view that the present case is very unlike the situation in Pacific King Shipping Holdings and that the underlined part of the disclosure order against R1‑R3 above is not objectionable in that it has not gone beyond the ambit of the associated freezing orders and is no more than what is necessary in order to make the underlying Mareva injunction effective. My reasons are as follows:
34.In the circumstances, I refuse R1‑R3’s application to strike out or varied the disclosure orders made against them. MRS CHUN & MADAM QIN 35.Evidence has been filed, in the form of an affirmation from Mrs Chun,[39] on behalf of R1‑R3 which purports to explain that Mrs Chun and Madam Qin were the sources of the purchase price of the Property and the funds in the bank accounts of R1‑R3. In particular, Mrs Chun explained that the purchase price of the Property and the funds in Rs’ bank accounts came mainly from the following:
36.On the other hand, Ms Chi, one of the joint and several liquidators, has filed a lengthy affirmation giving a detailed rebuttal of the version given by Mrs Chun. 37.Ms Sit, in her very helpful written and oral submissions, has given a plethora of reasons as to why this court should reject what Mrs Chun said in her affirmation. In my view, the reasons given by Ms Sit are valid ones. For present purpose, it suffices for me to name just a few of them:
38.In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that Ps have shown that there are at least good reasons to suppose that the Property as well as the funds in Rs’ bank accounts in Hong Kong and in UK are in fact assets of D1 or that they are amenable to execution of a judgment obtained against D1/D13. In coming to the above view, I have not ignored Mr Mok’s submission that there is an assumption of advancement in favour of Mrs Chun (and perhaps also Rs) regarding the assets which were or believed to have originated from D1. Yet, as noted by Litton NPJ in Cheung Pui Yuen v Worldcup Investments Inc,[57] the presumption of advancement is nothing more than an evidential tool; its weight varies with the circumstances of the case. In Suen Shu Tai v Tam Fung Tai,[58] the Court of Appeal observed that the presumption of advancement is a rather weak concept these days. I am also alive that I am not conducting a mini trial on affirmation evidence. What I need to decide is whether, in view of the assumption of advancement in favour of Mrs Chun and Rs, Ps can still show that in the circumstances of the present case there are “good reasons to suppose” that the various assets under consideration (the shares and the properties) are in true D1’s assets or assets which are amenable to execution of a judgment obtained against D1/D13. In my view, looking at all the relevant evidence as a whole, there are such good reasons to suppose even after taking into account the assumption of advancement. 39.I am also satisfied that it is obviously just and convenient that the freezing orders (subject to the deletion of the words underscored above) and the disclosure order against Rs should continue, bearing in mind that Rs are allowed to stay in the Property, that there are no suggestions that the allowances they are currently permitted are not sufficient for their purpose or that they have suffered any hardship. CONCLUSION 40.I allow Ps’ application for the continuation of the Amendment Order, subject to the deletion from the freezing orders the words underscored as discussed above. 41.Rs’ application for the variation of the freezing orders is allowed to the limited extent as discussed above. However, their application for the discharge/variation of the disclosure order is refused. 42.As aforesaid, the issue about the ownership of Rs’ assets should be the subject matter of a trial according to the Masri procedure. However, Rs are still studying and preferably the Masri procedure should take place not during school term. Moreover, the date for the criminal trial of Mrs Chun, who will be an important witness for Rs, is not yet known. Therefore, I leave it for the parties to discuss the preferable hearing dates for the Masri procedure. For avoidance of doubt, whilst I have expressed certain views above in relation to the probabilities or otherwise of certain matters, those views are necessarily provisional in the sense that they are based solely on affirmation evidence. The judge who is going to preside over the Masri procedure will of course be entitled to form his own views on those matters and he will also have the added advantage, which I do not have, of seeing and hearing to witnesses giving evidence in the witness box. COSTS 43.Given the aforesaid results, I am of the view that Ps are the major winner of this hearing, although Rs are successful in having part of the freezing order against them varied. Looking at the matter in the round, I make an order nisi that Ps have three‑fourth of their costs relating to the two applications before this court, to be taxed, if not agreed.
