Francis Michael Chidiebere v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 110/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 15 March 2022.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 19 November 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1682 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 110/2022 [2022] HKCFI 711 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 110 of 2022 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 19 November 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1682 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Nigeria. His visitor’s visa expired on 2 January 2011. He overstayed and surrendered to the Immigration Department on 17 March 2016. He raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department by written significations dated 28 July 2016 and 1 August 2016 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance; BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance; BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 4.His claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 24 April 2017. 5.He appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 19 June 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed his appeal. 6.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 24 June 2019. 7.His appeal against the Court’s Order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 23 April 2020. 8.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 7 July 2020. 9.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 5 August 2021. 10.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter dated 13 September 2021. 11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 12.The factual basis of his previous claim is that if refouled, he will be harmed or killed by the Boko Haram and the Muslims out of his Christianity belief. Besides, his family had a land dispute with his paternal uncle, Jonathan, who conspired with some members of the community to plan to kill his whole family in order to capture his family’s land. 13.The Director found that his claim was not substantiated. He found that the risk of him being harmed or killed by the Boko Haram and the Muslims or Jonathan’s people was low; that there being no evidence that the state was involved, state protection was available to him and that relocation is also an alternative option open to him. 14.He appealed the Director’s Decision to the Board. The Board agreed with the Director’s views and further found that his evidence in relating to the land dispute was vague and far-fetched. The Board did not accept that he was brought up a Christian himself and he was untruthful in relation to his Christian claims. The Board refused to accept that he would be subjected to the alleged risks if he returned to his own country. 15.Under section 37 ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 16.In support of his subsequent claim, he said that he relied upon the facts in support of his previous claim that he will be harmed or killed by Nigerian-based Islamic terrorists and the Nigerian government. These issues had been considered in his previous claim by the Director and the Board. He also stated that he is a member of the Indigenous People of Biafra (“IPOB”) in Hong Kong and as such, he will be arrested by the Nigerian government. The Director considered that it is only his speculation and the possibility of being arrested by the Nigerian government is too far-fetched. He had also submitted some documents which show that unsatisfactory security situation in Nigeria. However, the Director had considered them together with the country of origin information available. He concluded that state protection is available to him upon his return. 17.The Director does not accept that there are new circumstances after the previous claim. The Director considers that, coupled with the previous claim, there is no additional information, which will give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 18.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application. He said that the Director’s Decision poses a substantial risk to his life and the country of origin information he referred to is misleading. He enclosed some documents, one of which is his written submissions in support of his application and I shall summarize below.
19.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526 CA, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1). 20.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant repeated the above grounds and maintained that his life would be in danger if he returned to Nigeria and he had his family here. The Nigerian government would not protect him. He asked the court to help him. 21.His additional materials had been considered by the Director and for the reasons given by the Director, the Director rejected his subsequent claim. The applicant is unable to show any valid reasons to challenge the Director’s Decision. 22.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 23.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 24.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 25.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretarty for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129 § 25. 26.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 27.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 28.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant asked the court to assist him to stay in Hong Kong. 29.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 30.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 31.RPO in terms of paragraph 29 be made against the applicant. Dated the 15th day of March 2022
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment