Dinh Van Hoc v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 266/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 25 April 2023.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 9 February 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1447 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
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HCAL 266/2023 [2023] HKCFI 1051 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 266 of 2023
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 9 February 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1447 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.This Form CALL-1 is written in English despite of the fact that the Director’s Decision was written in Chinese. This is because the applicant has submitted his affirmation in support of his application in English, which means he can understand English. 3.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 4.The applicant appeared before the Court on 22 March 2023. The procedural history 5.The applicant is a national of Vietnam. He came to Hong Kong illegally and surrendered to the Immigration Department on 27 April 2015. On the same day, he lodged his non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds of Torture risk[1], the BOR 3 risk[2], the Persecution risk[3] and the BOR 2 risk. 6.By Notice of Decision dated 14 October 2016 (“the Director’s Decision”), the Director refused his claim on the above risks. 7.His appeal of the Director’s Decision to the Board was dismissed by the Board’s Decision on 25 June 2018. 8.His application to the Court of the First Instance for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance on 25 March 2021 “(the Court’s Order”). 9.His appeal against the Court’s Order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 4 October 2021. 10.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 6 May 2022. 11.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 2 December 2022. 12.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 12 December 2022. 13.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 14.The applicant’s previous claim was based on his allegations that if he returned to Vietnam, he would be harmed or even killed by his creditor because he is unable to repay a loan of 400 million Vietnamese currency for his failed importing garment business from China. 15.The Director found that his previous claim was not substantiated. 16.The applicant’s appeal to the Board against the Director’s Decision was dismissed for the reasons that the applicant was absent at the hearing before the Board, which, after giving due notice to him and for his continued absence, assessed the merits of his case. The Board found that his creditor had no intention of killing him and there was no real risk for him to return to Vietnam as state protection was available to him and internal relocation was a viable option open to him. 17.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 18.For his application for his subsequently claim, the applicant had submitted his statement. As the applicant admitted before this Court that he relies upon the same facts in support of his previous for his application for subsequent claim, it is unnecessary to set out the details of his statement. 19.The Director found that the applicant had failed to submit additional materials, which when considered together with his previous clam, would give him a reasonable chance of success for his subsequent claim. The Director therefore dismissed the applicant’s subsequent claim application. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 20.The applicant has filed an affirmation in which he said that the Director’s Decision was biased without taking into account his right to life. The Director has also placed too much reliance on the country of origin information, without taking into consideration his personal background. The Director was also wrong not to accept his explanations and unreasonably required him to answer questions that he was not in a position to offer any response. The Director’s attitude is unfair and he has not attained the higher standards of fairness in assessing his case. DISCUSSION 21.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1). 22.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said that he understands the Director’s reasons for rejecting his subsequent claim. However, he admitted that he had relied upon the same facts in his previous claim in support of his subsequent claim application. 23.In Re: Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:
24.The reasons stated in his affirmation fall apart as he had admitted in court that he relied on the same facts in his previous claim in support of his present application. Under the circumstances, his application is an abuse of the process. The Director is right to stop him for abusing the legal process. Those grounds are only general assertions and comments without any evidence in support. In fact, the applicant was absent before the Board. He cannot complain that he was not given any chance to give explanations to the Board. 25.Therefore, there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim. I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 26.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 27.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 28.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 29.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. Upon my enquiry of what comments he had on the intended RPO, he said he had nothing to say. 30.I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 31.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 32.RPO in terms of paragraph 30 be made against the applicant. Dated the 25th day of April 2023
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. [2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
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Cases cited in this judgment