Hossain Mohommad Lokman v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 673/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 30 July 2025.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 28 February 2025 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his claim on the applicable risks [1] , which had been determined in his previous application under HCAL 3009 of 2018 (“the previous application”).
Cites 7 cases
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HCAL 673/2025 [2025] HKCFI 2876 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 673 OF 2025 _____________
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_______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 28 February 2025 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his claim on the applicable risks[1], which had been determined in his previous application under HCAL 3009 of 2018 (“the previous application”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 28 May 2025 and admitted that he had made judicial review in respect of the Board’s Decision in the previous claim and this is the second application on the same facts and grounds. The procedural history 4.The applicant, is a national of Bangladeshi national. He came to Hong Kong illegally on 21 November 2012. He applied for non-refoulement protection on 24 November 2012. 5.He claimed that if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by the persons called Latif and Momin, who were members of the Awami League. 6.The Director dismissed his claim for the reason that it was not substantiated. He appealed to Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”). The Board found that he might relocate to other places in Bangladesh and live safely and dismissed his appeal. 7.His application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance on 7 August 2020. He applied to Court of the First Instance for extension of time to appeal and his application was refused. 8.He applied to the Court of Appeal for extension of time to appeal against the Court of the First Instance’s decision and his application was refused. 9.On 24 May 2022, he issued a Notice of Motion to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal and his application was refused by the Court of Appeal. 10.He applied to the Court of Final Appeal of leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision and his application was refused by the Court of Final Appeal on 16 August 2024. 11.By letter dated 30 August 2024, the applicant applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection. By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 12.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 13.Upon the immigration officer’s advice, he had submitted additional materials in support of his application. 14.The immigration officer considered his evidence and found that the applicant further relied on the fact that his father converted to Awami League from Jel, which he did not disclose in his previous claim. The immigration officer did not accept this new ground as a significant change of circumstances after his previous claim and he further took the view that the applicant had made up a new story for his request. See paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Director’s Decision. The immigration acknowledged that he had mental stress, which required medical treatment. However, the immigration officer refused to accept that such medical diagnosis advanced his application for subsequent claim. [16] Besides, the immigration officer also found that state protection would be available to him and internal relocation was viable. [15] 15.For those reasons, the immigration officer was not satisfied with the applicant’s subsequent claim application satisfied the conditions under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and he refused his application for subsequent claim. Application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision 16.The applicant filed Form 86 on 17 March 2025 for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 17.In the affirmation in support of his application, the applicant has raised the issues of procedural impropriety, error/misdirection in law and irrationality against the immigration officer. Such grounds have become insignificant in view of the fact that he has admitted that he relies on the same reasons of his previous claim in support of this application. In any event, those assertions are without any evidence in support. Discussion 18.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 19.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that his enemies are the same enemies. He wanted to stress that his government has changed, which the Director believed. However, he did not believe that this the new circumstances in support of his application. He further said that he has lost contact with his family in his country and the situation in Bangladesh is not good, with gangsters and robbers around. He wished to be allowed to stay until after the election. 20.In Re: Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:
21.The applicant has admitted that his enemies remain the same as in his previous claim. He raised the issue of change of the government, for which there is no evidence to show that this issue will cause any risk to him personally. The immigration officer cannot be criticized for not accepting this issue as new circumstances in support of his subsequent claim application. 22.There is no valid reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. 23.The applicant fails to show that he has any realistic chance of success in his intended judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 24.I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 25.Because of the applicant’s attempt to abuse the process, the Court has to protect its process to be abused again. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 27.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The RPO was explained to the applicant before the hearing. When asked whether he had anything to say about the proposed RPO, he said he had nothing to say. 28.I am therefore satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 29.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 30.RPO in terms of paragraph 28 be made against the applicant.
The applicant appeared in person. [1] The applicable risks are:
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Cases cited in this judgment