China Metal Recycling (Holdings) Ltd (in Liquidation) and Another v. Chun Chi Wai and Others
Read the full judgment text of HCA 1412/2013 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 15 April 2019.
1. By a summons filed on 21 March 2019 (“the summons”), the 2 nd defendant seeks an order that (a) the trial which has been scheduled to commence on 14 October 2019 with 30 days reserved, i.e. until 22 November 2019 (“the Civil Trial Dates”), be vacated; and (b) the trial be re-fixed to commence on a date not before 16 December 2019 with 30 days reserved. The application is opposed by the plaintiffs.
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HCA 1412/2013 [2019] HKCFI 1068 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 1412 OF 2013 ____________
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_______________ DECISION _______________ Introduction 1.By a summons filed on 21 March 2019 (“the summons”), the 2nddefendant seeks an order that (a) the trial which has been scheduled to commence on 14 October 2019 with 30 days reserved, i.e. until 22 November 2019 (“the Civil Trial Dates”), be vacated; and (b) the trial be re-fixed to commence on a date not before 16 December 2019 with 30 days reserved. The application is opposed by the plaintiffs. 2.I would first set out the relevant background. Background 3.In these proceedings, the 1st plaintiff is a listed company now in liquidation. The 2ndplaintiff is the 1stplaintiff’s main operating subsidiary. On 9 March 2015, Harris J handed down a judgment in which the learned judge found, in acceding to the Securities and Futures Commission’s petition to wind up the 1st plaintiff on public interest ground, that a fraud on a massive scale had been perpetrated by those in charge of the 1stplaintiff, on the basis that of, inter alia, the “Round Robin Scheme” and false bills of lading relating to the 2nd plaintiff in 2007 – 2009, 2012 and2013 involving the 2nd plaintiff’s suppliers and customers which were set up upon the instructions of the 1stdefendant or persons associated with him. The learned judge found that the 1stdefendant exercised control over the 1stplaintiff and its subsidiaries at the relevant time [1]. 4.These proceedings were commenced by the liquidators acting on behalf of the plaintiffs against the 1st defendant (Chairman, CEO and majority shareholder of the 1st plaintiff), the 2nd defendant (the 1st defendant’s wife and co-founder and director of the plaintiffs), and various entities controlled or associated with them (the 3rd to the 10th defendants). The 13thdefendant is the corporate vehicle and alter ego of the 1stdefendant. The liquidators are trying to recover the loss and damage the plaintiffs have suffered by reason of a large-scale fraudulent scheme operated by those in control thereof and the related parties. 5.The 2nd defendant is now the only defendant defending these proceedings. The plaintiffs have discontinued this action against the 11th and the 12th defendants. In respect of the other defendants, there have been default judgments entered against some of them, and the remaining defendants have been debarred from defending this action. 6.Apart from these civil proceedings, the 2nd defendant is also a defendant in a set of criminal proceedings, HCCC 66/2018. The matters in the criminal proceedings are related to these civil proceedings. The 2nddefendant has been legally represented at all times in the criminal proceedings. 7.In these civil proceedings, the 2nd defendant was legally represented at all times until 21 September 2017. From that time onwards, the 2nddefendant has been acting in person. Her legal representatives representing her in this case management conference only have limited instructions to act for her in relation to the summons. The 2nddefendant claims that due to the financial burden created by these civil proceedings and the criminal proceedings, she intends to act in person in the trial in these civil proceedings. 8.On 1 February 2018, in a hearing before DHCJ Kent Yee in which the 2nddefendant appeared in person, the 2nddefendant agreed that this action should be set down for trial and raised no objection to the plaintiffs’ estimated length of the trial, ie 30 days. The court ordered that this action be set down for trial with 30 days reserved. 9.On 10 April 2018, the plaintiffs’ representatives and the 2nddefendant attended an appointment before the listing clerk and the Civil Trial Dates were fixed in that appointment. 10.On 17 April 2018, the court issued a notice to the parties in this action, notifying the parties the Civil Trial Dates. 11.On 27 December 2018, the liquidators’ solicitors received a letter from the 2nddefendant dated 21 December 2018, in which the 2nd defendant for the first time told the liquidators that the trial in HCCC 66/2018 had been fixed to commence on 16 September 2019 with 60 days reserved, ie until 10 December 2019 (“the Criminal Trial Dates”). In her letter, the 2nd defendant said since the Criminal Trial Dates overlapped the Civil Trial Dates, she requested the liquidators to consent to postpone the trial in these civil proceedings. Thereafter, there was correspondence passing between the liquidators’ solicitors and the 2nddefendant. The liquidators do not agree to postpone the trial herein. 12.The 2nd defendant has filed her 5thaffirmation in support of the summons, in which she claims the following:
