Karamjeet Singh v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 511/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 12 August 2021.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to file the application for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 19 March 2021 (“ the Director’s Decision ”) refusing his application for a subsequent claim of HCAL 1009 of 2017 (the “ original claim ”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“ the Ordinance ”).
Cites 5 cases
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HCAL 511/2021 [2021] HKCFI 2304 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 511 of 2021 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to file the application for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 19 March 2021 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his application for a subsequent claim of HCAL 1009 of 2017 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“the Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from India. He raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department on 10 March 2016 on the grounds of Torture risk under section 37U (1) of the Ordinance, BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bills of Right Ordinance; the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 4.By the Director’s Decision dated 9 September 2016 and the Director’s Further Decision dated 2 June 2017, the Director rejected his claim on all the risks and he appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board. His appeal was dismissed by the Board’s Decision dated 27 November 2017 (the “Board’s Decision”). 5.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was rejected by the Court by its Order dated 4 December 2018 (the “Court’s Order”). 6.His appeal against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on 2 April 2019. 7.His motion of appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 4 June 2019. 8.His application for leave to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 13 May 2020. 9.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter dated 1 June 2020. 10.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 11.The factual basis of his claim is that if he is refouled to India, he would be harmed or killed by his paternal uncle’s wife, her brothers and associates because he had a land dispute with them. 12.The Director found that there was no ground for believing that he would be so subjected to the risks; that there was no evidence that the state was involved; that state protection would be available to him and that internal relocation was an option open to him. 13.The Board agreed with the Director and rejected his appeal on the same grounds. 14.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success. 15.The applicant relies upon the following new circumstances and he had produced some documents in support of his case:
16.The Director rejected his grounds for the reasons that the incidents originated from his original clam; that state protection was still available to him and that internal relocation was still an option open to him. The application for leave to file judicial review application 17.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application and set out his grounds as follows:
18.The Court will bear in mind that the Board’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. 19.In Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:
20.The grounds in support of his application are his comments or opinions without any specific evidence in support of them. The Director was entitled to make the assessment of the evidence and may come to his conclusions as he did. 21.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 22.Since there is no reasonable prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The Restricted Proceeding Order 23.In accordance with Practice Direction 11.3, RPO should be made under the following circumstances:
24.As shown by the procedural history above, it is plain that the applicant refused to accept the unfavourable decisions made by the Director, the Board and the courts. His reasons in support of his subsequent claim are clearly insufficient to overcome the reasons given by the Director and the Board in rejecting his claim. He should be well aware of those reasons himself. 25.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his claim for a subsequent claim, categorically fitting in the description of
26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretarty for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2002] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021 paragraph 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129 paragraph 25. 27.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. The Court should take preventive measures against any abuse. 28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why a RPO should not be made against him. The applicant has been explained the proposed RPO by the court interpreter outside this court before hearing. 29.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant said that he had nothing to say. 30.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings on the same facts for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 31.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 32.A RPO in terms of paragraph 30 be made against the applicant. Dated the 12th day of August 2021
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (1997-1998) 1 HKCFAR 72, §48 [2] Ibid §§7 & 8 |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCAL 511/2021