Case Document

100%Judiciary

FCMC 6626/2015

[2021] HKFC 172

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 6626 OF 2015

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BETWEEN
	YNNA	Petitioner
and
	HCKW	Respondent
	WWCA	Intervener

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Coram: District Judge K K PANG in Chambers (Disposal on papers)

Date of Petitioner’s Submissions: 30 July 2021

Date of Respondent’s Submissions: 12 August 2021

Date of Judgment: 27 August 2021

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J U D G M E N T

(Application for Leave to Appeal)

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1.I refer the Petitioner Wife and the Respondent Husband as W and H respectively.

2.On 2 July 2021, I handed down the Judgment by which it was ordered that W’s claim for a lump sum payment in compensation for W’s expenses incurred by her for maintenance of the children of the family for the period from 1 February 2017 to 31 May 2021 be dismissed.In my judgment dated 2 July 2021, I take the view that the children maintenance matter including W’s so-called claim for backdating is fully settled by the consent order dated 19 December 2019, save to the limited extent of the proviso under the paragraph 5 thereof and subject to the developing needs of the Children, and that, by the consent order dated 26 May 2021, the parties have also fully settled the question of the quantum of the monthly payment out for the children of the family under the paragraph 5 of the order dated 19 December 2019.

3.This is W’s application for leave to appeal against the Order made on 2 July 2021. W puts forwards two grounds relying upon which in support of the intended appeal: -

(1) The Learned Judge erred in law by holding that W’s claim is fully settled by the consent order dated 19 December 2019 and the consent order dated 26 May 2021;

(2) The Learned Judge erred in law by failing to duly consider or failing to give reasons for dismissing the backdating claim, in particular for the period from 1 January 2020 to 31 May 2021.

4.I take the view that W’s intended Ground of Appeal (1) simply raises issues that have already been canvassed during the substantive hearing of the matter and have been adequately dealt with in the Judgment dated 2 July 2021. As to the intended Ground of Appeal (2), despite that it is argued otherwise on behalf of W, I take the view that the reasons of the Judgment dated 2 July 2021 are fully set out in the paragraphs 2 to 20 thereof. About W’s claim for the period from 1 January 2020 to 31 May 2021, as said in the paragraph 19 of the Judgment dated 2 July 2021, I take the view that, W’s claim having been fully settled under the terms of the order dated 19 December 2019, the proviso under the paragraph 5 of the order dated 19 December 2019 clearly is solely for the benefit of the children of the family, and that W’s so-called claim for backdating is for her own benefit and therefore it does not fall within the proviso under the paragraph 5 of the order dated 19 December 2019.

5.After having carefully considered the matters set out in the above, I am satisfied that W’s intended grounds of appeal do not have a reasonable prospect of success.

6.Section 63A (2) of the District Court Ordinance provides that leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the intended appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or that there is some other reason in the interests of justice that the appeal should be heard. There is no reasonable prospect of success in any of the said grounds of appeal. Nor is there any other reason in the interests of justice that the appeal should be heard. Accordingly, it is ordered that W’s summons dated 30 July 2021 for leave to appeal be dismissed

7.W is unsuccessful in the present application. Currently, I see no reason why costs should not follow the event. It is ordered nisi that W shall pay H the costs of this application with certificate for counsel. The above costs order nisi becomes absolute 14 days after the order is made unless a party has applied to the court for varying the order.