Celso Noel Abenojar v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1595/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 16 January 2024.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 21 August 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 456 of 2019 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (the “Ordinance”).
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HCAL 1595/2023 [2024] HKCFI 98 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1595 of 2023
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 21 August 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 456 of 2019 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 10 October 2023. Before the Court, the applicant admitted that he relied upon the same facts in his previous claim to support his application. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of the Philippines. He came to Hong Kong as a foreign domestic helper. His employment contract was terminated prematurely on 2 December 2002. He did not depart and overstayed since 17 December 2002. On 26 February 2015, he was arrested by the police and was referred to the Immigration Department on 27 February 2015. He lodged a non-refoulement claim on Torture risk, BOR 2 risk, BOR 3 risk and Persecution risk. 5.His claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 10 April 2018 on all applicable risks. 6.He appealed to the Torture Claims Board (the “Board”). By Decision dated 12 February 2019, the Board dismissed his appeal. 7.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and failed. He then pursued the matter to the Court of Appeal and finally to the Court of Final Appeal. His application to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed on 15 May 2023. 8.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 23 June 2023. 9.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 10.In his previous claim, he lodged his non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department on the basis that, if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by his wife and her family members as he cheated on his wife. 11.The Director found that his previous claim was not substantiated and rejected his application. He appealed the Director’s Decisions to the Board. 12.The Board considered the facts of the applicant’s case and finally dismissed his appeal for the reasons that it did not accept that his wife and her family members had any interest in pursuing or harming the applicant upon his return to the Philippines and found that the applicant could safely relocate to another part of the Philippines. 13.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success. 14.The applicant submitted a statement together with other documents in support of his application. The additional information or materials relate to the private dispute with his wife and her family members, which remain unchanged as he had raised them in his previous claim. 15.The immigration officer therefore did not accept that there had been significant change of circumstances since the applicant’s previous claim was finally determined. The Director thus refused the applicant’s application for the subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 16.The applicant has filed Form 86 dated 11 September 2023 to apply for leave for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 17.The applicant has, in support of his application, attached the Director’s Decision to his affidavit. But he has not raised any specific ground. Discussion 18.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 19.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. 20.Before me, the applicant admitted that he had relied upon the same reasons in his previous claim in support of his subsequent claim application. 21.There is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim. I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 22.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 23.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 24.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 25.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The RPO was explained to the applicant before the hearing. The applicant said he had nothing to say. 26.I am therefore satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 27.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 28.RPO in terms of paragraph 26 be made against the applicant. Dated the 16th day of January 2024
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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