13.The liquidators are not privy to the matters in the criminal proceedings, save and except that they attended a hearing in the Eastern Magistrates’ Court on 16 January 2017 and the 6thCMH. Discussion 14.Now there is a complete overlap of the Criminal Trial Dates and the Civil Trial Dates. The 2nddefendant must be present in the criminal court throughout the criminal trial. That means if the Civil Trial Dates remain unchanged, the 2nddefendant would not be able to be present in the civil court during the civil trial. 15.In my view, the 2nd defendant herself is the author of this difficult situation:
16.As the matter now stands, if I do not alter the Civil Trial Dates,the 2nd defendant would not be able to attend the civil trial. On the other hand, if I re-fix the trial dates, realistically the liquidators would have to wait for a much longer time in order to have their day in court. Ms Eva Sit, counsel for the plaintiffs, informs the court that the latest estimation of the length of the trial is approximately 18 – 20 days. Ms Sit requests that the trial be re-scheduled to take place in the period between January and March 2020. I have tried to accommodate counsel’s request but a 20-day timeslot is not available in the first quarter of 2020 in the court’s diary. I have also checked the court’s diary and it is also not possible to find a 20-day timeslot to accommodate the civil trial before the commencement of the criminal trial on 16 September 2019. In other words, once the trial dates are re-fixed, the trial would take place at a time after March 2020, probably a long time after the 1st quarter of 2020. The delay caused by the re-fixing is substantial. 17.Having considered the matter anxiously, I reluctantly come to the conclusion that the trial dates in these proceedings should be re-fixed, but the 2nddefendant has to pay the costs of and occasioned by the summons, including the costs thrown away by the adjournment of the trial, on an indemnity basis forthwith. I would direct that the trial be re-fixed with 20 days reserved and the earliest available dates be given, in consultation with counsel’s diary. 18.The Civil Trial Dates are milestone dates and may not be varied unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the variation[3]. In my view, the fact that the 2nd defendant would not be able to attend the civil trial if the Civil Trial Dates remain unchanged constitutes exceptional circumstances justifying the variation of the trial dates. 19.The court has the duty to ensure that all the parties in these proceedings have a fair trial [4]. A fair trial means, inter alia, that each party would have the opportunity to attend the trial and to participate in the trial process, including to give evidence as a witness in the trial [5]. The 2nddefendant now intends to defend herself in person in the civil trial. The 2nddefendant has the right to do so. Even if the 2nddefendant is legally represented in the trial, the 2nd defendant still has the right to attend the trial in person to observe the trial process. Further, the 2nddefendant herself is a factual witness in the trial. She has the right to attend the trial to give evidence in support of her case. The court cannot deprive the 2nddefendant of these rights. In these circumstances, there is no other alternative and the trial dates in these proceedings have to be re-fixed. 20.As said in the above, I am of the view that the 2nd defendant herself is the author of this difficult situation. To show the court’s disapproval of her conduct, I am of the view that the 2nd defendant must pay the costs of and occasioned by the summons, including all costs thrown away, to the plaintiffs forthwith on an indemnity basis. Those costs are to be summarily assessed on paper. Disposition 21.For the reasons above, I make the following order on the summons:
22.I further direct that the plaintiffs do lodge a bill of costs for summary assessment with the court and provide the same to the 2nddefendant within 7 days, and the 2nddefendant do provide a written reply to that bill to the court and to the plaintiffs within 7 days thereafter. 23.Lastly, it remains for me to thank counsel for the assistance rendered to the court.
Ms Eva Sit, instructed by Hogan Lovells, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs Ms Sharon HW Chan, instructed by Chong & Partners LLP, limited instructions to act for the 2nd defendant in relation to the summons only The 2nd defendant appeared in person (for the case management conference) [1] Re China Metal Recycling (Holdings) Ltd (No 3) [2015] 2 HKLRD 415 [2] 2nd defendant’s 5th affirmation, §11 [3] Rules of the High Court, Order 25, rule 1B(2) and (3); Practice Directions 5.2 §42 [4] Hong Kong Bill of Rights, Article 10 [5] Yu Cho Lam v Commissioner of Police & ors CACV 180/2014 (17 February 2015), [9] – [10] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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