Mangoba Melody Piedad and Others v. Director of Immigration

HCAL 12/2022

[2022] HKCFI 2030

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 12 of 2022

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

	consideration of documents only;          or
	consideration of documents and oral submissions by the Applicants in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:

1.      Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.      A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the applicants.

Observations for the Applicants:

THE APPLICATION

1.The 1^st applicant is the mother of the 2^nd and the 3^rd applicants, aged 17 and 10 respectively. This is their joint application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Notice of Decision dated 28 December 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing their subsequent claim of HCAL 1680 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicants to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against them since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicants may take out further proceedings to assert their non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.

3.The 1st applicant represented the other applicants who were present before the Court. The 1st applicant confirmed that she had received a letter from the Court advising her to seek legal representation because there are minors. She had applied to the Director of Legal Aid for assistance, but was refused.

The procedural history

4.The 1^st applicant is an illegal immigrant from the Philippines by reason of remaining in Hong Kong without permission. Between 1997 and 2004 the 1^st applicant worked as a domestic helper. Her employment contract was terminated prematurely. But she remained in Hong Kong without permission. The 2^nd and 3^rd applicants were born in Hong Kong. She surrendered to the Immigration Department with the 2^nd applicant and they applied for torture claim protection. Their application was refused. Later, the 3^rd applicant was given birth. She submitted a written signification on 29 July 2013 on joint non-refoulement claim together with the 2^nd and 3^rd applicants, her two sons.  Their application was assessed under the Unified Screening Mechanism. The application of herself and the 1^st applicant was assessed on the BOR 2 risk, BOR 3 risk and Persecution risk whereas the 3^rd applicant’s application will also include the Torture risk as well.

5.Their joint claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 8 August 2017.

6.They appealed the Director’s Decision to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 9 August 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed his appeal.

7.They applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 25 June 2019.

8.Their appeal against the Court’s Order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 30 October 2019.

9.Their Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 6 December 2019.

10.Their application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 13 August 2021.

11.They applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter dated 30 August 2021.

12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused their application.

The subsequent claim application

13.As this is the family’s joint application, the family relied upon the 1^st applicant’s facts. The factual basis of her previous claim is that if refouled, she would be harmed or killed by her husband because of her commission of adultery in Hong Kong, a crime under the law of the New People’s Army, to which her husband is member. She is also afraid of returning to the Philippines because her son, the 2^nd applicant has been diagnosed with autism and mental retardation whilst the 3^rd applicant is suffering from ventricular septal defect.

14.The Director found that her claim was not substantiated. He found that the risk of her and her family being harmed by her husband was low as shown by her previous experiences with her husband, who did not exhibit any intention of killing her. Her husband does not have the power of locating her nationwide. This is only a family dispute where the state is not involved. The country of origin information provides that state protection is available to her and her children. Also, internal relocation is a viable alternative for her and her children.

15.On behalf of herself and her family, she appealed the Director’s Decision to the Board. The Board agreed with the Director. It further found that the state has social welfare facilities for her and her children. Medical facilities are also available to her children in the Philippines. There are special facilities for her children’s education.

16.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, the applicants have to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

17.In support of their subsequent claim, the 1^st applicant submitted to the Director that her husband is still looking for her and will harm or kill her; that she is afraid of being imprisoned for adultery; that her two sons need long term medical treatment and she may not be able to afford the expenses. She had submitted her two sons’ medical reports to the Director.

18.The Director found that the applicants relied upon the same or similar facts in support of their subsequent claim, such facts, when considered together with their previous claim, will not give them a realistic chance of success in their subsequent claim. He dismissed the applicants’ subsequent claim application.

The application for leave to apply for judicial review

19.The 1^st applicant has on behalf of herself and her sons filed an affirmation in support of their application. She enclosed a copy of the Director’s Decision and said she rejects the Director’s Decision as it disregards her and her children’s dangerous situations.

DISCUSSION

20.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1).

21.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the 1^st applicant asked the Court to help her to stay.

22.I note that there are two minors in this case and they were not legally represented before the Director or this Court. Their case was considered by the Director with separate consideration for the children. The Director had taken into consideration the social welfare facilities for the 1^st applicant and her two sons and the medical care facilities for the two children. It appears to me that there is no other underlying matter that may support minor specific non-refoulement grounds which had not been advanced before the Director. I shall treat the non-legal representation for the minors as a mere irregularity, relying upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re: Jasvir Singh & Ors  [2021]HKCA 53:

“33. … if the court is satisfied the Board had achieved high standard of fairness in dealing with the minor’s claim consistently with the above propositions and there is no such underlying matter that may support minor-specific non-refoulement grounds which had not been advanced before the Board, it is open to the court to conclude that the minor’s intended judicial review is without any merit. In such a case, the court can dismiss his leave application notwithstanding that he has not been legally represented before the Board and in the judicial review leave application, treating the non-compliance with Order 80, rule 2 as a mere irregularity as explained in Zoraydah v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2020] HKCA 442, discussed in [57] of Fabio Arlyn Timogan.”

23.Those conditions in the Court of Appeal case apply to this case. The Board had considered the minors’ case separately. Their intended judicial review is without merit.

24.The 1st applicant is unable to show any valid reason to challenge the Director’s Decision.

25.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational.

26.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in their subsequent claim, I dismiss their application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

The RPO

27.The Director’s findings show that the applicants are attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of their previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicants from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against them. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.

28.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.

29.In my view, the fact that the applicants are entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as their intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.

30.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicants to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against them. The 1^st applicant represented the other applicants. She has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing.

31.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against them, the 1^st applicant asked the Court to consider her children.

32.Having considered the 1^st applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicants would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below. The reference to the Applicant will cover the 1^st applicant and the other applicants or anyone of them in this case.

(1)   The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court, and any appeal, including this Order, without leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2)   All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to Deputy High Court Judge K. W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.

(3)   At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of her intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.

(4)   Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the Court written representations regarding the same.

(5)   All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the Court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the Court should otherwise direct.

(6)   If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the Court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the Court for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

(7)   Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.

(8)   Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the Court, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.

(9)   No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.

(10) No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave within this Order, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Judge.

(11) This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.

(12) A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

33.The applicants’ application is dismissed.

34.RPO in terms of paragraph 32 be made against the applicant.

Dated the 5th day of July 2022

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1