Cuciyati Bt Rasman Turidah v. Director of Immigration

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 157/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 12 July 2022.

1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 30 November 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 2941 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

Cites 6 cases

Case No.HCAL 157/2022[2022] HKCFI 2122
Court
High Court CFI
Date12 Jul 2022
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 157/2022

[2022] HKCFI 2122

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 157 of 2022

BETWEEN    
  Cuciyati Bt Rasman Turidah Applicant
  and  
  Director of Immigration Putative Respondent

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

    consideration of documents only;          or
   consideration of documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:

1.  Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.  A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

THE APPLICATION

1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 30 November 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 2941 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.

The procedural history

3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Indonesia by overstaying. She raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department by written representation on 22 May 2017 on the grounds of Torture risk; BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance; BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention.

4.Her claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 4 April 2018.

5.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 31 October 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed her appeal.

6.She applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 27 September 2019 (the “Court’s Order”).

7.Her application for appeal against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 3 June 2020.

8.Her notice of motion for leave to appeal the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 4 August 2020.

9.Her appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed on 14 September 2021.

10.She applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter of 20 September 2021.

11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application.

The subsequent claim application

12.The factual basis of her previous claim is that if refouled, she will be harmed or killed by her husband due to family dispute.

13.The Director found that her claim was not substantiated. He found that the past experiences indicated that the claimed risk of harm upon her return to Indonesia was low; that her husband did not intend to kill her; that state protection would be available to her; that from her evidence, she did not come to Hong Kong for protection from domestic violence and that internal relocation was an option open to her.

14.The Board affirmed the Director’s Decision. It further found that her evidence was not believable and there was not a real risk that she would face any of the proscribed forms of harm if she returned to Indonesia.

15.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

16.In support of her subsequent claim, the applicant said that the following new circumstances would be significant for consideration of her subsequent claim. Her husband had visited her aunt and he threatened her aunt and her husband that he would harm and kill her because she did not remit money to him. Her husband also said she would not be able to marry her boyfriend and look after her son. Her neighbour told her that her husband always hit her son. She and her boyfriend intended to return to Indonesia when the COVID-19 situation is stable in Indonesia.

17.The immigration officer had considered the above circumstances and took the view that they did not constitute significant change of circumstances as her enemy is still her husband. The issues of family dispute had been considered by the Director and the Board in her previous claim. The fact that she intends to go back to Indonesia with her boyfriend is inconsistent with her alleged fear of going back to Indonesia. COVID-19 is a worldwide problem, not only confined to Indonesia. The Director considered that given the above circumstances, they are not significant change of circumstances, which considered together with her previous claim, would not give her realistic success in her subsequent claim. As such the Director rejected her subsequent claim application.

The application for leave to apply for judicial review application

18.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of her application and enclosed a copy of the Director’s Decision without setting out any specific ground.

19.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1).

20.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said she understood that the Director was applying the law to her case. She did not mean that the Director was wrong.

21.The applicant has raised no valid ground to challenge the Director’s Decision.

22.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational.

23.Since there is no realistic chance of success in her intended judicial review of the Director’s Decision, I dismiss her application.

The RPO

24.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.

25.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.

26.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.

27.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. Before me, she said she had nothing to say.

28.I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings on the same facts of the previous claim for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court, and any appeal, including this Order, without leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to Deputy High Court Judge K. W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of her intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the Court written representations regarding the same.

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the Court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the Court should otherwise direct.

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the Court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the Court for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

(7)  Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the Court, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the Court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.

(10)  No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge refusing leave within this Order, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Judge.

(11)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.

(12)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

29.The applicant’s application is dismissed.

30.RPO in terms of paragraph 28 be made against the applicant.

Dated the 12th day of July 2022

  (Chung Lai Fan, Christine)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notes for the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:

       
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
  Sent to the Applicant
on 12 July 2022

Cuciyati Bt Rasman Turidah

Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil.
  Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 12 July 2022

Director of Immigration
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
L/M (24546) in ImmD RA 7/37/C (Formerly RBCZ 11333/17)

Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2)



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