HKSAR v. Fu Guangmiao
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 20/2020 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 6 August 2020.
1. The appellant was convicted after trial by Mr. Joseph To (“the Magistrate”) of an offence of “operating a money service without a licence” [1] and sentenced to a community service order of 100 hours. The appellant now appeals against his conviction and sentence.
Cited by 4 cases · Cites 2 cases
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[English Translation – 英譯本] HCMA 20/2020 [2020] HKCFI 1783 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 20 OF 2020 (ON APPEAL FROM KTS NO. 12266 OF 2019) ___________________ BETWEEN
___________________ Before: Hon S T Poon J in Court Date of Hearing: 27 May 2020 Date of Judgment: 6 August 2020 _________________ J U D G M E N T _________________ Background 1.The appellant was convicted after trial by Mr. Joseph To (“the Magistrate”) of an offence of “operating a money service without a licence” [1] and sentenced to a community service order of 100 hours. The appellant now appeals against his conviction and sentence. Prosecution Case 2.The appellant is a scientific officer of The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST). On an online forum of the University for Mainland teachers and students, he expressed to other HKUST teachers and students that he would provide them with a service that would let them deposit money in Hong Kong dollar into his account with Bank of China in Hong Kong, and he would, following their instructions, transfer money in Renminbi from his own Mainland account to the designated recipients’ Mainland accounts. 3.The appellant once wrote a post on the forum with the heading “Exchange Renminbi for Hong Kong Dollar”, in which he stated that he wanted to exchange the Renminbi he had for Hong Kong dollars, and his exchange rate would be the middle of the exchange rates offered by Hang Seng Bank. The Renminbi could be transferred to Mainland bank cards, Alipay of WeChat while the Hong Kong dollars could be deposited into the defendant’s bank card account with Bank of China either in cash or by transfer, or could be handed to him directly on campus. 4.In the three records of interview taken by the Customs and Excise Department, the appellant admitted to the Customs and Excise Department that during the period specified in the charge, he transmitted funds by the above method some 20 to 30 times, with a total amount of HK$300,000 to HK$500,000. 5.In the course of investigation, the Customs and Excise Department contacted via “WhatsApp” a party that claimed to be “Kong Yam (transliteration) Finance” (港鑫金融). “Kong Yam Finance” indicated that they could provide the service of remitting Hong Kong dollars from Hong Kong to the Mainland and exchanging them for Renminbi to be deposited in Mainland accounts. The local bank account provided by “Kong Yam Finance” for deposit was the same account held by the appellant with Bank of China. 6.The appellant admitted that he did not hold the licence required for operating a money service during the relevant period. The Appellant’s Case 7.The appellant did not testify at the trial, nor did he call any witness. 8.The appellant explained in the records of interview that the online forum of the University was restricted for use by teachers, students and staff of HKUST, and that he resorted to such a method of exchanging the Renminbi he kept on the Mainland for Hong Kong dollars just because his wife was in desperate need of money in Hong Kong dollar for her surgeon’s fees. 9.The main issues at trial were whether the currency exchange service carried out by the appellant for others in the above manner amounted to “remittance service” under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Ordinance (the “Ordinance”) and whether the appellant was “carrying on business”. The Magistrate’s Analysis 10.The Magistrate made the following analysis in respect of the above issues:
Grounds of Appeal against Conviction 11.The appellant’s perfected grounds of appeal against conviction were as follows:
12.The WhatsApp screenshots mentioned in Ground (1) refer to those of the communication record between the Customs officer and “Kong Yam Finance”. At trial, the appellant objected to the submission of those screenshots on the ground that the injustice caused to the appellant by the exhibit far outweighed its probative value. 13.Mr. Tsui on behalf of the appellant submitted that the first prosecution witness, namely the Customs officer who communicated with “Kong Yam Finance”, testified that the telephone numbers and the messaging application account numbers of the appellant and his wife were different from those used by “Kong Yam Finance”. Nothing concerning “Kong Yam Finance” was found by the Customs officers at the appellant’s home, and no money had ever been deposited by the Customs in the appellant’s Bank of China account. 14.Mr. Tsui submitted that the Magistrate should have exercised his discretion to reject those messaging screenshots, as it was highly likely that the Magistrate as the fact-finder would take an erroneous view about the contents of the screenshots by thinking that it was the appellant representing “Kong Yam Finance” to communicate with the first prosecution witness on that day. 15.In respect of these messaging screenshots, the Magistrate clearly stated in paragraph 14 of his statement of findings that he did not “take the view” that it was the appellant representing “Kong Yam Finance” to communicate with the first prosecution witness. He only stated that no matter if it was the appellant who communicated with the first prosecution witness on that day, given that the account for remittance provided by “Kong Yam Finance” was the appellant’s account, the appellant must know if someone deposited money in that account for remittance purpose. It is clear from the Magistrate’s analysis that when he took into account those messaging screenshots, the injustice alleged by Mr. Tsui simply did not exist. The Magistrate’s analysis was well-reasoned. Accordingly, Ground (1) must fail. 16.As regards Ground (2), Mr. Tsui made the following submissions:
17.As the Magistrate stated in paragraph 12 of his statement of findings, the appellant was not acquainted with all the people using the relevant online forum. The service provided by the appellant was not purely private in nature, as it was open to all the people using that forum. The service provided by the appellant did not stop in a short time. It carried certain continuity. Moreover, such service was provided for the purpose of transferring the customers’ Hong Kong dollars in Hong Kong to their Mainland Renminbi accounts, which is precisely remittance. The circumstances of this case are different from those I dealt with in HKSAR v YIP Wai Cheong[2]. In that case, the service provided by the defendant was not for remittance purpose. It was only in the course of providing other services that remittance was inevitably involved. 18.In the circumstances of this case, I am of the view that the act of the appellant amounted to operating a remittance service. The Magistrate is correct in his findings. 19.Ground (2) must fail. 20.In respect of Ground (3), as to whether the appellant kept the transaction record, the Magistrate only stated in paragraph 16 of his statement of findings that keeping no record was precisely the act that the Ordinance was meant to prevent, not that keeping no record by the appellant was seen as evidence to prove his guilt. And for the court’s comity towards China’s judicial system, it was only raised at trial by the Magistrate in his verbal exchange with Mr. Tsui, and it was never mentioned in his oral decision or statement of findings. I do not think that the Magistrate relied on that as a reason in reaching his decision. 21.In relation to “change of position”, by mentioning “legal obligation” in paragraph 12(3) of his statement of findings, the Magistrate intended to state that the appellant, upon receipt of a sum in Hong Kong dollar deposited by a customer, did have a legal obligation towards that customer to deposit an equivalent amount in Renminbi in the customer’s designated Mainland account, in order to show that the appellant’s act was earnest and likely for business purpose. I can see nothing wrong for the Magistrate to raise this point. 22.I consider that the conviction was not unsafe or unsatisfactory. There is no merit in the appellant’s appeal against the conviction, which shall be dismissed accordingly. Appeal against Sentence 23.The appellant raised the following grounds of appeal against the sentence:
In short, it was manifestly excessive to sentence the appellant, as a first offender, to a community service order of 100 hours. 24.The Magistrate was very brief in his consideration of the sentence:
25.From the transcript of the trial, it can be seen that the Magistrate interrupted when Mr. Tsui was about to start his submission in mitigation, querying him why a custodial sentence should not be imposed. The Magistrate kept stressing to Mr. Tsui that the offence in question was very serious as Hong Kong was under an international obligation to combat money laundering and terrorist activities. The way the Magistrate expressed his view would likely give rise to doubts that he had already made his decision on sentencing before hearing the appellant’s submission, which is undesirable. 26.The Magistrate took the view that, given the aforesaid international obligation, the sentence for the offence in question should be one that would serve as a general deterrent. 27.In my view, it is not appropriate in this case to consider a sentence of general deterrence. It is the fact of the case that the appellant carried out the remittances for the purpose of transferring to Hong Kong a sum of money that he obtained from the sale of his property on the Mainland, not for making profit out of the remittance activities. This is unrelated to money laundering or terrorism. At most, the appellant’s remittance service would only have lasted until the entire sum of money had been transferred to Hong Kong, and it would not have continued on a long-term basis. Furthermore, I do not believe that the appellant would be able to obtain an operating licence just for transferring a sum of money to Hong Kong. The appellant should have transferred the funds via an authorized financial institution and paid the charges required. What the appellant did in this case, in my view, is not an act specifically targeted by the Ordinance. 28.It is my view that in passing the sentence, the Magistrate made an error of principle and it is necessary to consider the matter afresh for an appropriate punishment. 29.In the appeal hearing, both parties were unable to provide this court with other authorities on sentencing apart from the case of YIP Wai Cheong. In that case, the defendant was fined HK$5,000. He did not appeal against the sentence. 30.In the present case, I consider that a fine of HK$20,000 is appropriate. Order 31.It is my decision that the appeal against conviction be dismissed and the appeal against sentence be allowed. The original community service order is set aside and replaced by a fine of HK$20,000.
Mr TIEN Kei Rui, counsel on fiat of the Department of Justice, for the HKSAR. Mr TSUI Ho Chuen, Brian, instructed by Ivan Tang & Co., for the Appellant. Translated by the Judgment Translation Unit of the Judiciary and vetted by Ms. Jenny Chung, Solicitor. | |||||||||||||||
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