譚 對 黃

FCMC 4004 / 2015

[2019] HKFC 84

香港特別行政區

區域法院

婚姻訴訟編號2015年第4004號

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判決書
（上訴許可申請 - 管養權）

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1.這是呈請人〔父親〕的上訴許可申請。

背景

2.父親現年64歲，母親現年37歲。他們於2001年8月30日在中國內地結婚。兩人育有兩名家庭子女。兒子於2002年1月3日出生，現年16歲。女兒生於2008年1月3日，現年10歲。2014年之前，父母及兩名子女均居於中國內地。

3.父親是一名基建公司的工程經理，週一至週五均於天津居住及工作。母親現時從事兼職倉務員，除非需要照顧家庭子女，否則通常每週七天均會上班。另外每月約有三天會於下班後從事帶貨〔主要為日用品、化妝品及手袋〕過關到内地或澳門，賺取額外收入。她亦會在澳門幫助客人兌换貨幣及籌碼及介紹客人到賭場。

4.2013年10月，母親與女兒遷出位於深圳的前婚姻居所，於附近的公寓居住。2014年8月，母親帶同女兒移居香港，並於天水圍租住單位。父親、其姊〔姑母〕及兒子亦在約2014年10月搬到天水圍的另一個單位居住。

5.2015年4月8日，父親提出離婚呈請。

6.2015年5月，兒子從父親的住所離家出走，從此與母親及女兒同住。2015年12月及2016年1月，於父親的探視期間，兒子兩度與姑母發生衝突，最後均須報警求助。後來，兒子因2016年與姑母的衝突而接受警司警誡。

7.2016年5月12日，法庭發出暫准離婚命令。

論點

8.就家庭子女的安排，父母兩人分別要求獲得兩名家庭子女的照顧管束權。答辯人（母親）接納共同管養，呈請人（父親）則要求獨自管養。

9.經審訊後，法庭將兩名家庭子女的獨自管養權，照顧及管束權判予母親；父親則獲合理探視權。父親不服判決，現提出上訴許可申請，上訴理由如下︰

(1)兒子對判決不滿意，鼓勵父親上訴。父親指兒子對社署報告內容不滿意；

(2)父親指親子鑑定報告顯示女兒並非他所出，指因此母親並非誠實的證人，父親更呈上2015年8月20日的鑑定報告；

(3)審訊期間父親沒有律師代表，因而證供混亂；而母親卻一直說謊；

(4)兒子自2015年5月從姑母住所離家出走後一直被母親洗腦，因此對姑母懷有敵意。

適用的法律原則

10.香港法例第336章《區域法院條例》第63、63A及65條訂明的條文。有關條例如下︰-

“63. 民事事宜的上訴

(1)除第(3)款另有規定外，在有法官或上訴法庭許可的情況下，可就法官在任何民事訟案或事宜中作出的每項判決、命令或決定，向上訴法庭提出上訴。

…

(2)上訴須受法院規則所規限。

63A. 上訴許可

(2) 聆訊有關上訴許可申請的法官、聆案官或上訴法庭除非信納 ——

(a)有關上訴有合理機會得直；或

(b)有其他有利於秉行公正的理由，因而該上訴應進行聆訊，

否則不得批予上訴許可。

65. 上訴的程序

除本條例的條文另有規定外，就區域法院的決定而向上訴法庭提出的每宗上訴，須以《高等法院規則》(第4章，附屬法例A)訂明的方式提出，並受該等規則訂明的條件規限。”

11.於審訊，法庭是行使其酌情權作出判決。除非上訴人可證實以下事項，否則法庭不會接受上訴（見White Book 59/O/54）

“Appeals against exercise of discretion – There are many authorities for the proposition that an appeal will not be entertained from an order which it was within the discretion of the judge to make, unless it be shown that he exercised his discretion under a mistake of law … or in disregard of principle … or under a misapprehension as to the facts …; or that he took into account irrelevant matters … or failed to exercise his discretion … or the conclusion which the judge reached in the exercise of his discretion was “outside the generous ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible.”

12.就父親試圖於上訴時試圖呈遞新證供，適用的法律原則如下︰

高等法院規則第59號第10條 （White Book, RSC Order 59r10）訂明︰ -

10. General powers of the Court (O. 59, r. 10)

(1) In relation to an appeal the Court of Appeal shall have all the powers and duties as to amendment and otherwise of the Court of First Instance. 

(2) The Court of Appeal shall have power to receive further evidence on questions of fact, either by oral examination in court, by affidavit, or by deposition taken before an examiner, but no such further evidence (other than evidence as to matters which have occurred after the date of the trial or hearing) shall be admitted except on special grounds. 

…

Allowing a case to be made though not raised in the court below:-

“A point not taken at the trial, and presented for the first time in the Court of Appeal… ought to be most jealously scrutinized…A Court of Appeal ought only to decide in favour of an appellant on a ground there put forward for the first time, if it be satisfied beyond doubt, first, that it had before it all the facts bearing upon the new contention as completely as would have been the case if the controversy had arisen at the trial; and next, that no satisfactory explanation could have been offered by those whose conduct is impugned if an opportunity for explanation had been afforded them in the witness box.” (per Lord Herschell, The Tasmaina (1890) 15 App Cas 223 at 225; approved in Karunaratne v Ferdinandus [1902] AC 405; Perkorvski v Wellington Corp [1959] AC 53 at 59; Warehousing and Forwarding Co v Jafferali [1964] AC 1; [1963] 3 All ER 511 PC; Wilson v Liverpool City Council [1971] 1 WLR 302 …But the rule stated at the head of this note is strictly applied … In addition, at the discretion of the court a party may be debarred form arising a point which was pleaded but deliberately omitted from argument in the court below … A party may be precluded, by his method of conducting his case, from raising a different case on appeal …”

“Applications for leave to adduce further evidence – Rule 10(2) was amended to delete restriction of “Special grounds” critenon to “appeals from a judgment after trail or hearing of any cause or matter on the ments”. Accordingly, Ladd v Marshall conditions apply to all appeals i.e. further evidence is admissible on an appeal only where such evidence:

(i) Could not have been obtained at the trial with reasonable diligence;

(ii) would or might, if believed, have a very important effect on the mind of the tribunal; and

(iii) is of a sort which inherently is not improbable.

