Wellcity Development Ltd and Others v. Mak Chun Fu and Others
Read the full judgment text of LDCS 22000/2014 on BabelCite. This LDCS judgment was delivered on 28 April 2017.
1. This is an application for compulsory sale of all the undivided shares of and in the Remaining Portion of Sub-section 3 of Section M of Kowloon Marine Lot No 28 (“the Lot”), together with the building erected thereon known as Hoi Hing Building, Nos 2-16, 2A-16A Kok Cheung Street, Nos 35-47 Li Tak Street and Nos 32-44 Fuk Chak Street, Kowloon (“the Building”) for the purposes of redevelopment under the Land (Compulsory Sale for Redevelopment) Ordinance, Cap 545 (“the Ordinance”).
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LDCS 22000/2014 IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION LAND COMPULSORY SALE MAIN APPLICATION NO 22000 OF 2014 ___________________
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________________ J U D G M E N T ________________ Background 1.This is an application for compulsory sale of all the undivided shares of and in the Remaining Portion of Sub-section 3 of Section M of Kowloon Marine Lot No 28 (“the Lot”), together with the building erected thereon known as Hoi Hing Building, Nos 2-16, 2A-16A Kok Cheung Street, Nos 35-47 Li Tak Street and Nos 32-44 Fuk Chak Street, Kowloon (“the Building”) for the purposes of redevelopment under the Land (Compulsory Sale for Redevelopment) Ordinance, Cap 545 (“the Ordinance”). 2.The 9-storey Building is served by 7 common staircases. An occupation permit No K290/64 dated 22 June 1964 was issued for the Building granting permission for 20 shops on ground floor, and an aggregate of 238 domestic units comprising 30 domestic units for each of the 1st floor to 7th floor and 28 domestic units for the 8th floor. After the issue of the occupation permit, 4 of the 238 domestic units had been sub-divided into 2 or 3 sub-units[1]. At the time of the application to the Tribunal[2], the Building was 50 years old. It is now over 52 years of age. 3.The Lot together with the Building was allocated 278 undivided shares. Each of the 20 shop units on the ground floor was given either 1 or 2 undivided share(s), making up a sub-total of 32 undivided shares. Each of the 238 domestic units on the upper floors was assigned 1 undivided share, making up a sub-total of 238 undivided shares. The then developer of the Building had disposed of all these 270 undivided shares together with the domestic units and shops of the Building. However, 8 undivided shares had been reserved and had remained undisposed of until its dissolution. After the commencement of the proceedings herein and on 4 September 2015, the 1st applicant acquired from the Government these 8 undivided shares which were vested in it as bona vacantia. 4.The applicants filed the Notice of Application (“the NOA”) on 28 November 2014. It was subsequently amended on 3 November 2015 pursuant to the Tribunal’s order made on the day before. At the time of filing of the NOA, the applicants owned 253⅔ out of the total of 278 undivided shares (i.e. 91.24%), i.e. more than the threshold of 80% undivided shares of the Lot required for building aged 50 years or older[3]. Respondents Remaining 5.At the time of Application, there were 15 respondents. The applicants have subsequently discontinued the proceedings against the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th respondents following the acquisition of their respective units and undivided shares in the Building. An amended NOA was filed to reflect the situation. At the time of filing of the amended NOA, the applicants owned 275 out of the total 278 undivided shares (i.e. 98.92%) of the Lot. At the time of trial, there are only 3 respondents whose domestic units have not yet been acquired by the applicants. 6.The following are the 3 remaining respondents whose respective units have not yet been acquired: -
7.Both R5 and R7(2) are missing owners. 8.The ownership of R7’s unit requires elaboration. According to the recital of the first assignment of the R7’s unit, originally, one Mr Lam Man Sang (“Lam MS, deceased”) purchased R7’s unit from the developer. A sale and purchase agreement was signed in 1962. However, Lam MS, deceased passed away in 1964 without fully paid up the purchase price[4]. He, however, left a will and one Madam Lam Woo Shui (“Widow, deceased”) and one Mr Lam Chak Chun (“Lam CC, deceased”) were appointed executors and trustees of his will. 9.The R7’s unit was subsequently assigned by the developer upon full payment to the Widow, deceased (17,900/27,900) and the said 2 trustees and executors as a group (10,000/27,900) as tenant in common[5]. The Widow, deceased passed away on 26 October 1981. Probate of her will was granted to Lam CC, deceased. Pursuant to her will, all her properties were bequeathed to her son Lam Pang Fi, i.e. R7(1). An assent of the Widow’s interest in R7’s unit (i.e. 17,900/27,900) in favour of R7(1) was executed by Lam CC, deceased on 4 July 1984. The said Lam CC, deceased also assigned to R7(1) 2/5 of 10,000/27,900 (i.e. 4,000/27,900) of R7’s unit which he derived from the estate of Lam MS, deceased[6]. R7(1) therefore became the registered owner of 21,900/27,900 (i.e. 78.495%) of the entire interest of and in R7’s unit. 10.Lam CC, deceased passed away on 19 December 1996[7]. The remaining 6,000/27,900 (21.505%) interest in R7’s unit which he held as executor and trustee for the estate of Lam MS, deceased had not yet been administered. R7(1) has instructed Zebra Kwan & Partners to apply for a fresh grant in respect of estate of Lam MS, deceased in his favour[8]. So far no probate has ever been granted. The undisposed undivided share in respect of R7’s unit remains the unadministered estate of Lam MS, deceased. The applicants therefore amended the title of R7 by substituting the estate of Lam CC, deceased with R7(2). 11.Pursuant to the Tribunal’s Order made on 25 November 2015, substituted service of the amended application on R5 and R7(2) was effected by publication of the requisite notices on newspapers on 14 December 2015. No one purporting to represent R5 and R7(2) had ever shown up within the 21-day period specified in the notices. Neither was there any application made to appoint someone represent R7(2). By the same Order, service of the subsequent documents in these proceedings on R5 and R7(2) has been dispensed with. 12.Only R2 and R7(1) entered appearance in the Application. Issues for Determination by the Tribunal 13.Despite orders granting leave to R7(1) to file Notice of Opposition and evidence out of time, he filed no Notice of Opposition to oppose the Application. He, however, attended some of the call-overs and the trial. He was allowed to make oral submission at trial. He also lodged a written closing submission. 14.After hearing R7(1) and reading his submission, it is fair to say that he does not oppose an order for sale to be made under the Ordinance for redevelopment of the Lot and the Building. He only disagrees with the applicants’ offers made to him. So far as can be discerned from his oral submission and written submission dated 31 October 2016, he is willing to accept a sum of $7,043,439 for sale of his interest to the applicants, which he said should be based on gross floor area instead of saleable area. It appears that he would like to be paid for the entire unit. The applicants consider it too high for his 78.5% interest in R7’s unit. 15.R2 is the only respondent who has filed a Notice of Opposition[9] and evidence in support[10]. He also appointed a surveyor Ms Sat Wei Ling (“Ms Sat”) of Memfus Wong Surveyors Limited to prepare expert opinion on valuation. At trial, he also testified in the witness box. It is his unchallenged evidence that since the start of the applicants’ purchase of units in the Building in or about 2012 for redevelopment purpose, he and his family had moved out of the R2’s unit, which has since been left vacant. 