Islam Majharul v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1671/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 20 January 2022.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 21 October 2021 (the “ Director’s Decision ”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1142 of 2018 (the “ original claim ”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “ Ordinance ”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 1671/2021 [2022] HKCFI 48 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1671 of 2021
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 21 October 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1142 of 2018 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Bangladesh. On 18 October 2015, he was arrested for illegally entering in Hong Kong. He raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department by written signification dated 21 October 2015 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance; BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention and subsequently BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance. 4.His claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 8 August 2017. 5.He appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 4 June 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed his appeal. 6.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 8 August 2019 (the “Court’s Order”). 7.His application for extension of time to appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed by the court and his application to the Court of Appeal for extension of time to appeal was also dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 16 October 2020. 8.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 2 December 2020. 9.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed on 21 October 2021. 10.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letters dated 19 July 2021. 11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 12.The factual basis of his claim is that if refouled, he will be harmed or killed by the members of the Awami League (“AL”) in Natherpetuya Union, Bangladesh because he refused to quit the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”) to join the AL. 13.The Director found that his claim was not substantiated. He found that the past events indicated that the risk of him being harmed or killed by the AL people was low; that the AL people were so not influential as to control the police; that state protection would be available and that internal relocation was an option open to him. 14.The Board affirmed the Director’s Decision. It further found that the applicant was not a witness of truth and that he had fabricated claims in relation to his membership of the BNP. 15.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 16.In support of his subsequent claim, he had produced some photographs, which showed the injuries of his family members. He submitted that the AL people were still looking for him. They caused troubles to his family. His neighbour had occupied some portions of his family’s land and there had been fights between his brothers and the neighbour’s family. All these were told by his brother in Bangladesh to him. 17.The Director does not accept that the additional materials are significant change of circumstances as they arise from his original claim, which had been considered. His enemy is the same. They had been considered by the Director and the Board in his original claim. The additional information is hearsay material, which cannot be tested. The Director considers that coupled with the original claim, the additional information will not give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 18.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application. He attached the Director’s Decision to his affirmation without specifying any specific ground in support of his application. 19.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526 CA §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 20.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant agreed that the Director was not wrong to make the Decision. 21.It is quite clear that the applicant is re-litigating his original claim in his subsequent claim application. His enemies are the same. 22.The applicant has raised no valid ground to challenge the Director’s Decision. 23.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 24.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 25.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his original claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretarty for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 27.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 29.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant said he had nothing to say. 30.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 31.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 32.RPO in terms of paragraph 30 be made against the applicant. Dated the 20th day of January 2022
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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