…

The Court adopts a strict approach in applying Ladd v Marshall:

“When a litigant has obtained a judgment in a court of justice … he is by law entitled not to be deprived of that judgment without very solid grounds (Brown v Dean [1910] AC 373 at 374)…

If it is sought to deprive him of his judgment by further evidence, Three conditions must be satisfied before it can be received; “first it must be shown that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial; secondly, the evidence must be such that if given, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive; thirdly, the evidence must be such as is presumably to be believed, or, in other words, it must be apparently credible though it need not be incontrovertible … Otherwise, the applicant has to satisfy the court that:

(i) it is one of the exceptional cases where The Ladd v Marshall conditions do not apply, or apply only in a modified form; or

(ii) “the evidence relates to matter which have occurred after the date of the trial or hearing … (But, the words “The evidence relates to matters which have occurred after the date & the trial or hearing” do not cover evidence coming to light after trial or matters which occurred before trial)

Exceptional cases where The Ladd v Morshall conditions do not apply, or apply in a modified form-H has been held that, in the following exceptional categories, fresh evidence of pre-trial matters or events may, at the discretion of the court, be admitted notwithstanding the fact that The Ladd v Marshall condition are not satisfied:

(1) Appeals in judicial review proceedings …

(2) Appeals against committal orders …

(3) Appeals involving the welfare of minor children.

上訴許可的考慮

13.父親指兒子對法庭的判令不滿，並呈遞與兒子的通訊記錄。兒子的訊息指他根本不知道判詞內容，但又指對判決不滿意（見上訴理由附件1）。父親從沒解釋兒子在不知悉判決內容下，怎會不滿意及對那一方面不滿意。根據父親提供的訊息，兩人似乎是提及探視的安排。如判決後情況有變，父親隨時可申請更改安排，而非申請上訴。

14.於訊息內，兒子似乎對被捲入父母親之間的訴訟表示不滿。他提到不想被夾在父母之間；他只是想平靜地生活，不想學業受到影響。

15.父親遂指出兒子亦不滿社會福利署的報告內容。首先，社署的兩位社工分別撰寫兩份報告，另有一份心理專家的報告。審訊時，三名專家均到庭接受盤問。三名專家就兒子對背景的描述及意願均脗合。法庭是經過全面考慮所有的證供才作出判決。父親亦沒有指出法庭如何錯誤行駛酌情權。父親提出的新證供亦無法切合Ladd v Marshall一案的要求。

16.父親嘗試解釋兒子對父親及姑母的負面評價。這些解釋全為父親自圓其說的推測。

17.父親指女兒與他並無血緣關係，是母親婚外情的私生女。父親指母親隱瞞真相，不值得法庭信賴。根據父親提供的鑑定報告，父親於2015年8月已知悉女兒並非他所出。父親似乎忘記他是呈請人，而他於呈請書內指女兒是家庭子女。法庭明白父親是作出呈請後才獲取報告，但根據報告，母親並沒有參與親子鑑定，而從2015年8月始，父親亦從沒向法庭提及女兒的身份。相反，父親於2016年3月30日向法庭存檔申請審訊指示之申請書時，宣誓呈請書及子女安排陳述書中的內容全部真確，而當時父親更是有律師代表的。種種情況顯示，父親對法庭隱瞞事實及不滿意判決才用報告怪罪於母親。

18.況且，家庭子女的定義包括非親生但被視作家庭子女的未成年人。根據父親現時的立場，女兒出生時，縱使他已知悉女兒並非他所出，但仍視她為家庭子女。因此就算法庭知悉女兒是母親的私生女，也不會影響判決。父親亦未能滿足Ladd v Marshall的要求。

19.父親指他因沒有法律代表，而令其證供出現混亂，沒有專業法律知識可能令與訟人對程序有混淆，但不會影響證供，因為證人只須說出真相。法庭已細心衡量所有證供，父親的證供不但自相矛盾，還與姑母的證供有嚴重分歧。

20.父親一直指母親離間兒子與他及姑母的感情，法庭亦正正因此傳召社會福利署的心理學家撰寫心理報告。專家表示沒有出現離間的跡象；父親只是不接受他人的意見。

21.父親於陳詞內不斷重覆他的證供及陳述。法庭已於判決時逐一加以考慮。

22.法庭已細心考慮父親的上訴理由及陳詞。他未能說服法庭有關上訴有合理機會得直。法庭亦看不到有任何其他利於秉行公正的理由，因而該上訴應進行聆訊。因此，父親的申請被拒絕。

23.母親並沒就該上訴許可存檔任何文件。法庭不作任何訟費的命令。

呈請人：親自行事 處理上訴許可申請

答辯人：親自行事 處理上訴許可申請