16.R2’s appointed expert Ms Sat assessed the redevelopment value (“RDV”) of the Lot at $1,689 million[11] which was accepted by the applicants for the purpose of the proceedings (“agreed RDV”) at trial. Ms Sat did not do any valuation of each unit of the Building taking into no account of redevelopment as required under Schedule 1 Part 1 of the Ordinance (normally referred to as the existing use value “EUV”). However, she agreed to accept 0.31% as R2’s share in the RDV, based on the EUV initially prepared by the applicants’ expert Ms Dorothy Chow (“Ms Chow”) of Jones Lang LaSalle Limited. The said percentage was revised to 0.307% when Ms Chow updated her EUV assessment. At trial, R2 did not challenge the agreed RDV[12] and the adoption of the updated EUV ratio of 0.307% as his share arrived at by the valuation experts for the purpose of the Ordinance. Accordingly, his share of interest in the RDV is only $5,185,230. However, he refused to accept the same being his fair and entitled share because he considered the Ordinance unconstitutional. He rejected 2 of the applicants’ offers which exceeded the amounts based on his own valuations[13]. 17.R2’s challenges, so far as can be discerned from his witness statements and his various submissions, can be summarized into the following broad grounds: -
18.Apart from the above issues raised by R2, the Tribunal is also required to determine the following issues under the Ordinance: -
Section 3 – Whether the Conditions for Making An Application Under S.3 of the Ordinance Are Satisfied by the Applicants 19.Section 3(1) of the Ordinance requires an applicant to have not less than 90% of the undivided shares in a lot before it can make an application. As said above the Building was 50 years’ old when the Application was taken out. The applicable application threshold is 80%[16]. We are satisfied that as at the date of application, the applicants had already owned more than 80% of the undivided shares in the Lot. The Application was also accompanied by a valuation report prepared by Ms Chow assessing the EUV of each and every units of the Building on vacant possession basis without taking into account of the redevelopment potential of the Lot as at 19 September 2014, which was within 3 months of the Application on 28 November 2014. 20.Further, this Tribunal accepts:
21.We agree that the applicants were entitled to make the application under section 3(1) of the Ordinance. Whether the Ordinance Contravenes the Basic Law 22.Articles 6 (“BL6”) and 105 (“BL105”) of the Basic Law stipulate:
23.Whether the Ordinance is BL6 and BL105 compliant has been discussed, though briefly, at least twice by our higher courts, one by The Court of Final Appeal (“CFA”) in Sin Ho Yuen v Fineway Properties Ltd[22], and the other by the Court of Appeal (“CA”) in Good Faith Properties Ltd v Cibean Development Ltd[23]. In fact prior to Sin Ho Yuen there was the case of Capital Well Ltd v Bond Star Development Ltd[24] which was the first appeal relating to application under the Ordinance to be considered by the CFA. Although Capital Well is not directly on whether it was Basic Law compliant, the overview of the statutory scheme of the Ordinance by Hon Ribeiro PJ sheds light on whether the Ordinance would have offended the Basic Law. 24.In Capital Well, the minority owner raised arguments which were unrelated to Basic Law. Ribeiro PJ dissected the statutory scheme of the Ordinance into 4 distinct phases, namely, (i) the application; (ii) the Tribunal’s determination; (iii) the sale; and (iv) the apportionment and application of the proceeds of sale[25]. His Lordship then set out the ingredients for each phrase and justified the same by reference to the objectives of the Ordinance. In [21] of Capital Well his Lordship has this to say:
25.Implicit in the said decision is that the CFA did not consider private property rights absolute. His Lordship considered the Ordinance was doing a balancing exercise weighing private property right of a minority against that of the majority to redevelop his own property. A balance is struck when the minority was paid, in exchange for his land, a compensation that is fair and reasonable, subject to statutory criteria set out in the Ordinance being satisfied. Had the CFA considered the Ordinance Basic Law non-compliant, it would not have considered payment of fair and reasonable compensation a solution. It is therefore apparent from Capital Well that private property right not absolute. It may, for the purpose of facilitating urban renewal and upon payment of fair and reasonable compensation, be overridden in accordance with criteria set out in the Ordinance. 26.Sin Ho Yuen concerned a case in which the majority owner, after having agreed with the only minority owner on the reserve price for the auction, succeeded before the Tribunal to have it re-opened after the property market was hard hit by the financial tsunami in or about 2008. The Tribunal subsequently adjusted the reserve price downward by over 40%. Further, the Tribunal ordered the minority owner to bear 90% of the majority owner’s costs. The lot was subsequently sold at the lower price before the CA considered the Tribunal’s decision to re-open the agreed reserve price wrong. However, the CA took the view it had no jurisdiction to order the majority owner to pay the shortfall and in this respect, granted the minority owner leave to appeal to the CFA. The matter was settled on the day fixed for hearing by the CFA. One issue which attracted the CFA’s attention was the adverse costs order made by the Tribunal against the minority. It was because if the said order was to be enforced, the compensation would be substantially eroded, leaving much less, if any, for the minority whose property had been compulsorily acquired. 27.The learned Bokhary PJ shared the aforesaid view expressed by Ribeiro PJ in Capital Well, and considered that the objective of the Ordinance would be defeated if the compensation received by the minority owner under the Ordinance would be swallowed up or materially eroded by an adverse costs order against it. 28.Hon Litton PJ stated in [25] of Sin Ho Yuen the following:
29.Obviously, BL6 and BL105 were in the mind of His Lordship. It is apparent from the above that the Tribunal plays an important role in properly carrying out the statutory scheme of the Ordinance which contained provisions for protection of the entrenched private property rights under BL6 and BL105. 30.Accordingly, the CFA does not consider the Ordinance unconstitutional. It is the Tribunal’s judgment that the CFA takes the view that the Ordinance, with its provisions properly carried out and resolute steps taken to ensure statutory requirements being satisfied, is able to afford sufficient protections to individual’s rights protected under BL6 and BL105. 31.In Good Faith, the CA was dealing with whether or not the compensation approach should be adopted in awarding costs for applications under the Ordinance. Lam VP, after discussing the four phases of the Ordinance by Ribeiro PJ in Capital Well, went on to examine the statutory scheme of the Ordinance, and said at [11]:
32.The learned VP was of the view that the Ordinance provides a two-tier safeguards of the Basic Law guaranteed private property rights from being unreasonably interfered with. The first level is by imposing application threshold and justifications before the minority’s right of private ownership can be overridden. The second level is to ensure that the minority would be getting a fair share as determined by the Tribunal if the statutory criteria for overriding private property rights are met. His Lordship went on to discuss in details the statutory scheme in the Ordinance as regards the first level of protection[27]. Regarding the protection on the second level, His Lordship shared the views expressed by Bokhary PJ and Litton NPJ in Sin Ho Yuen in that the minority should be paid fair and reasonable compensation if the private ownership rights are to be overridden[28]. He concluded the compensation approach on costs part and parcel of the protection against interference of constitutional right of private ownership[29]. 33.In coming to his aforesaid conclusion on costs, it is apparent that His Lordship has BL6 and BL105 in mind: see [33] of Good Faith. His Lordship does not consider the Ordinance Basic Law non-compliant. Instead, His Lordship confirmed that the Ordinance provides a proportionate and workable compromise for interference of private right of ownership. In [42] the learned VP has this to say:
34.It is also noted that the learned VP has a brief analysis of the compensation payable under the Government resumption regime and the private sector scheme under the Ordinance. His Lordship came to the view that although the Government’s/authorities’ scheme may sometime result in lesser compensation, the learned VP considered basically the principle of equivalence is the proper yardstick for the fair and reasonable compensation under the Ordinance. In [24] and [33] of Good Faith, the learned VP stated:
35.The above authorities are binding on this Tribunal. In so far as R2 contends that BL6 and BL105 are absolute, it is our decision that:
36.In the course of hearing it appears R2 derives support from Hysan to contend that the Ordinance offends BL6 and BL105. 37.Hysan concerned challenges by developers against the decision of the TPB which imposed a series of planning restrictions including building height restrictions contained in 2 draft Outline Zoning Plans (“OZP”) after they have acquired their lands. The developers contended the restrictions represented a disproportionate and therefore unconstitutional infringement of their property rights in contravention of BL6 and BL105. Though the decisions of the TPB were quashed on various administrative law grounds, the developers appealed to the CFA for guidance as to the relevance and application of BL6 and BL105 when the TPB reconsidered its decision. 38.The CFA ruled that constitutional rights such as those provided under BL6 and BL105 are engaged when the TPB imposed restrictions. Hon Ribeiro PJ stated that for those constitutionally guaranteed rights that are absolute, such as prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, there would be no room for employing the proportionality test to determine whether the restrictions imposed are reasonable. His Lordship, however, considered private property rights not absolute, and the proportionality test should be applied to test whether the restrictions are reasonably necessary for the pursuit of a legitimate societal aim. This provides a short answer to R2’s contention, if he is really serious, that BL6 and BL105 are absolute. They are not. 39.Hysan is the authority that if certain constitutionally protected rights are restricted (in the present case the private property rights limited by the Ordinance), the restrictions should be subject to a 4-stage proportionality inquiry. However, as stated in [22] to [35] above, the higher courts have on at least 3 occasions reviewed the Ordinance, and with BL6 and BL105 in mind on at least 2 occasions. They do not find the Ordinance Basic Law non-compliant. It will therefore be unnecessary for this Tribunal to subject the Ordinance to the proportionality analysis with a view to finding out whether it survives the test. In the Tribunal’s judgment, it does survive the test. The Alleged Bill of Rights Issues 40.Article 39 of the Basic Law (BL39”) provides:
41.Articles 14 and 22 (“HKBOR14” and “HKBOR22” respectively) of The Hong Kong Bill of Rights (“HKBOR”) under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 stipulate that:
42.R2’s argument, so far as can be discerned from his evidence and submission[30], boils down to this. Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (歐洲人權公約) are the same as our HKBOR22 and is guaranteed by BL39. His case is that an owner whose property is being compulsorily acquired, no matter by whom, should be paid the same level of compensation. His unit, if acquired by the Government or the URA, would fetch a compensation paid according to a 7-year-old unit of similar size in the same or similar district, plus removal allowance (“the 7-year formula”). According to his estimate, the URA would compensate him at the rate of about $16,000/sq ft[31]. However, he was only offered $10,896/sq ft[32] by the applicants. Even according to the Ordinance as calculated by his expert, it is only $11,023/sq ft[33], and is far less than that offered by the URA. He said he was subject to unfair treatment, which violates HKBOR22. Since the Ordinance facilitates developers, and in the present case the applicants, snatching minority’s property arbitrarily, the Ordinance offends HKBOR14. 43.It is this Tribunal’s decision that private ownership rights guaranteed under the Basic Law is not absolute and can be overridden provided certain statutory requirements under the Ordinance can be satisfied. If the applicants are able to satisfy all these requirements, which will be dealt with below, it cannot be said that the applicants’ application herein is arbitrary, or unlawful. 44.As regards the 7-year formula, R2 has adduced no evidence to show how it comes about nor its rationale. Neither has he adduced evidence, expert or otherwise, on how he arrives at the figure of $16,000/sq ft. 45.URA is a statutory body established pursuant to the Urban Renewal Authority Ordinance, Cap 563 (“URAO”) for urban renewal and connected purposes. This Tribunal believes it is not in dispute the 7-year formula is adopted by the URA when old and dilapidated properties are being resumed for urban renewal purpose. It comprises the market value of the property to be resumed plus an ex-gratia allowance the aggregate of which is generally good enough for the affected owner-occupier to acquire a property of about 7 years old of similar size in the same or nearby district. Removal allowance is also payable. For owners not living in the affected flat the ex-gratia payment will be less. It is generally considered that the compensation is more favorable than that payable under the statutory scheme under the Land Resumption Ordinance, Cap 124 (“LRO”) which prescribes that the compensation is only restricted to value of the land resumed. Since usually dilapidated properties are resumed, it is apparent that very often, even with redevelopment potential already factored into the statutory compensation, such compensation will be insufficient for the owner to acquire properties of comparable size in the same district. The formula therefore provides a very good incentive to owner-occupiers to sell their properties to the URA, thus facilitating the acquisition process. It is only when the URA is unsuccessful in its acquisition that it would request the Government to invoke the LRO to resume the land. Accordingly, the 7-year formula is not statutory compensation based on any principle but a policy. 46.Although the schemes under the Ordinance and the LRO are two different statutory schemes, they share the same purpose, namely, to provide fair compensation for a party whose land has been compulsorily taken from him. This is called the principle of equivalence: see Director of Buildings and Lands v Shun Fung Ironworks Ltd[34]. In the CFA decision of Director of Lands v Yin Shuen Enterprises Ltd & Another[35], Lord Millett, NPJ, relied on the often-cited passage by Lord Nicholls in Shun Fung Ironworks as follows:
47.Implicit in R2’s submission is that the compensation provided under the Ordinance is unfair, e.g. it is less than what would have been offered under the 7-year formula and the compensation insufficient for him to buy a property of similar size. However, he has not elucidated the proper legal basis on which a minority should be compensated. As can be seen in [34] above, the Tribunal is of the view that as a matter of fairness, the principle of equivalence should be the compensation yardstick applicable to the Ordinance. Further, as will be elaborated below, it is what is now being protected under the Basic Law. 48.R2 said that the compensation offered (or even calculated in accordance with the Ordinance) is insufficient for him to acquire a property of similar size in the same locality. According to him, the recently completed real estate development in the locality costs about $16,000 to $24,000/sq ft whereas that for those of about 10 years old was about $16,000/sq ft[37]. 49.BL105 provides that compensation, if private property is resumed by the Government, should be equivalent to the “real value (實際價值)”. What is meant by “real value” has been discussed in [56] of Yin Shuen. It was held by Lord Millett, NPJ that in general the “open market value” of a property is the “real value” of the property. There is no reason to suggest that BL6 provides a protection more than the “real value” when the property is acquired. The principle of equivalence is applicable. It is entirely a matter of valuation and in turn it depends on the redevelopment potential of the lots to be acquired. In the Tribunal’s judgment, there is simply no logical basis to suggest that a residential unit of 50 odd years old, such as R2’s Unit which is due for redevelopment, should be equivalent in value to a brand new or a 7-year or 10-year old unit of similar size in the same district. In the Tribunal’s judgment, the affected owner is asking for something which is over and above that provided by the principle of equivalence. This is outside the concept of fair compensation which means compensation for fair and full loss[38]. The fact that some other body (the URA as contended by R2) is willing to pay more in similar situation will not render the original compensation scheme under the Ordinance unfair or unconstitutional. It is akin to a situation when someone is prepared to pay a speculative premium, or an incentive ex-gratia exceeding the value of the property with a view to achieving an expedited purchase. The price without such premium or ex-gratia remains the true value of the property. So it may well be true that R2 will receive less under the Ordinance than had his unit be resumed by the URA using the 7-year formula. It is not unfair. He is simply not getting more. 50.The Tribunal understands, and to a certain extent shares, the sentiment expressed by R2. It is because developers will be able, with the aid of the Ordinance, to turn dilapidated units and run-down buildings for which they only pay a relatively modest price, to luxurious and high class apartments for which they reap substantial profits. That, however, is not the same as implicating the scheme under the Ordinance being unfair and unconstitutional. One should not forget it takes years for one to accumulate sufficient percentage of undivided shares of a lot beyond the statutory threshold. Meantime, substantial capital needs be locked up and interest paid out, not to mention that the developer will be subject to the volatility of the property market over this long period of time. The developer then has to go through the statutory process prescribed under the Ordinance and satisfy all other criteria. Further capital needs be injected to materialize the redevelopment. The Tribunal believes that if there is real optimism in the real estate market, it will be reflected in the RDV and thus the reserve price for the auction, and the minorities will be able to enjoy his fair share in the end. As can be seen in a recent case[39], developers other than the original applicants will be willing to compete for the land, thus bidding up the final price well beyond that fixed by the Tribunal. The statutory scheme therefore provides a safeguard that the purchase price ultimately paid for the property acquired is the “real value” constitutionally protected. 51.In R2’s closing submission, R2 particularly relied on 2 cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights, namely
52.Briefly, Pine Valley concerned an applicant who bought a piece of land relying on an outline planning permission for industrial warehouse and office development on the site granted prior to the purchase. The permission was recorded in a public register. Permissions similarly granted by the relevant authority were later found to be ultra vires. A piece of legislation was passed with a view to validating prior permissions. However, it was decided by the Supreme Court of Ireland that the retrospective effect of the statute did not cover the ultra vires permission already granted to applicants in Pine Valley. The European Court decided that since the remedial action taken by the Irish Government benefited all holders of permissions except the applicants, 2 of the 3 applicants[40] were victims of discrimination contrary to Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No.1 (“P1-1”) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“Convention”), which read as follows:
53.The aforesaid Articles of the European Convention are similar in scope to our HKBOR14 and HKBOR22. Apparently, Pine Valley adds nothing more to our above analysis. The present case is not a case where R2 gets nothing under the statutory scheme of the Ordinance. Neither is it a case where he gets less under the Ordinance than under other statutory scheme. It may perhaps be a case where R2 gets no ex-gratia because the redevelopment is not URA initiated. We have already dealt with the argument above. We do not consider Pine Valley can help R2’s case. 54.Hentrich concerned a case where the subject matter of a land purchase by the applicant was compulsorily acquired by the relevant local authority by its exercise of a right of pre-emption under the relevant French law. It was a right said to be exercised for regulating, and raising moral standards in the property market and preventing tax evasion when the French Government considered the transaction price under-value[43]. Pursuant to that right, the pre-emption price would be 10% more than the contractual price. It was the applicant’s case that the exercise of the pre-emption right amounted to, inter alia, an unjustified interference with her right of property, in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No.1 (i.e. P1-1) and discriminatory treatment, contrary to Article 14 of the Convention[44]. 55.The European Court considered, inter alia, that there has been a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No.1 (i.e. P1-1). It is considered that the domestic law of pre-emption operated arbitrarily and selectively and was scarcely foreseeable, and basic procedural safeguards were insufficient. It was also said that the pre-emption decision cannot be legitimate in the absence of adversarial proceedings that comply with the principle of equality of arms, enabling argument to be presented in response to the Revenue’s allegation of underestimation – all elements were lacking in Hentrich. 56.Further, the French courts interpreted the said pre-emption law as allowing the French Government to avail itself of the said right without having to indicate the reasons of facts and law for its decision. The European Court also considered there were also other means to tackle tax evasion problems, such as taking proceedings to recover unpaid tax, and/or imposing tax fine. The proportionality test is not satisfied and the pre-emption law was considered arbitrary interference of one’s property right. 57.In [45] of Hentrich, it was stated that:
58.Hentrich is no more than stating the same principles in Hysan concerning proportionality. As stated above, the higher courts have already on several occasions decided that the Ordinance does not offend the Basic Law, this Tribunal does not consider Hentrich adds anything further to the Tribunal’s discussion or affects our decision above. The Applicant’s Offer Does Not Cover Costs, etc. 59.In Good Faith, the CA has decided that the compensation approach on costs should be adopted for cases under the Ordinance. Accordingly, all costs reasonably incurred by the minority owners in opposing the application for a sale order of all undivided shares in the lot, even though the opposition is unsuccessful, should be borne by the applicants unless there are “special reasons” which are subject to stringent scrutiny by the Tribunal. R2’s costs in engaging Ms Sat and lawyers are, prima facie, reasonable costs in the proceedings. It will be up to the applicants to argue there exists “special reason” to justify a departure from the usual costs order. 60.It is noted that in all the written offers of the applicants[45], nothing has been mentioned about the litigation costs herein. What have been said was that the stamp duty would be paid by A1, and each parties do bear its own costs of the conveyance. Accordingly, the costs incurred in the proceedings have not yet been discussed by the parties. This Tribunal is not sure whether there has been without prejudice letters exchanged on the conduct and costs of the proceedings once the applicants’ offer was accepted. On the face of the evidence it would be unfair to suggest the applicants have rejected to pay R2’s costs incurred in the proceedings. The Costs of Acquiring a New Property 61.In his closing submission, R2 appears to complain that apart from getting insufficient compensation from the applicants, he would also be forced to move to another place and thus incurring substantial expenses on, inter alia, removal and stamp duty if he re-purchases another landed property. It is true that other minority owner (but not R2 who moved out in or about 2012) might have such problem. However, as a matter of principle, what R2 was asserting did not appear to sit in well with the compensation principles. In the English Court of Appeal decision of Horn v Sunderland Corporation[46], the English CA then faced with a claim for business disturbance on the top of value for land compulsorily acquired. The land in question was a farm land for horse-breeding and was to be compulsorily acquired for housing purpose. Put very briefly, the question before the English CA was whether the claimant was entitled to both the value of land based on housing land user plus disturbance for his horse-breeding business. The gist of the decision is that (by a majority of 2:1 with Goddard LJ dissenting) since the value of the land as building land could only be realized by the removal of the business with the land sold on vacant possession basis, compensation for the disturbance could not be awarded if the claimant was to be compensated on the basis of housing land with its full potential unlocked. At p.486 Sir Wilfrid Greene MR had this to say:
62.In fact, Scott LJ expressed similarly on p.491:
63.Under the statutory regime of the Ordinance, if the Tribunal considers all the statutory criteria laid down in the Ordinance satisfied, it will direct a sale of all the undivided shares subject to a reserve price (if by auction) which will be fixed taking into account of the redevelopment potential of the lots. In other words, with a view to realizing the full redevelopment potential of the land so as to achieve the highest price obtainable in the market for benefit of all owners, the lot in question must be sold, and on vacant possession basis. All owners need be moving out and the building demolished for redevelopment in order that the full potential can be achieved. It is a price that an owner needs to pay in order to realize the redevelopment of the land. The costs as well as attributes for realizing that potential must have already been factored into the sale price. Once the value of the land with the redevelopment potential realized has been converted into a sum of money represented by the sale proceeds, the compensation process has completed. It will be up to minority owner whether to purchase another premises, or invest into other ventures. Anything on the top of the sale proceeds to take care of costs of any post-sale acquisition will be more than what should be required of under the principle of equivalence. Whether Development of the Lot is Justified Due to “Age” and/or “State of Repair” of the Building 64.In determining the application, section 4(2) of the Ordinance empowers the tribunal to make an order for sale if it is satisfied that: -
65.For the age and state of repair requirements, the applicants adduced expert evidence of Mr Wong Chi Ming (“Mr CM Wong”), a structural engineer and Mr Wong Wing Cheung Dennis (“Mr Dennis Wong”), a building surveyor. None of the respondents had adduced any expert evidence in this connection. 66.Mr CM Wong conducted a structural assessment and prepared one report dated 12 February 2016. He had identified the following defects in the Building: -
67.Mr CM Wong concluded that the structural elements of the Building were in a poor condition. He considered that corrosion of the reinforcement bars has been initiated and is likely to have entered the propagation phase. Given that cracks, spalling and corroded steel bars are indications that this process has already begun, he anticipated that more defects would develop and therefore extensive maintenance and repair works would be required in the near future. 68.In addition, since the conditions in respect of the durability of the structural elements are inferior to the requirements stipulated in the current standards, Mr CM Wong considered that the design life of the Building should be shorter than the design life of 50 years as stated in the code, and as the Building was 51 years old when he prepared the report, he was of the view that the Building had passed the end of its design life. On the other hand, since ductility and robustness were not considered in those days when the Building was designed, he reckoned that the structure of the Building cannot meet the current safety standards too. 69.Mr Dennis Wong prepared one condition survey report dated 11 February 2016. In terms of age of the Building, he found the following deficiencies: -
70.In respect of the state of repair of the Building, Mr Dennis Wong made the following comments: -
71.Based on his aforesaid findings, Mr Dennis Wong concluded that the age and the state of repair of the Building, each on its own, justifies redevelopment of the Building: -
72.Mr Dennis Wong assessed the costs of essential repairs at $167,496,783 (i.e. about $12,472.99/m2; including the repair costs for the structural frames in the sum of $1,955,360 as estimated by Mr CM Wong), which was about 62.41% of the unit costs for the construction of a new building (around $19,985.16/m2) and was disproportionately high. Mr Dennis Wong also concluded that even after the essential repair works has been implemented, the Building would remain an old building with its design and construction outdated and below market expectations and constitute a continuing repair liability to the owners. 73.The two experts called on this topic were not cross-examined by R7(1). R2 had put questions to both experts and suggested that the Building was structurally safe and would remain in reasonable condition with proper repair work, and therefore there is no need for redevelopment. In reply Mr CM Wong clarified that the structural condition of the Building was poor and but not structurally unsafe with immediate danger of collapse. Mr Dennis Wong also clarified that he had not recommended demolition of the Building because it was structurally unsafe. 74.Ms Lan, counsel for the applicants, submitted that the objective of the Ordinance is to facilitate urban renewal in respect of old and dilapidated buildings. It does not apply only to buildings which pose danger and risk to public safety as contended by R2. It is her submission that insofar as the condition of the development is concerned under the Ordinance, the focus is on the lack of repair. We agree. 75.Having considered the evidence Mr CM Wong and Mr Dennis Wong, we are of the view their reports are reliable and acceptable. The reports also show an accurate description of the conditions and state of repair (or disrepair) of the Building. Neither R2 nor R7(1) have put in any expert evidence to challenge their opinions. Their evidence remained unshaken under cross-examination. We are satisfied that redevelopment of the Building is justified due to its poor state of repair and the disproportionate costs of repair and maintenance. Although regular repair could extend the life of the Building, such repair costs will increase with time. Further, we believe that such maintenance can only bring about a modest improvement to the existing condition, and the Building would remain a sub-standard one given the modern standards as expressed by the experts. We are also satisfied that redevelopment of the Building is justified due to the age of the Building. This 52-year old building is in a poor condition and has in fact come to the end of its designed working life. Its design has become obsolete over time in many aspects both physically and functionally and has failed to conform to modern standards and requirements in many material respects. Determination of the EUV of all Units in the Building 76.As stated above, the NOA was accompanied by a valuation report dated 21 November 2014 (“Application Report”) prepared by Ms Chow containing assessments of EUV of all units of the Building as at 19 September 2014. The report was prepared no earlier than 3 months before the filing of the NOA in accordance with section 3 of the Ordinance. 77.Under section 4(1)(a)(i) of the Ordinance, if there is a dispute between the parties on the EUV of the units in the Building on the Lot, the Tribunal has to determine the values. Section 4(1)(a)(ii) further provides that, in the case of any minority owner of the Lot who cannot be found, the majority owner of the Lot is required to satisfy the tribunal that the value of the minority owner’s property as assessed in the application is: -
78.R2 had filed valuation reports prepared by Ms Sat, but she did not include in any of her reports the EUV of individual unit and shops of the Building. Ms Sat had just said that she had valued each unit of the Building by direct comparison method, but no details were provided. She also commented that although she did not agree with some of the adjustments and selected comparables chosen by Ms Chow, she had no dispute on the pro-rata EUV for R2’s unit at 0.31% in the Application Report. In the 1st Joint Statement of Experts dated 8 April 2016, Ms Chow agreed with Ms Sat for settlement purposes the apportionment of EUV for R2’s unit at 0.31%. However, Ms Chow had since then revised her EUV valuation in her supplemental valuation report dated 29 February 2016 (“Supplemental Report”) that the apportioned EUV percentage for R2’s unit is only 0.307%. 79.We consider that the settlement agreement on the apportionment of EUV between the experts, which as a matter of fact will have an impact on interests of other respondents, does not bind the Tribunal, particularly in light of s.4(1)(a)(ii) of the Ordinance when there is missing owner. Further, Ms Sat had never provided proper evidence of her EUV assessment for the Tribunal’s consideration. At trial, she did not dispute the applicants’ EUV assessments as contained in both the Application Report and the Supplemental Report. 80.R7(1) had neither filed any expert evidence in this regard nor had suggested any EUV in opposition, although he claimed that the assessment of the R7’s unit should be based on gross floor area as opposed to saleable area. He put in no evidence to dispute the EUV come up by the applicants. 81.In any event, R5 and R7(2) are missing owners. The Tribunal, before making any order for sale, should satisfy that the value of their respective units as assessed in the application is not less than fair and reasonable and not less than fair and reasonable when compared with the value of the majority owner’s property assessed in the application. 82.In the Application Report, Ms Chow explained her valuation method and the assessment process to arrive at the EUV of each unit in the Building. In undertaking the assessment, Ms Chow adopted the Direct Comparison Method. She firstly identified the reference units for both shop and domestic portions of the Building and compared them with the actual transactions in the market. The remaining shop units and domestic units in the Building were then compared with the respective reference units. 83.Ms Chow updated her EUV assessments in the Supplemental Report. She adopted 1 new domestic comparable, updated the property indices for time adjustment and revised the layout adjustments to 2 shop comparables. Ms Chow finally revised the unit price of the reference domestic unit to $71,600/m² and the unit price of the reference shop unit to $219,600/m², and then updated the EUV of each unit in the Building. 84.We accept the EUV assessed by Ms Chow in the Supplemental Report and are satisfied that the value of the units owned by the respondents are not less than fair and reasonable and not less than fair and reasonable when compared to the value of the applicants’ properties. The EUV of all units in the Building as at the relevant date of valuation, i.e. 19 September 2014, are reproduced below: -
The total EUV of the Building is $1,088,770,000 ($360,630,000 + $728,140,000). The pro-rata EUV of R2’s Unit and R7’s Unit relative to the Building are therefore respectively 0.3068% and 0.3251%. Since R7(1) is only a tenant-in-common having a 78.5% interest in R7’s Unit, he will share according to the same proportion in the overall sale proceed of the Building and the Lot. # R2’s Unit; *R7’s Unit Whether the Applicants Have Taken Reasonable Steps 85.The applicants are under an obligation to take reasonable steps to negotiate on terms that are fair and reasonable for the purchase of all the undivided shares of the Lot under section 4(2)(b) of the Ordinance. 86.Before the commencement of the present proceedings, the applicants made the following offers to R2, R5 and R7 on 13 October 2014 as follows: -
87.Ms Lan submitted that the 1st offers were based on the then valuation and were 5% over the respective proportionate share of the then RDV of the Lot (i.e. $1,321,000,000) as assessed by Ms Chow, but none of the respondents accepted them. 88.After the commencement of the present proceedings, the applicants made the following offers: -
89.Ms Lan submitted that the 2nd offers on 6 March 2015 were 10% over the respective proportionate share of the then RDV of the Lot (i.e. $1,321,000,000) as assessed by Ms Chow. Ms Lan further said that after the order dated 14 December 2015 for substituted service in respect of R5 and the R7(2), neither of them entered any appearance in the Tribunal, and therefore the applicants have subsequently made offers to R2 and R7(1) (i.e. 78.5% of the R7’s unit) only. 90.Ms Lan submitted that the 3rd offers on 31 March 2016 were 20% over the respective proportionate share of the then RDV of the Lot (i.e. $1,356,000,000) as assessed by Ms Chow, and were also higher than the respective shares of the then RDV of the Lot as assessed by Ms Sat at $1,556,000,000. Ms Lan further said that the 4th offers on 1 September 2016 were based on an earlier counter-offer from R7(1) in which he proposed to sell his share of interest in the R7’s unit at a consideration of $12,207/ft² based on an alleged saleable area of 535 ft², and they were higher than the respective share of the then RDV of the Lot as assessed by both Ms Chow at $1,416,000,000 and Ms Sat at $1,689,000,000. 91.In assessing the reasonableness of the offers, there is the following guidance from Ribeiro PJ of CFA in Capital Well at [33] and [36]: -
92.There is no evidence before this Tribunal that Ms Chow’s assessments were faulted. We consider that the applicants’ offers, which were based on professional valuation, do fall within a range of what may broadly be regarded as fair and reasonable. They are even higher than that based on the respondents’ own valuation. We are satisfied that the applicants have taken reasonable steps to acquire all the undivided shares of the Lot including those owned by R2, R5, R7(1) and R7(2). R7(1)’s Argument 93.R7(1) argued that the applicants should have offered compensation based on gross floor area as opposed to saleable area. However, he stated no gross floor area of his unit at trial and only did so in his closing submissions. He said that based on his recollection, the gross floor area of his unit was 590 ft². He also alleged that the saleable area of his unit is 535 ft², but he did not state other than his memory how he arrived at his own figure as opposed to that of 48.25 m² (i.e. about 519 ft²) in Ms Chow’s report. We consider R7(1)’s allegations not supported by proper grounds and evidence. Further, we find no basis to adopt gross floor area in valuation when there is no standard definition of it in the market. It has been an established practice for practitioners using saleable area for comparison. 94.Further, R7(1) is only a co-owner of R7’s unit, we find it reasonable in the circumstances for the applicants to make offers to him on a pro-rata basis, and the amounts offered are also reasonable in the circumstances. Order for Sale 95.We are satisfied that redevelopment of the Lot is justified in terms of age and state of repair of the Building. We are also satisfied that the applicants had taken reasonable steps to acquire all the undivided shares of the Lot and had negotiated for the purchase of the respondents’ shares in their respective units on terms that are fair and reasonable. In the circumstances, we agree that an order for sale should be granted in favour of the applicants. Reserve Price for the Auction 96.Although the latest RDV assessed by Ms Chow was $1,416,000,000, the applicants asked to set the reserve price for auction of the Lot at $1,689,000,000, the RDV as at 12 September 2016 as assessed by Ms Sat and contained in the 2nd Joint Statement of Experts dated 26 September 2016. At trial, Ms Chow confirmed that Ms Sat’s RDV assessment was considered to be within the reasonable range albeit on the upper end. We consider that a higher reserve price for the auction in these proceedings is favourable to the respondents, and in any event appears not unfavourable to them. 97.Mr Sat adopted residual method to assess the RDV of the Lot. Residual method is the assessment of land value by deducting the development costs (including construction costs, professional fees, financial costs and profit, etc.) from the estimated gross development value (“GDV”) of the proposed development, as if completed, as at the date of valuation. 98.Mr Sat opined that the optimum redevelopment on the Lot comprised a commercial/residential composite development with shops on ground and 1st floors, E & M facilities on 2nd floor, club house and recreational facilities on 3rd floor, transfer plate on 4th floor and domestic units on 5th floor to 27th floor (20 floors, without the 13th, 14th and 24th floors). Details of the hypothetical development with the proposed total gross floor area of 16,816 m² (i.e. excluding exempted balconies) and plot ratio of about 9, the GDV assessed (i.e. $359,000/m² saleable area for shops on ground floor, $108,000/m² saleable area for shops on 1st floor and $200,000/m² saleable area for domestic units on upper floors), the development costs adopted (i.e. average $31,617/m² gross floor area) and the residual valuation were set out in the revised residual valuation in the 2nd Joint Statement of Experts. The residual land value was assessed at $1,689,000,000, which is equivalent to an accommodation value of about $100,400/m² gross floor area. 99.Having gone through Ms Sat’s RDV valuation in the 2nd Joint Statement of Experts, we accept that the market value of the Lot reflecting the redevelopment potential on its own, i.e. the RDV of the Lot, as at 12 September 2016 is $1,689,000,000, which should be the reserve price for auction of the Lot. Whether Hysan Would Have an Impact on the RDV 100.R2 contended that Hysanmay affect the RDV of the Lot because it was likely that the TPB, in light of Hysan, may relax certain restrictions such as the height restriction. At trial, Ms Sat confirmed that to the best of her knowledge, it was unlikely that Hysan might have any impact on her RDV assessment at $1,689,000,000. R2 put in no further evidence to suggest how, and if so, to what extent Hysan would impact on the RDV valued by his appointed expert and agreed by the applicants. We cannot help come to the conclusion that it is a mere speculation on the part of R2. We do not consider Hysan having any bearing on the RDV. Order 101.By reason of the above, this Tribunal comes to the following decisions: -
Costs 102.Following Good Faith, we make a costs order nisi that the applicants do pay costs of these proceedings to R2 and R7(1) on High Court scale, to be taxed if not agreed. Unless any of the parties apply by summons to vary, the costs order nisi shall be made absolute upon expiry of 14 days from today.
