HKSAR v. Cherop Caroline
Read the full judgment text of CACC 321/2018 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 2 August 2021 before Macrae VP, Zervos JA.
Criminal law – drug trafficking – trafficking in dangerous drug (cocaine) – 691 grammes of cocaine with street value of approximately HK$1,004,496 – guilty plea – sentence of 14 years' imprisonment – appeal against sentence – whether appellant entitled to further discount for assistance to Father Wotherspoon's anti-drug campaign – whether appellant deprived of fair sentencing hearing by failure to produce or refer to Father Wotherspoon's mitigation letter – whether trial judge erred in not giving credit for assistance rendered – role and assessment of prisoner assistance to pastoral anti-drug campaign – whether 'name and shame' campaign within proper terms of prison chaplaincy – hearsay and assertion versus evidence in mitigation – sentencing guidelines for low-level drug couriers – discretion of sentencing judge – whether appellate court should interfere with sentence – Court of Appeal dismissed appeal and reiterated principles from Kilima Abubakar Abbas and Herry Jane Yusuph – token discount for assistance to Father Wotherspoon's campaign is matter of absolute discretion of sentencing judge and not entitlement – three months represents exceptional limit – information assessed by authorities as of 'no practical use' cannot attract discount merely because repeated to Father Wotherspoon – concern expressed about placing sensitive law enforcement information on public websites – starting point of 20 years with 1 year enhancement for international element, less one-third for guilty plea, resulting in 14 years' imprisonment, was 6 months below purely arithmetical calculation and demonstrated judge's awareness of mitigating factors.
Legal issues: Whether appellant entitled to further sentence discount for assistance to Father Wotherspoon's anti-drug campaign
Outcome: Appeal against sentence dismissed.
Cited by 13 cases · Cites 13 cases
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CACC 321/2018 [2021] HKCA 1132 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 321 OF 2018 (ON APPEAL FROM HCCC NO 204 OF 2018) ________________________
________________________ Before: Hon Macrae VP and Zervos JA in Court Date of Hearing: 15 July 2021 Date of Judgment: 15 July 2021 Date of Reasons for Judgment: 2 August 2021 ________________________________ R E A S O N S F O R J U D G M E N T ________________________________ Hon Macrae VP: 1.The appellant was charged with one count of trafficking in a dangerous drug, namely 816 grammes of a solid containing 691 grammes of cocaine, contrary to section 4(1)(a) and (3) of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, Cap 134. 2.Having pleaded guilty to the charge in the magistrate’s court, the appellant was committed to the High Court for plea and sentence before M Poon J (“the judge”) on 4 October 2018. On the same date, the appellant was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment. On 6 November 2018, she applied for leave to appeal against her sentence out of time. 3.At the hearing on 9 June 2020, the Single Judge[1] granted the appellant an extension of time for her application for leave to appeal against sentence. Further, at the hearing on 6 November 2020, the Single Judge granted her leave to appeal and an Appeal Aid Certificate[2]. The appellant was represented by counsel Mr John Hemmings, who appeared at the appeal but not the trial below. 4.At the hearing of the appeal, we dismissed the appeal and said we would hand down our reasons for so doing in due course. These are the reasons for our decision. The facts 5.On 21 November 2017, the appellant, who is a Kenyan National, arrived at Hong Kong International Airport on a flight from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. She was selected for Customs clearance. Notwithstanding that no contraband was found on her at that time, Customs officers suspected that she might have concealed dangerous drugs within her body. Accordingly, she was conveyed to North Lantau Hospital for medical examination. Whilst she was awaiting examination, the appellant admitted to the officers escorting her that she knew she had done something wrong and had drugs inside her stomach. She was immediately arrested and cautioned, whereupon she repeated that she had swallowed drugs but did not know what kind of drugs. She stated that she had swallowed 65 pellets of an unknown type of drugs whilst in Addis Ababa. 6.At the time of her arrest, the appellant was found in possession of US$2,570 and 678 Ethiopian birr (about HK$190) in cash, and two mobile telephones. Over the course of the next three days, the appellant discharged 64 pellets of cocaine, in the quantities particularised in the count in the indictment. The street value of the cocaine at the time was estimated to be HK$1,004,496. 7.In a subsequent cautioned interview, the appellant claimed that she had travelled from Kenya to Addis Ababa in Ethiopia on 16 October 2017, on the promise of employment. However, upon her arrival in Addis Ababa, she was brought to a hotel and instructed to swallow the pellets in question. On 20 October, she was taken to the airport to board a flight bound for Hong Kong. She said the US currency in her possession had been given to her so that she could demonstrate to anyone who might ask that she was visiting Hong Kong on business. 8.An examination of the appellant’s mobile telephone revealed WhatsApp conversations between herself and those with whom she had been dealing in Addis Ababa, and included messages sent by her concerning the proposed reward for the trip, as well as expressions of satisfaction towards the arrangements that had been made for her. Father Wotherspoon’s letter (dated 19 September 2018) 9.For the purpose of the appellant’s mitigation, Father John Wotherspoon had written a letter on her behalf, which set out her participation in his purported “campaign” against drug-trafficking. Since it lies at the heart of this appeal, it is worth reciting the relevant parts of that letter. Addressed to the High Court judge, it read:
The letter continued by detailing certain information the applicant had given, which Father Wotherspoon claimed had enabled him to “expand (his) profile” of two named individuals who were suspected to be drug traffickers. 10.He concluded the letter by making the following statements:
11.Notwithstanding the hearsay and assertive nature of the information contained in these passages letter, and the fact that the letter allegedly written by the appellant, and put onto the said website, was never produced at the leave hearing, leave was nevertheless granted on the basis that it was reasonably arguable that the applicant was deprived of a fair trial at her sentencing hearing[3]. The Chambers hearing 12.At the sentencing hearing on 4 October 2018, a 15-minute Chambers hearing was held immediately prior to mitigation being advanced, at the behest of defence counsel, Mr Carl Yuen, who was of the view that a Sivan hearing was necessary to protect the appellant who had given the authorities a non‑prejudicial statement[4]. Mr Gary Leung, for the prosecution, took a different view. He considered that a Sivan hearing was not necessary, since the information concerned matters outside Hong Kong and, in any event, there had been no positive outcome as a result[5]. 13.Accordingly, a Chambers hearing was held to determine if a Sivan hearing would be required. The hearing took place in closed court but in the absence of the appellant. In accordance with the usual practice, the judiciary recording system was turned off in order to preserve the confidentiality of the hearing. Regrettably, no other form of recording or note had been made by any party in respect of what took place at the Chambers hearing. 14.Considering that what transpired at this hearing might be relevant to the appellant’s ground of appeal, the Single Judge directed Mr Yuen[6], Mr Leung[7] and the trial solicitor, Mr Samuel Ho[8], to file affirmations with this Court setting out their recollections of what took place at or about the time of the Chambers hearing. 15.It is not necessary to set out the detail of what appears in these various affirmations. There was, however, a difference in recollection between Mr Yuen and Mr Ho on the one hand, and Mr Leung on the other, as to whether or not the mitigation letter of Father Wotherspoon had been produced to the judge at the Chambers hearing. Mr Yuen averred that the judge was reluctant to continue the hearing in Chambers and refused to accept that Father Wotherspoon’s letter amounted to any constructive assistance to the authorities. She had also commented that various mitigation letters had not been submitted in time, but she was prepared to allow Mr Yuen to summarise the gist of each letter during mitigation[9]. 16.For his part, Mr Leung confirmed that he had received a copy of Father Wotherspoon’s letter from Mr Yuen prior to the Chambers hearing. He recalled the judge querying the necessity of a Sivan hearing, but he could not remember Mr Yuen physically producing the letter from Father Wotherspoon at the Chambers hearing. Had there been a refusal by the judge to read or receive any particular documents, he would have made a record of that fact[10]. Mitigation 17.The appellant was a 38-year-old single mother with a clear record in Hong Kong, who was said to have been lured into committing the offence by her financial difficulties in Kenya. Her counsel submitted that during her remand in custody in Hong Kong, she had been active in talking about her faith amongst fellow inmates. It was further submitted that for the amount of cocaine involved, the starting point should be between 20 and 23 years’ imprisonment under the relevant guidelines, which, it was accepted, could be enhanced by 1 to 2 years for the international element of bringing the drugs across the border into Hong Kong. 18.In his concluding words in mitigation speech, Mr Yuen informed the court as follows[11]:
This was the only reference by counsel, according to the transcript of what took place in open court, to Father Wotherspoon. Reasons for sentence 19.The judge adopted a starting point of 20 years’ imprisonment, which she further enhanced by 1 year for the international element. She gave a full one-third discount for plea, resulting in a final sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment. The grounds of appeal 20.Mr Hemmings originally advanced two grounds of appeal but chose to focus on the second ground. His first complaint was directed at defence counsel’s alleged failure to file the letter of Father Wotherspoon before the sentencing of the appellant, on which matter there is an issue, as we have indicated, as to whether or not he actually produced the letter to the judge in the Chambers hearing. His second complaint is more concerned with the failure to refer to the contents of Father Wotherspoon’s letter, when he had been permitted to do so by the judge and allegedly instructed to do so by the appellant, thus depriving the appellant of potential mitigation which might have secured her a further, admittedly small, discount on the eventual sentence. 21.Mr Hemmings acknowledged that arithmetically the starting point for trafficking in the quantity of cocaine concerned could have been 20 years and 5 months’ imprisonment[12]; whilst for the international element, the sentence could have been enhanced by 1 year and 4 months’ imprisonment[13]. Instead, the appellant was given a starting point of 20 years’ imprisonment with an enhancement of 1 year’s imprisonment, thus resulting in a notional sentence after trial, which was in fact 9 months lower than it might have been; which in turn resulted in an ultimate sentence after plea that was 6 months lower than it might have been. Nevertheless, he submitted that those were the figures adopted by the judge and, if this Court was persuaded that the applicant should have been given a discount for her assistance to Father Wotherspoon’s campaign, then the sentence should still be reduced as a matter of principle, however slight that reduction might be. The respondent’s submission 22.Mr Andy Lo, on behalf of the respondent at this appeal, submitted that, since the Customs and Excise Department, having assessed the information provided by the appellant and the response from the relevant overseas law enforcement agencies, had come to the view that the information provided was of “no practical use”, the appellant was not entitled to any further discount. With this conclusion, he noted, Mr Hemmings had rightly taken no issue. If that were so, then it was hardly a principled approach to sentence to allow a discount for Father Wotherspoon’s claimed “assistance by Caroline to the authorities and to my campaign” when that same assistance was of no practical use to those same authorities. 23.As to whether there was the possibility of some slight residual benefit for assistance to Father Wotherspoon’s campaign, Mr Lo wondered how one was to assess such benefit when it was based on hearsay and the assertions of Father Wotherspoon. Moreover, the judge had already adopted a notional sentence after trial which was some 9 months lower than it might have been. Given that all sentencing judges in Hong Kong could not fail to be aware of Father Wotherspoon’s campaign, it should not be assumed that that the judge had not borne this factor in mind. It should be remembered that whether a judge gave any discount at all, bearing in mind that it could only ever be a “token” one, was a matter within “the absolute discretion of the court, an exercise with which this Court will not lightly interfere”[14]. Accordingly, any such token discount that might have been given specifically for assistance in Father Wotherspoon’s campaign was more than offset by the appellant’s receipt of a significantly lower sentence than she might otherwise have received. 24.Finally, Mr Lo pointed out that it was within defence counsel’s professional judgment whether he chose to refer to, and rely upon, Father Wotherspoon’s letter during mitigation. It was Mr Yuen’s view, as defence counsel at trial, that the contents of the letter were “not specific enough to warrant any reduction of sentence, at least at this early stage, and I so advised Ms Cherop accordingly”[15]. Moreover, by her signed instructions, dated 21 September 2018, the appellant had unequivocally agreed to “leave it to my Defence Counsel Mr Carl Yuen to decide whether to submit any of these documents (including Father Wotherspoon’s letter) to the High Court Judge for mitigation”[16]. As such, the appellant was bound by the way in which Mr Yuen conducted the case on her behalf. Discussion 25.In our judgment, there is no merit at all in this appeal. Quite apart from the question of whether the judge knew of the contents of Father Wotherspoon’s letter from the Chambers hearing or not, on which question there is a divergence of evidence, although this issue was ultimately of no relevance to the appeal argued by Mr Hemmings, the fact is that the appellant received a significantly lower sentence than she might otherwise have received on a strictly arithmetical application of guidelines to quantity. Ultimately, the overall sentence was 6 months lower than it could have been. The judge was clearly aware of Father Wotherspoon’s support for the appellant and his presence in court during mitigation because she was specifically told about these matters in open court. Whether the judge discounted the sentence for this factor or whether she did not, in the exercise of her absolute discretion, the fact is that the appellant received a sentence that was significantly lower than any discount for assisting Father Wotherspoon’s campaign would have produced. This Court is effectively now being asked to assume that the judge did not bear this matter in mind, and to tinker with a sentence which is acknowledged to have been lower than it should have been. A similar submission was made and rejected by this Court in HKSAR v Fundi Furaha Giles[17]. 26.It is, with respect, time to engender some reality, perspective and common sense into the question of assistance to Father Wotherspoon’s anti-drug campaign. When Father Wotherspoon’s name first emerged during mitigation several years ago, the courts were given to understand that he was encouraging prisoners to write letters concerning their experiences of how they came to be recruited and involved in drug trafficking for publication on a website(s) on the Internet so as to discourage others in their part of the world from taking the same dangerous and disastrous path. The prisoners were, for the most part, from impoverished backgrounds in Africa and South America, although a few were from Russia and satellite countries in the region. Sentencing courts responded by applauding these efforts and granting further discounts for participation in Father Wotherspoon’s campaign, although this quickly led to an unsatisfactory disparity in the discounts that were being given by different courts. 27.The campaign then seemed to take on a more proactive approach with Father Wotherspoon obtaining information and intelligence from prisoners himself and furnishing it to the authorities in Hong Kong and other foreign states. From time to time, we have been aware that he has himself gone to other countries in pursuit of leads which he did not feel were being properly followed up both here and in those countries. In one case, he travelled to Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia to see whether an alleged drug trafficker was still residing at a particular address, as alleged by two prisoners in his care[18]. More recently, he has attempted to put what he has been told onto various websites in order to “name and shame” alleged drug traffickers, so as to warn anybody who might look at these websites about involvement with certain identifiable individuals. Sometimes these have also involved placing photographs of alleged drug traffickers onto these websites. Indeed, Father Wotherspoon’s letter in the present case referred in terms to his own “name and shame anti-drug campaign” by purporting to identify two individuals who were allegedly trafficking in dangerous drugs, one of whose photographs was provided by the appellant. Moreover, he claimed that the appellant’s information had helped him to expand his profile of the alleged drug traffickers concerned. 28.It must, however, be remembered by all judges, both at trial and appellate level, that the criminal law deals with facts, evidence and proof: not with hearsay, assertion and innuendo. Because of the differing ways that judges were responding to Father Wotherspoon’s campaign efforts, this Court felt it necessary to forge a more consistent sentencing approach to them in HKSAR v Kilima Abubakar Abbas[19]. One of the central problems faced by the Court was how to characterise this aspect of mitigation. It seemed artificial to describe the writing of letters to Father Wotherspoon for publication on a website as ‘positive good character’, or the product of ‘remorse’. In reality, the prisoner would understandably do whatever was necessary to get a reduction in sentence. Nevertheless, it was recognised that the encouragement of these efforts was still in the ‘public interest’. 29.One of the particular concerns voiced by the Court in Kilima Abubakar Abbas was how a court could sensibly assess the value of a particular individual’s contribution to Father Wotherspoon’s campaign. Lunn VP put the matter in this way[20]:
30.On this issue, Macrae VP commented[23]:
Macrae VP went on to observe that the figures of arrests from different countries could also be misleading, since experience had shown that “syndicates do not rigidly recruit their couriers from one country but use nationals from different countries, even different continents, if only to throw the authorities in Hong Kong off the scent”[24]. 31.There were other concerns discussed in the various judgments of the Court in Kilima Abubakar Abbas. It was noted, for example, that given the concentration of effort in respect of prisoners principally from Africa and South America, other prisoners from Europe or Asia were not being afforded the same advantage in reduction in sentence because there was no facility for them to assist Father Wotherspoon’s campaign. In particular, it was wondered why “mainland couriers who traffic drugs across the land or sea borders into Hong Kong should be deprived of that concession or advantage”[25]. 32.In the present case, Father Wotherspoon’s letter on behalf of the appellant made a similar claim to that made by the applicant in Kilima Abubakar Abbas, when he suggested that the publicity generated by the appellant’s contribution to his campaign had been a factor which had led to a supposed reduction in the numbers of drug traffickers from Africa. With respect, this kind of speculative assertion, without more, has little utility in the sentencing exercise. Defence counsel in the court below was entirely correct to say that, in his view, the letter “was not specific enough to warrant any reduction of sentence”. 33.It is to be noted that nowhere in Father Wotherspoon’s letter was there any reference to, or copy of, any letter(s) the appellant had supposedly written for publication on the website concerned, which the Court had always understood was the original purpose of his campaign. Certainly, that was the Court’s understanding in Kilima Abubakar Abbas. Nor was any such letter produced at the hearing before the Single Judge, or before this Court. All that Father Wotherspoon’s letter appears to contain are assertions of information that the appellant had given to him about two alleged drug traffickers, which was the same information the Customs and Excise Department had been given but had judged to be of no practical use. We fail to see how a sentencing judge could conceivably have given the appellant any recognition for information which was of no practical use, and which is now accepted was of no practical use, simply because it was repeated to Father Wotherspoon and put by him on a website. 34.In the recent case of HKSAR v Herry Jane Yusuph[26], the question of how assistance to Father Wotherspoon’s campaign was to be treated was further discussed. The Court said this[27]:
35.The Court went on to emphasise a point which we feel we must again reiterate[28]:
36.In Fundi Furaha Giles, the same presently constituted Court again noted that all the trial judge had been told in mitigation was that the applicant had written “a couple of letters” which had been posted on an East African Internet blog by Father Wotherspoon, and which were said to have attracted considerable correspondence and comment. We remarked then that we did not think the judge should have “considered anything more than a very token discount at most for this factor in this case”[29]. On reflection, without even a sight of these purported letters, we consider our assessment to have been generous. 37.In the course of the discussion before us, we questioned the wisdom of a so-called “name and shame” campaign where there was an ongoing criminal investigation or operation by a domestic or foreign law enforcement agency. To have alleged drug traffickers publically named, and their purported photographs publicised, when the authorities are undertaking the delicate, sensitive and sometimes dangerous task of obtaining covert evidence in a wider criminal investigation into drug trafficking or other offences could well be extremely deleterious to law enforcement operations, whether in Hong Kong or any other country. It seems to us a matter of particular public concern if sensitive information is being placed in the public domain by the unskilled amateur, however well-intentioned, rather than the professional law enforcement agent. We do not in any way wish to undermine the giving of pastoral care and spiritual comfort to those in prison who may be far away from their homes and families. However, we question whether the collection and proliferation of information in order to propagate a “name and shame” campaign on an international forum is either a wise or prudent course; or, indeed, whether it properly comes within the terms of reference of a prison chaplain. 38.In the recent decision of HKSAR v Omogo Stephen Okuta[30], Zervos JA voiced a different but related concern about the obtaining and misuse of information, and the difficulty which Father Wotherspoon’s wider ‘campaign’ may sometimes place law enforcement agencies and the courts:
