Case Document

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HCAL 1424/2024

[2026] HKCFI 5656

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1424 OF 2024

BETWEEN

	Jagmohan Singh	Applicant
	and
	Torture Claims Appeal Board	Putative
		Respondent
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative
		Interested Party

Application for leave to apply for judicial review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)

Following:

consideration of the documents only; or

consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant or counsel in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:

1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”.

2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the applicant:

The Leave Application

1.By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 26 August 2024, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 8 August 2024 (“the Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-

https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2024/HCAL001424_2024_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf

2.The Board found that the applicant had not made out a case for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 18 March 2024 and confirmed the same, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

Amendment

3.The applicant named the Board and “Non-Refoulement Claims petition office” as the putative respondent in Form 86, when only the Board should be so named.

4.The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the Board and should not be named as a putative respondent at all.

5.This court therefore makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”.

The applicant’s case

6.It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.

7.In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to India, he would be harmed or killed by Diyal Singh (“Diyal”) due to a land dispute. The applicant also claimed to fear harm from the religious people from the Sikh religion, as he had converted to Christianity.

Disposal on paper

8.The applicant did not request for an oral hearing of the Leave Application. This court is also satisfied that the Leave Application can be disposed of based on the written materials before this court. Hence, the Leave Application is dealt with on paper.

Grounds for judicial review

9.The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).

10.In Form 86 and his supporting affidavit dated 26 August 2024, the applicant did not give any grounds for his intended judicial review, but stated that he was not satisfied with the Board’s Decision.

Discussion

11.First of all, the applicant’s general comment that he was not satisfied with the Board’s Decision cannot help him. The applicant did not say why the Board’s Decision was wrong or how the Board had erred in its assessment of the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection.

12.The applicant’s alleged risk in his home country had been duly assessed but rejected by the Board. If he intends to challenge the Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for judicial review.

13.The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

14.Thus, despite the fact that the applicant did not advance any valid ground for the intended judicial review, this court will scrutinize the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality as aforesaid.

15.In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an oral hearing on 17 June 2024. The applicant was present and was thus given the chance to present his case to the Board in person.

16.As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board gave full and detailed reasoning in rejecting the applicant’s claims.

17.The Board had laid out its analysis of the applicant’s case in paragraphs 19 to 51 of the Board’s Decision. In gist, the Board found that in material aspects of his case, the information/evidence given by the applicant was inconsistent and not believable. The claimed risk was based on unreliable information/evidence which was not accepted as being reliable. The Board therefore found that the basis of the applicant’s claim was gone. The Board was of the view that the applicant’s claim should be dismissed.

18.In relation to the applicant’s claimed risk due to his change of religion, the Board noted that the applicant had not mentioned this risk in his Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) at all. The Board considered that if the religious people from the Sikh religion were also his enemies, he should have mentioned it in his NCF. The applicant only mentioned this fear in his Grounds of Appeal and Petition, and did not refer to the risk emanating from Diyal. The Board found that the authenticity of the applicant’s claim was doubtful.

19.Nevertheless, in the assessment of the applicant’s risk of harm, the Board explicitly stated that even if the information/evidence given by the applicant was to be accepted, the Board would still dismiss his appeal/petition. The Board had given its reasons for such a conclusion in paragraphs 53 to 59 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary to repeat the same here.

20.Simply put, the Board found that there was nothing to show that Diyal had the required resources and a strong nationwide network to locate him over the whole of India. The Board was of the view that it would not be unduly harsh and unreasonable for the applicant to relocate to a place in India other than his home place in order to earn a living and to avoid the claimed risk of harm from Diyal and his men.

21.Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all the applicable grounds under the USM.

22.The finding of facts relating to a non-refoulement claim, including the assessment of evidence and risk of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board in dealing with the applicant’s appeal/petition. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board reached its decision.

23.Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof. The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its decision.

24.As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave must be refused.

Conclusion

25.For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.

Dated the 7^th day of October 2026

( Gladys LEE )
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence

Notes for the applicant: If leave has been granted, the applicant or his solicitors must:
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A); b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).		Sent/Handed to the applicant/the applicant’s solicitors on: 07/10/2026 Applicant’s ref. no: Nil		Sent/Handed to the putative respondent / the putative respondent’s solicitors / such putative interested parties as may be directed by the Court / the putative interested parties’ solicitors on: 07/10/2026 Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office Putative respondent’s ref. no.: USM 23335 Director of Immigration Putative interested party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 385/24 (Formerly RBCZ 5000400/24) Department of Justice, Senior Assistant Law Officer (Civil Law) (Civil Litigation Unit 2)