Ms Gekko LAN, instructed by Zhong Lun Law Firm, for the 1st to 3rd applicants The 2nd respondent appeared in person The 5th respondent was not represented and did not appear The 1st named 7th respondent appeared in person The 2nd named 7th respondent was not represented and did not appear [1] Flat B8 on the 8th Floor was sub-divided into 2 domestic units whereas Flat B1 on the 3rd Floor, Flat B2 on the 8th Floor and Flat C5 on the 8th Floor were each sub-divided into 3 domestic units. [2] The Application was made on 28th November 2014 to the Tribunal (A1/9) [3] Section 3(1) of the Ordinance prescribes that the minimum percentage of undivided shares that an applicant or applicants should possess before making an application under the Ordinance is 90%. Section 3(5) of the Ordinance provides that the Chief Executive in Council may, by notice in the Gazette, specify a lower percentage in respect of a lot belonging to a class of lots specified in that notice. The Land (Compulsory Sale for Redevelopment) (Specification of Lower Percentage) Notice made under section 3(5) of the Ordinance (“the Notice”) was gazetted on 22 January 2010 and tabled at the Legislative Council meeting on 27 January 2010. It came into operation on 1 April 2010. Section 3 of the Notice lowered the threshold for compulsory sale, insofar as it is applicable, from 90% to 80%. Section 4(1)(b) of the Notice specified one of the classes for the purposes of Section 3 being “a lot with each of the building erected on the lot being issued with an occupation permit at least 50 years before the date of the application. Since the occupation permit of the Building was issued on 22 June 1964, i.e. 50 years before the date of application (28 November 2014), the applicable percentage is therefore 80%. [4] According to the recital, Lam MS, deceased only paid up $10,000 out of the full purchase price of HK$27,900 [5] By an assignment dated 18 December 1968 [6] By an assignment dated 20 December 1984 [7] See Death Certificate attached with the applicants’ closing submissions dated 26 October 2016 [8] Zebra Kwan & Partners had once been but ceased to be R7(1)’s solicitors in this Application on or about 10 November 2015 pursuant to an order of the Tribunal made on that date granting leave for their cease acting for him. [9] Bundle A1/33 [10] He filed 2 witness statements, one dated 1 March 2016 (Bundle A2/340) and the other dated 12 September 2016 (Bundle A2/545) [11] It is not in dispute that Ms Sat’s valuation of the RDV is $1,565 million as at 15 February 2016 pursuant to her report of 25 February 2016 (Bundle D3/2590) and revised to $1,556 million as at same date pursuant to her report of 22 March 2016 (Bundle D3/2619). Ms Sat subsequently revised it to $1,689 million as at 12 September 2016 pursuant to her joint statement with Ms Chow dated 26 September 2016 (Bundle D2/2570-6) [12] In [7] of R2’s closing submission dated 31 October 2016 he accepted it was a figure arrived at by his surveyor academically, but said there is always discrepancy between reality and academic study [13] It is not in dispute that the applicants made to R2 a 3rd offer at $4,992,000 on 31 March 2016 (Bundle A2/357-1). According to Ms Sat’s RDV valuation at that time ($1,556 million), R2’s share (0.31%) was only $4,823,600. The applicants made to R2 a 4th offer at 5,786,000 on 1 September 2016. According to Ms Sat’s RDV at that time ($1,689 million), R2’s share (0.31%) was $5,235,900, or even $5,185,230 (if based on 0.307%). [14] The position of R2 is somehow not clear because in [2] of his closing submission, he acknowledges that such rights are not absolute [15] Also known as the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and see also [5] & [6] of R2’s closing submission dated 31 October 2016 [16] See [4] and footnote 3 above [17] See A1/180-5 [18] See A1/197 [4] and A1/211-2 [19] See A1/49-50 [20] See A1/47-8 [21] See A1/36 [22] (2011) 14 HKCFAR 497 [23] [2014] 5 HKLRD 534 [24] (2005) 8 HKCFAR 578, [2005] 4 HKLRD 363 [25] See [10] of Capital Well [26] s.4(1)(b), Cap. 454. [27] See [11-21] of Good Faith [28] See [19] of Good Faith [29] See [35] of Good Faith [30] See [5] and [6] of R2’s closing submission dated 31 October 2016 [31] See [5] of R2’s closing submission dated 31 October 2016 [32] See [5] of R2’s closing submission dated 31 October 2016 [33] See [8] of R2’s closing submission dated 31 October 2016 [34] See [1995] 2 AC 111 at p.125-125 [35] (2003) 6 HKCFAR 1 [36] At [12] of Yin Shuen [37] See [4] of R2’s witness statement dated 1 March 2016 [38] See [46] above [39] See the news reports on 22 March 2017 regarding the compulsory sale order made in Fairbo Investment Limited v Chow Wei-Chi Joseph, appointed by Order to represent the Estate of Chow Kiu Kam Jing, deceased, (unrep) LDCS24000/2014, 3 February 2017 [40] One of the applicants had already sold the land to the other applicant and therefore was not considered victim. [41] Recited in [61] of Pine Valley and reproduced here [42] Recited in [50] of Pine Valley and reproduced here [43] See [36] of Hentrich [44] See [52] above [45] See the offers of the applicants through their solicitors Yam & Company respectively of 13 October 2014 (Bundle A2/292-5), 6 March 2015 (Bundle A2/305-8), 31 March 2016 (Bundle A2/357-1-261) and 1 September 2016 (Bundle A2/363-1 -363-5) [46] [1941] 1 All ER 480 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under LDCS 22000/2014