Miah Mohammad Shamim v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 665/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 6 August 2021.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 16 April 2021 (“ the Director’s Decision ”) refusing his application for a subsequent claim of HCAL 226 of 2017 (the “ original claim ”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“ the Ordinance ”).
Cites 5 cases
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HCAL 665/2021 [2021] HKCFI 2265 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 665 of 2021 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 16 April 2021 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his application for a subsequent claim of HCAL 226 of 2017 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“the Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Bangladesh. He raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department on 1 March 2014 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance, the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention and BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bills of Right Ordinance. 4.His claim was rejected by the Director by Notice of Decision dated 21 January 2016 on the Torture risk, BOR3 risk and Persecution risk and Notice of Further Decision dated 21 June 2017 on the BOR 2 risk. 5.He appealed to the Torture Claim Board (“the Board”) against the Director’s Notice of Decision only. By its Decision dated 15 May 2017 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board rejected his appeal. 6.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was rejected by the Court by its Order dated 10 August 2018 (the “Court’s Order”). 7.He appealed against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal and his appeal was dismissed on 28 January 2019. 8.He applied for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal and his application was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 15 April 2019. 9.He appealed against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal and his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 22 July 2020 10.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter dated 27 July 2020. 11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 12.The factual basis of his claim is that if he is refouled to Bangladesh, he will be harmed or killed by (i) the supporters of the Awami League (“AL”) and the Bangladesh Chhatra League due to his affiliation to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”); (ii) his neighbour for causing him wounds in an argument over a land dispute; (iii) his money-lender for failing to repay the loan and (iv) the false accusation of murder or engaging terrorist activities filed by his political enemies in Bangladesh. 13.The Director found that the level of risk of him being harmed or killed if he returned to Bangladesh, was low; that there was no evidence to show that state protection would not be available to him and that internal relocation was an option open to him. 14.The Board found that there was no evidence to show that the state was involved. It further found that state protection would be available to him if he returned to Bangladesh. 15.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success. 16.The applicant relies upon the following new circumstances supported by documents submitted by his legal representative:
17.The Director rejected his grounds. The first ground only relates to his brother, not to him personally. The second ground was not mentioned in his original claim. The Director did not accept his explanation that he was unaware that he should mention it because he had been notified to give all his reasons in support of his claim. The Director also refused to accept his evidence because there were inconsistencies and contradictions in his evidence, for which he was unable to give satisfactory explanation. 18.The immigration officer accepted that there had been significant change of circumstances since his previous claim was finally determined. However, the immigration officer did not accept that such circumstances would give his subsequent claim realistic prospect of success. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 19.The applicant has filed an affirmation and attached the Director’s Decision to it without specifying any ground in support of his application. 20.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. 21.In Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:
22.The Director has rejected his first ground because it had nothing to do with him. The Director rejected his second ground because he did not mention it in his original claim. 23.Although the Director considers that there are significant changes of the circumstances after the determination of the original claim, those changes are no more than excuses for his subsequent claim because such changes will not alter the fact found in the original claim, that is, state protection would be available to him and internal relocation is an option open to him as found by the Director. The applicant should be well aware of this as he was legally represented for his subsequent claim application. 24.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 25.Since there is no reasonable prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The Restricted Proceeding Order 26.In accordance with Practice Direction 11.3, RPO should be made under the following circumstances:
27.As shown by the procedural history above, it is plain that the applicant refused to accept the unfavourable decisions made by the Director, the Board and the courts. 28.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his claim for a subsequent claim, categorically fitting in the description of
29.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretarty for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2002] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129. 30.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. The Court should take preventive measures against any abuse. 31.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why a RPO should not be made against him. The applicant has been explained the proposed RPO by the court interpreter outside this court before hearing. 32.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant said that he understood the contents of the RPO, but he had nothing to say. 33.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings on the same facts for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 34.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 35.A RPO in terms of paragraph 33 be made against the applicant. Dated the 6th day of August 2021
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (1997-1998) 1 HKCFAR 72, §48 [2] Ibid §§7 & 8 |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCAL 665/2021