Ms Eva Sit instructed by Hogan Lovells, for the plaintiffs Lau, Kwong & Hung, for the 1st and 13th defendants, excused Mr Johnny Mok SC and Mr Alexander Tang instructed by Chong & Partners LLP, for the respondents [1] Core Bundle [CB]/4/12 [2] Ps’ Summons, CB/1/1 [3] Rs’ Summons, CB/2/5 [4] CB/11/123 [5] On 7 August 2013, CB/4/16 [6] On 3 June 2014, CB/4/35 [7] CB/12/141 [8] On 3 June 2014 [9] Rs are, however, not required to provide again any information or documentation that they have already provided pursuant to the Order of B Chu J dated 17 August 2015 (at A/p 115, concerning the whereabouts of the US$82 million originated from D13): see Clauses 2.7(a) & 2.9, CB/p 21; and Clauses 2.3 & 2.5, CB/p39. [10] On 23 August 2016 [11] R1: about GBP 300,000 in UK NatWest account and about HK$186,000 in HK HSBC account
[12] Clause 2.7(a), CB/4/20; Clause 2.3(a), CB/4/39 [13] [1992] 1 WLR 231 [14] [1985] 1 WLR 876, 880H, 881B, 884B-E [15] CACV 11/2016 (5 December 2016), at §24. [16] (1999) 198 CLR 380 [17] [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 600, at 605 [18] [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 113, at §§43‑44 [19] See the judgment by DHCJ Yee dated 10 March 2016. [20] Namely, Chung Shing Finance (Holdings) Ltd [C1]; Chung Shing Investment Pte [C2]; Zhongjin Goldman (Tianjin) Financing Lease Co Ltd [C3]; Zhongjin Goldman (Tianjin) Equity Investment Management Co Ltd [C4]; and Chung Shing Finance Corporation Ltd [C5]. [21] See the judgment of DHCJ Keith, dated 5 February 2016, at §6 [22] See the judgment of B Chu J, dated 21 August 2015, at §18. [23] [2005] EWHC 1768, at §30 [24] HCMP 1718/2009 (24.9.2009), at §§46 and 48 [25] Supra, at §§57-58 [26] [2013] EWHC 422 (Comm), at §7 [27] “CAD” stands for cause of action defendant [28] “NCAD” stands for non-cause of action defendant [29] Supra, at §27 [30] [2015] 1 HKLRD 830. The case was about a domestic Mareva injunction obtained in aid of a Singapore injunction. The subject matter was a disclosure order against a third party bank [B] “relating to all bank accounts of [D], whether inside or outside Hong Kong, of which [B] has knowledge”. [31] [1981] QB 956 [32] Supra, at §§31-32 [33] See the 21st Affidavit of Cosimo Borrelli (“Borrelli 21st ”), at §§10-27, CB/5/57‑62. [34] See the judgement of DHCJ Anita Yip, SC in this series dated 12 October 2015. See also the judgment of Louis Chan J in China Metal Recycling (Holdings) Ltd v Chun Chi Wai [2014] HKLRD 951, at §§6 & 7. [35] CACV 109/2016 (19 January 2017) [36] See generally Borelli 21st. [37] The issue should be tried in due course under the Masri procedure: see Vogue Town Ltd v Right Head Ltd (HCA 4935/1998) (16 December 1998). [38] Borrelli 21st , supra, at §58, CB/5/72 [39] 4th Affirmation of Lai Wun Yin (“Lai 4th”), CB/9/95 [40] At an interest of 12% per annum: D/8/38 [41] See Mrs Chun’s tax return for 2012/13: D/21/113 [42] Mrs Chun deposed in her affirmation filed on 8 August 2013 that her own assets consisted of (i) cash of no more than HK$3.6 million; (ii) assets of Whampoa of HK$1.15 million; (iii) Shanghai property; and (iv) Guangzhou property. However, the loan proceeds of the Shanghai property she now says she had gifted to Rs. As regards the Guangzhou property, as pointed out by Ms Sit, it had already been encumbered prior to 2014 and it is most unlikely that the replacement mortgage in 2014 would have generated any new money to her. [43] See Mrs Chun’s 1st affirmation, B/2/37 [44] D1 claimed that his legal fees had been paid (at least in part) by Mrs Chun: Borelli 21, §37, CB/5/66. Mr Chun had engaged 3 firms of solicitors and 7 counsel (including 4 silks). Mrs Chun, as a defendant, would have to pay for her own legal costs in this action. Besides, it is apparent that the legal costs of R1‑R3 are also paid by Mrs Chun: Borrelli 21, at §39, CB/5/67. [45] C/12/114 [46] B/9/207 [47] On 3 June 2014 [48] CB/10/120-121 [49] 11th Affirmation of Chi Lai Man Jocelyn (“Chi 11th ), at §24, CB/10/113 [50] Chi 11th , at §§16-23, CB/10/109-112 [51] B/2/38. Unbeknown to Mrs Chun, the transfer was rejected by the bank and the money remained in Mrs Chun’s UK HSBC account. The transfer was eventually effected on 23.8.2013: D/4/24. [52] Chun 17th , §§21-23, B/10/224 [53] See Chi 11th , at §§19 & 20, CB/10/109; D/4/24 & 26 [54] Lai 4th , CB/9/95 [55] E/1/54 [56] E/1/59 [57] (2009) 12 HKCFAR 31, at §6 [58] [2014] 4 HKLRD 436, at §10.17 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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