39.For these reasons, it is vitally important that judges, at both trial and appellate level, treat submissions that a defendant/appellant has contributed to Father Wotherspoon’s campaign with realism, perspective and common sense and with a firm grasp of sentencing practice, procedure and principle. In the context of appeals, that means that any attempt to introduce such material should meet the requirements of section 83V of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap 221 and is properly adduced as evidence, not assertion, innuendo and anecdote. For their part, prosecutors are reminded that they have a duty to see that material which does not in their view meet these requirements is properly addressed, rather than admitted informally in letter form without demur; unless, of course, they are prepared to admit such evidence. 40.Defence counsel also have a duty to ensure that what they are putting forward by way of mitigation is properly adduced. Mr Yuen took a certain view of the material contained in Father Wotherspoon’s letter and, it seems to us, he was entirely correct in his assessment and cannot be criticised for it. Judges too have a duty to ensure that material is properly produced before them before they can act upon it. 41.Affirmations were prepared and placed before this Court by Mr Yuen and Mr Ho (and Mr Lai), who were all also ordered to attend before this Court. In the event, given the entirely sensible approach of Mr Hemmings, this proved unnecessary. However, since Mr Yuen and Mr Ho have each been required to prepare affirmations to explain the situation at trial and their actions, we wish to make clear that there can be no criticism whatsoever made of their conduct. It can readily be seen that both acted with commendable care and concern for the lay client and her family. Indeed, for some three weeks after the hearing, the appellant was continuing to write to Mr Yuen, all of which communications were dutifully forwarded to the appellant’s family. 42.In Herry Jane Yusuph, which was the comprehensive attempt of senior judges of both the Chinese and English divisions of this Court to unify the approach to sentencing in drug trafficking cases, we concluded our judgment, in respect of appeals concerning discount for assistance to Father Wotherspoon’s campaign, with this statement[31]:
As any perusal of reported and unreported judgments of this Court over the last few years will amply demonstrate, there have been a great many appeals against sentence involving international couriers complaining in one way or another about the discount that was or was not given for their assistance in Father Wotherspoon’s campaign. It is time that this issue was brought under control, mindful that numerous different judges of this Court, including the Court in Kilima Abubakar Abbas, have already repeatedly said that these are matters, because of their ongoing nature, which are best left to the Executive[32]. Unfortunately, the Court’s judgment in Herry Jane Yusuph was not delivered until some two weeks after leave had been granted in this case. Nevertheless, we repeat that we hope this will be the last time that we entertain appeals on the question of discount for assistance in Father Wotherspoon’s campaign. 43.That is not to say that a token discount cannot still be given for assistance to Father Wotherspoon’s campaign as was envisaged by the Court in Kilima Abubakar Abbas. However, we wish to emphasise that judges should not rely on hearsay, anecdote and mere assertions of usefulness but must look at the letter(s) (properly adduced) that have been written by a defendant or applicant pursuant to this campaign, and consider the substance of what is said, as well as when and how the letters have been written, if they are properly to act on them in the exercise of their discretion. Otherwise, the complaints of inconsistency of approach at first instance will continue to bedevil the appellate courts. 44.We also wish to stress that a discount of up to three months is neither automatic, nor is it an entitlement: indeed, three months represents the limit of what might be given for this factor and is to be regarded as exceptional. Judges are perfectly entitled in the exercise of their discretion to give no discount for this factor at all; just as this Court said it would not have given any such discount in Herry Jane Yusuph. Where the assistance is rendered to Father Wotherspoon’s campaign after sentence has been passed, then it is a matter more properly to be addressed by the Executive. 45.Accordingly, it was for these reasons that we dismissed the appellant’s appeal against sentence. We nevertheless wish to record our thanks to both counsel at this appeal for their helpful and realistic submissions in this matter. Hon Zervos JA: 46.I have read the judgment of Macrae VP and agree with it. I wish to add these comments. In the course of the hearing of the present appeal, I made the observation as to whether the discount given to the sentence of a convicted drug trafficker for his or her participation in Father Wotherspoon’s anti-drug campaign, has to some extent developed in order to compensate for the high sentencing guidelines imposed on low-level participants in the trafficking of drugs, such as couriers. 47.It has been said that the sentencing tariffs for low-level participants in the trafficking of drugs are too severe and are already at such high levels that practically no meaningful distinction can be achieved when sentencing a minor offender and a major offender involved in trafficking a large quantity of drugs. See HKSAR v Kilima Abubakar Abbas[33], at [148]. 