Hossain Saddam v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 490/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 6 August 2021.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to file the application for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 24 March 2021 (“ the Director’s Decision ”) refusing his application for a subsequent claim of HCAL 756 of 2017 (the “ original claim ”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“ the Ordinance ”).
Cites 5 cases
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HCAL 490/2021 [2021] HKCFI 2263 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 490 of 2021 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to file the application for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 24 March 2021 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his application for a subsequent claim of HCAL 756 of 2017 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“the Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Bangladesh. He raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department on 17 May 2013 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance. The Director rejected his claim and he appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). His appeal was dismissed by the Board on 24 March 2014. 4.He then made claim on BOR 2 risk, Right to Life risk under Article 2 of the Bills of Right Ordinance; the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. His claim on other grounds was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 11 December 2015 and Notice of Further Decision dated 26 June 2017. 5.He appealed to the Torture Claim Board (“the Board”). By its Decision dated 29 December 2017, the Board rejected his appeal. 6.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was rejected by the Court by its Order dated 10 August 2018 (the “Court’s Order”). 7.He appealed against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal and his application was dismissed on 28 January 2019. 8.He applied for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal and his application was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 31 May 2019. 9.He applied for leave to the Court of Final Appeal to appeal the Court of Appeal’s decision and his application was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 8 June 2020. 10.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter dated 15 June 2020. 11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 12.The factual basis of his claim is that if he is refouled to Bangladesh, he will be harmed or killed by the supporters of the Chhatra League or the Awami League (“AL”) because he was a member of Chartra Shibir, the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami Party. He also feared that he would be harmed or killed by a man called Rocky, who blamed him for the death of his brother. The Director found that the level of risk of him being harmed or killed by the supporter of AL or by Rocky, if he returned to Bangladesh, was low; that state protection would be available to him and that internal relocation was an option open to him. 13.The Board found that there was no evidence to show that the state was involved. It further found that the nature of injuries he allegedly suffered from the attack by Chartra League failed to attain the minimum level of severity and he faced no genuine or substantial risk of being subjected to ill-treatment if he returned to Bangladesh. The Board also affirmed the Direction’s Decisions. 14.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success. 15.The applicant relies upon the following new circumstances as he was told by his friend in Bangladesh:
16.The Director rejected his grounds as the information was from his friend, who obtained the information from the newspaper. The Director also found that his fear of the AL supporters was the same issue in his original claim, which had been duly considered and therefore the information above did not constitute significant change of circumstances that would give his subsequent claim reasonable prospect of success. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 17.The applicant has filed an affirmation and raised the following grounds in support of his application.
18.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. 19.In Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:
20.Ground a is his opinion only. Ground b is irrelevant because it is not necessary for the Director to go to Bangladesh to understand the situation there. He may rely upon the origin of country information compiled by other countries, which he did. There is no valid ground from the applicant to challenge the Director’s Decision. 21.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 22.Since there is no reasonable prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The Restricted Proceeding Order 23.In accordance with Practice Direction 11.3, RPO should be made under the following circumstances:
24.As shown by the procedural history above, it is plain that the applicant refused to accept the unfavourable decisions made by the Director, the Board and the courts. 25.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his claim for a subsequent claim, categorically fitting in the description of
26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretarty for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2002] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129. 27.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. The Court should take preventive measures against any abuse. 28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why a RPO should not be made against him. The applicant has been explained the proposed RPO by the court interpreter outside this court before hearing. 29.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant said that he understood the contents of the RPO and he had nothing to say. 30.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings on the same facts for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 31.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 32.A RPO in terms of paragraph 30 be made against the applicant. Dated the 6th day of August 2021
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (1997-1998) 1 HKCFAR 72, §48 [2] Ibid §§7 & 8 |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCAL 490/2021