Ahammed Mohammed Tahanbir v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 387/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 5 June 2023.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 7 November 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1165 of 2017 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
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HCAL 387/2023 [2023] HKCFI 1471 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 387 of 2023
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 7 November 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1165 of 2017 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 12 April 2023. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of Bangladesh. He came to Hong Kong on 14 May 2014 illegally. On 16 May 2014, he lodged his non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds of Torture risk[1], the BOR 3 risk[2], the Persecution risk[3] and the BOR 2 risk. 5.By Notice of Decision dated 7 July 2017 (“the Director’s Decision”), the Director refused his claim on the above risks. 6.His appeal of the Director’s Decision to the Board was dismissed by the Board’s Decision on 3 November 2017. 7.His application to the Court of the First Instance for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance on 8 November 2018 “(the Court’s Order”). 8.His appeal against the Court’s Order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 6 June 2019. 9.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 15 June 2021. 10.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 29 April 2022. 11.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 25 July 2022. 12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 13.The applicant’s previous claim was based on his allegations that if he returned to Bangladesh, he would be harmed or even killed by members of the Awami League (“AL”) because of his refusal to join them. 14.The Director found that his previous claim was not substantiated. 15.The applicant’s appeal to the Board against the Director’s Decision was dismissed for the reasons that the applicant had failed to show that he was under a real risk of being harmed or killed by the AL; that state protection and internal relocation would be available to him. 16.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 17.For his application for his subsequently claim, the applicant had failed to submit additional information in support of his application. 18.The Director found that the applicant had failed to submit additional materials, which when considered together with his previous clam, would give him a reasonable chance of success for his subsequent claim. The Director therefore dismissed the applicant’s subsequent claim application. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 19.The applicant filed Form 86 on 14 March 2023 for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The applicant has filed an affirmation in which he had not state any specific ground in support of his application. DISCUSSION 20.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1). 21.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said that he agreed that he had relied on the same story in his previous claim for his subsequent claim application. 22.In Re: Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:
23.The reasons stated in his affirmation fall apart as he had admitted in court that he relied on the same facts in his previous claim in support of his present application. Under the circumstances, his application is an abuse of the process. The Director is right to stop him for abusing the legal process. Since this is a subsequent claim application whereas there had been a screening process and the procedure of appeal to the Board for his previous claim, there is nothing amiss for the Ordinance to provide no screening interview and appeal to the Board for his subsequent claim application, which only involves additional information to his previous claim. 24.Therefore, there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 25.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 27.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. Upon my enquiry of what comments he had on the intended RPO, he said he has no objection to the law of Hong Kong, but he just wants to stay in Hong Kong for his life. 29.I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 30.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 31.RPO in terms of paragraph 29 be made against the applicant. Dated the 5th day of June 2023
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. [2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
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