Das Moly Rani v. Director of Immigration

HCAL 247/2022

[2022] HKCFI 1813

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 247 of 2022

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following;

	consideration of documents only;          or
	consideration of documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:

1.      Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.      A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

THE APPLICATION

1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 25 January 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 932 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The applicant appeared before the Court.

The procedural history

3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Bangladesh as she overstayed after her last employment in Hong Kong on 2 March 2015. On 7 May 2015, she surrendered to the Immigration Department. On 22 October 2015, she lodged non-refoulement claim on the grounds of Torture risk under Part VIIC of the Ordinance, BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance; BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention.

4.Her claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 20 December 2016.

5.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 29 March 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed her appeal.

6.She applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 10 October 2019 (the “Court’s Order”).

7.Her application for appeal against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 3 June 2020.

8.Her notice of motion for leave to appeal the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 29 July 2020.

9.Her application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 14 September 2021.

10.She applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter of 25 October 2021.

11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application.

The subsequent claim application

12.The factual basis of her previous claim is that if refouled, she will be harmed or killed by Ananda Chandra Das (“Ananda”) or people from the Awami League (“AL”) because she had filed a court case against Ananda for the allegation of rape. She also feared of being framed up by the United Nations Development Project (“UNDP”) for having misappropriated funds which was a well-planned conspiracy of Ananda and his AL people to harass her.

13.The Director found that her claim was not substantiated. He found that there was no evidence that Ananda had the intention of harming or killing her despite they repeatedly threatened to kill her if she did not withdraw the court case; that there was no evidence to show that the police had charged her with the alleged offence of false accounting or misappropriating funds; that state protection would be available to her and that internal relocation would be available to her too.

14.The Board affirmed the Director’s Decision. It further found that she was evasive in giving evidence and was unreliable. She did not report the matter to police and her explanation was rejected. The Board found that she had manufactured forged documents in support of her rape claim and the allegation of embezzlement. The Board rejected the evidence in support of her claim. It therefore dismissed her appeal and affirmed the Director’s Decision.

15.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

16.In support of her subsequent claim, the applicant relied upon the information from her father, her sister and a journalist in Bangladesh to say that her enemies had gone to her family there and caused troubles with her sister and her family. The journalist told her that someone had used her photograph in an election campaign for Counsellor office, in which Ananda took part for nomination. Because of her photograph, Ananda was not nominated. He put the blame on the applicant and wanted to take revenge. People went to her father’s shop and house where they demanded money and vandalized the house. Her sister suffered a stroke as a result of the disturbance. The people put a knife on her father’s neck and threatened to kill him if they were not paid. They asked for her whereabouts. She believed that those people came from Ananda. Her father advised her not to go back to Bangladesh.

17.She had also submitted two documents in support of her subsequent claim. They are an affidavit by her father certifying her claim against Ananda for rape and a certificate of the District Councillor Office certifying the report of rape against Ananda.

18.The Director did not accept that there is significant change of circumstances and such information, coupled with the previous claim, would not give her subsequent claim any realistic prospect of success. The materials were obtained through hearsay evidence, which cannot be tested. Her enemies are the same enemies, who allegedly caused fear to her on the same reason, i.e. for her filing of a rape claim against Ananda, as she had claimed in her previous claim, which had been considered by the Director and the Board. The documents had been considered in her previous claim too. Her evidence was rejected by the Director and the Board.

The application for leave to apply for judicial review application

19.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of her application. She enclosed a copy of the Director’s Decision without specifying any ground.

20.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1).

21.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said she had to rely upon the same reasons for her subsequent claim and she was not saying that the Director was wrong.

22.The applicant has raised no valid reason to challenge the Director’s Decision.

23.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational.

24.Since there is no realistic chance of success in her intended judicial review of the Director’s Decision, I dismiss her application.

The RPO

25.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.

26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.

27.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.

28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. Before me, she said she had nothing to say.

29.I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings on the same facts of the previous claim for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court, and any appeal, including this Order, without leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to Deputy Judge K. W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of her intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the court written representations regarding the same.

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the Court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the Court should otherwise direct.

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the Court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the Court for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

(7)  Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the Court, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.

(10)  No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave within this Order, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Judge.

(11)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.

(12)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

30.The applicant’s application is dismissed.

31.RPO in terms of paragraph 29 be made against the applicant.

Dated the 16^th day of June 2022

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1