Md Sirajul Islam v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1120/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 17 September 2021.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to file the application for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 8 July 2021 (“ the Director’s Decision ”) refusing his application for a subsequent claim of HCAL 496 of 2017 (the “ original claim ”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“ the Ordinance ”).
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HCAL 1120/2021 [2021] HKCFI 2738 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1120 of 2021 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to file the application for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 8 July 2021 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his application for a subsequent claim of HCAL 496 of 2017 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“the Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Bangladesh. He raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department on 4 June 2014 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance, the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention and subsequently on BOR 2 risk, Right to Life risk under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance. 4.His claim was rejected by the Director by Notice of Decision dated 20 January 2016 and Notice of Further Decision dated 8 December 2016. 5.His appeal to the Torture Claim Appeal Board (the “Board”) was dismissed by the Board’s Decision dated 29 June 2017. 6.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was rejected by the Court by its Order dated 24 May 2018. 7.He appealed against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal and his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 4 December 2018. 8.He applied by notice of motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal and his application was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 4 April 2019. 9.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 21 April 2020. 10.He applied to the Director for subsequent claim by letter 18 November 2021 and was rejected by the Director’s Decision. The subsequent claim application 11.The factual basis of his original claim is that if he is refouled, he will be harmed or killed by some extortionists from the Awami League because he refused to pay them the protection money as demanded. 12.The Director found that the risk of him being harmed or killed if he returned to Bangladesh was assessed to be low; that state protection was available to him and that internal relocation was an option open to him. 13.The Board agreed with the Director. It further found that the applicant’s evidence was inconsistent and with improbabilities. As a result, the Board found that the applicant was not a witness of truth as his evidence was untrue. It further found that internal relocation was available to him. 14.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 15.The applicant relies upon the fact that his mother and wife in Bangladesh told him that those extortionists are still looking for him and demanding money from his mother and wife. 16.The immigration officer has considered his circumstances and disagrees that those are the changed circumstances since his original claim had been determined. The information does not give realistic prospect of success to his subsequent claim when considered together with his original claim. This means he is re-litigating his original claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision 17.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application. He said that he is a genuine asylum seeker and the Director was wrong in reaching his decision because he had not considered his situation. The Director is invited to go to Bangladesh to see for himself. 18.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision on the applicant’s appeal. The Court will not usurp the fact finding power vested in the Director. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC, 526, CA. §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 19.The Court will bear in mind that the Board’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said that he had nothing to say. 20.The Director is entitled to reach his conclusion after considering his evidence as he did in this case. The applicant has raised no valid challenge to the Director’s Decision or finding of the fact. It is not necessary for the Director to go to his country to understand his situation. The Director can rely upon the country of origin information as he had done in the applicant’s original claim. 21.It is quite clear that the applicant is re-litigating his original claim in his subsequent claim application. 22.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 23.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 24.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 25.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 26.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 27.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 28.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant said that he had nothing to say. 29.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 30.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 31.RPO in terms of paragraph 29 be made against the applicant. Dated the 17th day of September 2021
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment