Muhammad Asghar v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1600/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 30 December 2021.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 23 August 2021 (the “ Director’s Decision ”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 787 of 2017 (the “ original claim ”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “ Ordinance ”).
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HCAL 1600/2021 [2021] HKCFI 3767 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1600 of 2021 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 23 August 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 787 of 2017 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Pakistan. He raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department by written signification on 13 June 2013 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance; BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance; Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention and subsequently, BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance; 4.His claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 26 November 2015. His claim on BOR 2 was also rejected by the Director by a Notice of Further Decision dated 26 June 2017. 5.He appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 21 July 2017 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed his appeal. 6.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 3 August 2018 (the “Court’s Order”). 7.He appealed against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal and his application was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 25 January 2019. 8.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 12 July 2019. 9.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 30 December 2020. 10.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter dated 18 February 2021. 11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 12.The factual basis of his claim is that if refouled, he will be harmed or killed by the government agents and the police because he had taken photos and shot video for an opposition party (the “event”), which he later found to be Jamat-e—Islamic (“JML”) and that the Event was anti-government. 13.The Director found that his claim was not substantiated. He found that the level of risk of him being harmed or killed if he returned to Pakistan was low; that alternative avenues to seek justice was available to him and that internal relocation was an option open to him. 14.The Board affirmed the Director’s Decision. It further found that there was no evidence in support of the applicant’s allegation of the facts, which were not believable and that there was no substance to his allegations. 15.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 16.In support of his subsequent claim, he relied upon the facts of his original claim as foundation and said that the police are still looking for him. They had gone to his house and looked for him from time to time. His brother Anwar had disappeared. His brother is not a wanted person. 17.The Director does not accept that those are significant change of circumstances as his threats arise from his original claim. Such information, coupled with the original claim, would not give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 18.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application. He said that one of his brothers was missing and the other brother was kept in jail by police. The police said that his brother had asserted him to hide. The immigration officer did not allow him time to get the documents in Pakistan. 19.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, CA. §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 20.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said the Director’s Decision was not wrong, but his problems still remained. 21.It is quite clear that the applicant is re-litigating his original claim in his subsequent claim application. 22.The applicant has no valid reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. It is difficult to see what documents he can get to prove the facts he said. The immigration officer is right not to delay his application. 23.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 24.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 25.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his original claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 27.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 29.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant had nothing to say. 30.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 31.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 32.RPO in terms of paragraph 30 be made against the applicant. Dated the 30th day of December 2021
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment