Case Document

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HCAL 516/2026

[2026] HKCFI 6011

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 516 OF 2026

BETWEEN

	Bijjur Ganga Bhooshan	Applicant
	and
	Torture Claims Appeal Board	Putative Respondent
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative Interested Party

Application for leave to apply for judicial review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)

Following:

consideration of the documents only; or

consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:

1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name of the putative interested party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.

2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the applicant:

The Leave Application

1.By way of Form 86 dated 20 February 2026 and filed on 4 March 2026, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 9 February 2026 (“the Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-

https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2026/HCAL000516_2026_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf

2.The Board found that the applicant had not made out a case for non-refoulement protection on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Accordingly, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 4 December 2025 and confirmed the same, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

Amendments

3.The applicant named the Board and Immigration Department as the putative respondents and the Board as the putative interested party in Form 86, when only the Board should be the putative respondent and the Director should be the putative interested party.

4.Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name of the putative interested party to “Director of Immigration”.

The applicant’s case

5.It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.

6.In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to India, he would face the risk of harm or even death at the hands of his creditor named Ganga Reddy.

Oral hearing

7.The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application and his case was heard on 22 October 2026.

8.At the beginning of the hearing, the applicant said that he was not applying for judicial review and when his case was concluded, he would leave. When this court asked the applicant for the grounds of his intended judicial review, he merely replied that he had problem in India. However, when this court asked the applicant what was wrong with the Board’s Decision, he said that there was nothing wrong.

Grounds for judicial review

9.The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).

10.The applicant did not advance any grounds for the intended judicial review in Form 86.

11.In his supporting affirmation dated 4 March 2026, the applicant only mentioned that the Board’s Decision was not fair, he did not want to go back to his country because his life was still in danger, his problem was very serious and he was not satisfied with the Board’s Decision. He added that when he went outside[1], he would give evidence to support his claim.

12.As aforesaid, at the oral hearing, the applicant told this court that there was nothing wrong with the Board’s Decision, but he had problem in India.

Discussion

13.First of all, the applicant’s danger arising from his problem in his own country had been duly assessed but rejected by the Board. If the applicant intends to challenge the Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for judicial review unless there were errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision.

14.His mere comments that the Board’s Decision was not fair and that he was not satisfied with the Board’s Decision cannot help him either. The applicant did not say why the Board’s Decision was not fair, why he was not satisfied with it, or how the Board had erred in its assessment of his non-refoulement claim and/or his appeal/petition.

15.With regards to his statement in his supporting affirmation that he would give evidence to support his claim when he was outside (taken to mean when he was released from detention), the applicant did not submit any further document since the filing of the Leave Application. He did not seek to submit any further evidence at the oral hearing before this court either.

16.As aforesaid, the applicant in fact admitted at the oral hearing before this court that there was nothing wrong with the Board’s Decision.

17.The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

18.Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the intended judicial review.

19.In assessing the applicant’s appeal/petition, the Board held an oral hearing on 27 January 2026 and the applicant was present via Video Conferencing System. Thus, the applicant was given the opportunity to present his case to the Board.

20.As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had extensively questioned the applicant at the Board’s hearing in order to try to understand his case better.

21.The Board had laid out its analysis of the information / evidence given by the applicant in paragraphs 37 to 45 of the Board’s Decision.

22.In gist, the Board found that the applicant’s evidence contained material discrepancies which undermined the credibility of his account. The most significant of these concerned the interest rate on the alleged loan and the applicant’s repayment history. The applicant also failed to provide a copy of the alleged loan agreement. Furthermore, the Board found that the loan arrangement as described by the applicant in oral evidence was inherently impossible.

23.Thus, the Board did not accept the applicant’s evidence as credible and reliable. The Board did not believe that the loan existed at all. It followed that the Board did not believe that applicant faced any risk of harm arising from the alleged loan upon his return to India.

24.Moreover, the Board found that, even if the information/evidence given by the applicant was to be accepted, it would still dismiss his appeal/petition (see paragraphs 46 to 56 of the Board’s Decision). The Board considered that the creditor’s forbearance throughout the dealings with the applicant was not consistent with a creditor who posed a serious risk of harm. The applicant confirmed that he had never been physically assaulted by the creditor. Since the applicant departed India, the creditor had only made enquiries as to his whereabouts. There was no evidence that the creditor had harmed or threatened the applicant’s family members who remained in India. The applicant’s dispute with the creditor was only a private dispute that had nothing to do with the Indian government.

25.Significantly, the Board noted that the applicant in fact had an available means of resolving the dispute. On the applicant’s own evidence, selling his share of the family land would be sufficient to repay the debt. The existence of this option demonstrated that any risk of harm, if existed, could be mitigated or eliminated. Thus, the Board found that the applicant would not be subjected to any risk of harm upon his return to India.

26.Moreover, the Board was satisfied that meaningful state protection would be available to the applicant if needed.

27.The Board had also given full reasons in paragraphs 52 to 55 of the Board’s Decision for its conclusion that internal relocation was a viable option to the applicant to avoid the creditor, even assuming that the applicant would face a real risk of harm by the creditor if he was to return to his hometown.

28.Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant’s claims for non-refoulement protection were not made out on any of the applicable grounds under the USM.

29.The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence and risk of harm, was primarily within the realm of the Board in dealing with the applicant’s appeal/petition. The Board was entitled to come to its own conclusion. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board reached its conclusion.

30.Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof. The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its decision.

31.As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave must be refused.

Conclusion

32.For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.

Dated the 28^th day of October 2026

( Gladys LEE )
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence

Notes for the applicant: If leave has been granted, the applicant or his solicitors must:

a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A); b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).	Sent/Handed to the applicant/the applicant’s solicitors on: 28/10/2026 Applicant’s ref. no: Nil	Sent/Handed to the putative respondent / the putative respondent’s solicitors / such putative interested parties as may be directed by the Court / the putative interested parties’ solicitors on: 28/10/2026 Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office Putative respondent’s ref. no.: USM 27760 Director of Immigration Putative interested party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 2115/25 (Formerly RBCZ 5002041/25) Department of Justice, Senior Assistant Law Officer (Civil Law) (Civil Litigation Unit 2)