48.We often see convicted drug couriers participate in Father Wotherspoon’s campaign in an effort to obtain some further reduction in their sentences. It has been held that a defendant’s remorse or contrition for having committed a crime is normally subsumed in the discount given for his or her plea of guilty. See Secretary for Justice v Lee Chun Ho Jeef[34], at [37]. For a defendant to receive any further discount on his or her sentence, something additional needs to be shown that falls within one of the accepted categories of mitigation, such as rendering assistance of practical use to the authorities. In some cases, participants in Father Wotherspoon’s campaign go further by providing information to the authorities but it would appear that the information mainly consists of identifying persons in other countries who either got them involved in smuggling the drugs or are generally known to be involved in the drugs trade. Whether the information is of practical use very much depends on the assessment of it by the relevant authorities. This is a sensitive and complex process in respect of which the courts rely on the relevant authorities to make the assessment of the assistance given. We have addressed the issue of disputed assistance rendered to the authorities in HKSAR v Yeung Hoi Ting[35]. 49.As a result of the generalised nature of Father Wotherspoon’s campaign and its broad objective of promoting awareness of the serious deleterious consequences to persons involved in the smuggling of drugs into Hong Kong, it is difficult to discern the actual role or contribution, if any, of a participant in the campaign. This is so for two main reasons. 50.First, it is increasingly hard to accept that persons from third world countries in Africa and South America do not already appreciate, to a greater or lesser degree, the dangers of being involved in the drugs trade, given it is obviously a global problem that is constantly publicised and tackled in most domestic jurisdictions. This is particularly so because of modern forms of communication that are now available and the flow of information that occurs, even in impoverished countries. In fact, Father Wotherspoon operates his campaign through various websites on the Internet in order to convey his message to people abroad. In the cases that have come before the courts in Hong Kong, the role of the international courier is extensive, generally involving the swallowing of a large number of pellets containing the drugs and embarking on a series of flights through several countries before arriving into Hong Kong. In those circumstances, a courier would not fail to appreciate the gravity of his or her conduct and the serious consequences that would follow upon their apprehension by the authorities. 51.Secondly, the letters submitted to a court in mitigation on behalf of a defendant as to his or her participation and assistance in Father Wotherspoon’s campaign are often expressed in broad and general terms. Sometimes information is provided but in such a way that is unclear as to the provenance and accuracy of it. It is fundamental that any matter advanced in mitigation should be properly placed before the court and based on credible and reliable information. 52.The subject of sentencing is very complex and it needs to be appreciated that even if a mitigating factor has been shown to be present, it does not automatically entitle a defendant to receive an allowance for it. In his seminal text, Principles of Sentencing (2nd Ed), Professor D A Thomas states, at p 194:
53.As held by this Court, it is within the discretion of a sentencing court to afford a defendant a small additional sentencing discount for his or her participation in Father Wotherspoon’s campaign. It is a discretionary matter that will depend upon an appropriate assessment being made by the sentencing court as to whether or not it should be given. If it is given, it will be, as was described by this Court, a token discount. See Kilima Abubakar Abbas, at [65]-[67] and [91]. 54.This ultimately raises for consideration whether the real issue is the scale and scope of the sentencing guidelines for low-level participants in drug trafficking cases. This has been partly addressed by this Court in HKSAR v Herry Jane Yusuph[36], in which emphasis was placed on the need to take into account the role and culpability of the offender in drug trafficking cases when applying the sentencing guidelines. 55.It has been argued in the past that the sentencing guidelines for couriers are manifestly disproportionate for the criminality involved, and as a result are exceedingly high and severe. While attempts have been made to address this issue, the challenges have so far failed to present sound legal argument and reliable empirical data to support the submissions advanced against the current sentencing guidelines for couriers and storekeepers involved in drug trafficking. See Kilima Abubakar Abbas, at [54], [73]-[76] and [147]- [148]; and HKSAR v Godson Ugochukwu Okoro[37], at [51]. In this regard, it is imperative not to lose sight of the overriding objective of a sentencing regime, which is to ensure that the sentence must not be more severe than is justified by the gravity of the offence and the culpability and circumstances of the offender.
Mr Andy Lo SPP, of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent Mr John Hemmings, instructed by Massie & Clement, assigned by the Director of Legal Aid, for the Appellant [1] McWalters JA. [2] HKSAR v Cherop Caroline [2020] HKCA 918 (Reasons for judgment: 11 November 2020), per McWalters JA. [3] Ibid., at [36]. [4] Mr Yuen’s affirmation, at [23], [24]. [5] Mr Leung’s affirmation, LYH-3. At that stage, the Customs and Excise Department had already contacted the foreign agencies with the information provided by the applicant; see, for example, the affirmation of SIP Lam Miu-chu Philme, at "LMC-1" to "LMC-3". The understanding at that time was that no positive result was forthcoming. [6] By the direction of McWalters JA dated 9 June 2020. [7] By the direction of McWalters JA dated 1 September 2020. [8] By the direction of McWalters JA dated 6 November 2020. [9] Mr Yuen’s affirmation, at [31]. [10] Mr Leung’s affirmation, at [12(3)]. [11] AB, p 10I-K. [12] On a strictly arithmetical calculation, the starting point should have been 20 years and 5.46 months’ imprisonment. [13] On a strictly arithmetical calculation, the enhancement should have been 1 year and 4.58 months’ imprisonment. [14] HKSAR v Kilima Abubakar Abbas [2018] 5 HKLRD 88, at [91]. [15] Mr Yuen’s affirmation, at [22]. [16] “YHC – 4” at p 1, as attached to Mr Yuen’s affirmation. [17] HKSAR v Fundi Furaha Giles (Unrep., CACC 82/2017, 1 February 2019), at [24]-[25]. [18] HKSAR v Ilmayanti (Dewi) [2019] 4 HKLRD 1. [19] HKSAR v Kilima Abubakar Abbas [2018] 5 HKLRD 88. [20] Ibid., at [66]. [21] HKSAR v Odira Sharon Lensa [2016] 5 HKLRD 249, at [50]-[51]. [22] HKSAR v Akinyi Grace Sylvia (Unrep., CACC 324/2015, 5 May 2016), at [39]. [23] Kilima Abubakar Abbas, at [89]. [24] Ibid., at [90]. [25] Ibid., at [90]. [26] HKSAR v Herry Jane Yusuph [2021] 1 HKLRD 290. [27] Ibid, at [124]-[125]. [28] Ibid., at [126]. [29] Fundi Furaha Giles, at [23]. [30] HKSAR v Omogo Stephen Okuta (Unrep., CACC 66/2019, 9 April 2021), at [66]. [31] Herry Jane Yusuph, at [127]. [32] HKSAR v Odira Sharon Lensa [2016] 5 HKLRD 249, at [50]-[51] per McWalters JA; HKSAR v Akinyi Grace Sylvia (Unrep., CACC 324/2015, 5 May 2016), at [36] per McWalters JA; and Kilima Abubakar Abbas, at [66] per Lunn VP; at [91] per Macrae VP; HKSAR v Kisamo Diana Semali [2019] 1 HKLRD 256, at [13] per Pang JA; HKSAR v Camara Aboubacar (Unrep., CACC 353/2017, 20 March 2019), at [20] per Zervos JA. [33] HKSAR v Kilima Abubakar Abbas [2018] 5 HKLRD 88. [34] Secretary for Justice v Lee Chun Jeef [2010] 1 HKLRD 84. [35] HKSAR v Yeung Hoi Ting [2019] 3 HKLRD 516. [36] HKSAR v Herry Jane Yusuph [2021] 1 HKLRD 290. [37] HKSAR v Godson Ugochukwu Okoro [2019] 2 HKLRD 451. |
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