Ilyas Muhammad v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 763/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 7 September 2021.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to file the application for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 10 May 2021 (“ the Director’s Decision ”) refusing his application for a subsequent claim of HCAL 1069 of 2017 (the “ original claim ”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“ the Ordinance ”)
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HCAL 763/2021 [2021] HKCFI 2613 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 763 of 2021 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to file the application for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 10 May 2021 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his application for a subsequent claim of HCAL 1069 of 2017 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“the Ordinance”) 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Pakistan. He raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department on 7 December 2013 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance, the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention and subsequently on BOR 2 risk, Right of Life risk under Article 2 of the Bills of Right Ordinance. 4.His claim was rejected by the Director by Notice of Decision dated 29 June 2016 and Notice of Further Decision dated 27 July 2017. 5.He appealed to the Torture Claim Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 8 December 2017, the Board rejected his appeal. 6.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was rejected by the Court by its Order dated 20 November 2018. 7.He appealed against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal and his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 1 March 2019. 8.He applied by notice of motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal and his application was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 12 April 2019. 9.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 20 April 2020. 10.He applied to the Director for subsequent claim by letter 1 June 2020 and was rejected by the Director’s Decision. The subsequent claim application 11.The factual basis of his original claim is that if he is refouled, he will be harmed or killed by the people from an opposition political party, the Pakistan Muslim League (N) (“PML-N”) because he had been a supporter of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (“PTI”). 12.The Director found that the level of risk of him being harmed or killed by PML-N if he returned to Pakistan was assessed to be low; that state protection would be available to him and that internal relocation was an option open to him. 13.The Board affirmed the Director’s Decision. The Board further found that he was never inflicted with any serious injuries and he was not a particular target of the PML-N members. The Board also agreed with the Director that state protection was available to him and internal relocation was an option open to him. 14.Under section 37 ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 15.The applicant relies upon the fact that his wife told him that the PML-N members are still looking for him. He is therefore still apprehensive about returning to Pakistan as there is a risk the he would be harmed or killed. 16.The immigration officer has considered his circumstances and disagrees that those are the changed circumstances since his original claim was finally determined. This means he is re-litigating his original claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision 17.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application. He enclosed the Director’s Decision without specifying any ground in support of his application. He subsequently filed a statement dated 23 August 2021 to the court, in which he set out his grounds in support of his application summarized below.
18.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Board complied with the public law requirements in coming to its Decision on the applicant’s appeal. The Court will not usurp the fact finding power vested in the Director and the Board. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC, 526, CA. §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 19.The Court will bear in mind that the Board’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. 20.The Director has adopted a holistic approach in the assessment of the applicant’s subsequent claim. Those grounds above are the applicant’s comments on the Director without specific evidence in support of them. The main facts of his original claim had been considered and assessed by reference to the COI already. 21.The Director is entitled to reach his conclusion after considering his evidence as he did in this case. The applicant has raised no valid challenge to the Director’s Decision or finding of the fact. 22.It is quite clear that the applicant is re-litigating his original claim in his subsequent claim application. According to the Director, the incidents after the determination of the original claim are the continuation of the facts in the original claim. I agree. 23.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 24.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 25.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 27.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 29.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant asked the Court to re-consider his case. 30.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 31.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 32.RPO in terms of paragraph 30 be made against the applicant. Dated the 7th day of September 2021
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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