Fadya Kholyqumina Rizky v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 730/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 14 September 2021.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 16 April 2021 (the “ Director’s Decision ”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 708 of 2018 (the “ original claim ”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “ Ordinance ”).
Cites 7 cases
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HCAL 730/2021 [2021] HKCFI 2553 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 730 of 2021 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 16 April 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 708 of 2018 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Indonesia. She raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department by written representation received on 15 October 2015 and written representations dated 12 October 2015, 19 October 2015 and 27 October 2015 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance; BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance; the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 4.Her claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 9 September 2016 and Notice of Further Decision dated 8 August 2017. 5.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 6 April 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board rejected her appeal. 6.She applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was rejected by the Court by its Order dated 9 January 2019 (the “Court’s Order”). 7.She appealed against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal and her application was refused by the Court of Appeal on 7 May 2019. 8.Her Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 14 June 2019. 9.Her application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 12 August 2020. 10.She applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter dated 9 September 2020. 11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application. The subsequent claim application 12.The factual basis of her claim is that if she is refouled, she will be harmed or killed by the wife of a money lender, who found out about his plan to marry her as his second wife. She also fears the death threat from her father because she refused to marry the money lender. 13.The Director found that her claim was not substantiated. He found that the level of her being harmed or killed if she returned to Indonesia was assessed to be low; that state protection was available to her and that internal relocation was an option open to her. 14.The Board agreed with the Director. The Board also found that her evidence was inconsistent and implausible to believe and that she was unable to provide any explanation for the deficiencies. As a result, the Board rejected her alleged facts in support of her claim, including the money lender, her father’s maltreatment and considered that she had manufactured her story in order to prolong her stay in Hong Kong. 15.Under section 37 ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 16.She relied upon the information from her nephew that the debt had not been settled and her father had borrowed more money. The Director found that she had submitted no cogent evidence in support of her request for subsequent claim. 17.The Director rejected her grounds in support of her subsequent claim for the reasons that the information was hearsay evidence from her nephew, which could not be tested. The Director does not accept those are significant change of circumstances, which coupled with the original claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 18.The applicant has filed an affirmation with which she had annexed the Director’s Decision without specifying any grounds in support of her application. 19.At the hearing before me, the applicant asked the Court to allow her more time to stay in Hong Kong. 20.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. 21.In Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:
22.Her submissions in Court do not advance her case. 23.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 24.Since there is no reasonable prospect of success in her subsequent claim, I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The Restricted Proceedings Order 25.In accordance with Practice Direction 11.3, RPO should be made under the following circumstances:
26.As shown by the procedural history above, it is plain that the applicant refused to accept the unfavourable decisions made by the Director, the Board and the courts. 27.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her claim for a subsequent claim, categorically fitting the description of
The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) and the extended order against her.[2] 28.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, §9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, §25. 29.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. The Court should take preventive measures against any abuse. 30.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why a RPO should not be made against her. The applicant has been explained the proposed RPO by the court interpreter outside this court before hearing. 31.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the applicant said she wanted to stay longer. 32.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings on the same facts for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 33.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 34.A RPO in terms of paragraph 32 be made against the applicant. Dated the 14th day of September 2021
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1, §48 [2] Ibid §§7 & 8 |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCAL 730/2021