Re Haldar Based

Read the full judgment text of CAMP 96/2019 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 23 April 2020.

1. This is an application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of Campbell-Moffat J given on 4 December 2018 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) /adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 17 November 2017 dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 31 May 2016 and 26

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Case No.CAMP 96/2019[2020] HKCA 224
Court
Court of Appeal
Date23 Apr 2020
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

CAMP 96/2019

[2020] HKCA 224

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 96 OF 2019

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL 951/2017)

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RE: HALDAR BASED Applicant

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Before: Hon Cheung JA and Barma JA in Court

Date of Judgment: 23 April 2020

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.This is an application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of Campbell-Moffat J given on 4 December 2018 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) /adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 17 November 2017 dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 31 May 2016 and 26 September 2017 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

Background

2.The applicant is a national of Bangladesh.  He entered Hong Kong illegally and was arrested by the police on 28 June 2014.  He lodged a non-refoulement claim on 1 July 2014. 

3.The applicant’s claim was based on threats from his neighbours in Bangladesh, who have a dispute over land with the applicant’s family.  The details of the applicant’s claim have been summarised by the judge at [4] of the CALL-1 form.

4.By a Notice of Decision dated 31 May 2016 (“the Director’s First Decision”), the Director decided against the applicant’s claim.  The Director’s First Decision covered the BOR 3 risk[1], the persecution risk[2], and the torture risk[3].

5.By a Notice of Further Decision dated 26 September 2017, the Director also assessed the applicant’s claim based on the BOR 2 risk[4], and decided against him.

6.The applicant appealed to the Board.  After a hearing on 13 October 2017, the Board dismissed the appeal on 17 November 2017 (“the Board’s Decision”).  The Board’s Decision covered all four grounds for non-refoulement protection.

7.At [98] of the Board’s Decision, the Board held that the risk of harm to the applicant upon his return is low.

The judge’s decision

8.The applicant filed a Form 86 on 24 November 2017 which contained no ground for seeking relief.

9.In his affirmation in support of the leave application dated 24 November 2017, the applicant only said that he wished to challenge the Board’s Decision and the decisions by the Director without giving any ground.

10.The applicant did not request an oral hearing before the judge, who accordingly dealt with the application on paper.

11.After considering the facts and background of the case and giving due consideration to the decisions of the Director and the Board, the judge refused to give leave for judicial review.  The judge gave the following reasons in refusing leave to apply for judicial review at [10] to [12] of the CALL-1 form:

“10. There were no grounds of review. The Applicant has not complained of any procedural irregularity, unfairness or unreasonableness. The Applicant has a duty to state the grounds of his intended judicial review and that they are reasonably arguable and enjoy a realistic prospect of success: Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676. I have nevertheless considered whether the papers indicate any such ground for the purposes of considering whether to grant leave.

Conclusion

11. Despite the fact that the Applicant did not submit any grounds of review, I have considered the papers carefully. I have not found any error of law or procedure. I see no evidence of procedural unfairness nor a failure to adhere to a high standard of fairness throughout. Despite the onus being upon the Applicant, the Adjudicator engaged in a joint endeavour with the Applicant and considered all relevant criteria, gave the Applicant a reasonable opportunity to state his case and enquired into that case appropriately. There is no criticism of his determination, which was open to him on the facts and eminently reasonable.

12. In my judgement, there is no reasonably arguable basis upon which the Applicant could found a claim for judicial review and, as such, there would be no realistic prospect of success if he were to be granted leave.  I therefore refuse leave for judicial review.”

Application for extension of time to appeal and grounds for appeal

12.Pursuant to Order 53 Rule 3(4), the applicant had 14 days to lodge an appeal.  He failed to do so.  By a summons dated 27 December 2018, the applicant sought leave to appeal out of time.  His application was dismissed by the judge on 14 March 2019.

13.By a summons dated 20 May 2019, the applicant renewed his application for an extension of time to appeal before this court.  He did not give any explanation for the delay in bringing the intended appeal or mention any ground of appeal in the summons. 

14.In his skeleton submissions lodged on 10 June 2019, the applicant submitted that:

(1)  he did not get the paper in time so he could not appeal in time;

(2)  the Board and Director lacked “practical knowledge”;

(3)  the solicitor assigned by the Duty Lawyer Service only slept and did not help him, he asked for a replacement unsuccessfully;

(4)  the Board did not give him sufficient opportunity to make submissions; and

(5)  the judge dismissed his application for leave for judicial review without sufficient cause.  The judge ought to have allowed his application because the Board failed to give the applicant opportunity to make submission.

Discussion

15.Having considered the papers, we are satisfied that this application can properly be dealt with on the papers without the need for an oral hearing.

16.The applicant claimed that he did not receive the CALL-1 form in time without explaining why that was the case.  We are of the view that the applicant has not provided any reasonable explanation for his delay in bringing the intended appeal.  We nonetheless go on to consider the merits of the intended appeal.

17.The applicant has not formulated any proper grounds of appeal.  In his written submission, the applicant complained that the Board did not give him sufficient chance to make submissions.  However, this was never raised as a ground for judicial review before the court below.  It is thus not open to the applicant to raise these matters on appeal for the first time, well outside the time limit for bringing judicial review proceedings (see Re Nupur Mst [2018] HKCA 524, CAMP 54/2018 at §14(4)).  Neither were the other complaints against the Board raised in the court below.  As the judge observed, the applicant put forward no grounds for judicial review before her.  In those circumstances we can see no merit in his complaint that the judge dismissed his application without sufficient cause.   

18.We therefore do not see any prospect of success in the intended appeal.  We will not grant extension of time for a hopeless appeal.  The summons of 20 May 2019 is dismissed accordingly.

19.We are also of the view that the application is totally without merit.  Pursuant to Order 59 Rule 2A(8), we make an order that no party may request this determination be reconsidered at an oral hearing inter partes.

(Peter Cheung) (Aarif Barma)
Justice of Appeal Justice of Appeal

The applicant acting in person


[1] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.

[2] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

[3] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.

[4] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.

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